Double Issue
Spring-Summer 1974
Volume 20 no 2/3 (91/92)
£2.00 $5.00

SURVEY

a journal of East & West studies

Détente

Robert Conquest
John Erickson
Gregory Grossman
Bernard Lewis
Leonard Schapiro
Brian Crozier
Joseph Godson
Leopold Labedz
Richard Pipes
Edward Shils
P. J. Vatikiotis

Communism & Intellectuals

Essays on

Georg Lukács
Romain Rolland
Amadeo Bordiga
Henri Barbusse

Solzhenitsyn

The Gulag Archipelago
Lydia Chukovskaya

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Editor: Leopold Labedz

International Advisory Board

Enzo Bettiza ..... *Il Giornale, Milan*
François Bourricaud ..... *University of Paris*
Zbigniew Brzezinski ..... *Columbia University*
Luciano Cafagna ..... *University of Pisa*
Melvin Croan ..... *University of Wisconsin*
Colin Crouch ..... *London School of Economics*
François Duchêne ..... *Institute for Strategic Studies, London*
Giorgio Galli ..... *Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, Turin*
Pierre Hassner .. *Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris*
Masamichi Inoki ..... *Kyoto University*
Karl Kaiser ..... *University of the Saarland*
Ivo Lederer ..... *Stanford University*
John Wilson Lewis ..... *Stanford University*
Richard Löwenthal ..... *Free University of Berlin*
Alasdair MacIntyre ..... *Boston University*
Mark Mancall ..... *Stanford University*
Ali Mazrui ..... *Makerere University, Kampala*
Leonard Schapiro ..... *London School of Economics*
Soedjatmoko ..... *Indonesia*
Theo Sommer ..... *Die Zeit, Hamburg*

Assistant Editor

Sheila Wolfenden

Editorial Office

Ilford House, 133 Oxford Street, London W1R 1TD (Tel. 01–734–0592)

Subscription Office

Oxford University Press, Subscription Department, Press Road, Neasden, London NW10 (Tel. 01–450–8080)

Subscription Rates

£4 or US $10.00 Student Rates £2 or US $5.00. Single copies £1 or US $2.50. Special arrangements for airmail.

Manuscripts

Articles should be submitted in duplicate to the editorial office. They should be typed in double-spacing and, preferably, conform to the house-style of *Survey*.

Copyright © *Survey* 1974

Survey is published under the auspices of the International Association for Cultural Freedom and Stanford University by

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Spring-Summer 1974
Volume 20
no 2/3 (91/92)

SURVEY

a journal of East & West studies

Détente

Détente: An Evaluation 1

Cultural Exchange and its Prospects ... ... *François Bondy and George Urban* 28

Détente and Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe *J. F. Brown* 46

Eastern Europe

Gierek's Three Years ... ... *Robert W. Dean* 59

Rumanian Nationalism ... ... *George Schöpflin* 77

Rumanian Foreign Policy ... ... *Robert R. King* 105

Communism and Intellectuals

The Rolland-Barbusse Debate ... ... *David James Fisher* 121

The Rediscovery of Amadeo Bordiga ... *Earlene Craver* 160

Lukács's Road to Marx ... ... *Lee Congdon* 176

The Fellow-Travellers ... ... *Lewis S. Feuer* 206

Soviet Dissent

The Gulag Archipelago ... ... *Michael Heller* 211

Documents ... ... *Lydia Chukovskaya* 228

Letter to L. I. Brezhnev ... ... *Yu. F. Orlov* 241

Our Contributors 246

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Anglo-Soviet Relations 1917-1921

Volume 3: The Anglo-Soviet Accord

Richard H. Ullman

In February 1920 the civil war that had ravaged Russia in the wake of the Bolshevik seizure of power was all but over, and with it the attempt of foreign governments to intervene on behalf of the anti-Communist forces. Scarcely a year later Britain was the first major power to come to terms with the new leadership in Moscow. Richard H. Ullman's account of that cautious coming to terms offers a perspective on the processes by which British foreign policy adjusted to the drastically changed circumstances of the aftermath of the First World War. Illustrated £7 *Princeton*

Soviet and American Society

A Comparison

Paul Hollander

The author here provides a comprehensive sociological survey of contemporary life in America and Russia that highlights the basic similarities, as well as the differences, between the two societies. £5·75
OUP New York

Economic Reforms in East European Industry

General Editors: Alec Nove, J. G. Zielinski

There are many studies of the Soviet economic system but our knowledge of the economies of other East European countries remains fragmentary, although some of them have now embarked on changes more far-reaching than anything yet attempted in the Soviet Union. The seven individual volumes in this new series analyse these changes, determine the reasons for their relative success or failure, and assess their importance in the evolution of the Communist-ruled countries of Eastern Europe. A comparative volume will complete the series. The first two volumes to be published are:

Economic Reforms in Polish Industry
J.G. Zielinski
£6·50

Economic Reforms in Rumanian Industry
Iancu Spigler
£3·90

Oxford

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Détente: An Evaluation

The American-Soviet détente *is now several years old. Although formally it involves only the two super-powers, the overwhelming strength of their economies and military establishments ensures that their relations affect in one way or another the lives of the rest of humanity. The time has come to scrutinize the premises of the present* détente *and to appraise its consequences for the Western world. The following analysis has been prepared by a group of specialists in international affairs who share a deep sense of concern that the policy of* détente *as practised so far has not been well thought out in the West and that its net effect has been to erode the ability of the Western world to safeguard its values and its way of life. It is hoped that this analysis will stimulate a long-overdue discussion of a matter which, affecting as it does the condition of the world, must not be left exclusively to governments.*

The aims of the Soviet foreign policy in the period of détente

In the present Soviet terminology *détente* or " peaceful coexistence " denotes a strategic alternative to overtly militant antagonism against the so-called " capitalist countries." It does not imply the abandonment by the Soviet Union and its allies of conflict with the liberal Western countries. It does not mean the cessation of the slogans about class warfare and about the " ideological " conflict between the " two systems " with the aim of replacing the capitalist (democratic) system by the communist system. The point is emphatically and repeatedly made in Soviet theoretical pronouncements intended for consumption within the Communist bloc. *Détente* means a change of methods. Head-on conflict is to yield to indirect methods of combat, using non-military means, described as " ideological ": in Soviet practice this term covers subversion, propaganda, political blackmail and intelligence operations.

Historically the first period of *détente* occurred in 1921 when, following the victory over the White Armies, Lenin decided that his country required a long period of consolidation of power and economic rehabilitation. At this time the Soviet Union entered into regular diplomatic relations with those " capitalist " powers which were willing to reciprocate, and engaged with them in extensive negotiations and collaboration aimed at propping-up the Soviet economy. This period came to an end around 1930 with the triumph of Stalin's one-man dictatorship and the drive for the militarization of the Soviet Union. Immediately after Stalin's death, and particularly after 1957 when Khrushchev established himself in full authority, the policy of " peaceful coexistence " was renewed. Its initial intention seems to

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have been twofold: to slow down the military effort of the United States, as well as to break out of the diplomatic isolation in which Stalin had placed the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's successors maintained this policy in full vigour. In addition to the original aims of *détente*—the expansion of the Soviet system and the enfeeblement of the liberal democracies—they had a new aim, namely the securing of Western financial aid and the technical assistance for their lagging economy.

The Soviet Government expects the policy of *détente* to accomplish the following:

1. To weaken the Western alliance by making it appear to be unnecessary, indeed, dangerous to peace.

2. To reduce the pace of the American defence effort and to eliminate the United States presence in Europe.

3. To secure from the West financial and technological assistance which would directly enhance Soviet military power by making easier the continuous build-up of the military sector of the economy.

4. To isolate China and to counter the political consequences of the fact that the Soviet Union is involved in a hostile confrontation with both East and West.

5. To legitimize its domination over Eastern Europe by making it appear historically irreversible.

As theoretical writings appearing in the Soviet Union make it quite clear, the ultimate result of a carefully pursued policy of *détente* should be a decisive shift of the world balance of power in favour of the Soviet Union and its bloc. This shift, it is expected, will permit the Soviet Union to achieve further expansion without recourse to general war, largely by the use of methods of internal subversion and external intimidation.

It is only if this policy is frustrated and its aims are abandoned by the Soviet Union that conditions for a genuine *détente* may arise. Until that time, the West, while not relinquishing hope for the relaxation of international tension, must distinguish between the real targets of Soviet policy and the smokescreen used to camouflage them. A genuine policy for peace, providing a convincing promise for the future, must rest on public opinion which is aware of the realities of the international situation (including the need to preserve the Western position in the balance of power) and not on illusory slogans about "peace" and "friendship," or stern condemnation of the "cold war" —without any substantive changes in conduct by the Soviet leaders. Above all the West must not allow itself to be deluded into believing that the policy of *détente* is directly related to the avoidance of nuclear conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union—as both countries, for different political reasons, tend to suggest. In fact the determination to avoid nuclear conflict has characterized the policy of both the United States and the Soviet Union for many years before talk of *détente* became fashionable—the first striking instance

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was on the occasion of the Cuba confrontation of 1962, and the last one was on the occasion of the nuclear alert during the October 1973 Middle East War. There were other less striking examples.

Whilst *détente* does not mean the abandonment of the Soviet posture of ideological struggle, it tends to foster in the West the idea that it has to accept tacitly Soviet political practices as a necessary condition for avoiding a nuclear war. This false alternative provided in the past the underlying premise for those advocating unilateral Western disarmament. Today it is Western government spokesmen who often use this simplified dichotomy to justify an attitude of silent indifference towards victims of Soviet persecution. This can only confuse the Western public about wider political issues. Contrary to official suggestions, a defence of Solzhenitsyn or Sakharov does not in any way increase the risks of a nuclear war. The Soviet Union does not accept "ideological co-existence" and there is no reason why the West should compromise its own fundamental values and ideas. Avoiding ambiguity in this respect, also on the governmental level, can only decrease the risks of nuclear confrontation in the long run.

Détente and the internal evolution of the Soviet Union

One of the major points raised about *détente* has been whether, and in what sense, it is connected with—and should be connected with—a "liberalization" in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union and of other countries in the Soviet bloc. The question has been dramatized in particular by the amendment, through which Senator Henry Jackson, supported by large majorities in the United States Senate and House of Representatives, has sought to deny to the Soviet Union "most-favoured-nation" treatment and similar trade advantages unless and until it permits the free emigration of its subjects. Although in practice, this has primarily until now revolved round the question of Jewish emigration, the amendment expresses a general principle and does not limit its application to Jews.

The Jackson amendment and similar demands have been denounced by the Soviet Union as intervention in its internal affairs. For it is a matter which would require altering Soviet law, or at any rate, Soviet treatment of their own citizenry. But this argument, even at its own level, is false. No change of law is required, only a change of practice. The United Nations Declaration on Human Rights, though not legally binding, is an expression of international principle which is held to be generally applicable; it specifically covers the free movement of people. The Soviet Union has accepted the Declaration of Human Rights. The observance or non-observance of these international standards should certainly be regarded as one touchstone of the reliability of Moscow's attitude to the formally accepted obligations which constitute a part of the general guarantees which the Soviet Union has undertaken to give as part of its contribution to *détente*.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Jackson Amendment, and the demands made by representatives of many Western countries at the Helsinki and Geneva talks for a free exchange of people and ideas between Russia and the West, puts the problem in its clearest form. Those who defend the policy of *détente* in the way in which it is understood in the Soviet Union argue that international negotiations between powers are simply a matter of realistic policies to which ethical issues of this sort are irrelevant. A supplementary argument for the Soviet form of *détente* is that whatever the current conduct of the Soviet leadership, international *détente* will in the long run, more or less automatically, lead to an improvement in the Soviet treatment of its own citizens, if only through an increase in the standard of living.

This argument has no foundation in experience. For centuries Russia has sought (with some success) to import Western technology, but this has never had any effect on the internal nature of its regime, Tsarist or Soviet. The Soviet authorities are, of course, well aware of the fact that the United States and other Western countries believe that *détente* will lead to a liberalization of the Soviet regime, and that is why there has been a progressive tightening-up of controls in the Soviet bloc during the period when *détente* has been mooted. There are certainly signs of fear inside the USSR among the hardliners, or those who fear for their own privileges (the hack writers and venal intellectuals, for example), or the KGB officials, that the United States arguments for *détente* may be right: this is why Brezhnev has repeatedly been reassuring them in his speeches that *détente* provides the best platform for ideological warfare, and, following up words with deeds, he has been intensifying persecution of dissent.

The Soviet leadership makes no secret of the fact—and indeed states it in speech after speech and document after document—that its opposition to Western ideas and to any significant "liberalization" is total and irreconcilable. Such a persistent and unrelentingly hostile attitude is quite incompatible with any development of real progress towards genuine friendly relations between the two sides. Until genuine "liberalization" takes place, or at least until there are some signs of serious progress in that direction, we may unreservedly take all the other elements of "*détente*" in current Soviet policy as temporary and tactical. They are not evidence that the Soviet Union is inclined to reduce its hostility towards the Western countries.

The fate of culture in the age of détente

As explained above, when faced with the prospect of *détente*, the internal Party line in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe hardened to prevent any undesirable cultural developments which might undermine the Party's ideological domination. The increasing cultural rigidity was most pronounced in the Soviet Union itself where a determined effort was made to end the phenomenon of *samizdat* and

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to crush the dissidents. The KGB arrested many of them: some were sent to mental prisons, some to camps with harsher sentences than were usually given to dissidents sentenced earlier. The most important of the *samizdat* journals, *The Chronicle of Current Events,* was finally hunted out of existence. " Case 24 " as it was called by the KGB, culminated in the Yakir-Krasin trial during which the accused, after a year of preliminary " investigation " in prison, cooperated with their prosecutors and—broken men—" confessed " in a manner reminiscent of the infamous Moscow Trials of the thirties. There was, of course, no similarity in the gravity of the charges and the accused earned themselves a reduction of the already lenient sentence by " freely " denouncing their own " misdeeds " during the press conference at which they were presented to foreign correspondents. There was, however, another ominous sign recalling the technique of the thirties: during the same press conference, the state prosecutor, Malyarov, declared that the two most prestigious Soviet dissidents, Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn, " are not immune " before Soviet law, a clear indication that they might also be arrested, which indeed is what happened to Solzhenitsyn later on.

At the same time the KGB succeeded after a five-day interrogation in breaking Solzhenitsyn's friend who had typed the manuscript of *The Gulag Archipelago.* Having disclosed the manuscript's whereabouts to the KGB, the woman was released (only to commit suicide). Solzshenitsyn and Sakharov, faced with an impending threat to themselves, appealed to Western public opinion. They denounced the increased oppression in the Soviet Union and reproached the West for its lack of moral stamina and courage in defending the universal cultural values, as well as for the short-sightedness of its policy of sacrificing freedom for the chimera of pseudo-*détente.* Already, during President Nixon's visit to Moscow in May 1972, Sakharov had warned that the Soviet leaders would take the new agreements as a green light for increasing internal repression, since they would assume that such repression would no longer affect Western policy towards the Soviet Union. In this they may have been mistaken, although the American administration has indeed been attempting to dissociate its foreign policy from the question of internal Soviet rigidity. Secretary of State Kissinger and Chancellor Brandt, both refugees from Hitler, declared that they would be pursuing the same policies even if Hitler and Stalin respectively were still in power. It is an ironical situation in which Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn stand for the cultural values of the West, while Western statesmen are ready to sacrifice them for the sake of an unrealistic *Realpolitik* which, as Sakharov noted in this message to the American Congress, would in the end also undermine Western security.

In contrast to the political leaders' non-committal reaction, Western cultural and scientific milieux, and Western public opinion in general, have been overwhelmingly sympathetic to Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As the latter stated, this was the only factor which had until then prevented his arrest. The publication in the West of *The Gulag Archipelago* prompted another campaign against Solzhenitsyn, the style and vocabulary of which was not very different from the assaults of Soviet propaganda in the Stalinist period. He was soon to be expelled from the country.

The point so forcefully made by Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn, and only very rarely encountered in Western writings on *détente*, is the extreme importance of internal Soviet policies as an indication of the Soviet Union's future external behaviour. A more liberal internal policy could be regarded as a test of the nature of Soviet political evolution. It would not be a sufficient guarantee that the Soviet Union had ceased to be expansionist, but it would constitute a necessary precondition for its evolution in this direction. Internal cultural control based on ideological mendacity (doublethink, doubletalk and double standards) suggests that similar attitudes and methods will also be used in foreign relations, and raises the problem of Soviet reliability vis-à-vis *détente*. That is why the question of the " free flow of ideas, information and people " is of paramount importance in gauging the future of East-West relations. In the long run, the official attitude of the communist countries to cultural developments is the only indication which makes possible an assessment of Western security on the political, rather than on the military plane. The West can disregard this fact only at its peril. Yet the Soviet view of *détente* includes both pressure to prohibit any Western criticism and the acceptance by the West of the principle that so far as the Soviet Union is concerned, the Soviet leaders are to be free to pursue the " ideological struggle." The most pungent comment on the double standards evident in the Soviet definition of *détente* was given in the *New York Times* (3 February 1947): " The Soviet contention clearly is that Moscow is free to tell lies about the West but the West must not tell the truth about the Soviet Union."

The Soviet formula for this is that the " free flow of ideas " must not violate " the customs and sovereignty of each country " (which means, in effect, that ideas and information are free to flow within the bounds allowed by Soviet censorship). The official Soviet idea is that international cultural relations are to be limited to innocuous state-controlled " cultural exchanges "—as if culture were a commodity which could be manipulated and exchanged. But the fact remains that the works of Pasternak, Akhmatova, Sinyavsky, Nadezhda Mandelshtam and Solzhenitsyn which emerged in the post-Stalin literary revival remain largely inaccessible to Soviet readers. Yet, unofficial literature, unofficial art and unofficial history writing are the only manifestations of living culture in the Soviet Union. The official culture is dead, unable to produce anything of value.

It is not surprising that it is only the unofficial culture which attracts surreptitious attention in the Soviet Union and Eastern

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Europe, and that it is eagerly followed in the West which has become a temporary repository for unofficial Russian writings. The reason why the official culture is dead was put succinctly by Lydia Chukovskaya, recently expelled from the Soviet Writers' Union, in an open letter in defence of Sakharov:

> There are written laws and unwritten ones, and in Russia there exists one unwritten law which has more force than the whole collection of our laws put together and which the authorities never fail to apply. In Russia there is only one crime for which the authorities never pardon anybody. This one law, the strictest of all, lays down that every person must be severely punished for the slightest attempt to think for himself. To think aloud, that is.

This attitude to free thought as a crime and a sin, also determines the official attitude to culture, whether it is a work of literature, art or history. Solzhenitsyn illustrated it in an interview with two Western journalists in Moscow:

> Vaganov, head of the regional archives in Tambov, refused to let me look even at newspapers which were 55 years old. In the central military historical archives, a rigorous search was recently carried out in order to discover who, in 1963, had turned over to me material about the First World War and how this had happened.

The access to historical materials remains a closely guarded privilege in the Soviet Union. It is granted only to ideologically reliable historians who can produce such works as, for instance, the new history of World War II, which accuses Britain, France and the United States of plotting to smash the Soviet Union. Thus, even in a time of *détente*, Soviet leaders remain faithful to the Orwellian idea that " he who controls the past controls the future."

This attitude is not confined to cultural controls in the Soviet Union, but extends abroad where no such controls can be exercised. Soviet authorities try hard to dampen critical thought in the West, although not very successfully, under the cover of *détente*. Examples of this are many: the campaign to silence Western broadcasts to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the expressed intention to use the Universal Copyright Convention to prevent the publication in the West of unofficial Soviet writings, and the campaigns in the West identifying *détente* with the Soviet state and Party interest (as once upon a time they identified it with " peace "). More often that not, in this particular sphere, Soviet behaviour is so crude that it has the effect of turning the Western public against the Soviet Union. It is, incidentally, sobering to recall that it was the American administration which suggested that the Soviet Union should sign the UCC and that it seriously considered this a triumph for international cultural relations, instead of realizing that the Soviet Union would try to use the Convention as an extended arm of Soviet censorship.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The fundamental naiveté of so many political perceptions in the West is ultimately due to lack of understanding, not just of the mechanisms of the Soviet political system, but of the mentality rooted in the political culture underlying it. It is the Western lack of political comprehension which makes possible Soviet attempts at cultural exploitation of *détente*. The situation would indeed be laughable if it were not so tragic for the Soviet artists and writers and if it were not for the threat which it poses for the West through the extension of Soviet political influence, the infiltration of Soviet *doublethink* and the possible debasement of Western cultural standards. The fate of culture in the age of *détente* depends, in no small measure, on the steadfast attachment of the West to its own cultural standards and the avoidance of confusion which pseudo-*détente* could bring to them as a result of Soviet political pressure.

Détente and the military balance

It is generally assumed in the West that *détente* by its very nature reduces the need for reliance on military strength. It is thought that relaxation in international tension is the obvious occasion to reduce military establishments and to run down weapons programmes. An inspection of military programmes in the Soviet Union and among its allies, however, shows that they do not share this Western view. Even in simple numerical terms, *détente* has brought no diminution, nor even a levelling, but rather a programme to expand both Soviet strategic offensive and defensive systems, as well as adding to the capacities of general purpose or " conventional " ground, sea and air forces. Behind these military armament programmes lies an extensive civil defence programme, a major military training programme for Soviet adolescents and a mass of well-trained reservists, continually swelled by the Soviet conscript system. In brief, there is *no* sector of Soviet military policy where expansion, diversification and modernisation cannot be observed. The growth of the Soviet Navy serves as but one example of this relentless process.

In terms of strategic offensive weapons the SALT-1 agreements of 1972 served the Soviet Union handsomely, investing it with a 40 per cent advantage in ICBMs—1,618 for the Soviet Union to 1,054 for the United States—and missile-launching submarines—62 to 44, over 30 per cent more submarine-launched ballistic missiles—950 to 710—and a massive three-fold lead over the United States in total destructive power. It was argued, nonetheless, at the time that the United States could afford this numerical disadvantage by virtue of superiority in technology, namely the multiple independent targetable warhead (MIRV). Strategic bomber forces were not included in this initial agreement. In the 21 months that elapsed after the SALT-1 agreement, the Soviet command steadily increased the numbers of its ICBM force to well over 1,500 and increased its submarine missile

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

strength to some 580: numbers, however, tell only part of the story, since four *new* ICBMs with large yield have been developed; an improved version of the DELTA-class missile-carrying submarine, capable of carrying sixteen rather than twelve 4,000-mile range SLBMs is under development; and at least one of the new ICBMs is mobile. All the while ICBM plants have been modernised, facilities for testing missile engines expanded, and new "cold launch" techniques for ICBMs developed, utilising varied diameter canisters enables the Soviet Union to circumvent the SALT-1 limitation on numbers of *missile-silos*, since they make it possible for one silo to house a range of missile types. Thus, the "numbers game" has been exploited in favour of the Soviet Union; while the other factor which it was believed at the time of SALT-1 would prevent the balance of advantage from tipping in the Soviet favour, namely, United States superiority in technical innovation has crumbled. The Soviet Union has itself developed MIRVs for its massive new ICBMs, thereby compounding the Soviet lead both in numbers and in missile throw-weight (meaning more MIRVs on bigger missiles). Meanwhile, a new strategic bomber, the *BACKFIRE*, is entering the Soviet arsenal and adds to the strategic offensive potential (while the USAF B-1 strategic bomber is not yet in full production).

The momentum of this Soviet build-up shows no signs of relaxation. Ominous though that is in an era of *détente*, the Soviet conduct at the SALT-2 negotiations gives much cause for uneasiness: the Soviet Union's requirement for permanent numerical advantage, coupled with the energy with which it pursues its own technological progress, could only result in consigning the United States to permament strategic inferiority. It follows, therefore, that Soviet objectives aim at overt strategic superiority as opposed to the mere "insurance" of limited numerical advantage: "parity" no longer suffices. While the Soviet MIRV is disquieting, the most alarming element of the strategic weapons build-up is its scope and rate, with significant long-term implications. The pattern of *détente* based on undisputed Soviet strategic superiority has not been fully explored in the West. Existing evidence is sufficient to suggest that military superiority is incompatible with the mode of political accommodation which is what the West thinks *détente* ought to be. This kind of *détente* could best be served if the Soviet Union accepted this conception. The crisis at the SALT-2 negotiations tends to confirm that it does not.

Meanwhile, the Soviet general purpose forces have grown and continue to grow. The Soviet Navy, modern and powerfully armed with a wide range of missiles, displays its oceanic presence and presents an oceanic challenge. The Soviet Air Force modernises and improves its tactical air power, with ultra-modern aircraft, such as the *FOXBAT*, and significantly adds to its capacity for strategic and medium-range air-lift; this was shown in the recent Middle East War. It is in the European theatre, however, that Soviet policies of military

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reinforcement expose the emptiness of the talk of political *détente*. Over the past five or six years, the ground forces of the Soviet Union, which form the core of the power of the Warsaw Pact Countries, have undergone major improvements in combat capacity. In the past three years some 9,000 tanks have been added to the Soviet tank force, more than 4,000 armoured personnel carriers have been introduced into Eastern Europe, tactical air power has been improved both in quantity and quality, the number of nuclear weapons assigned to the ground forces has been increased, more than 1,000 additional guns have been provided for the Soviet divisions and stocks of conventional ammunition has been augmented. A marked improvement has also taken place in the Soviet logistical system, with emphasis on serving armoured and missile units. The net result is to give the Soviet command a preponderance in the European theatre of at least 3 : 1 in armour and of more that 2 : 1 in tactical aircraft. And once again, in line with the SALT-2 negotiations, Soviet conduct during the present (1974) talks on the reductions of forces shows no sign of yielding any element of this superiority.

Even on this brief inspection, the Soviet policy of preaching *détente* while increasing military strength is demonstrably the reverse of our own. More than that, however, the *détente* sought by the Soviet Union is viewed by that country not as the justification for accepting the prevailing military balance, but as an opportunity to spurt forward towards unchallengeable superiority.

The economic consequences of détente

Some of the most uncritical attitudes generated by *détente* in the West are in the field of East-West trade. The understanding of its limitations and of the Soviet motives involved is quite inadequate not only among the general public but also among Western businessmen and governments. Yet such understanding is of crucial importance for a realistic view of the prospects for *détente*.

Soviet purposes are related to the current difficulties confronting the Soviet economy. They include the decreasing rate of growth of the GNP, the exhaustion of employable reserves of manpower, the balance of payments deficit and the inefficiency which is particularly apparent in agriculture and in the Soviet inability to respond to demand and to generate technical progress.

Having rejected any far-reaching economic reform which might, or might not, have raised efficiency, but which would certainly have antagonized many powerful vested interests in Soviet society, especially the Party apparatus, Soviet leaders have opted for the other major course that bore some promise of countering the unfavourable trends in the economy: massive assistance from the West. This policy is all the more attractive because, while it is expected to bring large amounts of capital into the Soviet Union, the repayment is to be

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mainly in the very commodities that the Western-financed projects would produce. At the same time, the flow of Western technology and know-how is expected by the Soviet leaders to narrow the growing technological gap with the West and to improve Soviet export capacity. The Americans, the Japanese, and the Europeans are to build up whole industries for the Soviet Union and develop vast regions there at very little cost to the Soviet Union itself, and with minimal risk to Soviet institutions.

Contrary to widespread Western belief, the "more liberal" Soviet economic strategy abroad is quite compatible with a conservative policy at home. Indeed, this double-pronged economic strategy is an alternative to domestic economic reform which the Soviet leaders feared might jeopardize the stability of existing Soviet institutions and generate political strife. The risks to domestic political control from increased Western contacts can be minimized by police methods designed to isolate the bulk of the population from contact with the West. Past experience has shown that such contacts in the economic sphere involve only a relatively small and select group of Soviet citizens. To the extent that some risks are nevertheless present, they are counterbalanced by the promise of additional economic benefits which might assuage the growing consumer demand. They are countered prophylactically by the tightening of control over dissidence that we have witnessed in recent years. Contrary to some Western expectations, past experience shows that a more reactionary policy at home can well be combined with economic advances to the West.

The paramount Soviet target in its economic *détente* offensive is the gaining of large long-term credits at low interest rates (chiefly from the USA) in order to finance the purchase of equipment and technology for the development of oil, natural gas and other mineral resources. Such assistance from the West may not only increase Soviet overall economic strength, but it could also enable the Soviet government to engage in military spending on a scale which would otherwise be impossible, given the competing claims of investment and consumption.

The economic *détente* strategy of seeking large Western credits may thus bring not only enormous economic advantage to the Soviet Union internally, but also to Soviet military and foreign policies, particularly as it will tend to create groups in the West with vested interests in Soviet-derived profits and in the protection of Western loans. These groups can be politically manipulated in the free societies, while the appetite for profits among businessmen is also easily exploitable.

But it is not necessarily true that what is good for Pepsi Cola, or for the Chase Manhattan Bank (and their European equivalents), in their dealings with the Soviet Union is also good for the United States or Western Europe. Yet very little homework has been done in the West on the problems involved in close relations with the Soviet econo-

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mic state monopoly. Instead of soberly assessing the disadvantages of a free enterprise system in a situation in which the Soviet state monopoly can exploit economic competition among Western firms while it makes only deals it chooses to make, many Western business leaders have shown themselves to be remarkably eager to take Soviet economic propaganda at face value. Whether the enthusiasm will survive the diminishing prospects of governmental credit guarantees following the passage of the Jackson Amendment is another question.

Not only was the short-sightedness and the band-wagon psychology of the supposedly hard-headed Western businessmen amazing; so was the small amount of public discussion in the West on the questions whether assuming the rôle of the Soviet Union's banker was in the national interest of the Western countries; and whether it was wise to invest in the development of Soviet resources of energy (especially after the experience with the Arab oil embargo) rather than in Western sources. At a time of inflationary pressure, is a substantial outflow of capital from the West to communist countries desirable either politically or economically? And is it true, as advocates of *détente*-at-any-price never cease to proclaim, that trade promotes peace?

A realistic answer to these questions is quite different from what the Western public was led to believe in the period between President Nixon's visit to Moscow in May 1972, and Secretary Brezhnev's visit to Washington in June 1973.

The private interest of business corporations and banks is not equivalent to the national interest, much less to the interest of the West as a whole. Competition for investment in the Soviet Union and the granting of large long-term credits to it would not only divide the West, and strengthen economically, politically and militarily its most dangerous and avowed adversary, but would also reduce political options for the West in the future by making it (particularly the United States) dependent on the USSR for a substantial amount of the energy supply and other essential goods. It would give the Soviet Union a lever on Western policy through the very fact of its indebtedness and its control over the new sources of energy on which the West would come to rely. Moreover, this Western policy may produce the opposite effect from the intended one of "intermeshing" Western and Soviet economic interests, of "Gulliverization" of the Soviet Union. Trade and investment generates friction and conflict even among friends, history provides enough examples to show that they do not ensure peace. Germany was the largest trading partner of Russia just before each of the two world wars, and the high point of Russian-Chinese trade was immediately before the break between Moscow and Peking.

Political as well as economic realism would thus dictate caution in granting credits for the export of Western technology and commodities to the communist countries, sober assessment of each deal (after

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the grain deal fiasco), and realization that Soviet purposes in expanding trade are as different from the Western ones as are the economic rules of the game adhered to by the two sides. So far, there is no evidence that the tough problems involved here have been generally comprehended either by businessmen, or by governments, or by the public of Western countries. Yet there is little doubt that the original euphoria over trade and credits as the miracle weapons for dealing with the Soviet Union—bringing both profits and peace—has subsided and a more realistic mood is slowly expanding in the West. The effects of the Soviet-American wheat deal and of the Arab oil embargo have not been lost on the Western, particularly the American, public. These have dampened the early enthusiasm. But the policy's premises which have generated unrealistic expectations and illusions are still operative. One example should suffice. A US official very much responsible for the 1972 wheat deal, faced with a Soviet proposal to re-sell to the United States some of the still-undelivered grain at a much higher price than Russia had paid for it, still justified the original deal on the grounds that it " constructively helped the process of *détente* " and defended its " historic importance " in opening up agricultural trade with Russia. Vladimir S. Alkhimov, the Soviet trade official who offered to sell (at a much higher price) grain (originally sold to the Soviet Union at subsidized prices) which would replenish the US stock diminished by exports to the USSR, made a less euphoric comment: " Look at Alaska, which we sold you for $7 million back in 1867. That was cheap too, but you don't hear us complaining." Clearly the Soviet attitude to *détente* involves a rather long view of economic reciprocity.

In the meantime, the Soviet Union is trying to narrow down the technology gap by acquiring advanced American technology. The American Control Data Corporation and other firms are helping to close this gap. According to spokesmen of this firm, by spending $3 million in three years, the Soviet Union gained 15 years in R & D. Lockheed and other aircraft firms compete for deals with the Soviet Union which will provide that country with access to the latest American jet-liner technology, design and know-how. But at the same time as the Soviet Union is negotiating the purchase of most advanced items, like the high-speed electronic computer " Cyber," Soviet technological achievements remain inaccessible to the West. The economic and technological advantages of *détente* are thus somewhat one-sided and in the long run this asymmetry could be dangerous.

Soviet aims in Western Europe in the context of détente

As has been seen, the policy of *détente* was primarily envisaged by the Soviet Union in relation to the United States, as having two objects in view: first, to obtain American capital and technology as a means of reviving and expanding Soviet industry, and of developing essential resources, particularly oil; and secondly, to negotiate, in part-

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nership with the only other serious nuclear power, settlements of conflicts all over the world, with the need to avoid nuclear confrontation with the United States always in mind. *Détente*, vis-à-vis the United States, from the Soviet point of view, is a continuation of the *old* " spheres of influence " and " hot line " policy in improved form; and a *new* exploitation of American willingness, consequent upon the end of United States involvement in Vietnam, to trade with the Soviet Union.

The relationship with Western Europe is regarded quite differently by the Soviet Union. Before the dramatic change in United States policy in 1971, the aim of the Soviet Union was to obtain its capital and technological requirements from Western Europe, while Soviet propaganda was mainly directed towards encouraging economic disunity between Europe and the United States. The United States is, however, a much more attractive supplier of capital and technology than Europe: because of the EEC, of which the Soviet Union disapproves as an entity, and because expanded business relations with the EEC might act as a new temptation to certain " bloc " countries, especially Poland and Rumania, to develop their own economic ties with the EEC and to escape thereby from the Soviet stranglehold. Moreover, as far as Europe is concerned, the Soviet Union can reasonably hope to exploit to the maximum its already overwhelming preponderance and its military proximity, in order to increase its political influence—and especially so if isolationist and economic pressures inside the United States may lead to US withdrawal from Europe. The Soviet Union may also hope to gain political advantage from exploiting the divisions which exist between the individual countries of the EEC and any economic and political discord between the United States and Europe.

Soviet policy regarding the European Security Conference shows that the Soviet Union hopes (vainly so far) to replace an effective defence system (NATO) by meaningless declarations and treaties which would leave Europe virtually disarmed against the Soviet Union. It also seeks to consolidate social and cultural relations in the only form acceptable to the Soviet Union: namely, state-to-state relations, in which all contacts are organized and therefore controlled by the state. If this policy were to succeed, which at present seems unlikely in view of the position taken by several European powers, this would give the Soviet Union a powerful argument for claiming to stifle all criticism of the Soviet Union in Europe—which in practice covers all objective discussion of Soviet reality, and in particular to bring about the closing down of certain wireless stations, especially Radio Liberty. This has been one of the main aims of the Soviet Union for years.

Whatever the outcome of the present MFR and " Security " talks, the policy of the Soviet Union towards Europe is likely to remain for a time radically different from its policy towards the United States. In the case of the United States the Soviet Union may well offer for some

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

time the concession which Polyphemus offered to Outis, that of being devoured last. In Europe, where the Soviet Union hopes for an ever-increasing military proponderance, its policy aiming to increase Soviet political influence as that of the United States declines, is likely to employ the following tactics:

(a) clandestine subversion. (This activity is discussed on pages 19–21). This has particular advantage which the Soviet Union has enjoyed for half a century of conducting subversion and "peaceful coexistence" side-by-side—such as entertaining the British Foreign Secretary while arms are being supplied to the Provisional IRA for the purpose of killing British soldiers.

(b) a vigorous policy of misinformation, e.g. through feeding false stories to press correspondents and through the recruitment of conscious or unwitting agents of influence.

(c) the exercise of pressure on scientists and university teachers by withholding of visas from those who have not been sufficiently congenial to the Soviet Union, as a warning to others.

(d) the exercise of pressure on businessmen, who are interested in trade with the Soviet Union, to use their influence to prevent unwelcome criticism.

(e) if the opportunity arises, direct political action, reinforced by military pressure. This is not difficult to imagine if one thinks of the situation already obtaining in Scandinavia, which has to live under the shadow of the vast Soviet Baltic Fleet. This danger of political pressure under cover of military preponderance would clearly increase if isolationism grows in the United States and if the present discord between the United States and Europe is not repaired.

Détente and the Middle East

The Middle East conflict is not a local dispute. If it were, it would have been resolved some time ago. As it is, however, neither side in the conflict is able to impose its will on the other.

Nor are the great powers simply "sucked into" the conflict. On the contrary, the Soviet Union has exploited the conflict for a variety of purposes. These include: (1) the neutralization and detachment of Turkey and Iran from the Western alliance; (2) the outflanking of NATO, assisted by a prolonged energy crisis, and the disruption of the EEC; (3) the acquisition of a bridge to Asia and Africa; (4) the isolation of its own Muslim subject peoples against influences from the region; and (5) the control of the route to India, which is particularly important in view of the rivalry and conflict with China.

In short, the Soviet Union is in the Middle East because of its vital interest in the confrontation with the West, i.e. the United States and Western Europe; the conflict with China; and the vast oil resources.

The arms deal concluded in September 1955 with Egypt inaugurated a period of massive Soviet military, technical, and economic assistance,

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which was soon extended to Syria and Iraq. During the Suez War in 1956, the Soviet Union exploited to its advantage the instant and unequivocal American opposition to the Anglo-French military action. It was thus only after President Eisenhower had publicly warned his allies of this position that the Soviets issued their threats against Britain and France. Yet the myth grew among the Arabs that the Soviet Union was responsible for the frustration of the Anglo-French venture. In the decade from 1957 to 1967, the Soviet Union used its greater military, technical, and economic assistance programmes in the region (e.g. arms supplies, the Aswan High Dam, increased aid to Syria and Iraq) to impose the nearly total dependence of these states in their domestic, regional, and international policies. At the same time, it sought to isolate the United States from the region, and to divide the policies of Western European states.

Although the Six Day War in 1967 ended in the defeat of Soviet clients in the Middle East, and was a blow to its military assistance policy in the region, it nonetheless produced a still greater dependence of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq on the Soviet Union for arms and economic aid. Even while the relations between these states and the Soviet Union deteriorated, the programme of massive rearmament was accelerated on a greater scale.

Despite the acceptance of Secretary of State Rogers' plan, and the ending of the war of attrition on the Canal in August 1970, the Soviet Union immediately took advantage of the standstill to introduce more missiles on the ceasefire line. Despite the publicized expulsion of the Soviet military advisers and technicians from Egypt in the summer of 1972, the treaties of friendship and cooperation, which were signed with Egypt and Iraq in the early seventies, provided for the continued massive infusion of Soviet arms, consultation and collaboration in regional and international policies. Military assistance to Syria was increased and accelerated.

In part, it was the Nixon-Brezhnev *détente* agreement in May 1972 which prompted some of the Arab clients of the Soviet Union to reconsider their relations with Moscow. By 1973, however, it was clear that *détente* was having no effect in reducing—on the contrary, it increased —the Soviet military activity in Iraq and Syria. Simultaneously, the Soviet Mediterranean fleet, and particularly its amphibious and air operational strengths, was greatly increased. It continued to use shore facilities in Egypt and Syria, and was complemented by a stronger presence in the Indian Ocean, where the West had been weakened by the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf.

In the war of October 1973 it became clear that the Soviet Union had prior knowledge of the coordinated attack on Israel by Egypt and Syria. *Détente*, however, was not understood by the Soviet Union to mean sharing this information with its American partner, in spite of its formal obligation undertaken in the US-Soviet agreement of 24 June 1973. Nor did it exert any effort in seeking a cease-fire. On the con-

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

trary, it urged, in a series of notes, the non-belligerent Arab states to join in the fight. And for some time before that it had been encouraging them to apply the " oil weapon " against the West (later it urged them to continue the oil embargo against the United States until the moment it had been lifted).

On the third day of the war the Israelis halted the Syrian advance in the North. On the fourth day, the Soviet Union began a massive airlift of arms to Egypt and Syria; its allies, North Korea and North Vietnam, supplied pilots for the Syrian air force. Even when the imminent collapse of the Egyptian Third Army at the end of the second week of hostilities forced the Soviet Union to seek an immediate cease-fire, it did so by threatening disruption of the *détente*. No sooner was the ceasefire agreement worked out in Moscow with the United States Secretary of State, Dr Kissinger, than the Soviet Union ventured a repetition of its August 1970 performance by seeking to introduce further, more sophisticated weapons into Egypt.

The importance of the Middle East, in contrast to Vietnam, in the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union derives from the proximity of the region to Europe and Russia. It is the meeting place of three continents, Africa, Asia and Europe. It is a vast reservoir of oil, upon the availability of which depends the life of all the industrial countries in the West.

The Soviet Union has shown a keen appreciation of this importance. At the end of the Suez War, it made the transition from a far-away, silent spectator, to a strident agitator in the area. Its violation of the August 1970 standstill agreement on the Canal revealed the complaisance of the United States, which, in turn, encouraged the steady Soviet build-up and expansion of its military presence in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. Seen as a signal of the West's weakness, the Rogers plan led to a hardening of the Soviet-Arab line.

More recently, the Soviet Union has developed links with the Palestine Liberation Organisation, which could be used as a " destruct mechanism " of a possible peace settlement.

While the Soviet Union uses *détente*, as an instrument for the advancement of its own policies in the Middle East, the dilemma of the United States is clear: in order to detach the Arabs from the Soviet Union, it must restrain the Israelis and press them into accepting an accommodation which can seriously weaken their security. This also means saving the Soviet Union from defeat. It will continue its policy of expansion in the region, notwithstanding *détente*, in spite of the alleged " end of the era of confrontation " between the super-powers, and, whatever the consequences of the diplomatic efforts of Dr Kissinger to achieve peace in the Middle East. One cannot help remembering that in June 1973 Dr Kissinger declared that the United States and the Soviet Union " will make an effort not to become *inextricably* involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict " and the two countries signed a solemn agreement to " continue to exert their efforts to promote the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

quickest possible settlement in the Middle East." The ink was not yet dry on this declaration when the Soviet Union began to speed up its arms deliveries to the Middle East which made possible the October War.

Trade unions and détente

Moscow's policy of *détente* in the free trade union and labour field has been given succinct expression in its unrelenting drive for exchanging "East-West delegations," close cooperation "to promote the interests of the working class," and the ultimate re-unification of unions in the communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) with those affiliated to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). The Kremlin's purpose in promoting these exchanges was described by the ICFTU in 1955 as: (a) winning moral respectability and legitimacy for their state company unions; (b) misleading the workers of the West by making them accept these organizations run by the Communist Party, as *bona fide* trade unions; (c) facilitating communist infiltration and subversion in Western countries; and (d) promoting the expansionist interests of Soviet imperialism.

Repeatedly, the Western non-communist trade unions have asserted that for the sake of labour solidarity and human freedom, free trade union organizations should avoid exchanging delegations with any country which denies its people fundamental human rights specified in the United Nations Charter, denies its workers the right of freedom of association, prohibits genuine collective bargaining and the right to strike, and penalizes those who advocate free trade unionism and democracy.

However, in recent years, in part as a result of the eagerness for *détente,* the principles of communist trade union policy have been less clearly perceived. Thus the German trade union leaders (DGB) have officially defended their changed view by citing Chancellor Brandt's *Ostpolitik* and their moral obligation to support it through "Ostkontakte."

The British Trade Union Congress, after meeting with the former head of the Soviet secret police, Mr Alexander Shelepin, now chairman of the Russian "equivalent" of the TUC, called for a new trade union relationship between East and West. Its general secretary, Mr Len Murray, recently told a *Trud* correspondent in London that "what the Soviet trade unions are doing for the working man and their activity in concluding and implementing collective agreements is really impressive. At the same time, it will be interesting for Soviet colleagues to acquaint themselves with the experience of the British TUC's work in various spheres, in particular with our experience of relations with state power."

In Italy, there has been constant talk of a trade union merger and while trade union unity has not yet been realised there is a sort of

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

de facto unity in existence. Much depends on decisions in the political parties there, primarily the Christian Democrats and their general secretary, Signor Amitore Fanfani, whose recent wavering position vis-à-vis the Communist Party proposals for a coalition raises the possibility of an eventual extension of communist control over the whole Italian trade union movement (including the Christian and Social-Democratic unions). Early in 1973, a new European Trade Union Conferedation (ETUC) was formed which opened the door widely for the admission of the large communist-controlled Italian CGIL and the similarly communist-controlled French CGT. In January 1974, representatives of Eastern and Western trade union centres met, for the first time in 25 years, in Geneva to discuss a joint programme of action. The very convening of such a conference constitutes a significant advance for the Soviet Union. At this meeting, it was agreed to convene late this year an ostensibly "non-ideological" conference "on humanizing the industrial environment." Indeed, *détente* already seems to have contributed to a lowering of all previous barriers against communist penetration into almost all Western trade union and labour movements. An outstanding exception has been the relatively small *Force Ouvrière* in France and, of course, the AFL-CLO in the United States.

More significantly, many trade union leaders in Western Europe have begun to indulge in wishful thinking about the nature of the Soviet trade unions. Some have, on the basis of their brief visits, concluded that they should no longer view East European trade unions as "mere transmission belts of their State communist parties."

Détente in the trade union movement has to date been completely one-sided, benefiting only the Soviet Union and the communist parties in the West. Contacts and exchanges have neither brought more rights, freedoms, and social justice for the workers in communist countries—if anything such contacts, exchanges, and dialogues have in fact strengthened the communist union officials in their efforts to hold down the workers in the interest of the Communist Party and the government which it monopolizes—nor have they brought about a *rapprochement* between East and West European workers. Only trustworthy and dogmatic East European *apparatchiki* are selected for such exchanges. There is already substantial evidence that these so-called new relations have considerably accelerated the process of infiltration of the free trade unions to the economic and political detriment of the West.

Détente in the age of subversion

As has been noted, *détente*, in Soviet eyes, is not incompatible with subversion. What the Russians understand by "*détente*" is consistent with what the West means by "subversion."

In the Soviet view *détente* entails the *de jure* as well as the *de facto* recognition by the members of NATO and other Western countries of

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the permanent division of Europe on ideological lines, and the validity of the Brezhnev doctrine which "justified" Soviet military intervention in any communist country which departs from "socialist" principles, as defined in Moscow.

In the Soviet view "subversion" is what Western countries would be doing to the Soviet Union and other communist countries if Moscow conceded that principle of free movement of persons and ideas which is required for a genuine *détente*. Similarly, as understood by the Soviet Union, the "cold war" includes all Western activities considered by Moscow to be hostile, including any Western criticisms of the Soviet treatment of political dissidents. "Peaceful co-existence," on the other hand, is regarded in Moscow as essentially a transitory—although possibly prolonged— phase in relations between the Soviet Union and non-communist states pending the "final triumph of communism." During this phase, the Soviet Union reserves the right to subvert other countries, while sealing itself off from, and in other ways resisting, any exposure to non-communist ideas and influences.

There are thus two sets of rules: on the Soviet side, a right to operate anywhere and to subvert any other country; and on the Western side, the obligation to avoid criticisms of the Soviet Union and of all countries under Soviet protection, and to abstain from communicating to those countries any ideas which their rulers think might make their citizens critical of them.

Soviet spokesmen have said repeatedly that "peaceful coexistence" implies the intensification of the struggle between the world systems. The intensification of the struggle implies, above all, more subversion in all its forms.

The forms of subversion include: agitation and propaganda (*agitprop*), misinformation, espionage, and the clandestine training, financing and arming of terrorists, saboteurs, and guerrillas. There is naturally overlapping between these main categories. In all of them, the KGB plays a major rôle; in some, the relatively smaller military espionage organisation, GRU, is also involved. Agitprop and misinformation are intimately linked.

The "agitation" of selected social groups, such as industrial workers is carried out by communist parties through the penetration of trade unions. They may, and often do, proclaim their independence of Soviet control but in fact, to a smaller or greater degree, conform with the policies of the Soviet Union. The Leninist end view is the weakening of Western economics and their currencies, with the aim of discrediting their governments and their economic systems and alienating the citizens from their institutions.

Another important technique has been propaganda and agitation among conscripts or enlisted men in the armed forces of the NATO countries. Misinformation about the nature of the states which these armed forces are required to defend plays an important part in this

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

activity. In other walks of life misinformation is disseminated by pro-communist sympathisers and by the various left-wing groups which are not sympathetic to Moscow but in some cases are penetrated, and often quite unwittingly by non-Marxists who repeat fashionable arguments which such left-wing groups have seized upon and promoted. Nor should the special rôle of the various international "front" organizations—such as the World Peace Council and the World Federation of Trade Unions—in propagating views which aid Soviet policy be overlooked.

The expulsion of the 105 Soviet agents from the United Kingdom in September 1971 drew attention to the scale of Soviet espionage in Western countries. Broadly speaking, with the one exception of Belgium, other NATO countries have preferred to expel "their" KGB and GRU men discreetly and in small numbers. In neutral as well as NATO countries in Western Europe about 70 per cent of all accredited Soviet diplomats are, in fact, spies. Nowadays, such personnel are as likely to be in quest of industrial and technological secrets as of military information.

Although the Soviet media frequently denounce terrorism and other political violence, clandestine aid to terrorist groups is highly organized. In Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia, Chile, Ulster, the Middle East, and Africa, there are well-authenticated instances of Soviet involvement. The Lenin Institute in Moscow provides regular "guerrilla" courses for selected groups of communists from Western and other countries; non-communists are more likely to be given facilities in Tashkent or Odessa. This should not be surprising as Soviet leaders themselves regard subversion as compatible with "*détente*" and "peaceful co-existence" with increasing subversive activities.

Détente and China

The Chinese attitude towards *détente* is basically determined by the Sino-Soviet conflict.

When after the Cultural Revolution China emerged from self-imposed isolation and entered the mainstream of international political life on the level of state relations, it was the result of its perception of the growing Soviet menace. It was this factor which necessitated a shift in Chinese foreign policy. This brought about restoration of diplomatic relations with those countries which had recognized China before the Cultural Revolution, efforts to win recognition from other countries, entry to the United Nations, and *rapprochement* with the United States. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Brezhnev Doctrine made China even more acutely sensitive about the danger of Soviet expansionism.

The shift in Chinese foreign policy has as its primary motive the reduction of this danger. This led not only to a new policy towards the United States and Japan, but also to the support of the idea of a strong,

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

united Western Europe which would continue to tie down Soviet military forces and provide a political counterbalance to the Soviet Union on its Western flank. Hence the Chinese criticism of the Soviet *détente* moves in Europe (*Peking Review*, 8 February 1974):

> The Soviet Union . . . while making further military deployments in Eastern Europe, took pains to press for the heads of the European governments to meet before the end of last year in the third stage of the conference on European security and cooperation, so as to lay what it called a "solid foundation" for European security and cooperation. It hoped in this way not only to consolidate its overlordship in Eastern Europe, but also to lull the vigilance of the West European countries, divide them and edge the United States out so it could not put the whole of Europe under its sole domination . . . The Soviet leading clique has tried its best to advertise "relaxation" of the international situation. However, the reality of the stepped-up Soviet arms expansion and war preparations in Europe and its intensified contention with the United States in the Middle East have relentlessly exploded the *détente* myth. . . .

While the Chinese assert that for all their talks about *détente* the two super powers are engaged in a struggle to achieve world hegemony, the Soviet press maintains that the Chinese "modified at the Tenth (Party) Congress (held in 1973) their foreign policy in such a way as to be able to use various forces, including the imperialist circles, for their struggle with the Soviet Union, the paramount obstacle on the way to Peking's hegemony" (*Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, January 1974). In their interpretation of the Cultural Revolution the Soviet analysts point out that this shift has occurred at the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the CCP in Lushan in Summer 1970:

> During this meeting the substance of the secret talks between Peking and Washington, which were already conducted for some time on the instructions of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, were first disclosed. Everything points to the fact that other Chinese leaders, including Lin Piao, were unaware of this . . . The new line of Mao contradicted the resolutions of the 9th Party Congress. In his speech at this Congress Lin Piao . . . referred to the "latest Mao directive" about the "new historical period—the period of simultaneous struggle with the USA and the Soviet Union." Now Mao proclaimed a completely "new stage," a stage of collaboration with the American imperialism to conduct a struggle with the Soviet Union. This new turn proved to be too sharp even for such an old hand as Lin Piao. (*Voprosy Istorii*, December 1973.)

There can be little doubt that during the Cultural Revolution there were important differences of attitude among the Chinese leaders about the problems of foreign policy, and that some of these differences persisted after it was over. But it is extremely doubtful that any Chinese leader could afford (or was inclined to take) a pro-Soviet line: the differences were about strategy and tactics.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

There is also little doubt that the American-Soviet *détente* efforts were seen with growing distaste, if not alarm, by Peking and that the new internal struggle which erupted after the Tenth Congress, although it is basically concerned with the internal affairs, may well get entangled with the issues of foreign policy. It is not just a question of struggle for succession, but also of basic future orientation of China which is involved in the esotoric formulations of the attacks on Confucius and Lin Piao, Beethoven and Antonioni. Whatever the symbolic status of the "sick horse" sold by the Chinling production brigade to the Taoyuan production brigade in the opera "Three Ascents of Peach Mountain," one can be quite certain that Mao's successors will have to face the same dilemmas as he does, and that their margin of manoeuvre in foreign policy will also be limited. Given its geo-political context and the nature of the Sino-Soviet conflict China can either have a policy of equidistance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the USA, or a policy of *rapprochement* with the USA (with the Soviet Union being "enemy number one"). The Sino-Soviet *rapprochement*, the regular bugbear of Western analysts, is unlikely in the present state of Sino-Soviet relations, and even in the post-Maoist period, although factional struggle can be seen as offering an opportunity eventually to be exploited by the Soviet Union.

In this situation the American advances to the Soviet Union cause irritation among Chinese leaders. They look with growing concern at the Soviet-American summit meetings as Chou En-lai made clear in his speech at a banquet for President Nyerere in March 1974. They have shown their disappointment on several occasions. When Dr Kissinger visited Peking in October 1973 not even a common communiqué was produced. Shortly afterwards the heads of the respective diplomatic missions were withdrawn from Peking and Washington. The visit of Dr Kissinger to Moscow in March 1974 caused another painful reaction on the part of the Chinese leaders. They perceive the American *détente* policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union as jeopardizing both European and Chinese security interests.

Détente and the US-Europe relations

It is not just the *détente* policy itself that has caused the present state of disarray in the Atlantic Alliance, but it has certainly contributed to this disarray. The fact that the post-Gaullist regime in France is straining the Alliance to breaking point is not sufficient explanation for it. It was the Nixon Doctrine which helped to release the forces detrimental to the Atlantic Alliance and made possible their narrow-minded nationalistic ascendancy.

At the moment, however, the problem is not how to apportion the blame—this can be left to future historians—but how the special relationship between the United States and Europe, which was and is

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the only realistic basis for the survival of Western civilization, can be preserved.

For that purpose it is not sufficient to concentrate on the details of day-to-day politics of the alliance, on the mechanisms of decision-making, on the accommodation of national interests, on the "atmospherics" favouring or undermining such adjustments, in short, on the pragmatic side of American and European diplomacy. No less important is a wider historical context of such analysis which is concerned with the fundamental purposes of the Alliance.

It is only within this context that success and failures of diplomacy can be judged. Diplomacy, however brilliant, is no substitute for policy, and policy, particularly one which stresses its "realistic" character, has to be assessed by its results. Looked upon in this way the policy of *détente* has very little to show in terms of either promoting Western interests or Western cohesion. Shuttle diplomacy of Dr Kissinger may be dazzling, but just as it is difficult to see what were the actual results of the peripatetic efforts of General de Gaulle, so it is difficult to see the positive historical consequences of Dr Kissinger's travels to implement his "grand design" for the "structure of peace." The epigones of the General try to imitate his foreign policy performance, but *où sont les neiges d'antan*? What happened to the "grand design" on "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals"? What remained as a result of all those diplomatic tours to Russia, Latin America, Canada (*'Vive Quebec libre!'*)? Similarly, a comparison of the aims of American policy—as formulated by President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger—shows a striking contrast between promise and fulfilment, between hopes raised and the results obtained.

During the period of the implementation of this policy the balance of power has shifted against the West. Instead of a new "pentagonal balance" we have witnessed the disenchantment, to a smaller or greater degree, of Europe, China and Japan, the three pillars on which the new "structure of peace" was supposed to rest. The American-European relations in particular are worse than ever before in the last half century. What is more, such dangerous symptoms do not elicit sufficient anxiety on either side of the Atlantic to foster initiative to improve the situation. They are smothered by the soothing perspective of *détente*. The dangers involved in the present drift in the Atlantic Alliance would suggest that the fundamentals of this policy should be soberly assessed and brought home to the general public. Otherwise no realistic cure for the present ills of the American-European relations can be achieved. Diplomatic or administrative palliatives would not be sufficient to have this particular world restored.

Détente: past and future

Détente is not a modern Soviet invention. Its tactical beginnings are to be found in Lenin's views on Bolshevik strategy and tactics in 1921.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Western enthusiasts proclaimed its existence already in Khrushchev's time. But the present policy of *détente* emerged as a result of a United States initiative, a concomitant to America's reduction of its global commitments. It was conceived as a means which was expected to facilitate American disengagement from its confrontation with the Soviet Union, to permit a policy of balancing between Moscow and Peking (made possible by the resumption of American-Chinese relations), and to promote an increased international rôle for Europe and Japan.

As has been noted, the results of the *détente* policy in its present form do not conform to its political premises, to its proclaimed purposes, and to the expectations raised with the public at large.

The Soviet Union has deftly turned the tables and used *détente* to promote its own interests against the interests of the United States and of the Western countries in general, rather than accept *détente* as a *modus vivendi* leading to a "structure of peace." Western policies were immediately handicapped because of the illusions generated by the Western perception of *détente* as based on genuine relaxation and reciprocity, while the Soviet Union saw it as an opportunity to lull Western public opinion into a lack of vigilance towards the perils it was facing, to divide the West by exploiting the differences between America and Europe, in short to promote one-sidedly and vigorously its own political and strategic interests.

The experience of *détente* in action during the period since it was proclaimed is a string of Western disappointments, of political developments which were directly contrary to the hopes of the architects of this policy. There has been since then a general weakening of the Western position strategically, economically and politically.

First of all, *détente* was presented as promising increased security for the West, i.e. for both America and Europe. The SALT-I agreement was hailed as a turning point in the arms race. It was seen as a genuinely reciprocal arrangement stabilizing the strategic balance, thereby dispelling American and European anxieties about security. The acceptance of nuclear parity with the Soviet Union was interpreted as a step towards further reciprocal measures of arms control (through supplementary arrangements in SALT-II) rather than a step which put on agenda the possibility of the Soviet Union reaching for military superiority, the American debate about the proper response to it and the highest military budgets in the peacetime history of the two countries. It is not surprising that the Western public fed for years on the optimistic fare of *détente*, is puzzled and bewildered, and that the West is at a disadvantage in matters of security-spending (Soviet leaders do not have to "sell" it to their public politically). The repeated visits of Kissinger and Nixon to Moscow are not likely to affect this picture in favour of the West, as is now quite clear.

As far as Europe is concerned, the Soviet-supported Middle Eastern war resulting in the Arab oil embargo has struck a heavy blow to the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NATO alliance. A combination of the *détente*-induced complacency and of the most short-sighted economic nationalism has seriously undermined its cohesion. For the first time the prospect of European neutralism as a first step towards the "Finlandization" of Europe has acquired reality. Politically, the Western world has reached such a point of disarray that *Time* magazine has even referred to "the West" as an obsolete concept.

It is not difficult to see that the present kind of *détente* policy has contributed to this outcome. The exaggerated American preoccupation with Soviet exigencies resulted in a neglect of European susceptibilities and the universal hopes generated by *détente* lowered the Europeans' concern about their security so much that Dr Kissinger's "Year of Europe" turned out to be a resounding flop. Later, there was a chain reaction to the treating of allies as a nuisance and of enemies as friends. One cannot absolve the Europeans for their vacillations and the short-sightedness of their conduct. During and after the Middle East War the European "allies" indeed behaved in a most reprehensible and un-allied fashion. The fact remains that American policy instead of strengthening the Atlantic community has only deepened the already existing European malaise and contributed to the weakening of the Alliance.

While the Soviet Union is registering slow and intermittent, but cumulative, political gains and becoming more menacing, the West is bickering. At a time when the internal situation in many Western countries is at its most dismal since the war, when *détente* has clearly not brought any *quid pro quo* for all the Western concessions made for its sake, when the newly recognized East Germans are already occasionally resuming the tactics of traffic obstruction to Berlin (a problem which *détente* was supposed to have solved) the picture of political disunity, both within Europe and between Europe and America can only gladden the heart of the Soviet leaders. The political illusions of *détente* have certainly contributed to this picture. The Soviet press is gloating with satisfaction over the mess on both sides of the Atlantic, and the Soviet leaders are only too keen to profit by the French-American quarrels. The politics of blackmail, so successfully practised by the Arab countries, may not remain the monopoly of those countries. *Détente* will not preclude its application by the Soviet Union as well, once it feels that it can be used without undue risks. The Watergate paralysis in the United States and the economic beggar-my-neighbour policies of the European states may offer new opportunities to the Soviet Union. Its imperial aggrandizement is predicated on the weakening of the political will of its opponents. A genuine *détente* is, of course, most desirable, but in its present form *détente* proved to be an effective instrument in the process of weakening the West, as it has hidden from it the political and military realities of the situation and lowered the threshold of risks for the Soviet Union. It made possible the presentation in the West of political failures as successes for peace,

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of businessmen's fantasies about profits as rational enterprises in the interests of the state, of Western military decline as an achievement leading towards strategic stability. It is time for the West to recover its sense of reality if Western civilization is to survive. The Soviet attitude to the *détente,* even in its present form, is not irreversible, it may well one day be followed by a more militant posture as happened before when the Soviet Union decided that the circumstances were ripe for a change of strategy.

It is only as the end product of a well thought out and firmly executed policy, supported by public opinion aware of the issues, that a genuine *détente* may come. It can only be a result of the Soviet recognition of its necessity and it would certainly be welcome. No one wishes a recurrence of military confrontations which carry with them unforeseen consequences. However, *détente* cannot be based on illusions. It must be a two-way street. The Soviet Union must contribute to it by giving some indications that it does not intend cynically to exploit it as an opportunity to improve its ability to subvert and destroy the West. *Détente* will not be genuine as long as " peaceful coexistence " is for the Soviet leaders only a euphemism for a conflict by all means short of war.

An evolution of Soviet policy towards a meaningful *détente* would require its moving away from this position. Among the measures that can be taken as indications of such an evolution in the Soviet Union would be the following points:

1. Abandoning the " ideological war " against the West.
2. Decelerating the arms build-up.
3. Giving up the idea of military superiority in the SALT-II negotiations.
4. Providing a proof of a serious approach to *détente* at the talks on European security by liberalizing the movement of peoples and the flow of ideas.
5. Stopping the sabotage of the peace efforts in the Middle East.
6. Discontinuing the supply of arms to the so-called guerrilla movements and desisting from other forms of subversion.

If none of these steps is taken, Soviet assurances about *détente* will remain empty. If, however, some of them are taken, even gradually, it would be an indication of an evolution in the right direction. When all of them begin to be implemented it would be a sign that the Soviet Union is genuinely interested in *détente* and is prepared to take its place as a responsible member of the community of nations.

This statement was written by a group of students of Soviet and international affairs, which includes **Robert Conquest, Brian Crozier, John Erickson, Joseph Godson, Gregory Grossman, Leopold Labedz, Bernard Lewis, Richard Pipes, Leonard Schapiro, Edward Shils, P. J. Vatikiotis.**

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Conversation with François Bondy

Cultural Exchange and its Prospects

George Urban

Urban—The idea of "cultural exchange" makes me feel uneasy, for the linkage between "culture" and "exchange" conveys the impression that culture is some package of goods of known value which you barter away for other cultural commodities of the same value—and this isn't at all self-evident. "Exchange" itself brings this analogy to mind, but we also talk of "flows" of people and ideas; we insist that there has to be a "balance" between the exchange of basketball teams and opera singers; and our cultural agreements are negotiated by state monopolies (ministries of education) with a fine sense for keeping a positive balance of payments between cultural "exports" and "imports." [1]

I'm not sure if I know what exactly culture is, but I think I know what it isn't—it is not a commodity. Aren't we then betraying culture by forcing it into the Procrustean bed of intergovernmental barter?

Bondy—The question has been worrying me too a great deal lately. There is a lot of talk of making culture perform the kind of functions politics and economics do. This is, of course, nonsense. Culture is elusive; one cannot put it into any particular pigeon-hole, for it continuously crosses barriers. Culture, for an easy definition, is a flux, and fluxes aren't caught in baskets.

But coming to the specific case of having cultural exchange with the Soviet Union and the East European countries, my dilemma is that we betray culture if we have such relations but we also betray it if we refuse having them. Those of us involved in seeing people from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and travelling to these countries are faced with the morally uncomfortable situation of having to entertain, meet and be kind to a lot of hacks and bureaucrats if we want to get through to the really valuable and independent-minded people, the creators, if you like, of culture. So one has to meet the *apparatchiks*, including often sinister people, and one has a tongue-in-cheek relationship with them. They will be very genial, they will joke with you and even give you subtly to understand that they, too, know perfectly well the nature of the game you are playing. There is double-talk on both sides.

Now this is clearly regrettable. But on the other hand, if—out of a sense of integrity and solidarity with the persecuted writers and

[1] Professor Peter Wiles originated this analogy in his paper, "On the principles of cultural exchange."

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

intellectuals—you refuse to let yourself in for this game, then you may not reach these persecuted or isolated people at all. The amount of double-talk needed and the length of the detour varies, of course, from country to country, so one should not generalize, but it is true of all socialist countries that in order to reach the genuine people, you have to go through the functionaries.

I am therefore reluctant to accept the point implied in your question, namely that our attitude should be one of straightforward revulsion at this notion of cultural good. If, in order to preserve our integrity, we were to communicate with the genuine East European and Russian writers and scholars only through a clinically sterilized, narrow channel, then we might not be able to give them the feeling that they are in touch with us, which they so obviously need. I have seen it suggested before: walk on stilts through the excrement if you want to make any headway at all—but this amount of moral fastidiousness would be an easy way of evading the problem altogether and I am not for it. One might as well abandon any pretence that cultural exchange has anything to do with culture.

Urban—The distaste one feels for the *apparatchiks* with whom one has to rub shoulders varies, I think, with the background of the *apparatchiks*. The standard opportunists are such an ageless type that I find them the least embarrassing to deal with—we know exactly where we are with them, and they are the vast majority. The hypocrites of the refined Tartuffian stamp are a more complicated case, but one's real difficulties start only with the hard core of true believers of whom there are, fortunately, not too many.

Bondy—Obviously we deal with people whose profession as bureaucrats is to oppress and silence a lot of people, to send them to gaol and asylums and—in Eastern Europe—to exert pressure and keep tabs on intellectuals in less visible ways, e.g. by preventing them from existing as intellectuals, preventing them from travelling and so on.

For example, in the coming days I'll be playing host to a leading cultural functionary of an East European state. The organization in my country which had invited him asked me if I'd like to show him around, so I invited him to my house. Now I know that this man and many others like him have very little to do with culture, and the genuine writers of their country would be reluctant to have anything to do with them. However, if I refused to deal with functionaries of this sort while they were visiting us in the West, my chances of returning to the East European countries and of meeting the writers and scholars I really want to see would be much reduced. So I don't know how to avoid this kind of contact. There are, I know, writers in Russia and Eastern Europe who feel betrayed: "You have wined and dined this or that monster and are making sure that the suppression of culture and censorship are here to stay." But if you stand on your integrity and avoid the *apparatchiks*, aren't you punishing the people you are most anxious to help? It is an awful dilemma.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

I was once invited to dinner at the house of a distinguished East European intellectual: I had marked the wrong day in my diary and turned up on the wrong night. There was a slight embarrassment—a Government Minister was there and a couple of other high officials. However, I was asked to stay and one of the topics we came to chat about was the films of a well-known director. " It is a pity " I said, " that we don't see enough of these films in the West and I'm told that some of them are heavily censored." At this point one of the guests at the dinner table gave me a good-humoured look and told me with a broad smile on his face that he was the one who censored films and that he had unfortunately had to make a lot of cuts in the films of this director. Now it was my turn to be embarrassed. But the censor wasn't in the least put out; he said he understood my point perfectly and that he'd discuss the matter with him.

You see, it is not a pleasant experience to be at dinner with a censor, but I am certainly prepared to be on good terms with anyone I can in Eastern Europe so long as this keeps my way open to the writers I want to stay in touch with.

Urban—You are up against the oldest of dilemmas: do ends justify means? And, in this specific case, are the ends good enough to justify stretching one's conscience a little? I suppose in Eastern Europe the question is not being put very sharply at the moment for—with the exception of Czechoslovakia—the cultural commissars are not the unpalatable lot they are in Russia. But one has, of course, no assurance that this state of affairs will last, and it may well be that one day the means will become so heavily tainted again that they may nullify any good we may have hoped to serve by using them.

Bondy—Once you become professional about anything the means become your sole concern. In cultural exchange, too, we have reached a stage where we are beginning to feel that the means are self-sufficient —that keeping the channels open is an end in itself no matter what, if anything, flows through them. This is a great problem. I think we ought to subject the stuff that actually comes through these channels to very serious examination: whom have we actually helped? What publications, what translations can be directly ascribed to our interest? What films and plays owe their existence or staging to our encouragement? We have to draw a balance sheet to see whether we have in fact made any headway—whether we aren't under the illusion of having achieved something, whereas in reality we are just making excuses for some of our activities for the simple reason that they flatter our vanity. The lure of the red-carpet treatment has to be resisted.

It is under conditions of the latter kind that the medium of exchange becomes the message itself. It is then that the medium no longer transmits any message, or that the message is so garbled as to be meaningless. This can very easily happen.

Urban—At what point would you refuse having *apparatchiks* sent

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

over under cultural exchange agreements? As long as exchange is conducted through official channels, we aren't in a strong position.

Bondy—There are issues on which we cannot compromise. If, for example, the Russians propose to send us scientists who have condemned Sakharov in some open letter, we should flatly refuse to allow them in. People of this kind already enjoy too much Western largesse and hospitality. We are of course caught in an ugly dilemma: we want cultural exchange, but cultural exchange may very well function against the people who create and represent culture.

There are issues on which we should even risk a complete breakdown of cultural exchange. Suppose a distinguished Russian mathematician is confined in a psychiatric asylum for his political views; then it is the duty of Western mathematicians to stand up as a body and tell the Russians that they would see no *official* Russian mathematician until the one in the asylum was free to talk to them.

Urban—But this solidarity is very hard to come by.

Bondy—It is, as we could see from the horrible example of the World Psychiatric Congress in Mexico where the assembled psychiatrists refused to protest to the Soviet Government against the committal of people to so-called psychiatric asylums on grounds of "incurable reformist and utopian ideas." *The Times* backed the refusal in an editorial, taking the line that psychiatrists throughout the world were in the same boat and that we in the West were in a poor position to rock it. The reason given was that in some Western countries psychiatrists commit people at the request of their families, without being too squeamish about the patient's real state of mental health, and once committed, it is extremely hard to get them out again. The Russians (*The Times* was implying) do this sort of thing on government orders—we do it for different reasons, but we are in the same boat.

Our answer to this argument should be that this is the kind of boat we don't want to share with the Russians, and if it is true that we are sharing it, we must indeed rock it.

Eventually, but only under public pressure, the psychiatrists decided to make a token move at their Moscow Congress and saw General Grigorenko—but this didn't lead to anything. Indeed, the Secretary-General of the World Psychiatric Association came out with a statement saying that none of this was their business—psychiatrists were serious scientists and they *would* not meddle in politics.

I am scandalized by this attitude, for psychiatry goes to the heart of the most important questions we can ask about man—"what is a human being?", "what are human values?", "what is normal behaviour?" and so on. We cannot permit psychiatry to become a technology, for if we concede that it is a value-free activity, we are in fact throwing the gates open to brainwashing and menticide.

So here we have a really frightening example of how cultural relations must not be conducted.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Urban—At the 1973 Salzburg conference on *détente*, which we both attended, Thoreau's classic question was reformulated and put to us by Professor Robert Byrnes: If our message to the Soviet intellectuals were to be summarized on a postcard, what would we be saying to them? I should like you to answer that question for I have my personal doubts whether we *have* the kind of message a man like Sakharov (or previously Solzhenitsyn) would expect from us—a message transcending complacent statistics about living standards, the permissiveness of our society and the pluralism of our political institutions.

Bondy—Well, postcards with a maximum of five words on them go at a reduced rate, so I would make our message very brief and simply say " we are concerned," for the one thing our friends in Russia and Eastern Europe need constantly to be reassured of is that they have not been forgotten, that we are concerned over their freedom and are listening to every word they utter. We must remember that the voices of many Russian and East European writers, artists and intellectuals are not as loud as were Solzhenitsyn's—yet they have important experiences to convey to us, they have thoughts they want to communicate and wishes we would want to be aware of and satisfy. This does not mean that we have to accept everything they say uncritically, but we must keep our ears open and give their message the most careful consideration. And I know how crucially important it is for their morale to know that we are informed of what is happening around them—that we know who can and who cannot publish, who is free and who isn't, what pressures are being brought to bear on this or that writer, scholar or publishing house. This, I am sure, is the most important thing we can do.

What we write is in one way or another already conveyed to the unofficial intellectuals, and even if it isn't, they have a shrewd sense of discovering it for themselves—it does not have to be specially channelled to them. But the knowledge—and especially the well-publicized knowledge—of our concern is a great reassurance to them and it helps them with their establishments. A man who is in the focus of Western attention is much more difficult to silence or to arrest than one who is not. I say difficult—not impossible—for the deportation of Solzhenitsyn shows that the Soviet Government has many illegal means at its disposal for putting (as it hopes) a man out of action without actually killing or physically silencing him on Russian soil.

Moreover, it is also in our own best interest to keep in touch with these people, for we have so much to learn from them.

Urban—But do we? When we in the West talk of cultural exchange we silently—and I think rightly—assume that by and large we are the ones who have something to impart and people in the East the ones who have something to learn. This may sound patronizing, but is it all that unjustified? I remember a meeting I had with Kuznetsov some time after his defection from the Soviet Union—well, this once

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

celebrated Russian writer, who is nobody's fool, was a babe in the woods as far as Western literature of the last hundred years was concerned. Yeats, Proust, Eliot, Rilke were all news to him, and he made no secret of his bewilderment. One would rarely come across this kind of ignorance in an East European writer, but I don't think Kuznetsov is untypical of Soviet writers and intellectuals. So what exactly do you mean when you say " we have so much to learn from them "?

Bondy—One of the two stereotypes we have about Russia is either that she is much more Eastern than Western or that she is a halfway house between Asia and Europe. But then suddenly along come people like Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov—and when I use these two names I also mean all those many, gifted *samizdat* writers whose voices are not reaching us—and they have a message for the world which we have always thought was typically Western: the dignity of the individual, the inviolability of his conscience, his right to refuse to be submerged in race, class or nation. Here in the West such ideas are being very sparingly used these days—the clear sound of the trumpet comes from Moscow. This gives us much food for thought; perhaps we ought to revise our ideas about what is typically Eastern and typically Western.

Urban—I would have thought this was the reaction of a few sensitive minds to fifty years of collectivism. I can see no sign that the ordinary Russian is any more inclined to assert his individuality than he was under the Tsars.

Bondy—This may well be so, but the culture we are now talking about is " high culture " where the keynote is struck by people like Solzhenitsyn.

Urban—Let me try and turn Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov against your principal position. It is quite clear from their many warnings that they regard *détente* on Soviet terms as a gigantic confidence trick. Buttering up a commissar every time you want to talk to a genuine writer is not the sort of thing these two men approve of. They firmly believe that if you accept Brezhnev's rules of the game, you'll be beaten by the Soviet system and you'll end up making Russia more powerful and more dangerous. So while we know from their own statements that Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov are extremely conscious of the benefits of Western publicity, they are on record as disapproving of any move that might lend the Soviet system an aura of respectability. They feel, in fact, that our connivance at Soviet double-talk has already gone too far.

Bondy—Yes, they feel that. I suppose one of the tests may be when the Soviet Union first tries to enforce its interpretation of the Universal Copyright Convention signed in May 1973. Boris Pankin [2] made it clear that the Soviet Government would not permit Russian authors to be

[2] Boris Pankin is head of the new Soviet Copyright Agency.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

published abroad except through approved channels which would, of course, mean gagging the whole of unofficial Russia.

Solzhenitsyn promptly threw down the gauntlet by having *The Gulag Archipelago* released for publication in the West, not, I think, directly to challenge the Soviet gloss on the Convention, but challenge it he did all the same. However, with Solzhenitsyn's expulsion the question is unlikely to arise. Some other book may become the test case.

The Soviet Government ostensibly signed the Convention as an act of " normalizing " a long-standing anomaly. The problem is that the Soviet leaders and the Western world do not always agree on what " normalcy " is. To official Russia the present relationship between rulers and ruled is normal. To us it seems highly abnormal and abhorrent. A " normalization " of the copyright situation *à la Russe* may well result—in fact we know it will result—in the silencing of the voices that are trying to reach us. So when the Soviets talk of " normalization ", we ought at once to remember how that concept was used in Czechoslovakia and be on our guard. We reject this interpretation of " normalcy ", and if " normalcy " threatens to cut the channels of communication between unofficial Russia and the West, we shall have to use unconventional means to keep those channels open.

Urban—This touches on the question of Soviet " laws, customs and traditions." The Soviet premise for any Security Treaty is that we must respect " Soviet laws, customs and traditions." We are, rightly, I think, reluctant to go along with this formula for we find some of the Soviet laws and most of the customs and traditions detestable. The death penalty for the theft of state property, the internal passport system, which is a hangover from serfdom, and the arbitrary and inhuman treatment of ordinary people at every turn are normal things in the Soviet Union, but we can surely never agree that they are.

Bondy—Perhaps we ought to make a distinction here between Soviet laws, most of which are, on paper, civilized and acceptable, and Soviet customs and traditions, most of which are not. We ought to tell the Russians: " We don't want you to respect our laws, but you don't even respect *your* laws. Your " customs and traditions " run slap in the face of your own Constitution. Why on earth should *we* help you to defy your own laws and permit you to get away with illegality? " After all, there is nothing in Soviet law to prevent citizens from gathering together in small groups and shouting " Freedom to Czechoslovakia," or from publishing books abroad, and when they get arrested for these things, no law is quoted against them.

Urban—The Soviet leaders' record of complying with this kind of point is not a very good one. While they may, so long as they have a stake in *détente,* refrain from doing certain outrageous things such as imprisoning or killing Solzhenitsyn—they are most unlikely to say to us " Give us your interest-free loan, help us to build a steel-works at Kursk, and we'll mend our ways on civil liberties." They will want to keep their " customs and traditions " intact *and* get the steel-works

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and fibre plants too. And by all the indications we can see at the present, the Western world—and especially the Federal Republic which wants to get its *Ostpolitik* moving again—will quietly assist the Russians in having their way.

Bondy—One could argue that by speeding up the sophistication of the system in Russia you are also speeding up its demise, for highly-trained Russians will not (so it is claimed) put up with totalitarianism. I am not at all convinced that this is so. The simple and sobering fact is that our relationship with Russia is unlike that with any other country, and this is due to the historic, cultural and political " otherness " of the Soviet Union. Pierre Courtade, former editor of the French Communist daily *l'Humanité*, described the Soviet Union after a recent visit as " a Congo equipped with rockets," echoing Alexander Herzen's fear of " Genghis Khan with the telegraph." We have, frankly, no answer to this problem. The best we can hope to do is to encourage the custodians of the rockets to keep the rockets at bay and put a premium on any move the system may make to work its way out of its Congo. On the practical plane this means that, so long as the cost of keeping the channels of communication free is not unacceptably high, we should go on exploring any opening we may find—whether it is through radio, cultural exchange, scientific cooperation or whatever. But we must do this with our eyes open and be fully conscious that, certainly in the short run, the Soviet system is unlikely to change.

Urban—One important point is whether the free flow of people and ideas—" Basket Three "—would really undermine the Soviet system and thereby fundamentally change the status quo. Do you feel that the Soviet leaders' fear is real, and if so, is it justified?

Bondy—I can't attempt to answer this question before first looking at the character of the personalities involved—a very un-Marxist approach foisted on us by the un-Marxist manner in which Soviet leaders come to power and exercise power.

Well, Khrushchev did not have this fear very strongly—Brezhnev does. Khrushchev was an adventurous man, perhaps the last Soviet leader to believe quite sincerely that the Soviet system could stand up to competition with the United States, for it had, through its ideology, the key to a morally, politically and economically superior social order. Brezhnev appears to have no such faith whatsoever; he behaves like the head of a country that needs development aid to fend off the consequences of a bad harvest—a country that is economically unable to pull itself up by its own bootstraps and is openly acknowledging the economic superiority of the West. Khrushchev was storming around the world challenging everyone to tackle him on the rival merits of the socialist and capitalist systems, and he really *was* convinced that he would " bury us." Brezhnev knows that in 1974 the Soviet Union has no charisma—that a recipient of development aid cannot expect fanatical commitments at home or abroad, and that the " God " has not only " failed," but that its only chance to avoid being toppled is to exact

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the passive obedience of its citizens. The fall, when you think of it, from *The God that Failed* of the 1930s to a poorly functioning society that cannot afford to pay a modest *interest* on the loans it is trying to borrow from us, is truly remarkable.

All this prompts me to believe that the Soviet leaders of our day are genuinely worried that a free flow of people and ideas might upset the apple-cart.

On the other hand we have the example of Yugoslavia to show that a communist government can happily survive intense and continuous contact with the West. The Yugoslavs have hundreds of thousands of their citizens temporarily domiciled in Western Europe. They travel backwards and forwards, they enjoy Western living standards and civil freedoms and carry the " infections " of the West with them; yet the roof in Yugoslavia hasn't fallen in (and if it does fall in it will be for different reasons). So what we can learn from Yugoslavia is that the communist system—the one-party state—can co-exist with a much larger degree of openness, with a much freer movement of people and information than the Soviet leaders would allow.

Urban—But what are the reasons for Yugoslavia's immunity? Of all the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, only two—the Russian and the Yugoslav—are indigenous. This entirely home-based, nationalistic nature of Yugoslav communism would partly explain its relative invulnerability. Moreover, one has to remember that the great migration of Yugoslav workers to the Federal Republic and other Western countries did not start until after the Yugoslav Party had been thrown out of Cominform and the regime had considerably mellowed. There is, in addition, the cultural Westernness of the Slovenes and Croats and their tradition, going back to the Habsburg Empire, of free communication with Austrians, Hungarians and Italians.

Of these conditions only the first—the indigenous nature of the communist regime—applies, and only partly applies, to Soviet communism. In all other respects the Soviet regime inherited a wholly different set of traditions—secretiveness, xenophobia, and centuries of isolation from the West. So my impression is that the Yugoslav regime's ability to resist Western infections does not really allow us to infer that the Soviet regime would prove equally immune.

Bondy—Yes, there are these differences. It is, in history, always very difficult to make valid comparisons. What would communism be like in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia if the Soviet Union had not interfered? Would there be any? Today Hungary, for instance, is much more accessible to Western people and ideas (and vice versa) than any other communist state outside Yugoslavia, and Poland seems, to some extent, to be following suit. Yet communism in these countries is not collapsing. And my explanation of the survival of the system in these countries would be that the local regimes can afford a certain liberalization precisely because they know that the ultimate sanction—occupation by a tough and strong Russia on the pattern of 1956 and

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1968—is there in the background to punish those who go too far. In other words, we can deduce no political laws about communism in Eastern Europe. We can only say that the geographic position of this or that country has made it inevitable that she should be under a specific form of communism.

But the position of Eastern Europe is *totally* different from Russia. Most of Eastern Europe is part of the West which happens to be under Soviet control—and I include, of course, in this notion of Eastern Europe Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Ninety per cent of what is written and thought there is Western. Even under Stalin Eastern Europe was less hermetically sealed off than Russia. The inhibiting vicinity of the Soviet Union has never really eradicated the cultural Westernness of these countries and it is most unlikely to do so in the future.

Urban—Cultural exchange, then, with the East European countries is a very different proposition from what it is with Russia.

Bondy—Very different indeed—it is like talking to like. When you visit Poland, Hungary or Czechoslovakia, you are overwhelmed by a feeling that you are among Western people with Western values—sometimes more Western than our own values precisely because so many East European intellectuals feel cut off and frustrated. And it is not just a minority—a small band of brave intellectuals, who carry this tradition of belonging to the West—but the broad mass of the people. It breaks surface now in this, now in that form and it is quite irrepressible. The paintings painted, the books written, the films made in Eastern Europe are so close to our own and so distant from the Soviet traditions that, seen from the Soviet point of view, they must surely seem even more squarely Western than they seem to us. I am pretty certain that a good deal of the Russian apprehension about Eastern Europe has to do with this great cultural gap. The Russians can see that the East European countries aren't really part of themselves, that they are merely under temporary Soviet management, that they may explode in their hands again and that they can, therefore, never be regarded as permanent building stones of the communist world.

Urban—You mentioned the culture of the Baltic republics as being part of the Western tradition.

Bondy—Yes, recently I attended a writers' conference with participants drawn from both parts of Europe. Well, one remarkable thing I noticed was the behaviour of the Estonians: they sided in virtually all questions with the West Europeans and East Europeans and practically never talked to the Russians—not, mind you, out of any racial or nationalistic prejudice, but simply because the Estonians were genuine writers while the Russians were bureaucrats—they had nothing to say to each other. And I suspect—in fact I know—that Estonian literature is much freer than Russian literature; it is much closer to Finland and Poland than to Russia. So it may be a useful mental exercise to carry

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the notion of a "Western" Eastern Europe further back into the multinational Soviet state itself, for it may well be that the dividing line runs deeper than we normally think.

At the same time it is perfectly true that in the Soviet Union—unlike Eastern Europe—the struggle for civil rights is entirely in the hands of a very small number of individuals. If you look at the background of the people who participate in the protests you will find that the girl talking to some American professor in Moscow is Tvardovsky's daughter, that the protest in Red Square is led by the grandson of Litvinov and so on. Wherever you go the dissident movement is largely carried by family traditions, some Christian sect, Jewish and other minority cultures. You can, unfortunately, too often identify the source of protest as being untypical of the Russian people as a whole. You could not do that in Poland or Czechoslovakia where the protesters are simply *Jedermann.*

Urban—In an earlier part of this conversation you corrected a patronizing misjudgement we are only too apt to make—that in cultural exchange we in the West are the natural donors and the Russians and East Europeans the natural recipients and beneficiaries. If we think of culture in the broad sense and include in it, as we should, the political culture of a society, I can see a very real possibility that a two-way traffic in people and ideas may make *us* into the recipients in ways we may not find beneficial.

Take the increasingly complex relationship between the Federal Republic and the GDR. As more and more West Germans come to know East Germany at first hand, they find an emotional chord being struck by certain aspects of East German life. They discover that East Germany is a less rushed Germany, a land of simpler values and more innocence than pulsating, chaotic, over-saturated, materialistic West Germany which is open to every influence. The West German finds a purposefulness, a single-mindedness to life in East Germany that he misses in the West. My impression is that the more we are exposed to the perturbing complexities of our civilization, the more people will hanker after order, ground-rules and unchanging values, and for many of them an ideological framework is perhaps the next best thing to living in a state of grace, which, in a sense, it is.

Bondy—The lure of possessing a single key to the world's problems has always been very strong, and the knowledge that a power exists which is using that key in its daily policies can add to the attraction, especially if one is in a position to form judgements about it from a safe distance.

Stalinist Russia with its unspeakable crimes has had an immense attraction for Western scientists, writers and scholars. In 1935 I was myself present, as a student, at the first communist-inspired Congress for Cultural Freedom—Gide was there, Malraux was there, even Musil was there, quite apart from people like Ehrenburg. This was the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

time when Soviet Russia had a magnetic attraction for Western intellectuals and one overlooked the realities, and those people who did travel to Russia chose to shut their eyes to the facts. Koestler has brilliantly described this in his own case and so have others. Stalinist Russia, of which one normally knew only from a distance, was admired —the Russia which in our view has become a little more civilized, the Russia to which one can take package tours, has lost all magic.

Sartre, for instance, who backed Stalin, never backed Khrushchev —he felt that a dictatorial state should not expose its ills to the wide world. Distance increases the mystery—familiarity (as the saying goes) breeds contempt. Diderot, philosophizing from Paris, was profoundly attracted by Catherine's Russia, but when he *did* see Russia (he was conducting a series of philosophical discussions with Catherine at the time of Pugachov's uprising) his feelings cooled very quickly. Pugachov was publicly quartered and decapitated, and Catherine had the guerrilla's limbs exhibited on wheels in four suburbs of St. Petersburg.

Now the case of the West Germans is a peculiar one. The majority of young students of the New Left are no longer anarchists: many have moved over to the Communist Spartakus League and support the GDR. Even people like Martin Walser give their vote to the Communist Party. He too is for the GDR and so, to some extent, is Peter Weiss. Quite a few of the better writers have become communists not, of course, because they have been exposed to cultural exchange. It is much more because they want to shock their society by showing it that they mean business. And how do you do that? Not by talking in the name of some utopia that will obviously never be, but by being on the side of the big battalions which may one day really take over. And, in fact, when you stop being a talking shop and support a regime which has existed for 25 years and has now exacted recognition and can be held up as a practical model of society, people will sit up and listen to you because they are afraid that what you're preaching may come true. And what can give an intellectual greater satisfaction than the thought that he is capable of frightening people?

Urban—I wasn't thinking so much of the back-room intellectual's admiration for power (though this is clearly as important as it is psychologically intriguing) as of a more and more bewildered Western public's demand for a cohesive social and moral framework in which right is right and wrong is wrong. Our senses are battered by an information explosion we cannot assimilate; we are being assaulted by environmental crises, news of the exhaustion of energy resources with its awesome consequences, the collapse of governmental and presidential authorities, strikes, chaos in industrial relations, terrorism, technological innovations with which we cannot catch up and so forth.

When a society's bewilderment has reached that stage, almost any alternative may seem preferable—people will not only not shy away from a black and white answer to their problems, but they may be positively looking for one.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

So I would not be too surprised if a lot of ordinary people would have this kind of reaction: "Our institutions aren't working too well; our money is being eroded by inflation. Perhaps we ought to try something else. Why democracy? Why pluralism? Why a free for all in moral values? Wouldn't it be safer to have a narrower band of options and a stricter discipline? Hasn't the communist world got at least part of the answer—badly applied, to be sure, but couldn't we improve on it?" I would have thought the Germans might be especially prone to say (as some East Germans already do): "These inefficient Muscovites have botched Marxism which is, after all, a German invention. *We* would know how to make it work." Nor would this be a new departture in modern German history. Ricarda Huch wrote from Munich in February 1919: "The opinion that the Germans are called upon to carry through what Russian Bolshevism would like to do, but cannot do, appears to me correct."

Then there is also the fact that no country which has sustained a rate of inflation of over 20 per cent for long has been, or has remained, a democracy. To take one very pertinent example, inflation in the United Kingdom has been running at an annual rate of about 10 per cent since 1970, and the British shopping basket between December 1972 and December 1973 alone went up by 23 per cent, with a 46 per cent increase in the price of all basic materials and fuels. In February 1974 the *Financial Times* commodity index was 225·58 compared with 114·63 a year before. The outlook for 1974–75 is worse.

It is not a happy package.

Bondy—Well—to skip from young men to old men—Martin Heidegger, who still comes to Switzerland from time to time to attend seminars in private groups, said on one recent occasion that the GDR managed its university problems rather better than the Federal Republic. East Germany, he said, maintained at least some respect, some order and some authority. In 1933 Heidegger had very similar feelings about the Nazis—now he admires the East German interpretation of Marxism as a social technology which has produced results. You can have this transfer of values if you are a psychological type that needs order in preference to all other things.

Of course, if you are looking for a radical alternative to a bourgeois industrialized society like ours, you are trying to find one that offers a complete contrast to it and is not just another—and poorly ordered—example of industrial society on the way to embourgeoisement, such as the USSR.

You mentioned the environmental package of problems: well, the Soviet Union faces pollution problems which are much graver than its development would warrant. The Soviets are very backward in this area—they are just beginning to be aware of what is at stake, and the piquancy of their backwardness is that it is grounded in Marxist theory, for in the labour theory of value, all value is ascribed to human work

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and none to natural resources—the value of these is rated zero; so it is, for a Marxist, extremely difficult to quantify pure air, clean water, energy resources, etc. and treat them as goods we may lose. To fight pollution from a Marxist platform is therefore much more difficult than it is for us because bourgeois theory—in so far as there is such—is at least entirely open-minded on this matter. Those who have been to Russia to look at Soviet pollution problems tell us that the damage done to the Volga and the Caspian Sea is quite horrendous and that there has been deforestation on a gigantic scale.

Coming back to the question of what kind of society offers a complete contrast to ours, it is obviously China, not the USSR, and China is in fact becoming the object of admiration of many intelligent and sensitive people. I know one of Europe's leading paediatricians—a researcher in premature birth—who believes that China is way ahead of us in social medicine. The "barefoot doctors" (he says) practice a simple form of preventive medicine which is highly effective.

This kind of admiration for some particular achievement of a distant and mysterious dictatorship is familiar to us from the 1920s and 1930s when the Soviet Union was the object of admiration, only in the case of China the mystery is excitingly deepened by the unfamiliarity of the language, and ignorance or near-ignorance of Chinese history and culture, all of which makes it simpler still to visit China and come back convinced of the same sort of things Western intellectuals—the Webbs, Shaw, Kingsley Martin, Gide, Feuchtwanger, Romain Rolland and many others—used to be convinced of about Stalin's Russia.

The Soviet Union is (as I have just said) a poor man's version of the United States. It has no ethos of its own. It is trying to catch up with the United States, borrowing techniques from it and copying some of its values. These are the standards the Soviet leaders have set themselves. China is, so far at least, genuinely different or can easily be so represented.

Urban—The anti-Americanism of many European intellectuals is probably an additional incentive to see China rather than the Soviet Union as the valid alternative to Western bourgeois society.

Bondy—Yes, and this is affecting the European Left's whole attitude to cultural exchange with Russia. Anti-American feeling has always run high among European intellectuals, and the war in Vietnam has done nothing to lessen it. For example, Heinrich Böll recently turned against official Russia with the argument: "If Brezhnev has lowered himself to talking and making pacts with a detestable man like Nixon, then I can have no respect for Brezhnev or the regime he heads." The mere fact that *détente* has opened the channels between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the American leaders has turned many European intellectuals against Russia—how (they ask) can you compromise or even talk with evil people like Nixon? The European Left is looking for some embodiment of an uncompromising counter-force to the hated Western establishment. As Russia does not look

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

like being that any more, she becomes unattractive and the whole idea of having cultural exchange with Russia loses its fascination. And this is where China again comes into the picture . . .

Urban— . . . except, of course, that the Chinese are also on their way to hobnobbing with the American leaders, in which case the European intellectual Left may soon run out of worthy targets of admiration.

Bondy—What can I add to your point about the accident-proneness of Germany? My impression is that what the West Germans like about the GDR is precisely that it has not caught up with modernity—that it is a more quiet, car-less place with many of the virtues of the older Germany still preserved intact. So if it is seen as a model, it is certainly not seen as a model of progress but rather of nostalgia.

Urban—The German case has many peculiarities. Whereas in the United States and Britain " culture " is never spoken of in the context of power, in Germany, and especially in France, it is. There seems to be a difference here between the Anglo-American and the Continental traditions.

Bondy—Let me go into this in some detail. When the Americans talk to the Russians about cultural exchange, it is quite clear that they speak from a position of strength and with enormous self-confidence. Western Europe has no comparable power and we are much more likely to want to appease. This is not obvious to the naked eye, but the Europeans' tacit fear of the Soviet Union, their unwillingness to drive an issue home, is never far under the surface.

Urban—I'm not sure if I'd agree with that. In the preparation of the Security Conference, for instance, America seemed much more pliable than most of Western Europe, and on " Basket Three " Europe is really carrying the ball. If you compare the United States Secretary of State's speech at the Helsinki meeting with that of the British Foreign Secretary, the differences strike me at least as more than differences in style; I had a distinct feeling that the two men were reading from different scores.

Bondy—Western Europe is too large a word, for there is no such thing as a West European or EEC attitude to *détente*. The European attitudes vary according to tradition. The British looked upon the Security Conference as a straightforward exercise in foreign policy and could, for a long time, see no virtue in it. So they were, and are, quite tough. The French have, as always, played their own game. The French tradition of *rayonnement*—of looking on culture as a weapon in your political arsenal which you deploy the way you deploy your diplomacy—is a very old one and is being pursued with great vigour. A visit by the Comedie Française to the Soviet capital is regarded in Paris as an event of national importance—something the British would find mildly funny and quite incomprehensible. It is this cultural " imperialism " that makes it rather easy for France to cooperate with

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Soviet Union whose attitude to culture is, *mutatis mutandis,* rather similar . . .

Urban— . . . which is not surprising as the Russian attitude to culture as a means of political policy is largely French in origin.

Bondy—Quite; in Russia, as in France, "high culture" means prestige, it touches on politics, it has to do with the image of the country and so on.

The German case is different again in the sense that the attitudes of the people who make and condone policies suffer from a peculiar weakness: the Germans have always felt a great urge to be *Musterschueler.* They stood out as *Musterschueler* in the Cold War and are now models of tact in pursuing *détente.* Their inclination always to do a little more than what is required of them—to indulge in *Fleissaufgaben*—makes me feel uncomfortable. When German officials believe that *Ostpolitik* demands certain policies to be adopted in their diplomacy, they do not hesitate to apply them to culture, expecting German artists, writers and scientists to fall into line with them. This is where Germany's much-vaunted pluralism—codetermination—should come in but apparently does not come into the picture. Culture cannot be harnessed to diplomacy without utterly betraying itself.

Let me give you a recent and by now famous example. In the summer of 1973 Günther Grass was due to give a private reading from his works in Moscow in the house of Ulrich Sahm, the German Ambassador, who had also invited Grass to stay with him. Grass made his preparations—he had got indirectly in touch with both Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn, and Solzhenitsyn was prepared to give him a manuscript to take back. In the meantime Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn came out with their statements about the risks of *détente.* Grass received a private letter from Sahm in which he was told that in view of the new situation it would be better if he called off his visit, and Sahm withdrew his invitation. Sahm thought he was acting as a private person cancelling a private arrangement. However, Grass took the matter in a different spirit; he had the letter published, made two television appearances about it and discussed the issues raised by the cancellation in the press. He argued that if *Ostpolitik* meant that people who had travelled to Russia before could travel there no longer, because, for diplomatic reasons, culture had become too dangerous, then he, who had always stood up for *Ostpolitik,* must turn against it. *Ostpolitik* (he said) then becomes the betrayal of culture and of the Russian writers.

You might say Sahm's letter was a *faux pas* on the part of one German diplomat acting in his private capacity and over-zealous in his interpretation of *détente,* and that the German Government had nothing to do with the whole business. However, Grass's publication of the letter earned him a public rebuke from a spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who thought the case called for an exercise

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of official humour and punned the following sentence: *Das wollen wir nicht gleich an die grosse Blechtrommel hängen sonst kommen wir in die Hundejahre.* The spokesman wanted to be witty at the expense of a committed writer and at the expense of an issue which Grass took very seriously. This was really despicable.

Well, you know how governments—all governments, I think—tacitly sponsor research institutes, books and periodicals. Ten years ago the German Government sponsored rather hawkish Cold War type of books. Now they will not sponsor anything that puts across a truthfully critical view of the USSR because they think it goes against *Ostpolitik*. They are once again caught in the spirit of *Fleissaufgabe*.

Then there was the case of (the Russian poet) Brodsky who had been invited to give a poetry reading in Munich. This was going to be subsidized, as all occasions of this kind are, by the Government-sponsored organization, Internationes. However, Brodsky is out of favour in Russia, and Internationes opined that an official subsidy would displease the Russians and refused to pay. Hans Maier, the Bavarian Minister of Education, eventually found the money; Brodsky came and his reading was a great success. But, mark you, the Soviets showed no concern either before or after the reading. There is no proof that they were in any way interested. Some over-zealous officials were simply anticipating Soviet displeasure.

Urban—I'd like you to give me an easy answer to my last and difficult question: is there likely to be any connection between *détente* and the domestic climate in the Soviet Union? In other words: do all our careful deliberations about cultural exchange, " Basket Three " and so on refer to the real world or are they nonsense?

Bondy—I must frankly say that I find a correlation very hard to establish. One should, of course, always be for an open-doors policy, free travel, the unimpeded exchange of people and ideas with all nations. However, in the specific case of the Soviet Union I can see no evidence that general trends in Soviet domestic policies have ever responded to particular acts of Western policy. Whether the Soviet Government had an open-doors or closed-doors policy in its cultural relations with the West in the past fifty years was almost entirely due to internal reasons, not Western influence.

I am speaking of general trends—of course it is true that Professor Barghoorn was set free and sent home under President Kennedy's personal pressure, and that Solzhenitsyn was forcibly expelled rather than tried and convicted because the Soviet Government feared that the subsequent outcry in the world would damage the already tenuous fabric of *détente*.

But if you look at the 1920s and the 1930s—well, in the worst days of Stalinism writers and scholars and artists and musicians could travel much more freely to and from Russia than they can today although (and probably because) there were no exchange programmes. So I

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

don't think we should delude ourselves into believing that *détente* and cultural exchange can have a fundamental impact on either making the Soviet Union more or less liberal than it is. Change in the Soviet Union is very largely the outcome of pressures within the Soviet leadership, and no one has, to my knowledge, yet found a recipe for wielding influence over the wielders of Soviet power. I'm not saying that it cannot be done; what I'm saying is that we don't know how to do it. Nor do we know whether we have unwittingly ever done it on any scale that mattered. None of which relieves us of the duty to go on trying.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Détente and Soviet policy in Eastern Europe

J. F. Brown

COHESION with viability has been the main Soviet aim in Eastern Europe since the death of Stalin. The definition of cohesion in this context is relatively easy: a situation where, in spite of local differences caused by variation in local conditions, there is a general conformity of ideological, political, and economic policy, both domestic and foreign, as laid down by the Soviet Union in any particular period. By viability is meant a degree of confidence and efficiency, especially economic, in the East European states that would increasingly legitimize communist rule and correspondingly reduce the Soviet need for a preventive preoccupation with the region.

The Stalinist period in Eastern Europe—defined here as the period during which Stalin lived—was relatively brief. It was mainly devoted to a dual process of *Gleichschaltung*: at the national level, through the imposition of leaderships trusted by Moscow; and at the domestic level, through a revolutionary transformation which assumed earthquake dimensions at the time and later laid the foundation for future socialist development.

The cohesion, therefore, that came about under Stalin was of a very distinctive kind, one that achieved its revolutionary purpose but one that could not last once the purpose was achieved. For it, viability was hardly relevant, since viability is essentially a post-revolutionary condition. Indeed, had Stalin lived beyond 1953, the system he created, successful though it was for the purposes of basic transformation, would have required modification in the new phases of consolidation and development. This job was left to his heirs.

There was no consistent Soviet policy in Eastern Europe for several years after Stalin's death. This was because of leadership divisions in Moscow and the paralysis in constructive thinking produced by the departure of a leader of Stalin's stature. True, important changes in policy, leadership, and atmosphere did occur in Eastern Europe very shortly after Stalin died, but they were nothing more than reflections of what was happening in the Soviet Union itself. They were reactions to Stalin rather than indications of how Moscow thought the East European states should be governed or their leaderships manipulated. The upheavals in Hungary and Poland in 1956 and the varying degrees of instability in other states as well were the result of the essential unviability of Stalin's system and of the failure to replace it by any new concept in the three years after his death.

This failure Khrushchev sought to redeem. Within one year after the Hungarian and Polish upheavals his leadership had been recog-

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nized; within two years it had been consolidated. In 1956 the seriousness of the task was evident; by 1958 he had the means to try to tackle it.

His attempts and his partial success are well known enough to observers of recent East European history. Against a theoretical background of newly enunciated principles of equality governing relations between socialist states, Khrushchev saw two institutions—the Warsaw Pact and, particularly, Comecon—as the instruments for welding a new, firm, and less brittle cohesion between the Soviet Union and the East European states and among the East European states themselves. But Khrushchev, much more than his predecessor and more than his successors, tended to stress the viability rather than the cohesive aspect of the Soviet aim. Whether he consciously believed that the greater the viability the greater the cohesion that would follow, whether he saw no unity, dialectical or otherwise, between the two, is difficult to say. But what is certain is that, directly in the Soviet Union and indirectly in Eastern Europe, he pursued policies and generated an atmosphere that broke the rigid frame of Stalinist conformity in quest of a viability that would make the communist system more operative and thus more attractive to its own citizens and to those labouring under other systems.

In Eastern Europe Khrushchev's attempt had a profound impact on both the national and domestic levels. The East European states were now able to assert, if not their national identity, then at least their distinctiveness, to a degree impossible under Stalin. It was never intended, of course, to allow them anything more than a semblance of independence: any illusions on this account Khrushchev sought to dispel immediately. But still, he did much to foster a situation in which East European leaderships, the composition of several of which he helped to change, developed some degree of autonomy and even some degree of bargaining leverage in their relations with the Soviet Union. (In their relations with each other, some were quite quick to show themselves legatees of traditional rivalries or prejudice.)

The autonomy which the East European states, or their leaderships, developed at the national level obviously enhanced the stimulus for change at the domestic level, especially when sweeping domestic change, set off by de-Stalinization, was promised in the Soviet Union itself. The degree of domestic change varied greatly from state to state. Many factors affected this: perhaps the most important were the level of economic advancement, public pressure, and the degree of self-confidence of the ruling elite. Sometimes the very autonomy the various leaderships now enjoyed worked against serious domestic change, as in Rumania, in Czechoslovakia before 1962, or in Poland after 1958. But domestic needs, plus the innovative example of the Soviet Union, produced considerable domestic reform and experiment in Eastern Europe—important steps towards viability and the first

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

faltering moves towards the legitimization of communist rule in Eastern Europe.

After the uneven process generally known as "de-Stalinization" in Eastern Europe the most noticeable, positive reform measures of the Khrushchev era were those affecting economic structure, planning and policy. Practically every country was affected by this, and it was hardly coincidental that the great stimulus to economic reform in Eastern Europe in the 1960s was given by the Liberman proposals in the Soviet Union in 1962. Reform blueprints, or a series of single measures for greater economic efficiency, subsequently appeared in the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, and even the Polish and Rumanian leaders were constrained to make some efforts at piecemeal change.

These reform measures—again, an illustration of growing diversity—met with different fates in different countries. In the GDR and Hungary they were to achieve great success; in Czechoslovakia they were one ingredient which produced the heady mixture of the Prague Spring; in Bulgaria they were hardly given a chance to operate before they were withdrawn. But even more important than their degrees of success or failure were their potential effects on the political and social life of the countries involved. Even the most cautious of these reforms, because they broke with the old command system of economy, tended to encourage pluralism in other branches of the polity as well. This is what bold and perceptive reformers realized and sought to accelerate; it was also what perceptive and apprehensive party *apparatchiki* realized and sought to brake. Thus, some embryonic form of political life began to re-emerge in countries like Czechoslovakia and Hungary, not to mention the distinctive case of Yugoslavia, which was developing its own system in a completely different way. In these countries, the existence of interest groups came not only to be recognized (they had always existed in all communist societies), but also to be quietly accepted, and as a result the role of the communist party was either publicly or tacitly modified. Its leading role continued to be proclaimed, but no longer was it seen as *directing* every aspect of policy implementation. As the amount of leeway grew for the interaction between various interest groups, so the party tended to assume a more Olympian role: that of arbitrating issues between various interest groups and of setting the general policy and frame within which public life was to be conducted.

KHRUSHCHEV lost power in October 1964 but the developments which began in Eastern Europe during his period of rule continued for several years after it was terminated. In fact, the Khrushchev era in Eastern Europe ended in August 1968 rather than October 1964. The momentum of what had begun during his rule increased after it, and had he remained in power no one would have tried harder than he to check it. He had allowed forces to be set in motion which

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

he appears to have seriously underestimated. One of these was certainly that of East European nationalism; another was the threat to communist party dominance by other political, economic, and social forces within some East European societies. Thus, forces which it was first considered could be harnessed for purposes of legitimizing communist rule, and even Soviet hegemony, were found to be so strong as to undermine the legitimacy they had been intended to strengthen. In the pursuit of viability, the goal of cohesion was made less attainable.

There were three outstanding examples of this. One was the rather special case of Albania, whose leaders, from nationalistic considerations, took advantage of the Sino-Soviet dispute and threw off Soviet tutelage. More important, however, were the cases of Rumania and Czechoslovakia. In the former national autonomy developed into a nationalist Rumanian policy, repudiating Soviet hegemony through the skilful manipulation of various factors, of which the Sino-Soviet dispute was perhaps the most important; in the latter, domestic reform rushed headlong towards a repudiation of all known variants of the communist system itself. Both processes took place during the Khrushchev era and were made possible by it; both accelerated after his departure.

This acceleration after October 1964 was facilitated by a number of factors, of which two were perhaps the most important. The first was that for over three years after Khrushchev's fall there was practically no Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe. There was, therefore, a hiatus similar to that which had occurred after Stalin's death. Not only was the new Soviet leadership relatively inexperienced in East European affairs; it was much more directly concerned with consolidating its power in the Soviet Union. Secondly, the serious consequences of what had been initiated in Eastern Europe during Khrushchev's rule could not quickly be realized or even foreseen. True, Rumania, after a brief period of cordiality, soon dashed any hopes the new Moscow leadership may have had of permanent quiescence with new manifestations of its independent spirit. But Rumania was isolated, the problem it presented capable of containment. A far more serious threat to the foundation of the Soviet and communist system in Eastern Europe—the transformation beginning in Czechoslovakia—did not become evident until early 1968. In December 1967 Brezhnev visited Prague for one day and left apparently reassured. Only in retrospect could he be blamed for lack of discernment.

THE Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia or, if pedantic precision is necessary, the formal removal of Dubcek in April 1969, marked the end of the Khrushchev era in Eastern Europe. It marked the beginning of a new period in which the relationship between cohesion and viability has been strongly tilted in favour of cohesion. The trauma of Czechoslovakia itself, the disruptive potential the Prague Spring

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had for other parts of Eastern Europe and possibly for the Soviet Union itself, convinced the Soviet leaders that the spirit of innovation and experimentation, of reformation, that had been abroad in Eastern Europe during the 1960s had to be terminated. They had condemned Khrushchev for "hare-brained scheming" immediately after his downfall in 1964. They had used the term then in relation to his domestic policy. Only four years later were they to realize that it may have had revelance for Eastern Europe also.

The situation now demanded a counter-reformation, the reinstitution of orthodoxy. The process as applied in Czechoslovakia is all too well known, but the "normalization" imposed by the Husak regime should not distract attention from the *broader* developments in Soviet-East European relations over the last five years.

Immediately after August 1968 there were many who feared that the crushing of the Czechoslovak experiment would lead to the imposition of a relationship between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe akin to what had existed in Stalin's day. This, however, was not attempted. What has evolved is a far more sophisticated effort to promote cohesion through a comprehensive integrationist policy at every level. With the invasion of Czechoslovakia and its ideological buttress, the Brezhnev Doctrine, serving as reminders of its grim ultimate deterrent, the Soviet leadership embarked on this comprehensive policy designed eventually to create a situation in which the circumstances that led to the necessity for invasion would no longer arise.

Integration is usually a term associated with economics, and it is true that it is most often used in referring to the Soviet Union's continued efforts, through Comecon, to exploit its own and Eastern Europe's economic strength and potential. In this, of course, Brezhnev is carrying forward Khrushchev's policy. But, whereas Khrushchev precipitately sought integration through a supranational planning body—and failed—Brezhnev, with more realism and sophistication, seeks integration "from the bottom up"—through a systematic interlocking of the basic elements of the East European economies with each other and, principally, with that of the Soviet Union. It is a long-range programme, publicly admitted to be so. But an important start has already been made with the agreements of several East European governments, including even the Rumanian, to invest in Soviet raw material industries. Presumably the ambition is that eventually the interlocking will be so complete as to make supranational planning the logical culmination of this process.

Economic integration, therefore, is still an essential part of the Soviet Union's plans, but its concept of integration goes further and wider. There is now much greater stress on political, cultural, and ideological integration as well. The apparently annual reunion of party leaders in the Crimea is simply the apex of a whole pyramid of the most varied types of meeting, at senior, intermediate, and junior levels of the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

various hierarchies, that are taking place constantly. It can be said almost without exaggeration that scarcely a day goes by without news of a meeting of some kind involving East European and Soviet officials claiming some expertise or other.

The aim of such exercises—often officially described as being held "to exchange experiences"—is uniformity: to create conditions in Eastern Europe that will preclude the possibility, on both the national and the domestic levels, that divergencies will assume the disruptive dimensions they have occasionally had in the past.

This massive essay in "directed consensus" does not mean, of course, that Moscow now eschews pressure or control of a more direct kind on individual East European regimes to secure its hegemony. There was evidence of this in the removal of Ulbricht in 1970, in the pressure on Yugoslavia and Rumania in the summer of 1971. There is reason to suspect direct interference by Moscow through the Soviet embassy in Warsaw in certain aspects of Polish domestic policy. Certainly the personnel changes in Hungary and the shifts in policy emphasis made in March 1974 were due in some measure to Soviet direction. But if the Soviet leaders have not suddenly become hidden persuaders (nor are ever likely to become such), they appear to see the future Soviet-East European interaction as one where direct pressure will be less needed than it was in the first generation of communist rule in Eastern Europe.

SOVIET policy towards Rumania and Hungary deserves special consideration, because each of these countries, in its own way, has presented challenges to Moscow's goal of a stablized uniformity. The Rumanian challenge, first ideologically formulated over ten years ago in the April Declaration of 1964, has been, on the national level, against Soviet hegemony. As long as Ceausescu survives it will remain—and the steps taken by him to institutionalize his personal rule at the end of last March indicate his concern at shoring up his power still further. But since the summer of 1971 the Soviet leaders seem to have banked on the possibility that this challenge can be reduced to the level of a tolerable irritation through a series of diplomatic manoeuvres which, Ceausescu's globe-trotting notwithstanding, enhance Rumania's isolation, through Rumania's own growing economic vulnerability and need, and through an increasing disenchantment among many sections of the Rumanian population with the shortcomings of Ceausescu's rule. Working on these assumptions, there would seem to be little need for anything but the more indirect kinds of pressure on Rumania. It is a policy that has certainly produced results over the last three years. There has been little serious strain between the two countries and, in its economic relations with the Soviet Union and Comecon, Bucharest has probably shown greater co-operation that at any time since the very beginning of the 1960s.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

But there is no guarantee that this satisfactory calm—from the Soviet point of view—will continue indefinitely. Indeed, by the spring of this year, there were already signs that it was being disturbed. The CPSU, through its loyalist parties, had begun to serve notice that it favoured the eventual convening of a new world conference of communist parties. The Rumanian was one of the parties making it quite clear that it disapproved of the idea—at least, in view of what were apparently the Soviet intentions in wanting the conference. One of these intentions was to take some measures against the Chinese party. This ran directly contrary to the Rumanian party's oft proclaimed principle of mutual tolerance in interparty relations as well as to the Rumanian state's persistence in maintaining its friendly links with Peking. It is true that, since Ceausescu's ostentatious visit to Peking in the summer of 1971, which caused serious strain in Soviet-Rumanian relations, Bucharest has pursued its friendship with China in a considerably lower key. But the intensification of Sino-Soviet polemics over the past year, in which all other Soviet allies have fully joined, has made the Rumanian policy even more anomalous. If Moscow now seeks to enforce a commitment of support from all its allies against China, then a renewed period of strain with Rumania seems unavoidable.

The problem presented by Hungary has been quite different. Hungarian foreign policy has been virtually indistinguishable from that of the Soviet Union, although there is occasional evidence, as for example in economic relations with the West, of differences of view. Yet the implicit Hungarian challenge to the Soviet concept of what Eastern Europe should look like was, for several years, more serious than the Rumanian. This was because Hungarian domestic policy, in the shape of the New Economic Mechanism, was from its inception in 1968 until very recently a Khrushchevian anachronism. It embodied those dangers of economic and social pluralism, of real political interaction, of institutional reform which burst out of control in Czechoslovakia and which, for several years now, the Soviet leaders have been seeking to eliminate.

The Soviet attitude toward the Hungarian reform was one of considerable restraint. In part, it was a restraint induced by a great deal of Hungarian skill and finesse, particularly on the part of Kadar himself. The Hungarian leadership not only supported Soviet foreign policy; it constantly assured Moscow of the Hungarian party's control over the situation and strongly rejected any notion that its domestic policy be a model for others. It thus sought to pre-empt any charge that Hungary was an agent of contamination. In fact, from the very beginning Kadar used his bargaining leverage with the Soviet leaders to good advantage. To many it seemed doubtful whether Hungary could proceed with the implementation of its New Economic Mechanism

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

after the crushing of the reform movement in Czechoslovakia in August 1968. There was considerable surprise when the Hungarian leaders not only continued their reforms, but expanded them. In retrospect, of course, it seems that Kadar was very well placed, vis-à-vis the Soviet leadership, to do precisely what he did. He had supported Brezhnev in an action, the wisdom of which he doubted; the price he was asking for his services must hardly have seemed too exorbitant to Brezhnev at the time.

It was only later, perhaps as late as 1972, that the Soviet leadership evidently realized they may have been a little too complacent about some of the implications of Hungary's reforms. Its tactics then were to add its own expressions of concern about the situation to the already existing—and increasing—difficulties which the reforms were facing in Hungary itself. These included certain purely economic problems, such as investment "overheating," inflationary tendencies and so on. But far more important was the growing discontent of large sections of the working class over what they (rightly) considered their own far too small rewards from the prosperity which the New Economic Mechanism had brought society as a whole. Many hard-liners inside the Hungarian party itself appear to have sided with these working class dissidents in an effort to slow down or change the course of the reforms. It was these two elements in Hungary, working together, plus the Soviet leadership, working, one assumes, independently for the most part, which have succeeded not in destroying the Hungarian reform (nobody ever wanted that), but in pulling it back towards, if not yet inside the bounds of what the Soviet Union apparently considers safe and acceptable. The first important step in this direction was taken at the Hungarian Party Central Committee plenum in November 1972 (a visit by Brezhnev took place immediately afterward). The second was taken in March 1974, at the plenum which removed Rezso Nyers and several other leaders identified with reform and which emphatically reaffirmed the working class orientation and orthodox character of party policy which the November 1972 plenum had laid down. Since the plenum last March, Hungarian politicians (including Kadar himself) and the communications media have sought to reassure the public that there will be no essential policy changes. No one expects the New Economic Mechanism to be scrapped overnight. But very few expect Hungary in the future to be quite so different from the rest of Eastern Europe as it was in the recent past. The Khrushchevian anachronism will gradually disappear.

THIS impressive revival of domestic conservatism in Eastern Europe could not have been achieved solely through Soviet manipulation. Moscow's post-1968 concept of cohesion found ready acceptance among the numerous officials in the East European communist parties

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

threatened by the reform trend of the previous decade. If one of the main reasons for Khrushchev's fall was the opposition of the entrenched party *apparat* in the Soviet Union, then the distrust of Khrushchevism by large sections of the East European party *apparats* has been the main reason for their acceptance of the new Soviet policy. The reversion to orthodoxy, the counter-reformation, has meant a shoring-up of their power under the ideological rubric of reaffirming the leading role of the party. In fact, considerations of power have been the mainspring of the ideological offensive waged in Eastern Europe for the last five years. A deliberate effort has been made to " depoliticize " public life by " re-ideologizing " it. But one of the main aims and consequences of this effort—having little to do with ideology as such—has been the strengthening of the power and prerogatives of the ruling communist party.

The process described above has been aimed at restoring cohesion or, more correctly, at creating a new kind of cohesion between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This had been the main Soviet preoccupation for the last five years. But essential to cohesion is public stability, a truism which the Soviet and East European ruling parties have frequently been taught by experience not to overlook. No sooner had consolidation in Czechslovakia appeared restored than the workers' riots in Poland broke out in December 1970. This upheaval not only led to a change of leadership in Poland but also led to tremors of uncertainty in other East European countries. The Polish temper was mollified by a number of important material concessions which have considerably raised the workers' standard of living. As for the rest of Eastern Europe it appears that Gierek's desperate actions in early 1971 gave a strong impetus to most governments, as well as to that of the Soviet Union, to incorporate " consumerism " as a basic part of their economic policies. In the GDR it had, in fact, become entrenched even before the Polish upheavals. But it has now become a basic (and fairly successful) part of the Husak regime's " normalization " policy in Czechoslovakia. It was embraced in a typically massive Bulgarian way at the end of 1972. It had always been in the philosophy governing Hungary's New Economic Mechanism; in November 1972 it became an obvious weapon in Kadar's effort to divert worker discontent.

But it would be a mistake to see this policy of " consumerism " in Eastern Europe solely in the negative sense of fending off trouble. It is seen also in the more positive sense of regalvanizing economic life; in other words, of re-creating viability to accompany the re-created cohesion. There is almost a River Rouge, capitalistic smack about some Soviet and East European leaders in this context. The Polish leader, Gierek, for example, genuinely seems to think that good living conditions and open, two-way communication between management and the shop floor will at one and the same time appease worker

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

resentment, blunt any demands for institutional innovations like workers' councils, and generate conditions for an efficient upsurge in production. Similar thinking is to be found elsewhere in Eastern Europe as well as in the highest echelons of the Soviet Party.

It is hardly surprising that the advocates of this (prevailing) philosophy of government have welcomed computerization and other aspects of scientific-technological revolution. They have not done this solely for the increased economic efficiency this revolution might bring, nor should their eagerness be taken simply as yet another symptom of underdeveloped countries grasping at the latest supermodern straw. Their hope apparently is that centralized direction, armed with the new technology, can achieve the same economic results, and even better ones, than could be achieved through decentralization and the various institutional changes characteristic of the economic reforms of the 1960s and still characteristic of Hungary's NEM. The manifold dangers inherent in those reforms could, therefore, be avoided.

But, obviously, this completely new dimension in technological development—still only in its infancy in Eastern Europe—reinforces more than ever the need for a large technical intelligentsia as the executor of economic policy. This section of society has been growing steadily in Eastern Europe for the last 10 to 15 years. It is manifestly the aim of the political leaderships to make it not only as proficient but also as apolitical as possible. They have been prepared to make material concessions to its members and to bring increasing numbers of them into positions of real responsibility in the governing economic hierachy. This has been a feature of East German policy for several years now. The results there have been encouraging and it would seem that what has been adopted successfully in the GDR is now being adopted more massively than before in the rest of Eastern Europe. In a subtle way, therefore, and probably unconsciously, the GDR, under Honecker, is becoming a model for Eastern Europe, something which it never was under Ulbricht, despite the latter's claims for the East German system when he was in power.

It remains now to discuss two external factors that could affect Soviet-East European relations and the course the Soviet Union wishes to take.

THE first factor—Soviet rivalry with China—can be dealt with briefly. China has certainly had its impact on Soviet relations with Eastern Europe. In quite contrasting ways, Chinese pressure influenced Soviet policy in Hungary and Poland in 1956; it also influenced Soviet efforts to re-create a formal edifice of socialist unity in 1957. Later, when the Sino-Soviet conflict became an acknowledged reality, Albania broke with Moscow and accepted the tutelage of Peking while Rumania adroitly manipulated the situation to enlarge its own area of autonomy. More recently, in the summer of 1971, when Soviet relations with both Yugoslavia and Rumania appeared to deteriorate markedly, there was

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

serious speculation about the creation of a "Balkan triangle," composed of Albania, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, looking to China for protection. This speculation was soon dissipated, however, by the conciliatory change in Soviet policy towards Belgrade and Bucharest and a realistic assessment in both capitals of the very feasibility of any putative Chinese protection against Soviet coercion.

For the foreseeable future it would appear that, whatever the possibility is of China having a disruptive influence on the course of Soviet-East European relations, it will be on the national, rather than the domestic, level. That is, it would be similar to the disruption already created by the Albanian and the Rumanian precedents. It is not likely that this would occur unless the threat of military conflict between the Soviet Union and China became so acute that any East European state so inclined could exploit the situation to extract concessions from Moscow on the national level. If such a situation did arise then Moscow would, in any case, have to decide between a more coercive or a more relaxed policy in Eastern Europe to keep would-be recalcitrants in line or to rally support against China. But this is a scenario which, though often envisaged in the West, is still not an actuality in the East. It remains, therefore, a speculative exercise rather than a diplomatic analysis.

As for Chinese influence on internal developments in Eastern Europe, this factor still lacks any dimension of seriousness. Apart from the special case of Albania, the *only* demonstrable instance of regime domestic policy ever being influenced by China was the Bulgarian "great leap forward" in 1958 and its antecedent propaganda. Just how far Ceausescu's "mini-cultural revolution" was affected by what he saw in China in 1971 is debatable, but the fact that this question can even be raised shows the sparseness of ready examples of Chinese influence on the East European domestic scene.

Not quite as minuscule, but so far still neglible, has been Chinese influence on "nonofficial" elements in East European societies. The dazzling militancy of Peking has attracted some discontented older Communists and some romantic younger intellectuals, both of whom see the socialist order as developed in Eastern Europe, not to mention the Soviet Union, as a debasement rather than a fulfilment of original revolutionary ideals. Such elements of discontent certainly exist and might well grow. But, with the possible exception of the veteran dissidents in Bulgaria in the first half of the 1960s, they have as yet had no noticeable impact on the regimes they despise.

A FAR more potent threat to the stability of Soviet order in Eastern Europe would be the prospect of *détente* in general and a real European security and cooperation arrangement in particular. This the Soviet and the East European leaderships both realized and have taken steps to forestall.

Their reasoning, especially the Soviet, was quite logical. Having

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

been generally successful in restoring stability in Eastern Europe, the Soviets were understandably loath to see it cracked by fissures emanating from the West. Both the Soviet and all the Eastern European leaders are aware that any real interaction between the societies of Eastern and Western Europe would presumably lead to a restlessness, a questioning of accepted norms, a widening of horizons, new standards of comparison—in fact, to a situation incomparably more fluid, unpredictable and disruptive even than that prevailing in the 1960s. Indeed, any such interaction would endanger not only Soviet but also communist control in Eastern Europe, at least in the form and manner in which it has been exercised up to now.

Knowledge of this has been behind the strenuous Soviet and East European attempts to resist Western proposals at both Helsinki and Geneva for a "freer flow" of information, people, and ideas. (Rumania has resisted the least; not because it is any the less fearful of what the West proposes but mainly because of its dislike of acting *en bloc* with the rest of its nominal allies.) The contacts covered under "basket three" on the Helsinki and Geneva agendas which the Soviet and East European leaderships will tolerate are essentially those carefully conducted exchanges they have countenanced previously. They have even admitted their readiness to allow more of these. "Freer flow," in the Western sense, they want no part of.

The Soviet Union has clearly shown that it is not prepared to take any chances even on the limited degree of genuine *détente* it would be prepared to allow. Over the last year and a half, since the preparatory meetings for the European security conference began, the Soviet leadership has accelerated those cohesive processes that have been taking place in Eastern Europe since August 1968. Indeed, so intensive have the Soviet moves been during this period that some observers have concluded that the drive for cohesion is a relatively new phenomenon prompted by Soviet fears of the impact of *détente*. What in fact these Soviet fears have done is to add a new dimension to a situation already existing for several years.

It is hardly surprising that what is in fact a new variation has been mistaken for a new theme. The evidence for the intensification of the drive for cohesion is indeed great. Domestic propaganda in all the Soviet-allied Eastern European states proclaiming that *détente* actually means a sharpening of the ideological struggle against Western values has increased enormously since the beginning of 1973. So have the arguments justifying a rejection of the Western demands for a freer flow of information, people and ideas. During the same period there has been a considerable increase in the number of multilateral conferences held on ideological subjects. China and its sins have, of course, figured on the agenda of these conferences, but the most important item has usually been the need for a more efficient counter

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to Western ideological penetration. This was probably discussed at the Crimea informal summit meeting last July and it apparently dominated the meeting of Central Committee secretaries responsible for ideology in Moscow last December.

Indeed, there is enough evidence to indicate that, in both Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union what *détente,* or more correctly, the debate about it, has produced so far has been exactly the opposite of what was predicted by many in the West. In the Soviet Union there is clearly less scope for dissent than two years ago. In Eastern Europe the acceleration of the drive for cohesion has seriously affected the domestic situation in Hungary and has led to new drives for ideological conformity in all the Soviet allied states. In all states it is the conservative rather than the reformist elements which appear ever stronger. On the national level, though Rumania keeps up its uphill struggle for independence, the general trend has been for an even more strongly pronounced Soviet leadership.

There are at present few grounds for assuming that these tendencies will be reversed by any progress made in negotiations between East and West. Indeed the evidence so far points to their being intensified. The Western predictions about evolution in the East made possible by *détente* seem to have been based on assumptions, either that a " secure " Soviet Union would feel confident enough to relax its grip on its allies, or that the Soviet Union would somehow agree to the type of contacts between East and West which would set in motion once again the forces for change in Eastern Europe. These predictions, based on one or the other assumption, may or may not be vindicated. But what all deliberations on *détente* have shown up to now is how insecure the Soviet Union feels itself in its relations with Eastern Europe and how insecure the East European leaderships still feel in relations with many of their own people. And the signs are that this insecurity will continue. This is hardly the basis for an eventual relaxation but rather for still greater efforts towards " comprehensive, multilateral integration." *Détente*, or the quest for it, still looks like leading to a tightening rather than an easing of the Soviet grip on Eastern Europe.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Gierek's Three Years: Retrenchment and Reform

Robert W. Dean

IN December 1970 violent social upheaval was the impetus for political change in People's Poland. The drama of worker demonstrations in the Baltic port cities, triggered off by a 15 to 20 per cent rise in the price of basic foodstuffs, brought the 14-year reign of party leader Wladyslaw Gomulka to an abrupt and tragic end, and with it the treadmill of his economic policies. In his place the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP) installed Edward Gierek, the 57-year-old provincial party chief in Silesia. The new First Secretary possessed a number of uncharacteristic qualities for an East European communist leader. Between 1923 and 1948 he had spent some 22 years as an emigrant in France and Belgium, working as a miner and political activist. In addition, from his position in Katowice (which he gained in 1957) he had successfully administered Poland's most important industrial and mining area, and earned a reputation for orthodoxy in political and ideological matters, and for pragmatism in social and economic policy. In view of the country's virtual socio-economic stagnation and the acceptably orthodox profile which any new party leader would have to bear from Moscow's standpoint in the post-Prague Spring period, Gierek was a man whose time had come.

Gomulka's close personal identification in the public mind with the austerities of the past years, as well as the headiness accompanying the fact that direct popular action had wrought such an immediate change, created a conditional reservoir of support for Gierek from the outset. He moved skilfully to utilize this tacit pact with the workers and to consolidate his own position in the party. His solicitous approach to the workers, his personal contacts with them, and his adeptness in distancing himself personally from Gomulka's policies did a great deal in the first months after December to ameliorate a still uncertain situation. His style was complemented by his policies. In lifting an earlier wage freeze and rolling back the price increases he proved himself responsive to popular demands. Vis-à-vis the party, Gierek moved very cautiously, aware that a too forceful reproval of past policies and/or individuals would send shudders of insecurity through the apparat, provoking opposition and possible support for rival figures in the leadership. For the same reasons, he did not initiate wholesale party purges, prudently forgoing retribution for stability.

In the months that followed, Gierek promised the nation comprehensive changes and reforms—in the economy, in social policy, in governmental-administrative practices, and in Church-state relations. Few had any illusions that he would preside over a Czechoslovak-style

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

liberalization, but expectations did seem justified that thoroughgoing, albeit measured, reforms would be set in motion. That this would not be the case became clear at the Sixth PUWP Congress which was convened in December 1971, one year before the statutory date. This supreme party body formally adopted either ambiguous or very cautious resolutions on those areas of concern which had been designated earlier as ripe for reform. The period of retrenchment had begun.[1]

After three years of Gierek's attempts at "building another Poland" (a phrase established as the motto of his leadership), it can be seen that he is no reformer in the conventional sense of the term. Now that many of the leadership's original pledges have been given programmatic form, earlier appraisals of the new regime's ability or willingness to undertake fundamental alterations in the system seem extravagant. In retrospect, given the exigencies of the first months, many of the concessions made seem tactical and many of the promises rhetorical. Some have even interpreted elements of the PUWP's programme as it has evolved as retrogressive, and have compared it with the pattern of Gomulka's retreat from his 1956 "October Programme." Certain elements of *déjà vu* notwithstanding, the comparison is exaggerated and unfair, for Gierek's achievements, especially the performance of the economy and the material benefits which have accrued to the population, have been significant.

Economic successes have been accompanied by the vigorous reassertion of the familiar pattern of communist rule in the body politic, above all in an uncompromising approach to the exclusive "leading role of the Party." For Gierek this began with the consolidation of his own position in the party. From all that is known the new First Secretary made his successful bid for power with at least the tacit support of Mieczyslaw Moczar (leader of the so-called Partisan faction known for their anti-Gomulka, anti-Semitic efforts during the March 1968 disturbances) who controlled the all-important security apparatus in the aftermath of the December events. Whatever his actual role, Moczar was rewarded with a Politburo post simultaneously with Gierek's elevation to party leader at the 20 December 1970 plenum. Shortly thereafter the pact proved to be an *alliance de convenance* and a power struggle ensued. Little is known of the infighting, but it is doubtful that Moczar ever presented a viable alternative to Gierek as First Secretary. At a minimum, however, his remaining in the top echelon of power would have spelled the presence of a strong contending influence on future policy planning, a situation Gierek was probably eager to avoid. Moczar's successive decline culminated in his removal from the Politburo at the Sixth Congress, along with two discredited allies of the deposed Gomulka. This completed Gierek's stabilization at the top, and with one additional appointment to the Secretariat in March 1972, both Politburo and Secretariat have shown complete con-

[1] For a discussion of Gierek's first six months, see Michael Costello, "Political Prospects," *Survey*, Vol. 17, No. 3, Summer 1971.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tinuity. The Gierek leadership is by no means a homogeneous group, but his personal pre-eminence has evidently been sufficient to impose a working unity and to forestall any challenges either in the form of the enhanced personal stature of rivals or of alternative platforms.

AS Gierek's position has grown more secure, party hegemony over the government, and intermediary organizations such as the trade unions and the youth movement has become qualitatively more monopolistic. His oft-repeated willingness to solicit the views of various groups and social strata in the formulation of policy has proved more than a cosmetic change in his leadership. But his thoroughgoing implementation of the Party's leading role has intentionally excluded any quasi-autonomous policy inputs. There have been no efforts, in short, to institutionalize accountability. Some of Gierek's efforts to introduce greater efficiency into decision-making, for example, are said to include enabling superior officials to draw upon the advice and experience of lower level counterparts and to benefit from their proximity to specific local conditions. In practice, however, this seems to occur on an *ad hoc,* informal basis which depends more on the willingness of the most senior officials to listen and consult than on the ability of subordinate organizations, groups or individuals to petition.

One important and illustrative extension of the Party's leading role has been the reform of the state apparatus. The separation of party and state functions was an early postulate of the new leadership. With a view to increasing the administrative efficiency of government, however, Gierek's overhaul of the notoriously inefficient system of local government has taken him in the opposite direction. The state apparatus consists of an ascending hierarchy of People's Councils on the communal, district and regional levels. Heretofore, blurred lines of authority have meant that beleaguered local officials have had to answer to several competing and often conflicting higher authorities, and that central ministries often bypassed the local chief executive by dealing directly with his subordinate department heads. To alleviate this confusion and interference, the *Party* leaders at the respective levels have been installed as chairmen of the People's Councils, thereby insulating local government from local pressures, providing a single point of contact for administration, and formally delivering governmental authority into the hands of the Party. The rationale of this and other measures is that it will render local government more responsive to central direction and that clearer information inputs from the local level will permit better decisions at the top. Be that as it may, this quantum expansion of the authority of the Party means that, in contrast with intentions registered earlier, government has become more than ever an appendage of the Party.

Leadership style has changed as well in comparison with the earlier period as indicated by the disappearance of a highly popular televised

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

programme entitled "Citizens' Platform," during which leading political personalities would reply to telephone questions from the public.

As a whole Gierek's policies have combined a measure of flexibility and economic pragmatism while strictly adhering to the orthodox axioms of political control. The former elements are most obvious in his approach to the economy and it is to a discussion of these policies that we now turn.

GOMULKA'S maladroit management of the economy was legend long before his final miscalculation. His successor inherited not only an explosive and distraught proletariat, but the economic maladies which over the years had eventually spawned it. One of the most serious, and illustrative of the rigid production patterns and supply and demand imbalances, was the fact that in the years prior to 1971 much of the economy's expanding output wound up as expanding inventories. Gomulka's legacy for 1970 included the appalling fact that the rate of growth in inventories was double that of retail sales growth, resulting in an enormous pile-up of stocks.[2] On coming to power Gierek's immediate concern was of course to check economic conditions which threatened worse calamity. On 15 February, amid continuing strikes at the giant Lodz textile works, the 13 December price hikes were rescinded. Soviet aid which included credit of 100 million dollars enabled the Poles to purchase "considerable quantities of meat abroad," and thus restore a certain market equilibrium.[3] Thereafter a fragile normalcy returned to the country (punctuated by strikes and work stoppages which continued through the summer) and the new leadership turned its attention to the more fundamental problems of the economy.

At the end of February a commission of "eminent specialists" was created under the "tutorship" of Gierek himself and charged with elaborating a comprehensive programme of economic reform, presumably to be instituted at one stroke and in its entirety.[4] The public was assured that the Commission would "guarantee that the problems of the mechanism of steering and functioning of the economy will be considered and solved in a complex and all-round manner."[5] Two months later, however, the concept of reform re-emerged in a form substantially pared down from the original proposals. Gierek told an April Central Committee gathering that the core of the Polish economy would remain central planning, but that "the centralization of planning should be accompanied by decentralization of authority—that is, by the independence and initiative of enterprise and other

[2] Michael Gamarnikow, "A New Economic Approach," *Problems of Communism*, September–October 1972 (XXI), p. 21.
[3] Speech of Politburo member and CC Secretary Edward Babiuch to the Ninth PUWP CC Plenum, PAP in English, 17 April 1971.
[4] Gamarnikow, op. cit., p. 28, and Stanislaw Kuzinski, "Plan After Congress," *Kultura*, 18 April 1971.
[5] According to a PAP release of 24 February, 1971.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

economic links." [6] The reform, in other words, would in practice eschew radical departures, and be limited to changes in the system of industrial management and economic planning. More appropriately put, the system would be improved rather than reformed. Indeed, the use of the term "reform" was itself short-lived, and description of the changes now under way has been limited to "strengthening" or "modernizing" planning and management methods. Such semantic hairsplitting avoids the political associations conjured up by the word "reform." Introducing the economic changes first set in motion in January 1973, Prime Minister Jaroszewicz, using yet another appellation, confirmed that "in streamlining the methods of planning and management, we ascribe particular importance to the inspiration provided by the experiences of the Soviet Union and the other socialist states." [7] Thus has the entire series of changes in the economy been carefully presented under a mantle of orthodoxy.

The main problem which the Party's Commission of Specialists addressed was the low economic efficiency at the national and plant level. The causes of inefficiency were identified as the following:

A. The evaluation of plant activity was based on plan fulfilment rather than economic production.

B. Economic decisions were not based on economic cost accounting.

C. There was lack of incentives to encourage economic efficiency.

D. The ability of economic organizations to influence decisions at a higher level supporting economic rationality and effectiveness was extremely limited.

E. There was little pressure from below to introduce innovations, especially with regard to technology and new product development.[8]

In 1973 28 large industrial organizations, representing almost 20 per cent of the nation's industrial potential and employing over one million people, were designated as pilot units in which new management and planning methods would be instituted on an experimental basis.[9] The exact principles of these changes and their practical application have been withheld from public scrutiny, and they are subject to continuing revision. Nevertheless, their outlines are clear. The enterprises concerned are not necessarily individual factories but large economic units upon which the functional status of enterprise is conferred in the framework of the new reform. They comprise aggregates of production units which manufacture similar products or have an interdependent manufacturing relationship (called *associations*), *combines* with specialized production, and individual factories which are in fact very large production units. Only large production units have been selected because it is felt they are more amenable to large production

[6] Speech to the Ninth Plenum of the PUWP CC, *Trybuna Ludu*, 17 April 1971.
[7] *Trybuna Ludu*, 16 December 1972.
[8] J. Kleer, "The Role of Large Economic Units," *Przeglad Zwiazkowy*, October 1972.
[9] *Trybuna Ludu*, 24 October 1973.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

series, more capable of economically adapting and exploiting technological innovations, and of sponsoring and applying specialized research and development. As noted above, the objective is greater efficiency. Enterprise performance, is therefore keyed less to filling planned targets and more to profitable production and management based on the broader use of " economic instruments of guidance and management, with a simultaneous strengthening of the role of the central plan in establishing the basic, strategic aims and targets." [10]

The new changes introduce a more flexible relationship between the enterprise and the central plan in which the central planning authorities, as a rule, will not be able to set exact targets for enterprises, although they will retain the right, it appears, to tell them what to produce and in some cases how much. At the enterprise level the responsibility and independence of managers for operational decisions on investment, wages, employment, internal organization, etc. has been greatly expanded with considerable stress being placed on clearly locating responsibility in individuals. A more economic approach to investments has been instituted, emphasizing financing through high-interest credits requiring repayment rather than through state grants, and to the wage system which makes earnings dependent on the efficiency of the enterprise. A central wage index relates admissable incomes paid from the enterprise wage fund to the dynamics of production, reduction of materials' costs and maintenance of repayment on investment credits. The general index of enterprise performance—as distinct from the earlier simple plan target fulfilment—is " added-value production," that is, the value of production sold, minus the value of purchased materials, external services, repayment of investment credits and interest rates, and turnover tax.[11]

Little more can be added at this time. From what can be discerned the main problem would seem to be the uncharted and neuralgic area between enterprise prerogatives and central directives. It is true that a principal feature of the changes is a reduction in the directive indices of the centre. Furthermore, there has been some discussion of enhancing the role of the enterprises and of *Voivodship* (regional) level officials in contributing to plan formulation by way of submitting draft plans, the idea being to shift " the main weight of constructive thinking " on to the authors of these drafts,[12] and to enable the central planners to make a more realistic evaluation of the resources, production possibilities, and problems of these subordinate components. Incompatibilities between a strong centre and a strengthened enterprise, however, may already have been encountered and it is possible that overseers of the reform have taken the line of least resistance by stress-

[10] Jozef Pinkowski (First Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission), *Trybuna Ludu*, 16 October 1972.
[11] Interview with Jozef Pinkowski. *Zycie Gospodarcze*, 18 February 1973.
[12] Interview with Jozef Pajestka (Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission), Radio Warsaw, 22 May 1972.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing the authority of the centre. In contrast to earlier stages in the public discussion of the reform, more recent comments tended to place greater emphasis on the obligations of the enterprise to adhere to instructions emanating from centre.[13]

Whatever difficulties were encountered, at the end of their first year of operation the pilot units had passed the test, having registered in the first nine months as much as a 20 per cent increase in production. Twenty-five additional enterprises are scheduled to be brought under the new system in 1974 including all the plants and establishments of the chemical industry. Together with those already operating under the new principles 40 per cent of the country's industrial production will then be under the reform.[14]

PERHAPS the clearest message of the Polish December was that domestic production of basic foodstuffs would have to be rapidly and considerably increased. As a result the ambiguity and indecision which has surrounded the scope of economic reform contrasts sharply with the decisive changes which have been made in agricultural policy. It must be recalled that 84 per cent of Polish farming, for the most part small holdings, remains in private hands. Though it was Gomulka who returned the country's agriculture to the peasant following restoration of his leadership in 1956, in the latter half of his tenure he declined any measures which would have improved the economic or social position of the private farmer, intending to keep open the option of eventual collectivization. The farmer laboured under a system which stifled his incentive and penalized his farm's profitability. Individual farms delivered agricultural produce in accord with government contracts on the basis of prices set beforehand which were comparatively low and did not always guarantee profitability of agricultural production. The farmer was obliged to abide by these inequities because they were combined with a system of privileges which permitted him to buy necessary products, above all coal allotments, which were virtually unobtainable elsewhere. Alongside these practices an odious system of compulsory deliveries, according to which farmers were required to sell a certain amount of their produce to the state at prices below production cost, amounted to a form of indirect taxation. In addition, a burdensome series of taxes (direct and indirect) acted as a disincentive to large-scale agricultural production. In sum, Gomulka's state sought to restrict the profitability of the individual private farm, with the

[13] " The yearly plans [of the pilot enterprises] should be based on the directives of the five-year plan, and on the prescribed norms and parameters, and should take into account the *directive tasks* and information received from units on a higher level. The methods of yearly planning, and its course and details, however, can be adjusted to the types and needs of individual units, provided the management *adheres to the basic guiding directives and requirements*." Interview with Jozef Pinkowski, *Zycie Gospodarcze*, 18 February 1973. Emphasis added.

[14] *Trybuna Ludu*, 13 December 1973.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

result that little incentive existed to increase its efficiency or to expand production for the market.

The Gierek leadership reversed these policies. In 1971 and after, government purchase prices for slaughter cattle were raised considerably and peasants were told that as much would be purchased as could be produced. Virtually overnight animal husbandry had become a profitable venture. From January 1972 compulsory deliveries of animal and plant products were abolished, which meant that farmers could begin to specialize. The burdens of the taxation system were also lessened in a way which made farm expansion more attractive. In addition, about one million farmers who had held and cultivated their land without valid property rights (the result largely of excessive land fragmentation due to post-war efforts by peasants to circumvent the tax system) became the legal owners. Finally, the national health service was extended to private farmers and their families.

The net result of these and other steps has been to generate enormous expansion of meat production, and, collaterally, to underwrite the institution of private agriculture in Poland—hardly the most salutary development from a political-ideological standpoint. Not surprisingly, these doctrinal transgressions have called forth exercises in ideological gymnastics. A characteristic example in the leading economics journal demurred that

> generally speaking, the present Polish agricultural system is dynamic, and the small-scale goods economy is incorporated into the system of communal forms of services, production, and accumulation. It must accordingly be concluded that the Polish agricultural system has socialist features.[15]

It would of course be highly impolitic for the Party to surrender the vision of collectivized agriculture for Poland, and, indeed, it has no intention of doing so. It is, on the contrary, keen to convey the impression that " the creation of conditions for the gradual socialist transformation of the countryside "—as the resolution of the PUWP's Sixth Congress phrased it—is among its most important if not immediate tasks.[16] In the foreseeable future, the premium will remain on the very pragmatic objective of boosting agricultural production, and

[15] And further: " Based on collaboration with the other socio-economic systems, private farming can continue to develop without upsetting the essentially socialist character of the country. At the same time this sector of the economy as a whole is undergoing gradual structural transformations of a socialist type (communal accumulation through the Agricultural Development Fund, the activities of the agricultural circles, etc.). In this manner we are carrying out the gradual socialization of our agriculture." Franciszek Tomczak, " Individual Farming in the Polish People's Republic." *Zycie Gospodarcze,* 20 August 1972.

[16] See the authoritative nine-part series of articles entitled " The Socialist Transformation of Polish Agriculture " by Mieczyslaw Mieszczankowski, published in *Zycie Gospodarcze* between 29 October 1972 and 18 February 1973. It provides an extensive scenario for collectivization which may reflect official opinion, or at least a portion of it. The point, however, seems to be to register alternatives rather than intentions.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nothing is likely to be undertaken in the rural areas which would upset the gains so far achieved on the basis of entrepreneurship.

AS for the economy as a whole, the thrust of Gierek's policy is to link industrial development and economic modernization with steady improvement in the population's material standard of living, thus reversing an earlier policy of economic growth and priorities in which, via a policy of compulsory austerity, the heavy burden of the nation's economic growth was forced upon the Polish consumer. The initial turnabout—that is, the trauma of 1970—is still the touchstone of economic and political policy, the difference now being that the Gierek leadership has endeavoured to transform necessity into virtue by wholeheartedly embracing an approach to economic development which has delivered, and promised further consumer and social benefits. Short-term success has been indisputable, but not unqualified. The policy of high investments and rapid wage growth incumbent upon a leadership which has chosen to identify with a pattern of rising consumer expectations has created severe inflationary pressures.[17] Acceleration of growth has been achieved through expanded imports, what would appear to be an incautious rate of investment, large credits and deficit financing, and a huge rise in purchasing power due to greatly increased wages. It is therefore a high-risk undertaking and commensurate disorders already in evidence—above all, inflationary pressures created by wage increases and a continuing price freeze on basic goods, and a rapidly rising adverse trade deficit—will have to be kept in check. In short, the Gierek leadership has mortgaged its own political legitimacy, and, in a literal sense, the country's economic future as well.

A three-year balance sheet was provided by the First National Party Conference of the PUWP held in Warsaw in October 1973. It was in effect an interim party congress convened to offer an assessment of policies midway through the 1971–75 plan, and to ratify the energetic development of the consumer economy. It provided a forum not only for extolling the economic successes recorded, but also for the ambitious upward revision of planned targets. Statistics made public at the conference provide an insight into the progress and problems at this stage.

Perhaps the most telling indicator of the Party's course is the rate of growth in production of Group B (consumer goods) which in 1971–73 amounted to 10·7 per cent (as compared with 6·6 per cent over the whole 1966–70 five-year plan). This was all the more remarkable in

[17] For example, by the end of 1973 it is estimated that the increase in the money supply for 1971–73 will reach some 250,000 million zloty as against 150,000 million foreseen in the national plan. This huge increase in purchasing power which the economy is incapable of absorbing in the form of current consumption has come to rest in savings. The result of the precipitous increase in the rate of savings means that although the entire Polish population saved 100,000 million zloty during the past twenty-five years, it saved an equal amount in the three years 1971–73! For discussion see Michael Gamarnikow, "A View on Poland's Current Economic Problems," *Radio Free Europe Research*, Polish Background Paper No. 17, 2 November 1973.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that for the first time in the Soviet sphere Group B rate of growth exceeded that of Group A (capital goods)—which in the same period amounted to 10·4 per cent (1966–70: 9·3 per cent). In revealing these figures Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz also disclosed that investment in the current five-year period would grow " more than 2·5 times in the light, food, and metallurgical industries," further comment on existing priorities of satisfying consumption, and would " more than double in the mineral, electrical, engineering, and paper industries." [18]

The evidence is unmistakable that if the Polish population has given the Gierek leadership its tentative vote of approval, it is because of the tangible benefits that have accrued to it over the last three years. Meat consumption has grown by 8·5 kg. per capita during this period, as compared with only 10·5 kg. per capita in the entire 1961–70 decade. Real wages have increased by some 24 per cent, exceeding the projected 18 per cent rise for the entire five-year plan, and Gierek promised a further growth of average real wages of the order of five per cent per year for 1974–75.[19] Finally, the freeze on retail prices for basic foodstuffs—in the public mind the very essence of the material improvement of the last three years—was extended by the Conference through 1974. This costly economic concession to political logic—a decision of " great political and social importance," as Jaroszewicz called it somewhat disingenuously—postpones an inevitable economic reckoning in order to avoid tampering with fragile public satisfaction and trust at this time.

The freeze cost the state 30,000 million zloty in subsidies in 1973 alone, plainly intolerable over the long term and something which Jaroszewicz indicated will make it " necessary to introduce in future a flexible price policy "—i.e., to end or radically modify the price moratorium. In any such change, however, the Party seems acutely aware of the obligation not to compromise consumer gains or upset the balance of wages and prices which have made for improvements in the standard of living. Stressing the unavoidable necessity of an " elastic " price policy in future, Gierek reiterated the axiom that " the price policy will be subordinated to the main aim of increasing the real incomes of the working people."

The economic strains attributable to the practices of the past three years notwithstanding, the Conference resolved to push ahead along the same paths of inflationary growth. Investment during the present five-year plan will be the highest recorded since 1945 (as a share of the national product it accounted for 25·6 per cent in 1973, and 26·3 per cent in 1974), and represents an increase of 80 per cent over invest-

[18] Speech by Jaroszewicz to the Conference, PAP, 22 October 1973.

[19] Gierek's report to the Conference, PAP, 22 October 1973. Real wages increased at an annual average of only 1·7 per cent during the decade 1961–70. Between 1966–70 this was the " lowest rate of increase in real wages of all the Comecon countries " according to official sources. " Documentary material for the Eighth Plenum of the PUWP Central Committee," *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), no date, pp. 66–67. As cited in Gamarnikow, op. cit., *Problems of Communism*, p. 21.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment outlays in the 1966–70 period. With another nod to priorities, Gierek revealed that the average yearly increase in investment in light industry had been 38 per cent and in the food industry 40 per cent, as compared with a 23 per cent increase for industry as a whole. With regard to foreign trade, Jaroszewicz rejected any " mechanical " limitation of imports, and despite a dangerously large trade deficit, announced plans for a two-year growth in imports of 34 per cent, to be accompanied by a projected 24 per cent increase in exports.

Summing up the proceedings of the Party Conference, Radio Warsaw noted that in discussing " the most pressing needs of the country, the participants emphasized that to meet these needs it is imperative that production tasks and the social needs of the working people be treated on an equal basis." [20] It is in this equation, which promises further increases in purchasing power, more housing, better food supplies, and the general expansion of the consumer economy, that the Party sees the confluence of official and popular interests. It is an interesting if moot point whether in adopting such a consumerist model the Party is leading society in an ideological sense or following popular impulses.

IF hopes existed in the early months of Gierek's tenure for a liberalization of the country's political, intellectual and cultural life, they were soon proved to be exaggerated. While assiduously avoiding confrontation, Gierek moved with dispatch and decision to consolidate the Party's comprehensive political control. Describing his leadership's attachment to an unbending interpretation of the leading role of the Party, Gierek told an April 1971 session of the Central Committee:

> The Soviet comrades are motivated by the correct principle that for a Leninist party, anarchistic loosening [of social discipline] which amounts to a parody of democracy is just as harmful as bureaucratic centralization which paralyzes the development of party organizations, and of initiative and activity among communists.[21]

The prospect that Party authority would have to reckon with the extraneous influence of various social groups, organizations, or institutions was clearly anathema. Guidelines for the Sixth Congress in December 1971 foretold little modification in the functional role of intermediary organizations, and subsequent changes in the youth unions and trade unions, for example, have only reinforced their transmissional purposes. If one thing is clear in present-day Poland, it is that enlightened, pragmatic policies, or the leadership's response to popular aspirations for improved living standards are not to be confused with or construed as the dispersal of political authority and control.

With the stabilization of the Gierek leadership, however, it seemed

[20] Radio Warsaw, 22 October 1973.

[21] Gierek's report to the Ninth Plenum of the PUWP CC, *Trybuna Ludu*, 17 April 1971.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reasonable to expect that increased self-confidence would result in greater tolerance of diversity and originality in the country's intellectual life. But where such activity has even remote political relevance political–ideological strictures remain rigid. Evidence of official attitudes was provided in early 1973 by an otherwise esoteric dispute over the proper bounds of historical scholarship. A book appeared by a historian known for her long and close association with the communist political establishment which set forth unorthodox views on Soviet contributions to the origins of the Cold War and Poland's early post-war history. It was nevertheless greeted with a remarkable review in the Party daily which praised it for demonstrating " the magnitude of our lack of knowledge." [22] Favourable comments of this nature would normally have been interpreted as signalling official approval of the book's publication, if not acceptance of its theses. In fact, the official response proved to be quite the opposite. The book was withdrawn from sale and became the target of a stinging attack in the Party theoretical monthly charging the author with " historical falsification . . . plainly harmful from the ideological point of view." [23]

More important still, the controversy was not the eye of the storm but only the most visible episode in a broader dispute concerning the ideological obligations of scholars. The debate pitted a number of well-known scholars against Party spokesmen in a euphemistic polemical exchange. Recalling the distortions of the 1950s when history found itself the servant of Party policy, the scholars argued for impartial and dispassionate historical inquiry " as opposed to an adjustment of the image of the past to some non-scholarly requirements." [24] The deciding note was struck by the Party, however. Speaking to a conference of political activists, Politburo member and CC Secretary Jan Szydlak condemned " alarming trends " in the study of history, " attempts to interpret the past falsely and tendentiously in the spirit of theories and patterns that are ideologically alien to us." [25] Exhortations, moreover, were only one means upon which the Party planned to rely for ensuring conformity with the official view. " It will be necessary," said Szydlak, " to augment substantially the activity of Marxist scholars and journalists in the historical, sociological, and philosophical sectors. We are working towards the absolute supremacy of the theories of Marxism–Leninism, and of socialist ideology in our society." [26]

[22] Bogdan Grezelonski, "A Useful Record," *Trybuna Ludu*, 2 January 1971. The book by Professor Maria Turlejska, entitled *Record of the First Decade* was apparently published toward the end of 1972.

[23] R. Lakowski, " The Postwar Decade," *Nowe Drogi*, March 1973.

[24] H. Wereszycki, " Historical Journalism—Lights and Shadows (An Attempt to Bend Popular History to Official Demand)," *Tygodnik Powszechny*, 1 April 1973.

[25] Jan Szydlak, " The Party Programme Expresses the Interests, Aspirations, and Aims of the Polish Nation," *Trybuna Ludu*, 19 January 1973.

[26] Ibid.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE controversy over historical scholarship itself was less important than what it revealed about leadership attitudes. Equally strong conformist pressures are also apparent in the cultural sphere where artistic activity is viewed through the political prism of the Party's own objectives. Art must be the ambassador of socialism, to use a favourite official phrase. But apparently Poland's artists have not assumed their duties as political envoys. Politburo member Szydlak has complained, " There is absolutely no justification or explanation for the absence of any artistic reflection of that optimistic vision of the future which we have emphasized and are implementing." [27] Poland's artists have been admonished for drawing their inspiration from the " fringes of modern life " and for dissipating their efforts on " marginal problems, personal frustrations and complexes [which they are] sometimes eager to present as the frustrations and complexes of the nation." [28] If this cultural policy has not generated new quantities of socialist art it has kept experimentation and artistic criticism in check.

Such views, however, are only one level of the cultural scene and while they have surely had a decisive effect in stifling diversity they have not eliminated it entirely. In early 1973 a revival in Cracow of the nineteenth-century romantic poet Adam Mickiewicz's play *Dziady* [Forefather's Eve], whose strong anti-Russian overtones sparked the political turmoil of March 1968, and Andrzej Wajda's film version of the early twentieth-century play *Wesele* [The Wedding], also an allegory on themes of national aspirations and oppression, played successfully and without incident so far as is known. Their appearance is unusual in view of the official attitudes outlined earlier. It may suggest that the cultural product which the Party would prefer is beyond its reach, or of marginal importance in its overall scheme. There are other cases as well of inventive, seemingly non-conformist art, but they punctuate rather than characterize the country's cultural and intellectual life. Commenting on the prevailing stagnation the Catholic writer Andrzej Micewski has asked rhetorically, " Why is it that there are no controversies concerning scientific and artistic works, that there are no great polemics, no sharp intellectual encounters? " [29] The absence of controversy and ferment is indeed the rule.

After a brief period of relative freedom in the period following the leadership's change, the press has been returned to its prescribed role, though not without efforts to revitalize its style and content. " It is our intention," according to Szydlak, " that with the concerted efforts of all Polish journalists the press should promote still more effectively the ideological unity of the people, rallying it around the programme

[27] Jan Szydlak, " Development and Popularization of Culture: A Component Part of our Socio-economic Planning," *Zycie Partii*, December 1972.

[28] Ibid.

[29] *Zycie Warszawy*, 14–15 January 1973.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the Party and the interests of our socialist state." [30] This has meant greater standardization and centralization, with *Trybuna Ludu,* the central Party daily, serving as the model. In the words of its editor-in-chief, *Trybuna Ludu's* objective is to " more comprehensively fulfil its tasks as a propaganda organ, agitator and organizer, the classic functions of the socialist press." [31] Despite this, there does seem to be a new element of realism towards the press in efforts to rid it of sterility, and to make it a more convincing proponent of official objectives. For example, publications have on occasion criticized specific industrial enterprises for wastage and substandard work. Members of the main board of the Polish Journalists Association have called attention to " the need for higher quality publication and for changing the habit of raising weighty social, economic, and ideological problems by way of campaigns." [32] The abolition of central censorship over *Trybuna Ludu* and *Polityka,* the leading political weekly, was another step in this direction. *Polityka,* known for its more provocative style, took advantage of the new elbow-room by publishing two lengthy articles on the life of the disenfranchised aristocracy in today's Poland which proffered a generally sympathetic view. Polemical counter-attacks followed in the Party daily and elsewhere and *Polityka* responded somewhat contritely that the intended irony of the articles had not been clear enough. Thus, the journalist's no man's land created by the original removal of censorship was occupied by the Party. If forms of control and media presentation have been altered with an eye to making a more effective public impact, their substance remains essentially the same.

IN a very real sense it is the younger generation which will assist or frustrate Gierek's grandiose plans for " building another Poland," and it is therefore hardly surprising that a great share of the attentions and energies of the leadership have turned on the problems of youth. One leading functionary drew a telling parallel between the March 1968 student revolt and the December 1970 workers' demonstrations. " These two dates," he said, " have only one point in common: in both cases young people appeared in the streets. In March exclusively, in December mainly. This is a matter for deep thought." [33] The task, as widely acknowledged, is not one of subduing youth, but of harnessing and channelling this vast national reserve. Poland is among the youngest nations in Europe with over half the population born since the establishment of the communist regime and 52 per cent under the age of 30.[34] The perplexing state of affairs in the younger generation

[30] Jan Szydlak, " The Party Programme Expresses . . . "
[31] Jozef Barecki, interviewed in *Zycie Warszawy,* 21–22 May 1972.
[32] *Trybuna Ludu,* 10 April 1973.
[33] Speech by CC Secretary Ryszard Frelek to the Eighth Plenum of the PUWP CC, published in a special issue of *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), no date.
[34] Radio Warsaw, 27 November 1972.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was the topic of a November 1972 CC plenum from which the main lines of Party initiative towards the problem emerged. Plenum discussions and documents emphasized the potential commitment of the nation's youth, but portrayed an alarming picture of refractory trends, ideological lassitude, widespread asocial attitudes, and a prevailing disinterest in social and political matters beyond one's personal ken.[35] The cause of these maladies was identified as the too diffuse system of Party influence in youth affairs and weaknesses in the educational system. The long-term remedy, according to Gierek, was ideological and to be found in increasing " the social awareness and understanding of the essence and values of the principles of the socialist system." [36] The more immediate task was an organizational one, however, and the Party moved to consolidate and extend its control over the youth unions, " a vital component of the people's rule." [37] The new Federation of Socialist Unions of Polish Youth integrated the top leadership of the five existing unions and established an executive committee responsible for the disbursement of funds and the formulations of uniform cadre and political-ideological programmes. Each of the five unions retained its special interest character (rural, university, Scouts, etc.) but surrendered any marginal freedom of action it had in the past. This restructuring facilitates the Party's direct role in directing youth activities, and creates more politically isomorphic organizations, bringing Poland more into line with the unified pattern of youth movements in other Warsaw Pact states.

The second major initiative is the projected overhaul of the country's educational system designed to standardize educational practices, to link education more directly to the demands of economic development, and to mould attitudes more effectively in accordance with officially defined objectives.[38] Few final decisions have been taken, but the reform foresees the gradual introduction of mandatory kindergartens, a compulsory 10-year general secondary education, followed by specialized, vocational or university-level training. Controversy surrounds specific measures but the general thrusts of the reform—

[35] For details, see *Trybuna Ludu*, 29 November 1972, and the opinion poll published in *Zycie Warszawy*, 22–23 October 1972.

[36] Ibid., *Trybuna Ludu*.

[37] From the so-called " Programme Theses on Youth " promulgated by the Seventh Plenum, entitled " For the Active Participation of the Younger Generation in the Construction of Socialist Poland," published as a supplement to *Trybuna Ludu*, 30 November 1972.

[38] The ideological component of educational reform and reorganization of the youth movement anticipates expanded international contacts in a period of *detente*: " It is necessary to do everything possible to immunize the younger generation against alien influences and alien aspirations and to shape the activities of the young in combatting hostile ideologies. It is necessary to prepare the young people to use the constantly intensifying international contacts in such a way as to ensure that the maximum advantages accrue from these contacts to the motherland and the cause of socialism." " For the Active Participation . . . ," Ibid.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

reducing rural-urban differences, universalizing educational opportunities, and modernizing educational plants and facilities—are definitely progressive steps. Few would take issue with the fact that Poland's backward school system (note the fact that, according to the 1970 census, out of 11 million workers and peasants only 800,000 had a secondary education) is badly in need of reform.

ALTHOUGH the Polish Episcopate has been the most outspoken critic of the reform it has confined its criticism to those aspects which it fears would hobble the Church's influence over its flock (80 per cent of the population is Catholic). It has singled out aspects of the proposed reform as introducing politically inspired restrictions which would impede and undermine the teaching of religious values in home and school. These concern changes in school curricula which accord an enhanced place to ideological instruction, the planned extension of the school day, which precludes normal afternoon religious instruction, and the general aggrandizement of the state's role in extracurricular pursuits which, in the words of one widely publicized Church statement, point to the " tendency to eliminate religious upbringing from school education." [39]

The educational dispute brought into relief the inherent difficulties in achieving a full normalization of relations with the Church as postulated by Gierek in the early months of his leadership. The past three years have shown that the nation's second most powerful institution is determined to protect its interests, and its head, Cardinal Wyszynski, has spoken out against every infringement of ecclesiastical life and authority. The regime's approach—amid periodic reiterations that it intends a full normalization—has been at once conciliatory and footdragging. As promised, it has delivered to the Church title to clerical property in the former German territories, but it has applied a minimal interpretation to its earlier pledge to grant permission for the construction of new church buildings. Periodic suppression of clerics and religious activity in rural areas has continued, probably the result of local functionaries' zeal, nevertheless prompting no official condemnation. The most demonstrative *démarche* towards normalization has been made not towards Poland's Catholics but towards the Vatican. An historic audience granted by the Pope to Foreign Minister Stefan Olszowski in November 1973 prompted speculation that the regime was attempting to bring surreptitious pressures on the indigenous Church hierarchy. The regime's effort to fashion a political triangle (if, indeed, that is what it was) apparently failed, and the Vatican restated its position that its own normalization (including the exchange of diplomatic envoys) would be subordinate to domestic improvement in the relations between Church and state. Progresss there, as noted, has been only desultory. The appointment (on 21 May 1974) of the

[39] Communique of the Polish Episcopate meeting in Czestochowa, 4–5 May 1973, as reported by Reuter from Warsaw, 9 May 1973.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

notorious hard-liner, Kasimierz Kakol, as the head of the Office of Religious Affairs has not enhanced the chances that these relations will get better in future. In his speech in the Sejm on 30 May 1974, the Prime Minister Jaroszewicz expressed the hope that they "would develop in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and tolerance," but the nomination of Kakol has been widely interpreted as indicating a decision to overcome the opposition of the Church to the Party's policy on education and other matters by whatever methods are necessary.

IN fashioning its domestic policies the Gierek leadership must proceed with a wary eye to the disposition of its Soviet mentor. On the whole, its cautious and politically-grounded approach has been exemplary by Soviet standards. How active a role the Soviets actually take in Polish day-to-day affairs, or in longer-term planning and programmes, is impossible to estimate. Rumours have occasionally appeared that the outward face of the Polish Party, faction-prone in the not-too-distant past, belies the existence of contending elements in the leadership whose point of reference is Moscow and Soviet support. However, whatever the possibility for the exercise of Soviet influnce through factionalism, the more important factor is the implicit presence of Moscow in Polish politics and the presumably significant effects this has had in shaping Gierek's policies. The political decline of the powerful and ambitious Franciszek Szlachcic and of the relatively "liberal" Jozef Tejchma indicates that Gierek would not tolerate any "playing to the gallery" on either Polish nationalism or on the hopes of cultural relaxation.

The Party leader himself appears to have won Moscow's approbation, indicated symbolically by the Soviet bestowal of the Order of Lenin on his 60th birthday. A more important indicator of Moscow's confidence in Gierek is the manoeuvrability permitted him in his very active pursuit of relations with the West. Polish foreign policy has in fact been partially reconstructed to serve the needs of the ambitious programme of economic development, and the accelerated pace of activity in seeking out Western financial and technological assistance has been second only to the Soviet Union itself.

In sum, Gierek's approach in his first three years has been a mixture of retrenchment and reform in which political efficiency and economic efficiency have received equal priority. He has proved to be neither bound by the traces of orthodoxy nor moved by the spirit of liberal reform.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures of the University of Pittsburgh

ANNOUNCES THE PUBLICATION OF THE HARD-COVER EDITION OF A NEW BOOK

Russian Emigré Literature

A Collection of Articles in Russian With English Resumés

Edited by NIKOLAI P. POLTORATZKY

This volume consists of contributions by some 30 American, Canadian, and European scholars and a few outstanding Russian émigré men of letters and editors. There are five sections. The first deals with the *development and general problems* of Russian literature in exile, the second with major *poets and prose writers*, the third with *literary scholarship and criticism*, and the fourth with the contribution of main literary *periodicals*. The fifth contains *English resumés* of all articles. There are also brief sketches of the contributors and an Index of names.
viii + 414 pages. 24 × 16 cm. $10.00 per copy. Check or money order payable to the University of Pittsburgh. Please address all orders to: Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, Loeffler Building 119, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pa. 15260 U.S.A.
The hard-cover edition (as well as the paperback edition) is obtainable also from Victor Kamkin Bookstore, Inc. and A. Neimanis Buchvertrieb and their representatives.

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

An American Quarterly Devoted to Russia Past and Present

Thirty-Third Year

TERENCE EMMONS, Editor

With its thirty-third volume, the *Russian Review* is appearing under new editorship. The *Review* publishes material of high quality in the fields of Russian history, politics and society, literature, and the arts. The *Review* continues to provide a forum for work on Russian-American and Soviet-American relations. It publishes reviews by leading specialists of important new books from the United States, the Soviet Union, and other countries.

Subscription:

U.S.—$9.00/yr.; Canada—$9.50; Foreign—$10.00; U.S. Student—$7.00
Single Issues: $2.50 — Cumulative Index (1941–1971): $7.50

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW
The Hoover Institution, Stanford, California 94305

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Rumanian Nationalism

George Schöpflin

THE most striking characteristic of Rumanian nationalism since the early 1960s has been its intensity. In the West, where for years Rumania had been written off as a docile satellite of the Soviet Union, newspapers suddenly became aware that the Rumanian communist leadership was pursuing a "nationalist" foreign policy. In this article I do not propose to rehearse the analysis of the importance of the Rumanian challenge, or whatever word is used to describe the Rumanian communist leadership's approach to its relations with the Kremlin. Rather, the article is intended as an analysis of the content of Rumanian nationalism as an ideology. In particular, it explores four different areas of Rumanian life where nationalism operates: economics, language, historiography and the concept of the nation, the state and the outside world.

The intensity of the expression of Rumanian nationalism is explained in part at least by the extent and nature of the oppression of the Stalinist years. As perceived by the Rumanians, the Soviet leadership and its Rumanian placemen pursued policies that appeared to have been directed at the national existence of the Rumanian nation and to have been designed to hasten its extinction. This direct challenge to the right of existence of the Rumanian nation inevitably sparked off a massive reaction, one which has still to run its course, and this involves the affirmation of Rumanian nationhood in every conceivable situation. Furthermore, whilst it has been fashionable to see in Rumanian nationalism an instrument for loosening Soviet control over Eastern Europe, a closer examination of the ideology of Rumanian nationalism, and of the policies born of that ideology, shows that it is directed not only against the Soviet Union but also against Hungary. It goes without saying that the Kremlin is well aware of this and has been prepared to exploit this antagonism to the detriment of both Rumania and Hungary. This suggests a rather different context for the evaluation of the resurgence of East European nationalism from the one that has been fashionable for the last decade.

In the economic field, Rumania, as a defeated power, was subjected to intense exploitation by the Soviet Union during the Stalinist period. "The Russians skinned us four times" was a graphic description of Soviet-Rumanian relations—from the Rumanian point of view—offered as early as 1947. The industrial infrastructure of the country, which was in any case not especially developed, was largely removed by the Soviet occupation authorities, while simultaneously the Rumanian state was obliged to pay $300 million fixed at 1938 prices, i.e. about 50 per cent higher than current prices.[1]

[1] Paul Lendvai, *Eagles in Cobwebs: Nationalism and Communism in the Balkans* (London: Macdonald, 1970), pp. 285-86 provides details and references.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The open plunder of the immediate post-war era was succeeded by a period of more sophisticated exploitation through the device of joint stock companies, known as *Sovroms*. There were 15 of these Sovroms, the last two being set up as late as 1952, and they covered the most vital areas of Rumanian's economic life: petroleum, chemicals, timber, banking, insurance and transport.[2] Even immediately after Stalin's death, when all but two of the Sovroms were dissolved (they went finally in 1956), Rumania did not benefit from the more liberal approach to trade with its East European allies by the Soviet Union and Rumania continued to suffer from a measure of price discrimination. Thus, for example, between 1956 and 1960, the Soviet Union doled out around $2,000 million in commodity loans to its various East European allies; the Rumanians received a mere $95 million of this. Over the same period, Soviet aid accounted for ten per cent of gross state investment in Bulgaria. Between 1945 and 1962, Soviet aid to Rumania came to $10·00 per head of the population; the equivalent for East Germany was $78·00 and $73·00 for Bulgaria and even Hungary received $38·00.[3] The impact of this unequal relationship between Rumania and the Soviet Union was that the industrialization of the former was slow and its economy remained heavily dependent on primary produce.

This history of exploitation was in itself humiliating and the Rumanian technical intelligentsia, which must have been aware of something of what was going on, saw itself obliged to remain silent or, even worse, justify the unequal relationship. As elsewhere in Eastern Europe at the time, Soviet-Rumanian economic relations were generally dressed up as magnanimous Soviet assistance, without which Rumania's economy would have foundered. Equally, Rumania's traditional economic and trading links with the West were denounced as evil capitalist exploitation. Western investment in Rumania, which had played an important role in the beginnings of the country's industrialialization, was particularly condemned.

It is impossible to judge how far Rumanian opinion—whether at the level of the leadership or of the intelligentsia or of public opinion —was aware of the extent to which the country's economic prospects had suffered during the Stalinist period. The Party leadership, at least, must have had a fair idea and their views inevitably percolated downwards as soon as this became politically possible. The continued economic weakness and relative backwardness of Rumania undoubtedly added to the resentment felt by the Rumanians at what they saw as the general assault on their interests as a nation and these arguably contributed at least to the style and intensity of the response in the 1960s.

At the same time, it would be futile to attempt an analysis of

[2] J. M. Montias, *Economic Development in Communist Rumania* (Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, 1967), p. 19 and other sources cited there.
[3] Paul Lendvai, op. cit. p. 286, and other sources cited there.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Rumanian economic policies in the 1960s exclusively in terms of nationalism. Economic development, especially through industrialization, is a fundamental and legitimate aspect of any state's policies and should not be interpreted as an expression of nationalism. With this in mind, one can still point to certain features of Rumania's economic policies and suggest that they were, partly, informed by nationalism. This is what I would judge to be the national content of these economic policies.

It is instructive that when the first signs of overt disagreement with the Soviet Union erupted it was precisely over economic matters. Although public signs of disagreement have been traced back as far as 1955,[4] it was only in the early 1960s with Khrushchev's plans to transform Comecon into a supra-national planning body that these differences gained political importance. If this scheme had been put into effect, Rumania's role within Comecon would have been that of a supplier of primary produce to its communist trading partners and its programme of industrialization been seriously curtailed. In this context, the construction of the Galaţi Steel Mill came to symbolise the quarrel and the Rumanian decision to press on with the Mill—after all, every developed country has a steel industry—was transmuted into an instance of national pride. The economic value of the Galaţi Steel Mill came to be seen as less important in itself than the fact that it represented a modernized Rumania.

Parallel with the country's industrialization, the Rumanian leadership also showed a marked autarkic approach to economic development. Again, this cannot be ascribed exclusively to economic nationalism, not least in view of the classic Stalinist policy of self-reliance which the Rumanians had imbibed in the post-war period. Nonetheless, promotion of self reliance into national policy implies a degree of nationalism. Equally, this policy of pressing forward with a specifically Rumanian economic policy brought Bucharest into conflict with its Comecon partners and in February 1963, the moment which has since assumed the significance of a turning point, the Rumanians rejected Khrushchev's scheme for supra-national planning within Comecon. This, it was argued, would infringe the sovereign rights of the organization's member States and by this point in time the concept of sovereignty had begun to assume major importance in Rumanian thinking as the most effective defence of the national interest (which is, of course, what it is).

The first comprehensive and fully authoritative statement on the new ideas now entertained by the Rumanian leadership was the so-called April Theses, the "Statement on the Stand of the Rumanian Workers' Party concerning the Problems of the International Com-

[4] J. M. Montias, op. cit. pp. 193–230 for the details of the dispute; and "Background and Origins of the Rumanian Dispute with Comecon," *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (October 1964), p. 125.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

munist and Working-Class Movement" of the 26 April 1964. The relevant passages are these:

> In accordance with the changes in the economic foundations, profound transformations have taken place in the social structure of these [socialist] countries. A new society has taken shape . . . [which enjoys a stronger] moral and political unity. . . . The victories obtained by the Rumanian People's Republic and by the other socialist countries show that the successful solution of the tasks of developing the economy depends first and foremost on the utilization of each country's internal possibilities, through an intense mustering of its own forces and the maximum use of its natural resources. . . .[5]

The statement explained the Rumanian leadership's objections to Khrushchev's Comecon scheme and clearly indicated that they turned not just on the prospect of having Rumania subordinated to the interests of the developed members of Comecon, but in principle, in terms of power and the interests of the Rumanian nation (this last by implication).

> [The Rumanian party is opposed to supra-state organs in economic management because] these measures are not in keeping with the principles which underlie the relations between socialist countries. The idea of a single planning body for all CMEA countries has the most serious economic and political implications. The planned management of the national economy is one of the fundamental, essential and inalienable attributes of sovereignty of the socialist state—the state plan being the chief means through which the socialist state achieves its political and socio-economic objectives. . . .[6]

The April Theses were a public declaration that the era of Rumanian docility in economic matters was over and that henceforth the Rumanian Party would overtly champion the country's national interest.

THE next stage, which indicated a growing sensitivity on the part of the Rumanians to anything which might be construed a challenge to their national sovereignty, was the polemic over E. B. Valev's proposal for the creation of an "interstate economic complex" in the lower Danube Valley, comprising large areas of Rumania, Bulgaria and the Moldavian SSR.[7] This *ballon d'essai* was very badly taken and C. Murgescu, editor of the newly founded paper *Viața economică*, concluded on the basis of a survey of relevant Soviet writings, that the object of the exercise consisted of the

[5] *Agerpres*, 27 April 1964.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Valev's article, "Problems of the Economic Development of the Danubian Areas of Rumania, Bulgaria and the USSR," *Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta*, No. 2, March–April 1964, was reprinted in Rumanian in *Viața economică*, No. 24/1964, together with a critical commentary by the paper's editor C. Murgescu.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> detaching from a national economic whole certain territories in order to subject them to the deeper influence of the international division of labour. Their ultimate import is that they are *attempting to theorize about a process of dismemberment of the national economies and of the national territories of certain socialist states* (original italics).[8]

Given the recent and more distant history of the Rumanian nation and the perception by the Rumanians of their nation's history, with its marked emphasis on national unity, a suggestion of the kind made by Valev was guaranteed to arouse the worst suspicions. Certainly, they added fuel to an already well-stoked fire. Murgescu's article was quite evidently (from its tone) a polemic, designed to arouse indignation.

From this point onwards, Rumania's economic policies became tinged with the naked pursuit of the national interest, regardless of how this was achieved. Trade was reorientated towards the West and attempts were made to diminish the country's dependence on the Soviet Union. But, more important than this, a skilful and largely successful campaign of public relations was mounted, especially vis-à-vis the West, to indicate that this reorientation had actually taken place and economic independence had been achieved. The semblance was probably more important than the reality at this stage and the fact—a point of some irony—that the Galaţi Steel Complex relies on deliveries of Soviet iron ore is largely overlooked. A similar fate befell Rumania's much vaunted efforts to develop its own nuclear energy capacity. In the mid-1960s, Rumania attempted to purchase Western nuclear plant, but this foundered on NATO restrictions, which banned the export of certain strategic materials to Warsaw Pact members. In the event, Rumania has been constrained to buy the same nuclear equipment that the other Comecon countries are installing and this, inevitably, comes from the Soviet Union.[9]

Parallel with those moves, a whole corpus of pre-communist economic writing was rehabilitated as contemporary policies were identified with those views of the earlier period which sought to underpin the legitimacy of Rumania's economic autarky. This included A. D. Xenopol, D. P. Marţian, Ştefan Zeletin and others who argued in favour of industrialization as the *sine qua non* of national power. Indeed, Montias argues that a fair parallel can be drawn between Rumania's economic policies in the 1960s and the 1880s.[10]

The principle underlying these policies appeared to be the urgent

[8] *Viaţa economică*, 12 June 1964. Valev's views were subsequently disavowed in the Soviet Union, see Montias, *Economic Development in Communist Rumania*, pp. 219–23.

[9] On the early stages of the effort to buy Western nuclear equipment, " Die rumänische Kernenergie-Pläne; weitreichende Ambitionen und ihre Kehrseiten," *Wissenschaftlicher Dienst Südosteuropa*, Vol. 17 (1968), p. 14. (Cited henceforth as *WDS*.)

[10] Montias, op. cit. p. 231, and " Bukarest rehabilitiert die ' Gestrigen,' " *WDS*, Vol. 14 (1965), p. 89.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

need to build up a strong industry in order to sustain the country's political independence of the Soviet Union. Part and parcel of this was the constant reiteration of the success of industrialization. A good instance of this, revealing because it was intended for Western consumption, was the article by Ion Mitran, "The New Social Experience of Romania," published as part of an eight-page advertising supplement in *The Times*.[11] Mitran wrote that the "Romanian Communist Party rejected the concept according to which Romania was destined to remain 'an eminently agrarian country'" and opted instead for industrialization as "the only way of producing deep-going transformations in the living conditions of the people." The success of this, Mitran suggested, was shown by the rapidly growing share of industrial output in the country's GNP (64 per cent) and by the fact that in 1972, Rumania's industrial output was 21 times higher than that in 1938.

However, while Rumanian publicists argue for domestic and foreign consumption that the country's economy is becoming ever more industrialized and articles extol the performance of this and that branch of industry, another line has been emerging which, though not entirely contradicting the first, sits somewhat uneasily with it. This second argument is aimed at proving to a not particularly sympathetic world that Rumania is an underdeveloped country and, therefore, that it is entitled to all the concessions that the developed countries of the world make to their underdeveloped brethren. This theme has been part of the Rumanian economic ethos since the late 1960s when there was an attempt to associate the country with UNCTAD. Subsequent efforts were concentrated on the EEC and on GATT to gain tariff privileges granted normally only to underdeveloped countries. The argument behind this has been expounded in various places and one instance of this claims that Rumania's status as "a socialist developing country" is demonstrated by its far lower GNP per capita than the United States, France, East Germany or Czechoslovakia and

> The productivity of social labour is another indicator which helps to determine the degree of economic development of a country. In Rumania, this particular level is three or four times lower than in the economically advanced countries.[12]

And, just to show that Ion Mitran's statistics on industrialization can also be made to prove the opposite point, it is claimed that although in Rumania the proportion of the population in agriculture has declined from 75 per cent in 1938 to 45 per cent in 1972, this level is still far below the norm for a developed country.

[11] 29 December 1972.
[12] Nita Dobrota in *Scînteia*, 6 October 1973.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THERE is another area indirectly associated with the economy where certain nationalistic tendencies can, arguably, be observed, namely demographic policy. In 1966, quite abruptly, the country's extremely liberal provisions on the availability of abortions were scrapped and abortion was made virtually unobtainable. (Divorce was simultaneously made immensely more difficult.) The argument was that the crude birth rate had fallen to 14·3 per 1,000 and that this was too low to maintain the population. Although the restrictions were justified predominantly on economic grounds, there were certain nationalistic overtones to some of the arguments used. The most striking instance of this was an article in *Scînteia* which had the title "Responsibility towards the biological continuity of our people" [13] and there was a similar flavour in Ceauşescu's speech to the National Congress of Women in the summer of 1966. After some fairly flowery passages praising Rumanian womanhood, Ceauşescu commented,

> From times of long ago . . . women have always fulfilled the noble mission of transmitting to the new generations the high virtues of our people. . . . One of the most important duties of women, mothers and educators is to devote themselves to the raising of new generations in the spirit of ardent patriotism, of respect and esteem for the glorious past of the people, of the desire to sacrifice its entire life to the flourishing of the socialist Homeland. . . .

Consequently, attitudes which favour an easy life and comfort are undesirable and are to be combatted, because this attitude "directly leads to the growing number of divorces, the breaking up of families and the neglecting of the education of children and their training for life." Despite the fact that material conditions in Rumania were improving all the time, Ceauşescu found it most disturbing that the number of births had been falling and, therefore, certain legislative provisions were to be re-examined.[14] The nexus is not there explicitly, but there does seem to be a certain connection made between the welfare of the nation and the birth rate.

It seems worth adding that the result of the ban on abortion was close on catastrophic in terms of social morale. Abortion was until then—and since—the only method of birth control known in Rumania and by attempting to outlaw it in this crude way, without taking any thought for the results of the massive increase in the number of births in the following year, the Party's policy led to near panic. There was an acute shortage of baby food, clothes, prams and other equipment and a good deal of dissatisfaction resulted. The medium term result, however, was to drive abortions underground—I was quoted the figure of 20,000 lei as the price for an illegal abortion in 1968—and, furthermore, to bring the law into disrepute. Whereas

[13] Mircea Bulgarus, ibid. 26 November 1966.

[14] Nicolae Ceauşescu, *Romania on the Way of Completing Socialist Construction: Reports, Speeches, Articles*, July 1965–September 1966, Vol. I (Bucharest: Meridiane Publishing House, 1969), pp. 473–80 at p. 477.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

until the mid-1960s the impact and memory of the Stalinist period was sufficient to maintain a fair measure of respect for the law, the ban on abortion and its subsequent wide-scale flouting helped to undermine that respect and corruption spread to other areas. Once again, this nexus is impossible to demonstrate, but it is an argument that I have had accepted in private by Rumanian intellectuals.

The last irony is that even Ceauşescu finds it impossible to expel nature with a pitchfork and after an initial surge to 27·4 per 1,000 in 1967, by 1972 the crude birth rate had fallen to 19·1 per 1,000, so that the authorities were showing considerable concern about the future of the nation. The press was full of articles about demography and demographic policy during 1973.

Language

IF the nature of a nationalist ideology in the economic sphere is rather difficult to demonstrate incontrovertibly, it is far clearer in the sphere of language. Language is one of the axioms of nationhood in Eastern Europe, both as a means of identification and as a factor of cohesion. Rumania is no exception to this, indeed, because the sole means of Rumanian national identification at the time of the emergence of modern nationalism in the nineteenth century was language, the role played by language in the national ideology is intense and abiding.

Before dealing with current conceptions of the language and its relationship to nationhood, the frontal attack made on the character of the Rumanian language in the Stalinist period must be examined. In a process that was unique in Eastern Europe, the Rumanian language and Rumanian culture were subjected to a process of denationalization by means of a sustained campaign of "Slavicization." This was strikingly illustrated by the story told by a communist diplomat stationed in Bucharest in the late 1940s and early 1950s, who explained to Ana Pauker at a diplomatic reception that he had been learning Rumanian and that he had found it a fascinating language, above all for its striking blend of sophisticated neo-Latin Western idiom with the barbaric rhythms of the East. "All that is known of the Rumanian language," Pauker replied, "is that it consists of a very large number of Slav elements." [15]

The Slavicization campaign was thorough and far-reaching. In schools at the time, children was taught that Rumanian was a Slavonic language with some neo-Latin elements superimposed. Philologists, at a more exalted though no more glorious level, "proved" that the Rumanian language was almost as good as an honorary Slav language. Emphasis was placed on the extensive Slavonic influence on the vocabulary and morphology of Rumanian and, it was asserted, the

[15] Private information to author.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

development of the Rumanian language as a means of expression had depended on Slavonic influence. To underpin this argument, the orthography of Rumania was changed to give it a Slavonic appearance and the letter â was changed by government decree to î (which had evolved on the basis of a Cyrillic character) in all positions, even where the relevant word was not a Slavonic loan word. The most visible—and to national pride the most wounding—result of this was that the very name of the country was no longer spelt *România* but *Romînia.* This more than any other change was seen to symbolize the subjection of the national language and culture. Yet others seem even more absurd in retrospect: it was seriously proposed, for example, that the word *trăiască* ("long live!" and thus much used in the communist context) was a foreign borrowing and should, therefore, be replaced by the fine (and long obsolete), old Rumanian word *slava.*[16] Parallel with this, the Latin origins of the Rumanian language were played down and those scholars of the pre-communist period who had stressed this were denounced on various grounds.[17] This effort was a natural concomitant of the general campaign to cut Rumania's links with the West. There is, in fact, no convincing explanation for this campaign of Slavicization imposed on Rumania—it was unique in Eastern Europe —but possibly it had some of its origins in the supposedly close links between Rumania and the West.

A further move in the campaign against the Rumanian language, which did not proceed all that far, however, was to constrain it to regard "Moldavian" as its paradigm. After the annexation of Bessarabia, the Soviet authorities pressed on with the construction of an autonomous Moldavian language and culture, and went to great lengths to demonstrate that Moldavian and Rumanian were wholly different. Until 1945, for example, Moldavian was written in a Latin script, but switched at that date to Cyrillic. Soviet commentators argued that until the sixteenth century Rumanian and Moldavian did form a single entity, but thereafter they diverged with the emergence of a separate Moldavian tradition, which had been more intensively enriched by Slavonic influence. In 1953, the Soviet Academy of Sciences issued a work in which it was argued

> Since the Moldavian people entered upon the road of socialist construction 25 years before the Rumanian, the Moldavian language, which has a significantly complete political vocabulary, can provide also for Rumanian, which is only now starting on the creation of a socialist terminology relating to culture and to social-political relations. The similarity of grammatical structure and the remarkable community of vocabulary of the two languages is the reason why the Rumanian language, as it enriches its

[16] Arnold Kleess, "Rumänisch und Moldauisch," *Osteuropa,* Vol. V (1955), No. 4, p. 281.
[17] For example Al. Rosetti, *Influența limbilor slave meriodionale asupra limbii române* (Bucharest: Academy of Sciences, 1954) cites Cihoc's Dictionary of 1879 which showed that out of 5,765 words in Rumanian, two-thirds were Slavonic in origin and only one-fifth neo-Latin.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

vocabulary through the new terminology, should follow Moldavian in a whole range of examples.[18]

This concentrated assault on what was regarded as the sanctity and right of existence of the Rumanian language produced an equally extreme reaction, which came in the early 1960s. The orthography was re-Latinised and *Romînia* once more became *România*, thus stressing the Roman origins of the country and the national language. The poet Tudor Arghezi, who had been silenced during the Stalinist period, called for a return to the use of the letter "â" in 1963,[19] and as early as 1962 he wrote *Dumnezeu* ("God") with a capital. Parallel with this, the town of Braşov returned to this, its traditional name and *Oraşul Stalin*, the name it had borne for well over a decade, became no more than a bad memory. The theory that Rumanian was a Slavonic language gone wrong disappeared without trace,[20] and writers gloried in the Latinity of the Rumanian language, sometimes going as far as denying any Slavonic influence whatsoever.[21]

The situation today is that there is a perceptible drift towards the exclusion of words of Slavonic origin from the language, although there is no campaign of purification, coupled with a high degree of openness towards borrowings from the French, the traditional supplier of neologisms. On occasion, words are taken over from French for which there may exist a perfectly acceptable Rumanian equivalent or root. The capacity of the Rumanian to generate new vocabulary internally seems to be very limited.

Popular interest in the language is wide and intense. Newspapers carry regular columns dealing with language, a universal feature of the East European scene, and this interest exists at virtually all levels. There is undoubtedly a far greater consciousness of language as such than in the West, and Rumanians take particular pride in the unity of the language, asserting that dialect differences are small and in no way impede mutual communication between inhabitants of the most distant areas. Some commentators, however, have remarked on the growing gap between the language of the intelligentsia and popular speech. This is certainly one of the developments that Ceauşescu was attacking in his demand for a return to *proletcult* principles in the

[18] From *Fragen der moldauischen Sprachwissenschaft* cited by Kleess, op. cit.

[19] *Gazeta literară*, 17 October 1963. See also "Rumänien: Re-Latinisierung," *WDS*, Vol. 14 (1965), p. 51.

[20] The mixed character of the vocabulary of Rumanian was demonstrated strikingly by the three words uttered in that language by President Nixon, during his visit to Bucharest in August 1969: "*trăiăscă prietenea noastra*" (= "long live our friendship")—one word of doubtful derivation, one Slavonic and one Romance.

[21] It is worth noting in this context the public relations ploy perpetrated by the Rumanians on an unsuspecting English-speaking world, including the U.N., that of persuading it that in English the name of the country should be written *Ro*mania, stressing its "Romanness" and tacitly suggesting that it is the only country with a truly Roman background. Interestingly, some English speakers are adjusting their pronunciation to the spelling and speak of *Row*mania. They grow quite heated when others prefer to use *Rou*mania or even *Ru*mania.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

summer of 1971. This gap, however, has as much to do with the relative isolation of the intelligentsia and its penchant for abstraction as with purely linguistic factors.

History and Historiography

The sense of its historical past is unquestionably one of the principal well-springs of the awareness of national identity in Eastern Europe and the Rumanians are no exception to this. The factors which may broadly be defined as specific to the Rumanian national identity are the nation's Roman antecedents and Latinity; the sense of the drive for unification throughout the Rumanian people's history; an inclination towards the West, particularly France, as a primary source of inspiration; and, conversely, a reluctance to move towards effective cooperation with neighbouring peoples, as contrasted with the aspiration of membership of a (non-existent?) community of Western nations.

The impact of the communist assumption of power was to question and eliminate the legitimacy of all these aspirations. As the consolidation of communist power progressed, the number of pre-communist works banned grew steadily. For example, a government decree of 1947 placed 42 works on the banned list on the grounds that they were " the spiritual heritage of the liquidated fascist régime." [22] Another decree of 1948 banned a further 600 books and pamphlets dealing, in this case, with the royal family and royalty. Another group of books banned dealt with Bessarabia and Bukovina, and this went so far as to include Traian Săvulescu's *Materiale pentru Flora Basarabiei,*[23] despite the author's membership of the Party and of the Academy of Sciences.

To fill this intellectual and ideological vacuum, historians were obliged to produce material on the basis of the newly imposed Marxist-Leninist ideology and this they apparently did with some gusto. Certainly, there were complaints that some historians were indulging in pro forma exercises in Marxism-Leninism and that they were incorporating classical Marxist and Soviet quotations in their output in places where they had no relevance whatever.[24]

The adoption of Soviet norms in history and historiography was both direct and indirect. For example, Rumanian historians used the Soviet schema of periodization without any attempt to make this appropriate to Rumanian historical circumstances and the official *Istoria Romîniei* (Vol. I, 1960 edition) expressly claimed to have used the latest achievements of Soviet historical science.[25] Likewise, the

[22] Dionisie Ghermani, *Die kommunistische Umdeutung der rumänische Geschichte unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Mittelalters,* Untersuchungen zur Gegenwartskunde Südosteuropas No. 6 (Munich: Verlag R. Oldenbourg, 1967), p. 18. (Cited hereafter as Ghermani, *Umdeutung.*)

[23] " Materials on the Flora of Bessarabia."

[24] Ghermani, *Umdeutung,* p. 21.

[25] Ibid. p. 57 note 164.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

content of Rumanian history was amended to conform with the new requirements. The two principal planks in this effort were the insistence on the dominance of Slavonic influence on the Rumanian people, their language and culture and on the upgrading of any popular movement that could even remotely be described as having shown traces of social discontent into harbingers of the (communist) revolution. The role of the masses, the role of "progressive" individuals, the role of Slavonic friendship and assistance, a new emphasis on socio-economic factors and the importance of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin were the guidelines for historical writing during the Stalinist period in Rumania. The approach was explicity a-national and de-nationalizing.

Some of its practical results verged on the absurd. Thus, for example, the first popular revolution with a social content in Rumanian history was the revolt of the Dacians against the Romans in the second century AD. Or, high on the list of the revolutionary roll of honour was the peasant rising of Horia, Cloşca and Crişan in 1784. However, it appeared that it was not considered wholly convincing that these Rumanian peasant leaders could have mounted a revolution of their own, so they were joined by a hitherto unknown fourth revolutionary leader, playing a vital role in the events, namely a certain Mikhail Popensky, a Russian officer (what else?) who had mysteriously found himself in the right place at the right time to lend fraternal Slavonic assistance to the otherwise benighted Rumanians.[26]

Another instance of the far-reaching reassessment of Rumanian history concerned the impact of the contact with various Slavonic peoples. The general theory was that Rumanian society only began to acquire civilized characteristics when it came under the influence of the culturally more advanced Slavs. The most significant of these Slavonic influences were the First and Second Bulgarian Empires, for which, in fact, a fairly good case can be made out. Less convincing was the argument that Moldavia only developed when it came under the cultural and political influence of the (Slavonic) Principalities of Kiev and Halicz and, further, that there was a substantial assimilation of Russian settlers in Moldavia. This line of argument then continued with the insistence on the importance of Russian help to the Rumanian Principalities against the Ottoman Empire. This Russian assistance was not only selfless and principled—as distinct from the unhelpful and exploitative attitude of the West—but "the national history of Rumania . . . cannot be properly understood . . . without an awareness of Russian support."[27] The high water mark of this Russophil approach is represented by G. Bezviconi's *Contribuţii la Istoria relaţiilor romîno-ruse,* published in 1962, which went too far even for Soviet historians and was criticized for having interpreted the motives of the Tsars too

[26] Ibid. quoting *Istoria R.P.R.* (1956), pp. 291–305.

[27] Ibid. p. 141 quoting V. Cheresteşiu, E. Stănescu and J. Ionaşcu, "Über die Entwicklung der Geschichtswissenschaft in der Rumänischen Volksrepublik in den Jahren 1944 bis 1954," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft,* Vol. IV (1956), p. 143.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

altruistically.[28] Another instance of this Slavophilia was the suggestion that the Rumanian Boyars of the Middle Ages preferred to use "Slavonic" as their *Umgangssprache*, as distinct from employing it as the administrative language of the church and the court where it clearly was used.[29]

Similarly, both the theory of the Daco-Roman origin of the Rumanian people and the so-called "continuity theory"—the theory of continuous Rumanian settlement of the contemporary areas of Rumanian settlement—were discarded during this period. Rumania's links with the West were generally denounced and the period of Byzantine influence was described as a period of feudal corruption. In general, the effect of this total reinterpretation of Rumanian history was to constitute a thorough assault on what Rumanians had come to accept as their true national history and, consequently, as a denial of their right to nationhood.

As a result, when the reaction came it was, as in the other areas of national ideology, complete and inclined to extremes in the opposite direction. Even before history proper was reassessed a breakthrough had been made in archaeology, a subject almost as much exposed to nationalist manipulation. A Research Collective set up in 1959 re-established the political validity of both the Daco-Roman origin and continuity theories. Indeed, led by Constantin Daicoviciu who had been active in this field in the pre-communist period and apparently worked undisturbed during the Stalinist era, they went a stage further. Whereas the pre-communist protagonists of the theories, notably Xenopol, had reached their conclusions on the basis of "logic" (for which read "intuitively"), the communists, by bringing new archaeological techniques to bear on the matter, were able to "prove" these theories conclusively on solid historical evidence. By the early 1960s the continuity theory was axiomatic and was being propagated for foreign consumption as well, another reversion to pre-war practices.[30]

THE first overt sign of disagreement in historiography with the Soviet Union was the polemic over the role of the Rumanian communists in 1944. In 1961, a Soviet historian V. B. Ushakov published his *Vneshnyaya politika hitlerovskoy Germanii* in which he made no mention of any role having been played by the Rumanian CP in the events of August 1944 and ascribed the "liberation" entirely to the Red Army. This view was taken up by A. Niri, in her review of

[28] Ghermani, *Umdeutung*, p. 141.

[29] Ibid. p. 143 note 566.

[30] Ibid. p. 131 quoting Daicoviciu, et al. *Din istoria Transilvaniei* (Bucharest, 1960); A German language pamphlet by Gh. Ştefan, *Die Entstehung der rumänischen Sprache und des rumänischen Volkes* came out in 1962 and a year later Daicoviciu, Emil Petrovici and Ştefan brought out *La formation du peuple roumain et de sa langue*. *Gazeta literară*, 22 July 1965 solemnly and in all seriousness announced that an unnamed British Egyptologist had pronounced Sarmizegethusa to be more spectacular than the Pyramids.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the book and was sharply criticized.[31] To lend emphasis to the changed Rumanian attitude to their history, both Gheorghiu Dej and Ceauşescu repeated the new line in speeches at the 1963 anniversary of the "liberation."

The next unfriendly step was the publication of the so-called Marx manuscript on Bessarabia at the end of 1964. This manuscript, "Notes on the Rumanians," contained a sharp attack on Tsarist policies in Bessarabia in the late nineteenth century and was, therefore, immediately interpreted by Rumanian opinion as the semi-official rehabilitation of Bessarabia in the national ideology—the edition of 20,000 copies in which the book was published was sold out in two days.

This move opened the floodgates and a complete revision of the previous line on national history followed. Nationalist historians of the pre-communist period were rehabilitated and subsequently the entire pantheon of historical heroes re-entered Rumanian life. The yardstick was not merely vague national "merit" but specific contributions and policy achievements in the context of Rumanian independence. An early instance of this was Dan Berindei's *Incepturile diplomaţiei româneşti moderne*[32] which revived the concept of a special Rumanian mission in Europe. It treated Rumanian history from the standpoint of the contemporary Rumanian state and projected that standpoint backwards. Thus Transylvania was, in effect, discussed as if it had always been Rumanian; and the Rumanian national idea, as understood today, was regarded as something that had always existed.

The journal *Lumea* carried a series of articles on Rumanian history in 1965 and this set the tone for the new approach. The overriding criterion for inclusion in the national pantheon was a supposed contribution to national independence in one form or another. On this basis, the following figures, who had been under a cloud in the Stalinist era, were once more acceptable: Mircea cel Bătrîn, Ion Hunyadi, Vlad Ţepeş, Ştefan cel Mare and Mihai Viteazul. Mircea cel Bătrîn was praised, for example, for having concluded an alliance with Sigismund of Hungary against the Turk and was thereby able to play a major, even decisive role in Balkan politics. Ştefan cel Mare gave expression to the (traditional) Rumanian spirit of resistance to foreign aggression and Mihai Viteazul was the man who had successfuly united the three Rumanian lands (1599–1600). The Rumanian Principalities were now described as having made the decisive contribution in defending Europe against the Ottoman menace and it was suggested that the West was less than grateful for this sacrifice.

The culmination of this approach to national history is to be found in Adrian Marino, "Great Figures in the History of Rumanian

[31] A. Niri, "Politica externă a Germaniei hitleriste," *Analele de Istorie a Partidului pe lîngă C.C. a P.M.R.*, Vol. V (1962), p. 179, quoted by Ghermani, *Umdeutung*, p. 149.

[32] "The beginnings of modern Roumanian diplomacy" (Bucharest, 1965). This subject is treated in detail in "Bukarest rehabilitiert die rumänische Vergangenheit: National Geschichte–neu gesehen," *WDS*, Vol. 14 (1965), p. 123.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Genius" which formed part of *The Times* advertising supplement already mentioned.[33] The argument in this article was that:

> the personalities who contributed to shaping and developing the Romanian spiritual civilisation have proved to be striking and individualized persons. However, more than in the West, such figures acquire general collective features and, one after another, enter "history," "tradition" and "folklore" . . . The Romanians lack the egocentric vision of the great personalities. They become "great" first by redeemed, recuperated collectivity.

The implication of this passage seems to be that the recognized exemplars of Rumanian history are exemplars by reason of their having contributed collectively to the national ideology; and the remainder of the article then offers a schematic interpretation of who provided which element that today constitutes the national ideology. Neagoe Basarab was the first to demonstrate the qualities of statecraft; he was a contemporary of Machiavelli's but his ideas were very different from those of the Italian thinker because ". . . the Rumanian spirit constantly rejected cynicism and amorality." Ştefan cel Mare and Mihai Viteazul

> embodied and gave memorable expression—traditional now—to the spirit of independence and resistance to foreign aggression, against invaders. One must never forget that this highly patriotic feature has left a deep imprint upon the entire history of the Rumanian national spirit, where it can be traced as an uninterrupted presence.

Mihai is credited with the unification of the three Rumanian lands and with having been father of the idea of unification, which lived permanently after him in the consciousness of the Rumanian people, deriving from their common language and culture. Horia, Closca and Crişan were responsible for having synthesized social with national awareness:

> The people acquired the awareness of liberty, of its national and human rights and demanded the abolishment [*sic*] of oppression and social discrimination.

Tudor Vladimirescu rose against Phanariot corruption and acted as a "regenerating impulse to social and national claims." Nicolae Bălcescu introduced the values of bourgeois democracy to the national ideology, Alexandru Ioan Cuza achieved the union of the Principalities and the beginnings of Rumanian political life, whilst Mihail Kogălniceanu was responsible for "vast social and administrative reforms . . . [and] resembled Cavour." The poet Eminescu enriched and purified the language, Iorga added "patriotism and sacrifice" to the mixture and finally, of course,

[33] 29 December 1972.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> In line with the great humanistic traditions of the Romanian people . . . the outstanding personality of Nicolae Ceauşescu expresses . . . the loftiest aspirations of the Rumanian spirit.

Any resemblance to the recipe for a heavy dragoon in William S. Gilbert's *Patience* is purely coincidental.

The State and the Nation

Perhaps the most striking expression of the Rumanian contribution to the theory of Marxism is the concept of the role of the nation. Whereas in the Stalinist period, and even after the April 1964 Theses under Gheorghiu-Dej, the line officially accepted was the classical Leninist one of "national in form, socialist in content," a major reassessment took place under Ceauşescu. Although it is ascribed to Ceauşescu himself, the authors of this new—and in Marxist terms revolutionary—line were more likely to have been individuals like Emil Bodnaraş and possibly Paul Niculescu-Mizil, the latter being a highly original and impressive thinker.

The April Theses did not go beyond noting

> . . . Even when socialism has triumphed on a world scale or at least in most countries, the diversity of the peculiarities of these countries, of the distinctive national and state features which, as Lenin pointed out, will prevail for a long time even after the victory of the proletariat on a world scale, will make it an extremely complex task to find the organisational forms of economic cooperation . . .[34]

Consequently, the analysis of the nation put forward by Ceauşescu just over a year later, in his Report to the 9th Congress of the RCP on the 19 July 1965, was a radical departure:

> For a long time to come, the nation and the State will continue to be the basis of the development of socialist society. The development of the nation, the consolidation of the socialist State comply with the objective requirements of social life. . . .

And in the passage immediately preceding this, Ceauşescu argued:

> Following the disappearance of the exploiting classes the nation has grown stronger and its unity has been cemented. It is only under socialism that the real community of economic interests, the common socialist culture of all citizens who live on the same territory can fully express themselves. . . .

These two themes are at the centre of the current Rumanian conception of nationhood: first, that the nation is a living reality and will continue in being for the future; and second, that the culmination of all the past efforts of the nation have come to triumph under socialism and the leadership of the Communist Party. These two interlocking theses

[34] *Agerpres* 27 April 1964.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have been expanded and in some areas made more sophisticated, but they remain the basis of what constitutes the fundamentals of contemporary Rumanian nationalism.

The effect of this thesis in Marxist terms is extremely far-reaching. It denies the sanctity of the role of the working class in society and accords this role to the socialist nation. The class struggle is, in effect, declared to be over and the Communist Party itself has been converted into an élite party representing the entire nation, which does no more than to deploy Marxism-Leninism " creatively " in the interests of the nation. The implicit and to some extent explicit argument runs that the socialist content of this socialist nationhood will ensure that the socialist nation will be different from the bourgeois nation, because it is, by definition, progressive. This also deals with any accusations of nationalism. This extraordinary transformation of classical Marxism-Leninism moved one commentator to declare that the Rumanian communists have as good as turned Lenin on his head. Instead of Lenin's exhortation that communists should establish a society that is " national in form and socialist in content," the Rumanians have declared for a society that is " socialist in form and national in content." [35] Lenin is alive and well, and living upside down in Bucharest. The implication of Ceauşescu's creative contribution to Marxist thinking on the nature of nationalism are extremely important and there is every indication that the Rumanian Party was fully aware of these. Within Rumania, its effect was to recognize that despite the achievements of the post-war period, Marxism-Leninism alone had been insufficient to mobilize the creative energies of the nation fully; but coupled organically with nationalism, with the two ideologies reinforcing one another, the Party was thereby placed in a remarkably powerful position to mobilize the nation more intensively than any of its predecessors.

Since 1965, the Ceauşescu thesis has been frequently repeated and re-emphasized, on occasion in the course of polemics with other communist theoreticians. Ceauşescu hinted at disagreement on the part of Rumania's allies in his speech on the 45th anniversary of the foundation of the Rumanian Communist Party, in which he unilaterally rehabilitated the whole of the Party's history and criticized the Comintern for having pursued policies that were hostile to the Rumanian national interest and in which he reaffirmed his view of the long term importance of the nation.[36] Numerous articles in the daily and weekly press, as well as learned journals rehearsed and embellished the Ceauşescu thesis. A few of these deserve special mention for having added a new shade of meaning to the thesis or, in one case, for having attempted to go substantially beyond it. So, for example, an article in *Scînteia*, in a rejoinder to articles by the Soviet ideologist

[35] H. H. [Hans Hartl], " Die revolutionären Thesen der rumänischen Kommunisten: Internationalismus—auf nationaler Basis," *WDS*, Vol. 14 (1965), p. 105.
[36] Ceauşescu, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 371.
[37] " The responsibility of the Communist party towards the nation," 2 April 1968.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mikhail Suslov [38] and the Hungarian Zoltán Komócsin,[39] called attention to the danger to which a communist party exposes itself if it attempts to operate in a vacuum, divorced from the national tradition. The subordination of the national interest to foreign interests, the article argued, could only lead to tragedy, a warning that proved prophetic in the case of Poland, where just less than three years later Władysław Gomułka's isolated and bankrupt régime was brought down by rioting in Gdańsk.

The Ceauşescu thesis was also argued in sociological terms, namely, that the nation was an irreducible element of international life with its own character and autonomous essence:

> The nation is a social micro-unit with its own structure; it has an independent existence, evolves on the basis of endogenetic factors and remains indivisible even in conditions of the sharpest internal contradictions, or of the most profound transformations and evolutions [sic].[40]

The most definitive statement on the official attitude of the Romanian Party to the problem of nationhood and socialism is to be found in one of several resolutions adopted by the National Conference of the Rumanian Communist Party in July 1972. The resolution bears the title " The flourishing of the socialist nation and the national problem in the Socialist Republic of Rumania " and it is a lengthy exposé of the Ceauşescu thesis.[41] It rehearses the familiar argument that the nation " was formed as a result of a complex progressive historical process," that the process is a continuing one even in mature nations and that nationhood, and its assertion, are powerful forces which cannot be suppressed artificially. The role of socialism in this historical process is to have raised the nation to a higher level of development: the working class has become the representative of the entire nation and has assumed responsibility for national unity, in view of the end of class exploitation. This is then followed by a somewhat cloudy passage on " the new community of interests," the formation of a " materialist-dialectical and historical outlook on life " and increasing social homogeneity. The upshot of this process is not the disappearance of the nation, but the emergence of a new and more powerful type of nation, the socialist nation. Furthermore, the socialist nation " will increasingly contribute to solving mankind's problems " (in some otherwise unspecified way), so that it is the duty of communists to encourage the development of nations and to become " the most faithful representatives of the national interest."

[38] In *Pravda*, 29 February 1968.

[39] In *Népszabadság*, 21 February 1968.

[40] G. Dolgu and M. Dulea, " The concept of sovereignty in a sociology of development," *Romanian Journal of Sociology*, No. 4–5 (n.d.), cited by Kenneth Jowitt, *Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: the Case of Romania 1944–1965* (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971), p. 275.

[41] Full text in *Scînteia*, 23 July 1972.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Some additional details were provided in an article which expressly argued the continuity between bourgeois and socialist nationhood.[42] Socialism had taken over the best values which had emerged throughout centuries of suffering and resistance to foreign invasion and was fostering these on a higher plane. At the same time, there were certain elements of discontinuity resulting from the success of the socialist revolution, which replaced capitalist production relations with socialist ones. Equally, the emergence of this " socialist nation " is not the consequence of random factors, but of a consciously guided process directed by the progressive élite, in which every important revolutionary act was a step in the successful birth of the socialist nation.

The one instance of an article attempting to go beyond the Ceauşescu thesis (noted above) is an article by Ana Gavrilă.[43] This article is tantamount to a repudiation of Lenin's formulation of the relationship between socialism and nationalism and, arguably, Gavrilă's thesis was not accepted by the leadership, for there is no trace of it in the July 1972 resolution. Gavrilă put forward the following argument:

> The new socialist culture arises and develops from and on the corpus of national culture, which is, in turn, the product of centuries of social development. The new creation continues the old, and tradition merges organically with what is new; socialism unites national culture with class culture. Socialist culture is national in content and in its forms of expression.

Gavrilă then takes this argument to its logical conclusion:

> If the form is national, then it necessarily expresses a national content as well, for there cannot be forms without content. A culture " national in form, socialist in content," on the other hand, excludes the [possibility of the] enrichment of universal culture through national culture and, what is more, limits the original contribution that nations have to make in culture to pure formalities.

Gavrilă accepts the theory of continuity between the bourgeois and the socialist nation, which is implicit in the Ceauşescu thesis anyway and equates class consciousness with the national consciousness of the proletariat, more or less squaring the classical Marxist circle. The working class, in this analysis, is not just the factor that represents the finest achievements of the nation, but, by implication, the *national* consciousness of the proletariat is the motive force for the *socialist* revolution. From this it follows without any difficulty that socialist construction cannot be regarded as merely the concern of the working class of the world in general, but of the working class of each individual nation.

[42] Ioan Chişu, " The flourishing of the socialist Roumanian nation in the years of the republic," *Korunk*, Vol. 32 (1973), No. 8, p. 1167.

[43] " The socialist nation—a higher stage in the lives of nations," *Analele Institutului de Istorie a Partidului de pe lîngă CC*, Vol. 12 (1968), No. 5.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

EVEN whilst Gavrilă's variant was not explicitly accepted, the expression of the content of Rumanian nationhood, encouraged by the leadership, was thorough and far-reaching. Almost immediately after the public elaboration of the Ceaușescu thesis, the concept of the "specifically national" was introduced as the determinant Rumanian culture. The signal for this departure was an article by Athanase Joja, a leading figure in Rumanian cultural politics, who subsequently became head of the Academy of Sciences. In his article, Joja outlined what must be regarded as the official interpretation of the nature of the Rumanian nation, under the title "The spiritual profile of the Rumanian people."[44] After declaring that the genesis of this Rumanian national specificity is to be derived from the fact that

> the Rumanian people arose within the Carpathian Mountains, where there is a moderate Continental climate. The region has three specific hall marks: it is well proportioned, harmonious and united. The Rumanian landscape is varied, balanced and of a genuine grandeur and beauty. It is in itself a spur to balanced character and unclouded vision.

It was against this unrivalled natural backdrop that the Rumanians evolved into the fine people that they are today. It all started off with the Dacians, who "were handsome and proud, inflexible defenders of their independence." Then came the Romans, who contributed moderation, realism and the civilization of Ancient Greece. The Slavs added love of freedom, humanity and artistic sensibilities. Then came the civilization of Byzantium and contact with French culture which corresponded to the deepest needs of the Rumanian people and their soul, not least by reason of the Latinity of French culture, which "helped the Rumanians to elucidate yet more strongly their psycho-ethnical heritage." Summing up this happy amalgam, Joja declared that

> Therefore, the moral physiognomy of the Rumanian people is characterised by the following components:
> —reason and rationality (in the broad sense)
> —realism
> —a lively sense of nature
> —the melancholy of the *doina* [pastoral song]
> —humour and vivacity
> —a deep national feeling, which is yet sober and allied with a spirit of broad tolerance
> —a remarkable capacity for absorption
> —a spirit of moderation and understanding of the concrete
> —rejection of mysticism.
> Naturally, these are only some of the components of the moral physiognomy of the Rumanian people, but which yet seem to

[44] *Steaua*, Vol. 16 (September 1965), p. 3. See also "Wandlungen der kommunistischen Kulturpolitik in Rumänien: Bukarest auf 'spezifisch-nationalem' Kurs," *WDS*, Vol. 15 (1966), p. 1.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> us to be especially characteristic. Each of these qualities can be found, no doubt, in the moral physiognomy of other peoples. We are of the view, however, that these qualities in their entirety characterise the Rumanian people and are peculiar to their spiritual profile among the great family of the peoples of the world.

Joja's remarkable article acted, as was no doubt intended, as a trigger and it was followed by a spate of other excursions on the same theme. Teodor Virgolei discovered the recurrent Roman qualities of various Rumanian historical figures,[45] whilst others praised the humanity of the Rumanian people and "their boundless love for the beauties of nature." The poet Tudor Arghezi provided an almost transfigured picture of the Rumanian people, who

> do not have a national arrogance but an extraordinary self-consciousness. . . . We possess boundless riches and great beauties, which are reflected in the delightful friendliness of a talented people furnished with endowments that others envy . . . Our enchanting people—its handsome men and its women whose figures sway rhythmically in dance—is the well-spring of poetic song and story which must remain the abiding yardstick of our national élan.[46]

I. D. Balan described the Rumanian people as "courageous, industrious, dynamic and optimistic, level-headed, of high dignity and responsibility, dominated by a sense of justice and probity, to whom any extremism is foreign."[47] Zoe Dumitrescu Busulenga took up one aspect of Joja's excursion and placed greater emphasis than he did on the Byzantine and Oriental influences on the elements of Rumanian national culture.[48]

THE concept of the "specifically national" proved to be an eminently flexible one as an instrument of policy and far more successful in mobilizing support for the Party than socialist realism had ever been. It came to pervade most aspects of Rumanian life and was deployed quite openly as a tool of official policy. A good instance of this was the gigantic pageant held on 7 July 1967, attended by Ceauşescu, on the site of the Battle of Călugăreni where Mihai Viteazul had defeated a Turkish army in 1595. During the ceremonies, Ceauşescu and other party leaders were formally invited into Mihai's tent in a clear attempt to associate Ceauşescu with the historical glory of Mihai. In the report on the event, no mention is made of the fact that "Mihai" was played by an actor, but he was referred to by his title throughout.[49]

[45] *Luceafărul*, 18 December 1965.
[46] *Scînteia*, 11 November 1965.
[47] Ibid. 25 November 1965.
[48] *Luceafărul*, 25 November 1965.
[49] *Scînteia*, 8 July 1967.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Similarly, considerable emphasis was given to the 90th anniversary of Rumania's declaration of its independence (1877), a step undertaken in the face of some hostility from Russia. Formerly it had been the custom to lavish praise on Russian-Rumanian brotherhood-in-arms against the Ottoman Empire, but this had disappeared and was replaced by pride in the accomplishments of Rumanian arms at the siege of Plevna (1877), without mention of any allies. *Contemporanul* reprinted extracts from the speech made by Kogălniceanu on 9 May 1877 to the Rumanian Senate on the country's claim to independence and Ion Gheorghe Maurer, the Prime Minister, declared in his speech on 9 May 1967 that " the victory achieved on the field of battle on 9 May 1877 set the seal on the state sovereignty of Rumania. No power had the right to intermeddle in its internal affairs or to constrain it to pursue certain foreign policies or to exercise supervision over it." [50]

The emphasis on the military valour of the Rumanian nation is one of the most striking features of the upsurge of national self-expression. Rumanian spokesmen, from the highest to the lowest, missed no opportunity to reiterate the nation's glorious military tradition. Apart from the centuries of struggle against Ottoman Turkey and the feats of military valour associated with the standard pantheon of Rumania's national heroes, considerable emphasis was placed on the role played by Rumanian armies on the Allied side in the second world war. Naturally, no mention was made of the performance of the Rumanian armies fighting on the side of Hitler against the Soviet Union, but the fact that the Rumanian army was numerically the fourth largest on the Allied side in 1945 and had, in fact, suffered serious losses after campaigns in Hungary and Czechoslovakia as an ally of the Red Army was given much stress.[51] This glorification of military valour, which closely parallels Jugoslav portrayal of the second world war *mutatis mutandis,* may partly be explained by the general contempt in which the Rumanian army has always been held by Rumania's neighbours and also by Hitler.

The portrayal of the Rumanian nation's military achievements and fighting qualities also played an important role the series of enormously popular national-historical film epics that emerged from the country's studios in the 1960s. These massive films, often made with resources that rivalled *Gone with the Wind,* were devoted to vast historical panoramas in which the Rumanian audience had a good chance to revel in its nation's glorious history. Among other themes, the Dacians were given the treatment in *Trajan's Column*, Michael the Brave in a film of the same title and Tudor Vladimirescu in *Tudor.*[52] Not that

[50] " Rumänien: 90 Jahre Unabhängigkeit," *WDS,* Vol. 16 (1967), p. 58.

[51] See for example the English-language pamphlet by Colonels Vasile Anescu, Eugen Bantea and Ion Cupşa, *Participation of the Romanian Army in the Anti-Hitlerite War* (Bucharest: The Military Publishing House, 1966), 104 pp.

[52] Ecaterina Oproiu noted that *Tudor* had been seen by some 10 million people, about half the total population of Rumania. *The Times,* 29 December 1972.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Rumanians were alone in Eastern Europe in using films to buttress their national ideology—the film studios of virtually every other communist country in Europe, the Soviet Union included, made national-historical epics along much the same lines. The only difference, perhaps, was that the Rumanian films were somewhat more explicit.

EVERY national ideology has a conception of the nation's territory, the national homeland, which it is the duty of the nation to incorporate into a sovereign state. This might be defined as the political task of nationhood in Eastern Europe and the particular problem in the area is that the ideal homeland of each nation tends to conflict with the ideal homelands of other nations. Rumania is no exception and since the emergence of modern Rumanian nationalism, territorial conflicts have absorbed a good deal of its energies. Some of these conflicts have been resolved or are now overlooked, but two—Transylvania and Bessarabia—remain active in one form or another. It is striking how readily Rumania agreed to the cession of the southern half of the Dobrudja and made no effort of any consequence to regain it after 1945. The area had been incorporated into Rumania in 1913 —a spoil of the second Balkan war—and was thereafter largely ignored. Perhaps its loss was made easier to absorb by the fact that it was assigned to Bulgaria (its population is predominantly Bulgarian) at the same time as Northern Transylvania went to Hungary and that when the latter territory was returned in 1945, Southern Dobrudja seemed so much less important. Be that as it may, there is no evidence of any Rumanian irredentism directed towards Bulgaria in the post-war period. Equally, although Rumania nearly went to war with Jugoslavia over which of them was to possess the Banate in 1919, Rumania claiming the entire area, the whole issue was quickly forgotten and relations between the two states have remained more or less trouble-free. This is regardless of the fact that there is still a small Rumanian minority in Jugoslavia.

Transylvania and Bessarabia are very different issues. Transylvania envenoms Rumanian-Hungarian relations for two basic reasons: both national ideologies regard it as part of the ideal homeland and, indeed, as an area which at one point in history made the vital contribution to the survival of the nation (the continuity theory in the case of the Rumanians); and, second, the thousand-year relationship that Hungary has had with Transylvania has left it with a substantial Hungarian presence which the Rumanian state has not been able to expunge. The most important aspect of this is, of course, the Hungarian minority, which numbered 1·6 million in 1965, but there are others, notably the unavoidable fact that, until 1918, the history of the area was for most practical purposes Hungarian, that the external appearance of its towns is Hungarian (or at least Austro-Hungarian) and that by depriving this very substantial number of Hungarians (the numerically largest national minority in Europe) of the fulfilment of their

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

national aspirations, the Rumanians have, whether they desire it or not, given a grave hostage to fortune.

This very large non-Rumanian element, to which should be added nearly 400,000 Germans and smaller numbers of Slavs (Serbs, Ukrainians, Slovaks), has not been at all easy to reconcile with the dynamic of the Rumanian ideology which has always insisted on the Rumanian state being the state of the Rumanians only (in practice if not in theory). In general, Rumanian policy since 1918 has oscillated between the overt and covert implementation of this dynamic. The Rumanian nation has without question refused to accept that the national minorities had the same right to nationhood and the fulfilment of their national aspirations as they themselves. In the Rumanian national ideology, the distinction between "citizenship" and "nationality" (*Staatsangehörigkeit* and *Volkszugehörigkeit*) is very weak and in general, most Rumanians feel that a citizen of the Rumanian state is nationally a Rumanian.[53] Hence if the individual happens to be a Hungarian or German and insists on the validity of his non-Rumanian nationality, even while behaving with total loyalty to the Rumanian state in carrying out to the full his obligations as a citizen, this is, at the least, a puzzling situation for a Rumanian for whom it would be an impossibility. In other words, the Rumanian national ideology appears to demand that non-Rumanian citizens should, as rapidly as possible, shed their non-Rumanian characteristics and acquire Rumanian ones. Failure to do so has, at times, been met with retribution of various kinds, on the implicit argument that a citizen of the Rumanian state who refuses to regard himself as nationally Rumanian will, by definition, be disloyal. If this argument is broadly accurate, and the evidence suggests that it is, it clarifies or illuminates several features of official policy towards the nationalities.

In essence, the policy of conciliation that Rumania adopted after 1945 (or more accurately after 1948) was forced on the leadership from without. The various concessions made to the Hungarians at that time were regarded as no more than concessions and were rescinded at the first available opportunity after 1958. The decision to ease the relentless pressure on the Hungarians around 1965–66 was taken not out of any consideration for the susceptibilities of the nationalities, but on tactical grounds: the pressure on the Hungarians at times cast a shadow on Rumania's image in the West and, more importantly, provided a lever for the Soviet Union, which was not above exploiting the grievances of a discontented minority. Since then, overt pressure has been ended, but, despite endless Party and State pronouncements to the contrary, nothing has changed in the basic Rumanian attitude of considering non-Rumanians as a foreign body on the national territory and one which will eventually have to be dislodged.

[53] The Rumanian words are *cetățenie* and *nationalitate*. I am indebted to my colleague Dr László Péter for this information.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The anti-Hungarian policy pursued by Gheorghiu-Dej in the late 1950s and early 1960s was, in fact, the first move in using nationalism to mobilize Rumanian opinion in favour of the Party. The traditional attitude has been one of unconcealed or barely concealed hostility towards the Hungarian state (a hostility which has been fully reciprocated) and then of regarding the Hungarians of Transylvania as representing the interests of that state. In general, it should be added, there is relatively little hostility among Hungarians and Transylvanian Rumanians at the grassroots, although Regateans appear to view Hungarians less charitably. There is frequently only limited contact between the two communities and the attitude expressed by one Rumanian intellectual to a Hungarian acquaintance "Why do you insist on being a Hungarian when you could be a Rumanian?" is not untypical.[54]

The policy of the party appears *prima facie* to favour the nationalities, by recognizing both their individual and to some extent collective rights. The July 1972 Resolution suggests fairly clearly that this policy is not much more than a matter of tactics. After acknowledging the longevity of nations, the Resolution accepts their eventual *rapprochement*, a word that probably (from the context) carries the same connotations as the Russian *sblizhenie* in Soviet usage, i.e. "drawing together" leading to an ultimate "merger." The Resolution in a subsequent passage makes the point that, although "distinct national characteristics will continue to be preserved," nonetheless the process of *rapprochement* is taking place and growing stronger and the task of the party is to ensure fully equal rights for all citizens "for increasing social and national homogeneity along the road of building a united communist society."[55] The Resolution, the most authoritative statement of the official concept of nationhood, is undoubtedly an accurate reflection—certainly on this subject—of the popular Rumanian view of the future of the non-Rumanian minorities in the state.

THE problem of Bessarabia is the mirror-image of that of Transylvania, for in this case it is the Rumanian nation that feels an injustice by having had a portion of itself incorporated in another state, the Soviet Union.[56] The belief at both the official and the popular level that Bessarabia is part of the ideal homeland of the Rumanian nation and that its "Moldavian" inhabitants are in every sense

[54] The literature on Transylvania and its national problems is enormous and all of it, these lines included, is regarded as tendentious by someone. My own views are set out at greater length in "National Minorities under Communism in Eastern Europe," in (ed.) Kurt London, *Eastern Europe in Transition* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), pp. 129–35 and "National Minorities in Eastern Europe," in (ed.) George Schöpflin, *The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: A handbook* (London: Anthony Blond, 1970), pp. 247–9.

[55] *Scînteia*, 23 July 1972.

[56] See above p. 85 of this article.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Rumanians is intense. The fact that this belief, an unshakable component of the national ideology, cannot be directly expressed only adds to the frustration that characterizes Rumanian comments on the subject in private conversation. Consequently, attitudes come to the surface indirectly and allusively.

The publication of the "Notes on the Rumanians" by Karl Marx in 1964[57] was the first of these tangential indications that the Rumanian leadership, reflecting strong national feelings on the subject, was determined to reactivate the Bessarabia issue. But there have been other similar attempts to show a continued interest. For example, Andrei Oţetea, who unearthed the Marx manuscript referred to above, published another set of notes by the most persuasive authority of communist doctrine in which it is claimed that Marx not only took an active interest in the Rumanian people and their history, but even read a certain amount in Rumanian. Marx referred to the nationality statistics assembled by the historian Regnault—that there were 7·7 million Rumanians—and this figure included the Rumanian speaking population of Bessarabia and Bukovina. Hence Oţetea's article can be reasonably interpreted as an implicit reference to the Soviet incorporation of what are Rumanian lands, to the fact that this incorporation is contested and that the Rumanians have the backing of Marx in their case.[58]

The celebrations of the anniversary of the Union of the Two Principalities on the 24 January 1966 were another instance of the same technique of drawing attention to the Bessarabian problem. First of all, this was the 107th anniversary, yet the pomp and circumstance generated suggested a far more important event. In fact, the 100th anniversary in 1959 had been rather muted, so, it can be argued, the 107th was as good a time as any to compensate. Between the 10–24 January 1966, the Rumanian press was full of articles about the Union, Rumanian unity and the indivisibility of the Rumanian nation. On the day itself, there was an official festivity at which the entire leadership, the Central Committee, the government and the diplomatic corps were present and the climax of the celebrations was an event not unlike the "Hora Unirii" in character (which had been a pre-war festivity, banned after the war as a fascist remnant, stressing national unity). The 1966 celebrations had as one of its objectives to draw attention to the substantial and as yet unredeemed Rumanian population beyond the Prut.[59] It did not escape Soviet notice. Ivan Bodyul, the first secretary of the Moldavian Party organization, attacked "slanderous propaganda" in the West, and this can be interpreted as a geographical rather than as a political reference, and demanded that

[57] See above p. 90 of this article and Ghermani, *Umdeutung*, p. 150 *et seq.*

[58] *Lupta de clasă*, April 1968. A similar hint was dropped by Miron Constantinescu in *Scînteia* 5 May 1968.

[59] "Die nationale Vereinigung aller Rumänen als 'Kern des Fortscritts'—Bessarabien rückt ins Blickfeld," *WDS*, Vol. 15 (1966), p. 15.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Moldavian historians should emphasize more strongly than ever the links that bound the Moldavian people to the Soviet family of nations.[60] Continuing Rumanian interest in Bessarabia was also shown by the construction of an extremely powerful radio transmitter in Iaşi, a mere 40 kms. from the Soviet frontier, which was audible beyond the Prut and carried a rich diet of historical and cultural programmes, reflecting the national preoccupations of Rumania.[61] Another instance of concern with Bessarabia was the 300th anniversary in 1973 of the birth of Dimitrie Cantemir, the 18th century *hospodar* of Moldavia who claimed the territory beyond the Prut as part of his domains. Historical maps published in Rumania as part of the Cantemir anniversary clearly showed Bessarabia as a Rumanian land.

Some conclusions

Finally, some attempt should be made to assess the extent to which official and popular nationalism overlap in the Rumanian case. It is invariably a difficult problem, given the shifting character of nationalist ideologies and it is even less easy in the Rumanian case in the absence of any public opinion polling on the subject. Hence this assessment is based on the personal impressions of Western observers of the Rumanian scene, myself included.

The popularity of the nationalist course pursued by the leadership over the last decade is not in doubt and it has clearly achieved one of its objectives, that of providing the communist régime with a measure of legitimacy as the defender of the national interest and that of offering the leadership a more effective means of mobilization than Marxist ideology alone had proved to be. How far and in what way the Rumanians' conception of their nationhood has been changed by their post-war experience can to some extent be deduced from this popularity. The fact that at all times expressions of nationalism have been strictly controlled from above is a good indication of the intensity of popular feeling, for the leadership is seemingly well aware that a free expression of Rumanian nationalism runs the grave danger of overt hostility to the Soviet Union.

Traditional anti-Russian sentiments have undoubtedly been strengthened by the Rumanian people's post-war experience. The political subordination, economic exploitation, the imposition of an alien ideology and the forced cultural reorientation, the artificial severing of links with the West, the restrictions on the independence of the state have all been perceived, in greater or lesser measure, as threats to the substance of the nation by the Soviet Union. Consequently, the de-Russification of the early 1960s was welcomed by the

[60] Ibid. quoting *Moldova Sochialista*, 16 February 1967.

[61] The new transmitter at Iaşi had a strength of 1,000 kw making it one of the most powerful medium wave stations in the area; it was commissioned at the end of 1970 or early 1971. Radio Free Europe *Research*, Rumania Situation Report 2, 19 January 1971.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

people, even if these moves by the leadership did little or nothing to broaden the limits of liberalization. The nationalist course did, nonetheless, provide a legitimate channel of expression after the years of frustration and, in this one respect at least, the Rumanians are aware that they are better off than any other East European nation. There is a good deal of mileage to be had from feeling that one is master in one's own house. The institutionalization of anti-Russian sentiments, which has simultaneously canalized and delimited them, can be regarded as a new development in the Rumanian national ideology.

There can be equally little doubt about the popularity of the moves against the Hungarian minority. As suggested, the Hungarians are viewed as a foreign body on the territory of the nation and are perceived as a threat to the nation—albeit less grave than the supposed Russian threat—virtually regardless of what the Hungarians may say or do. The fact that they remained solidly loyal to the Rumanian state in 1968 is ignored or discounted. The coolness between Rumania and Hungary, a feature of international affairs in Eastern Europe for a century, again rests on considerable popular support (in both countries). The Rumanians rightly or wrongly suspect the Hungarian state of harbouring designs on Transylvania and of being prepared to use the Soviet Union in pursuit of this. This view—certain Hungarian statements in the last few years give it some credibility—is never expressed as explicity as this but it does underlie official statements and private comments. Hence in this context one can point to a definite change in the Rumanian national ideology, perceiving a possible convergence of interests between Hungary and the Soviet Union over Transylvania. There was of course no trace of this in the pre-war period, when Hungary's patrons were Italy and a somewhat reluctant Germany.

On the whole, changes in Rumania's Marxist-Leninist ideology—an ideology which is not taken especially seriously—have been more a matter of adapting Marxist-Leninism to nationalism than vice versa. Consequently, the regime not only has a more clearly defined corpus of ideas as to what constitutes Rumanian nationhood than its non-communist predecessors, but it also has at its disposal a far more effective instrument of mass mobilization. To the extent that official and popular conceptions of Rumanian nationhood overlap and in as much as it is seen to defend the national interest, the Rumanian Communist Party rules by consent. The long term result of this fusion of Leninist organizational techniques with a highly effective mobilizatory ideology is that pressures for liberalization can be easily side-tracked by pointing to persistent threats to the nation from abroad. It is hardly a combination that makes Rumania a particularly agreeable society domestically.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Autonomy and Détente:

The Problems of Rumanian Foreign Policy

Robert R. King

CONTEMPORARY Rumania's claim to uniqueness is its foreign policy. Through skilful diplomacy and exploitation of opportunities presented by the international situation, Rumania has cautiously expanded its autonomy from the Soviet Union, but at the same time has maintained its membership in the Warsaw Pact and avoided Soviet military intervention. Although there are differences of view over the timing of and reasons for Rumania's policy of autonomy, the initial overt disagreement with the Soviet Union, and the first step in establishing Rumanian autonomy, was the dispute over economic integration within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon).[1] Rumania's attempts during this period to diversify its foreign trade and—particularly—to expand its trade with Western states increased the country's freedom of manoeuvre. With the Rumanian attempts to mediate between the Soviet and Chinese parties in 1963 and the issuing of the Rumanian Party's April 1964 Declaration, autonomy was codified and expanded to include political, as well as economic relations.

The death of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Nicolae Ceauşescu's assumption of the party leadership in March 1965 led to certain changes. Although Ceauşescu's foreign policy continued to follow much the same lines as that of Gheorghiu-Dej, he has personally been more directly identified with the policy of expanding Rumanian autonomy, and he has been more explicit and systematic in enunciating the policy and relating it to Marxist-Leninist ideology and Rumanian nationalism. Although the first few months of his tenure as party leader (which coincided with the initial period of the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership in the Soviet Union) were marked by caution and even by a certain improvement in Rumania's relations with the USSR, under Ceauşescu Rumania's autonomy has since been further expanded and legitimized. Soviet attempts to strengthen the Warsaw

[1] The best discussion of the dispute with Comecon is John Michael Montias, *Economic Development in Communist Rumania* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1967). Stephen Fischer-Galati suggests that as early as 1955 Rumania's leaders were cautiously pursuing " national policies " first formulated in 1945. (See his *The New Rumania*, [Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1967], p. 7, and his " Rumania and the Sino-Soviet Conflict " in Kurt London, *Eastern Europe in Transition* [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966].) Kenneth Jowitt argues, more convincingly from my point of view, that achieving autonomy was a gradual and contradictory process which only really began with the dispute with Comecon. (See Jowitt's *Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Rumania, 1944–1965* [Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971], pp. 198–224.)

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Pact organization in late 1965 and early 1966 were finally abandoned in the face of energetic opposition by the Rumanians. In a speech on the 45th anniversary of the Rumanian Party Ceauşescu responded to Soviet initiatives by reiterating Rumania's view that military pacts were obsolete, criticizing Soviet interference in the affairs of other parties under the Comintern, initiating thinly veiled claims to Soviet territory, and reasserting the sovereignty and independence of Rumania.[2] In 1967 he further strengthened Rumania's claim to autonomy and provoked a crisis within the Warsaw Pact by establishing diplomatic relations with West Gemany and refusing to support the Soviet Middle East policy following the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The high point of Rumania's defiance of the Soviet Union was its refusal to participate in, and its explicit condemnation of, the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. Although under Soviet pressure, Rumania's position on the Czechoslovak events was moderated within a short time, relations with the Soviet Union continued to be strained. The terms of a new 20-year Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union signed in July 1970, despite the limited normalization of relations which it implied, confirmed Rumania's unique position in the Warsaw Pact. Ceauşescu's daring visit to Peking in the summer of 1971 and the Soviet pressure which followed it further confirmed Rumania's autonomy.

ALTHOUGH one must not underemphasize the internal factors that were involved in the Rumanian leaders' pursuit of autonomy from the Soviet Union, international factors permitted them to follow this policy, and were skilfully exploited to that end.[3] Rumania's innovative foreign policy began during a time when the Cold War confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States was still the predominant feature in international relations. The East-West division was still clearly marked in Europe, although both major powers were seeking to seduce wavering members of the opposing alliance. Despite the development of serious differences between the Soviet Union and China, their conflict was fought within the communist movement, and Peking was isolated from the Western States. Yugoslavia was seeking to improve its own relations with the USSR but at the same time to maintain its freedom of maneouvre. These features were the most important external elements contributing to Rumania's expansion of its autonomy.

By the early 1960s the rather sterile East-West confrontation had given way to a more innovative and flexible Western Policy vis-à-vis

[2] See *Scînteia*, 8 May 1966. On the Warsaw Pact dispute, see Robin A. Remington, *The Warsaw Pact: Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution* (Cambridge: Mass.: MIT Press, 1971), pp. 80–88; and Fritz Ermarth, *Internationalism, Security, and Legitimacy*, Rand Memorandum RM-5909-PR (March 1969), pp. 33–40.

[3] For an excellent discussion of the domestic elements which led to the Rumanian policy of autonomy, see Jowitt, op. cit.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the East European states. Although the Soviet-American confrontation continued, Western states were willing to encourage East European moves away from Moscow. The visits of Gheorghe Gaston-Marin to Washington and of Ion Gheorghe Maurer to Paris and an increasing number of economic agreements between Rumania and Western states reflected Western political as well as economic encouragement. This Western interest, however, was not motivated so much by a desire for *détente* in general as it was by a desire to foster disintegration of the Soviet sphere. The Soviets, in the same spirit, were cultivating French reservations about the Atlantic Alliance.

During this time the Sino-Soviet conflict gave Rumania an opportunity to expand its autonomy within the international communist movement. The Soviet struggle with the Chinese permitted Bucharest to bargain Rumanian support for Soviet concessions. Neutrality in the Soviet-Chinese polemics was one of the tactics which ultimately induced the Soviet leaders to yield in the dispute between the Soviet Union and Rumania over economic integration. Gheorghiu-Dej later saw the differences within the socialist camp as an opportunity to expand Rumania's influence by playing the role of mediator between the two contending parties. During the 1960s China was diplomatically isolated, and the dispute was carried out primarily in the realm of interparty relations. Hence China's interest in securing party allies against Soviet domination was great, and the Chinese were anxious to support the Rumanians in their search for autonomy from Moscow.

A third external factor that contributed to Rumania's search for autonomy was the role played by Yugoslavia. Tito not only served as a model for Gheorghiu-Dej in his relations with the Soviet Union, but he also supported the Rumanian leader in his efforts to achieve autonomy. Although Rumania chose to maintain its institutional links with the Soviet Union (membership in the Warsaw Pact and Comecon), these ties did not hamper the evolution of an independent foreign policy. The very close relationship Tito maintained with Gheorghiu-Dej, and later with Ceauşescu, is a reflection of the similarity in the policies both countries pursue. Despite this similarity, however, Tito has at times been concerned about the course of Rumanian-Soviet relations. The Yugoslavs have counselled the Rumanians to proceed with greater caution at times, both in their own interest and in what they assessed as Rumania's interest. Nevertheless, the example and support of Yugoslavia were important elements which encouraged the Rumanian search for autonomy.

THOSE external factors which combined favourably in the early 1960s to permit the Rumanian Party to carve out its autonomous niche in Eastern Europe have undergone rather fundamental changes as the Soviet-American confrontation has begun to give way to a more general *détente* and as the bipolar world has evolved into a multipolar one. Soviet-American relations, the Sino-Soviet conflict, and

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the unique position of Yugoslavia remain important factors, but the changes that have taken place in the past few years make these external influences less helpful to Rumania's pursuit and maintenance of an autonomous foreign policy.

The improvement in Soviet-American relations has perhaps had most significant repercussions in this connection. The withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam and the winding down of the conflict in South-East Asia have removed a source of strain in the relations between the superpowers. At the same time, both the US and the USSR have reflected an interest in expanding economic exchanges and improving political ties, as was most dramatically shown by the series of visits between Nixon and Brezhnev which began in May 1973. Even in the area of military confrontation, the initial Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement and the prospect of mutual force reductions in Central Europe hold out the possibility of improvements in this sphere.

For Rumania, these developments portend a decline in the United States' interest in encouraging autonomy from the Soviet Union. While the US regarded the USSR as its principal adversary, it had a political interest in supporting a Soviet client state in any moves away from Moscow. Now, although an autonomous foreign policy is still considered praiseworthy by Washington, American concern is focused elsewhere. Once American policymakers decided to improve relations with the Soviet Union directly, it became necessary to deal more circumspectly with the states of Eastern Europe, in order not to risk antagonizing Moscow by overtly encouraging the antonomy of reluctant Soviet allies. The Soviet Union promises to be the best market for American industry, and in terms of potential for economic exchanges, Rumania would rank behind several other East European states. This does not mean that the United States is no longer interested in the continuation of Rumania's autonomous foreign policy; in fact, Secretary of State William Rogers reaffirmed this interest during his visit to Bucharest in July 1972. It does mean, however, that the United States places a lower priority upon it.

Militarily, the United States has always played a very limited role in Eastern Europe. The seizure of power by Soviet-inspired parties by 1948, the Soviet crushing of the Hungarian revolution in 1956 and of other uprisings in the post-Stalin years, and the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 were all carried out without American intervention. However, America's hostility to the Soviet Union and its extensive military capacity did add an element of uncertainty to any Soviet calculations on the use of force. As a result of the improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations, however, American military force is less likely than before to be a factor in furthering an autonomous Rumanian foreign policy.[4]

[4] This is not to say that *détente* has increased the likelihood of Soviet military action against Rumania. The USSR's interest in improving relations with the United States

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Economically, the United States' interest in Rumania has increased with the evolution of *détente*. However, this is increasingly unconnected with Rumania's autonomy in foreign affairs. Initially trade with Eastern Europe was used as a carrot in the policy of encouraging the Soviet client-states to rely less upon Moscow. In the 1950s both Poland and Yugoslavia were given most-favoured-nation treatment for their exports to the United States, largely for political reasons. By 1965 Rumania, too, would presumably have been entitled to MFN because of its foreign policy, but by that time the Vietnam conflict had escalated to the point where countries aiding North Vietnam or the Viet Cong could not be given this concession for domestic American political reasons. By the time the conflict had wound down sufficiently for trade concessions to be made to Rumania, the United States was involved in expanding trade with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European states. Although American-Rumanian trade was 8·6 times greater in 1972 than it was in 1965, it still only made up 2·1 per cent of total Rumanian trade.[5] There is potential for expanded economic relations, but in economic terms the Rumanian market and Rumanian conditions do not appear to be sufficiently attractive to lure major American economic interests to the country. The American Government's new concern with East-West trade means that in general, economic rather than political conditions will determine the flow of trade with the United States. Hence it is unlikely that economic relations will replace strategic and political elements in the United States' support of Rumania's independent foreign policy.

West Germany has also played an important role in Rumania's search for an autonomous foreign policy—not only by establishing diplomatic relations with Bucharest, and thus permitting Rumania to assert its individuality, but also by rewarding Rumania politically and economically for doing so. In 1967—the year Rumania defied the Soviet Union and established diplomatic relations with Bonn—Rumanian trade with West Germany almost doubled, but Rumanian exports to West Germany were only about one third of its imports from that country. As a further show of support, Willy Brandt, then the West German Foreign Minister, visited Bucharest in August 1967.

Initially West Germany was interested in improving relations with the East European states individually, and it was in this context that the Kiesinger-Brandt Government proposed the establishment of diplomatic relations with Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. The East German, Soviet, and Polish reaction to the establishment of such relations between Bonn and Bucharest effectively closed off further moves by West Germany in Eastern Europe for

and Western Europe for strategic, political and economic reasons would make any contemplated military action against Rumania a sufficiently costly move politically to prevent it in any but the most extreme case.

[5] *Anuarul Statistic al RSR*, 1973.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nearly three years. When the West German *Ostpolitik* again began to make progress it was on the basis that improved West German-East European relations were to follow improved relations between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union.

The progress of the *Ostpolitik*, pursued with greater success since the Brandt-Scheel Government came to power in Autumn 1969, has affected Rumania's relations with West Germany. The FRGs non-aggression treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland and the basic treaty negotiated with East Germany, which was followed by improvements in relations with Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria have tended to minimize the significance of Rumania's ties with Bonn. When it was the only East European state with which West Germany had established diplomatic relations, Rumania occupied a unique position as the only Warsaw Pact state on good terms with Bonn. Bucharest could present itself as a channel through which the thinking of leaders of Eastern Europe could flow, and as a broker between West Germany and the Warsaw Pact states. With the success of the *Ostpolitik*, Bonn has acquired more direct channels of communication with the East European states. Although the FRG has shown particular consideration for the Rumanians as it has pursued the *Ostpolitik*, Bucharest has clearly declined in importance. In view of the importance the Rumanian leader places on such personal diplomacy, the fact that Brezhnev visited Bonn before Ceaușescu did is a reflection of the relative importance of the two countries in German perspective.

Rumanian-West German economic relations have obviously been more important to Bucharest than to Bonn. Germany has found the Rumanian market limited both in scope and ability so far as providing needed goods in exchange for German shipments is concerned. In Eastern Europe the Soviet, Czechoslovak, and Polish markets are considerably more important than the Rumanian one, and with the expansion of trade between West Germany and these northern East European countries Bonn has become even more insistent that Rumanian-West German trade be placed on a strictly economic basis.

When Rumania was essentially the only East European state engaged in developing good economic and political relations with Western Europe, there was considerable interest in that country and international support for its independent foreign policy. Now that improved East-West relations have expanded to include the Soviet Union and most of the rest of Eastern Europe, Rumania's position is no longer unique. Rumania's foreign trade with Western Europe has continued to grow, but its rate of expansion has slowed down in the last few years, while trade between Western Europe and other East European states has increased more rapidly.[6] Rumania did receive

[6] Among the members of Comecon, Rumania continues to have the highest *proportion* of its foreign trade with developed Western states and the lowest proportion with the other members of Comecon. In 1971, 36·8 per cent of its trade was with the West

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

special recognition earlier, and its success in improving relations with West European states is openly acknowledged, but the uniqueness that characterized its position, which was the source of much Western support, has gradually been eroded.

SINO-SOVIET relations, and particularly China's interest in Eastern Europe—important external factors that affected Rumanian foreign policy—have undergone important changes in the past few years. From the early 1960s on the Rumanian Party's position on the Sino-Soviet differences was one of neutrality, but on the question of relations among communist states and parties the Rumanians and the Chinese both rejected any form of Soviet hegemony.

For a brief time during 1970–71, however, both the Rumanians and the Chinese became interested in closer relations with one another. By 1970 Rumania was facing serious internal economic problems as a result of its policy of rapid development of heavy industry; massive investments were no longer resulting in the planned rate of growth, and various elements of the economic reforms initiated in 1967 had been altered and emasculated by the pressures of certain vested interests. Added to these economic difficulties was the fact that in the late 1960s Rumania had relied for a large proportion of its economic growth upon import credits from Western Europe. By 1970 the pressure to expand exports to repay these credits was being felt, but like most other East European states Rumania had difficulty in marketing its manufactured goods in the West. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 underlined Rumania's anxiety to find an effective counterweight to Soviet political and military influence in Eastern Europe. The failure of NATO to do more than protest mildly against the Soviet-led invasion indicated that if Soviet political and military pressure were to be applied Rumania would be even less likely to receive meaningful Western support.

At the time Rumania began searching for an alternative to the West as a political and economic counterweight to the USSR, China briefly became a serious candidate for that role. The launching of its Cultural Revolution in 1966 had led the Chinese People's Republic into a more inward-oriented policy, but by the end of the decade the Cultural Revolution was coming to an end and the isolationism which had marked that period of domestic chaos was giving way to greater assertiveness in the international arena. The Chinese leaders were apparently concerned at what they considered to be renewed aggressiveness on the part of the USSR—indicated by the Soviet-

and 47·2 per cent with the other Comecon states. In terms of total trade *volume*, however, Rumania's total 1971 foreign trade is less than the volume of every other East European Comecon state. Even in terms of trade volume with the West, Rumania exceeds only that of Hungary and Bulgaria. See *Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik Stran Chlenov Soveta Ekonomicheskoi Vzaimopomoshchi 1972* (Moscow 1972), pp. 324–5.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Chinese border clashes in March 1969 and by the invasion of Czechoslovakia a few months earlier. In order to weaken the Soviet Union's strategic position by increasing the instability of its Western frontier, China became interested in improving relations with both Yugoslavia and Rumania. Bucharest and Belgrade proved to be interested in Peking's overtures, Albania was already a staunch ally of China, and this made possible a serious challenge to Soviet interests in the Balkans. A Hungarian newspaper [7] expressing concern about the formation of a pro-Peking "Tirana-Belgrade-Bucharest axis" seems to have been a reflection of Moscow's anxiety about such a possibility.

There were a number of indications of Rumanian-Chinese *rapprochement* during 1970 and 1971. China was by far the most generous of those who offered assistance to Rumania after the serious floods in Spring 1970. A series of high-level Rumanian visits to China prepared the way for sizeable Chinese credits, and various military delegations were exchanged between the two countries.

The clearest indication that Rumania had made the decision to move from neutrality between Peking and Moscow towards greater political and economic reliance upon China was the state visit of President and party leader Nicolae Ceauşescu to the People's Republic in June 1971. The seriousness of this decision was emphasized by the fact that this was the first visit to Peking by an East European head of state and party leader (with the exception of Enver Hoxha of Albania) since the Sino-Soviet polemics had become public. The warmth and ceremony with which Ceauşescu was welcomed indicated China's interest in cultivating good relations and encouraging independence from Moscow. In the communiqué signed at the end of the visit the Chinese pledged "to support the Rumanian people firmly in their just struggle to safeguard their national independence and state sovereignty," [8] and certain comments in speeches delivered by Ceauşescu and statements in the joint communiqué put Rumania firmly on the side of the Chinese on a number of issues.

Ceauşescu had not even returned to Bucharest before the Soviet Union and its faithful allies in the Warsaw Pact launched an escalating campaign of verbal attack on Rumania. The Soviets intensified their criticism of China, but left the verbal assaults on Rumania primarily to other East European states. During the early part of the crisis the Chinese, probably reflecting Rumania's original decision to play down its differences with the Soviet Union, offered little overt support, although there were exchanges of delegations and reaffirmations of friendship. As Soviet pressure escalated, particularly after it was announced that President Nixon would pay an official visit to Peking, the Chinese voiced their support for Rumania more openly.

The visit of Soviet party leader Brezhnev to Belgrade in September

[7] *Magyar Hirlap*, 13 August 1971.
[8] Hsinhua, 9 June 1971.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1971 reflected a new decision that pressure tactics were no longer the best way to deal with the problem of Chinese influence in the Balkans, and thereafter Rumanian-Chinese relations entered a quieter period. Reciprocal visits by various economic and cultural groups have continued, but the warmth and closeness that marked Chinese-Rumanian relations from the time of China's contribution to flood relief until Ceauşescu's visit to Peking have no longer been evident.

To a certain extent the lull was due to the fact that both countries became preoccupied with other concerns, but there are also indications that more fundamental problems have led the two nations to reassess the importance of their relations. During the period of tension with the Soviet Union in 1971, the Rumanians may have come to realize China's limited ability to defend them against the Soviet Union. Certain remarks by Chou En-lai in an interview with a Yugoslav daily [9] during the summer of 1971 must certainly have given rise to second thoughts in Bucharest. Although the Chinese premier asserted that "we shall never betray our friends" and "we shall extend as much support to them as we can," he also went on to observe that "we are far away from Europe and, as you know, one of our popular proverbs says: 'Distant waters cannot quench fire.'" Such statements must have raised doubts about the value of seeking good relations with China as a counterbalance to Soviet pressure.

In addition to recognizing that their ability to support the Balkan states was limited, the Chinese may now be less interested in playing for small stakes in the Balkans by wooing Rumania and Yugoslavia. After President Nixon visited Peking and emphasized America's interest in improving relations with the People's Republic, the Chinese leaders may have decided that they could influence international affairs and deal with the potential Soviet threat far better by establishing good relations with the United States, Japan, and other countries than by promoting the autonomy of a miscellaneous assortment of small Balkan states. China's growing acceptance by other nations makes Rumania much less important in Chinese eves. There are already signs that China's increasing role in the international sphere has led to a decline in Albania's significance as China's closest ally.[10] This is not to suggest that Rumania and China are no longer interested in good relations, but they are not accompanied by the previous sense of urgency.

TWO of the main external factors which permitted and encouraged Rumania to expand its autonomy from the Soviet Union—Western and Chinese support—have become less significant as a result

[9] *Vjesnik*, 28 August 1971.

[10] Two good discussions of this cooling of Albanian–Chinese relations are Peter R. Prifti's "Albania's Expanding Horizons," *Problems of Communism*, 20: 1 (January–February, 1972), pp. 30–39, and the article by Peter Kuntze in the *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, 11 March 1972.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of changes in the international situation. The third factor—support from Yugoslavia—also appears less certain at present, but primarily for domestic political reasons. Although Yugoslavia and Rumania have pursued quite different domestic policies, the two have followed remarkably similar foreign policies, and Yugoslavia is probably the state politically closest to Rumania. In both international and inter-party affairs Yugoslavia and Rumania have consistently maintained the right of each state and each party to pursue its own independent policy without outside interference. Although political relations between the two countries were very close since the beginning of the 1960s, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, which both condemned, brought them still closer together. They continue to maintain close political ties, and frequent high-level meetings take place between their leaders. Economic relations, however, have not kept pace with political relations, although both countries have deliberately sought to expand economic ties. Trade volume increased 3·6 times between 1965 and 1971, but in the latter year Yugoslavia still accounted for only 2·5 per cent of Rumania's total trade, and Yugoslavia ranked twelfth on the list of Rumania's most important trade partners.

Recently, however, Yugoslavia's internal political situation has become increasingly uncertain, and this has influenced the political calculations of the Rumanian leadership. Tito's purge of the Croation Republic's leadership, which was initiated in December 1971, and a similar reorganization of the Serbian Republic's leadership initiated in the autumn of 1972 continue to have unsettling effects upon the relations among the various Yugoslav nationalities. The attempt, under Tito's direction, to re-establish party predominance in political, economic, and ideological affairs has also had a serious effect upon the country.

Heightening the instability is Tito's advancing age. In May 1974 he turned 82. Obviously he will not long continue to head Yugoslavia, and even if he does continue to live, his ability to participate actively in Yugoslav affairs has declined. Whatever takes place in the post-Tito succession struggle (and this struggle is already under way), the prospect is that Yugoslavia will become less secure domestically than it is at present, and less important internationally, at least for a period of time. Under these circumstances Yugoslav influence in the communist world in general, and specifically its support of Rumanian autonomy from the Soviet Union, will further decline.

Yugoslavia's recent attitude, so far as foreign policy is concerned, towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in general has probably increased Rumania's concern. Since Brezhnev's visit to Belgrade in September 1971, Yugoslavia's relations with the Soviet Union have improved considerably—after reaching a low point at the time of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Soviet Union's policy in this area appears to indicate a further concern to improve its relations in Europe generally, and is obviously related to its

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

attitude towards European security and *détente*. This process has expanded to include improved relations with other states of Eastern Europe, including Czechoslovakia. The expansion of Soviet-Yugoslav economic relations has contributed to still closer ties between the two states. This whole process of *rapprochement* has probably increased fears in Bucharest about the reliability of Yugoslav support for Rumania's independent foreign policy, particularly when the changes in Yugoslav foreign policy are added to the uncertainty in its domestic situation.

THE elements of the international scene which permitted and encouraged Rumania to develop autonomy in the early 1960s have been altered as *détente* between East and West progressed in Europe and as China emerged as a major factor in the world power balance. Having achieved a degree of autonomy from the Soviet Union, however, the current Rumanian leadership is committed to continue this policy, and as a result there has been a serious search in Rumania for alternative sources of support, for new ways to maintain and perhaps expand its sphere of autonomy and its independence of action. This search has also been accompanied by "normalization" of relations with the Soviet Union. Since the invasion of Czechoslovakia there has been a cautious and uneven attempt to reduce differences between the two states. At the same time, since changing international and domestic conditions have lessened the interest and support of Western states, China, and Yugoslavia, Bucharest has sought to expand economic relations and identification with the developing countries, and has sought to utilize the current movement towards a European security settlement to further its own aims.

The process of normalizing relations with the Soviet Union has not been without its problems for both countries. Despite the general trend towards normalization since 1968, there have been periods of renewed stress, including Soviet pressure on Rumania in the summer of 1971 following Ceauşescu's visit to China. Generally, however, there has been a lessening of overt differences between the two.

In part this normalization can be attributed to the moderation of some Soviet policies. Moscow's decisions to improve relations with West Germany and seriously seek *détente* in Europe have been quietly welcomed as a vindication of Rumanian policy. At the same time, since the Soviet leaders have developed an interest in improved relations with the West they have had to accept a certain autonomy for Rumania since military action against Bucharest would undermine the improving relations with Western Europe.

While the Soviet motivation for achieving more normal relations with Rumania has been primarily political and diplomatic, Bucharest's interest appears to be primarily economic. By the late 1960s its growing trade deficit with the West led Rumania to seek closer economic ties with the USSR, since Rumanian industrial goods were more

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

welcome in the East than in the West. At the same time, a growing need for raw materials led Rumania to make long-term contracts for deliveries from the Soviet Union and to agree to invest in the extraction of these materials. This does not mean that Rumania has abandoned its interest in autonomy, but that conditions have favoured the development of economic relations.

RUMANIA'S interest in the developing countries is motivated by a number of economic and political considerations, though the former appear to have been the initial reason for this interest. As its industrial capacity has expanded, Rumania has sought wider markets for its products, and the developing countries seemed to be natural trade partners. Although stiff competition from Western states has caused Rumanian exports to increase slowly, demand in the developing countries is nevertheless great, and the competition has been less rigorous. The search for non-Comecon raw materials (motivated by the political desire to limit economic dependence) has led Rumania to seek alternative sources of such materials among the developing countries. Rumania has entered into a number of agreements to provide industrial products and technical know-how in return for raw materials. Despite the interest on both sides, however,

Rumanian Trade with Developing Countries [11] *1960–1972*

	1960		*1972*	
	Volume in Million Lei	Per Cent of Total Rumanian Trade	Volume in Million Lei	Per Cent of Total Rumanian Trade
Exports	280·2	6·5	1,488·2	10·4
Imports	155·4	4·0	1,048·7	7·2
Total	435·6	5·3	2,536·9	8·8

Rumania's trade with the developing countries has grown slowly, although in terms of volume there has been a significant increase.

Typical of the efforts Rumania has made to expand trade relations with developing countries are its economic relations with Iran. In the late 1960s, the latter became Rumania's largest single trade partner among the developing countries, with economic exchanges amounting in 1971 to some 345·8 million lei ($57·7 million at the official exchange rate at that time, 6 lei = $1). Crude oil made up some 65 per cent of Rumania's total imports from Iran in 1972, and its exports to that country have included a tractor plant, a soda products plant, a timber processing facility, and a hydro-electric com-

[11] *Anuarul Statistic al RSR 1973*. Figures are for trade with all developing countries listed separately in the statistical yearbook. These include, *inter alia*, Greece, Turkey, Israel, Spain, and Portugal.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

plex, as well as numerous other industrial products. Although efforts are being made to increase the proportion of Iranian industrial products being sent to Rumania, that proportion is still relatively modest.[12]

Rumania's political reasons for wishing to identify itself with the developing countries also have economic overtones. Rumania's request that the Common Market grant preferential treatment to Rumanian exports on the same basis as it does to those of developing countries is clearly motivated primarily by the desire to improve Rumania's foreign trade balance. Rumania also (unsuccessfully) requested membership in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which would have designated Rumania as a developing country. In becoming a member of this organization Rumania would become eligible for the generalized system of trade preferences granted to UNCTAD members by the developed states, but political considerations also appear to have been involved in the decision to seek membership.[13]

Rumania is politically motivated in its efforts to improve relations with the developing countries. Yugoslavia's important role in the grouping of nonaligned states had been an example which the Rumanians have appraised favourably and seek to emulate. Rumania's membership in the Warsaw Pact limits its formal links with the nonaligned movement, but its autonomy from the Soviet Union certainly gives it an opportunity to establish closer political ties with these developing countries. Although they have emphasized bilateral economic relations, Ceauşescu's visits to various developing countries have also tended to strengthen political relations. In recent years the Rumanian party and state leader has included trips to a number of developing countries in his extensive itinerary of travelling diplomacy.[14]

AN additional effort to secure support for Rumanian autonomy, which has assumed increased significance recently, is the effort to establish a system of European security. Although Rumania's interest in European security is primarily political, one cannot denigrate the importance of economic motivations.

The Rumanians see three related benefits from the current atmosphere of *détente* in Europe and the interest in convening the Con-

[12] Agerpres, 22 May 1972, and *Kayhan International* (Teheran), 15 October 1972.

[13] Rumania's motives for identification as a developing state are complex. In addition to external economic and political considerations, one cannot exclude the possibility that this designation is also being used to justify increased belt-tightening and a continuing high rate of investment within the country.

[14] Ceauşescu's visits have included Turkey, Iran, and India in 1969; Morocco in 1970; an eight-nation tour of Africa (Algeria, Central African Republic, People's Republic of the Congo, Zaire, Zambia, Tanzania, Sudan, Egypt) in 1972; Pakistan, Iran and a six-nation tour of Latin America (Cuba, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru) in 1973; and Argentina, Liberia, Guinea and a Middle East tour (Libya, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq) in early 1974.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. First, the security conference will most probably produce a declaration of the principles that should govern international relations which, although not identical in wording, will be very similar in spirit to Rumania's oft-expressed view that international relations must be based upon the principles of sovereignty, equality, noninterference in internal affairs, and mutual advantage. The conference, through such a declaration, will give a certain international validity to these principles, the Soviet Union will have made at least a verbal commitment to abide by them, and this will amount to at least moral support for Rumanian autonomy.

Secondly, the process of *détente* in Europe is something that the Soviet Union is anxious to further for its own strategic, economic, and political reasons. Therefore Soviet leaders are less likely to undertake any hostile action which might destroy the atmosphere of trust they have helped to create. The Soviet leaders have been willing to make important concessions in Berlin and to risk alienating East Germany, one of their most faithful and important allies in Eastern Europe, by improving relations with West Germany. In such circumstances the latitude for autonomous Rumanian action would appear to be expanded, since only the most serious Rumanian deviation would provoke military intervention by the USSR, which clearly would inhibit—at least for a time—the possibility of *détente*.

Finally, a long-term benefit Rumania hopes to gain from the developing *détente* in Europe is an increase in the Soviets' sense of security. As Soviet fear of hostile action from Western Europe declines, there will—it is hoped—be a decline in the USSR's need to secure its Western border by demanding strict conformity to Soviet wishes from the states of Eastern Europe. With the Soviets feeling more secure, Rumania, as well as the other states of Eastern Europe, could pursue policies which, while not contrary to fundamental Soviet interests, at least take national interests into consideration. The analogy of Finland is not inappropriate in this context. Whether an enhanced sense of security on the part of the Soviets will produce a " Finlandization " of Eastern Europe remains to be seen, but if such an evolution does take place, Rumania's opportunity to pursue an autonomous foreign policy would be preserved and even expanded.

Although both Rumania and the Soviet Union have consistently supported the concept of European security, specific Soviet goals in this area do not necessarily coincide with those of Rumania. The different Soviet reasons for favouring *détente* in Europe have varied, as has Soviet willingness to make concessions in order to bring about a favourable Western response to their proposals. However, there appear to be certain consistent Soviet aims. First, the USSR wishes to consolidate its position in Eastern Europe by gaining Western recognition of the borders of the states in this region and acceptance of Soviet dominance over these states. A second aim is to strengthen its

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

own security by weakening the links America has with Western Europe through NATO. The maximal goal here appears to be "Finlandization" of Western Europe. The Soviet Union is also anxious to secure expanded economic and technological cooperation from Western states.

Because Soviet and Rumanian goals in this area are contradictory on certain points, there have been a number of divergencies in their specific approaches to European-security-related issues. Although both have been consistent advocates of a security conference, the Soviet Union has generally been more vague and imprecise with regard to guarantees of security. The Rumanians have been much more specific in spelling out the provisions they consider to be essential if the security of all European states is to be guaranteed and if all states are to be prevented from interfering in the affairs of others.[15]

The Rumanians have not only made their position on European security known, but have also campaigned actively to encourage the adoption of their views. They have repeatedly stressed that the security conference should issue a declaration affirming the sovereignty and equality of all nations, repeatedly stressing that small and medium-sized nations must participate fully in international relations. To emphasize this point, during the first few weeks of the multilateral preparatory talks in Helsinki on the convening of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe the Rumanian delegation tenaciously insisted upon certain changes in the procedural rules which were not acceptable to the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, or to some Western states as well; to the apparent delight of the smaller countries participating in Helsinki, the Rumanians demonstrated that the interests of the smaller states must be taken into consideration by any conference. In his campaign to secure from the conference a suitable declaration on principles that should govern international relations, President Ceauşescu has signed a series of bilateral declarations which embody the principles as Rumania would like to see them phrased in the multilateral document.[16]

Rumania's efforts to secure its autonomous foreign policy in the context of European security have not been limited to seeking commitments to general statements of principles. As Rumanians have argued on numerous occasions, "While the principle of abstention from force is an essential legal bastion of security, elimination of the

[15] For a discussion of the Rumanian position on European security, see Robert R. King, "Rumaenien und die europaeische Sicherheit," *Europa Archiv* 27: 22, 25 November 1972, pp. 775–84.

[16] Such joint solemn declarations have been issued on the occasion of Ceauşescu's visit to Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy, West Germany, and Pakistan, as well as during the visit of the Shah of Iran and the Presidents of Sudan, Upper Volta, and the People's Republic of the Congo to Rumania. For the texts of these declarations, see *Scinteia*, 27 and 29 October 1972 and 10 January, 13 April, 28 May, and 5 June 1973.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

instruments of force—armaments—is its material guarantee." [17] Although the Warsaw Pact states have officially declared themselves ready to disband their military alliance as soon as the North Atlantic Alliance is disbanded, Rumania has been more vocal than its allies in calling for the dissolution of military blocs. The Rumanians have also been rather more active than most smaller delegations at the UN disarmament talks in Geneva. At the Vienna preparatory talks on force reductions in Central Europe, Rumania has likewise been anxious to participate in the discussions, and has criticized the tendency of the United States and the Soviet Union to dominate the meetings. In the context of the growing interest in European security and *détente*, Rumania has continued to call for the creation of a " zone of peace," free of nuclear weapons, in the Balkan region.

If *détente* in Europe progresses as the Rumanians hope, then their sphere for autonomous action vis-à-vis the Soviet Union will be maintained, if not expanded. On the other hand, if Moscow's hopes that European security will strengthen its control are fulfilled, Rumania will find itself in a very difficult position. The interest of Western states in supporting the autonomy of the East European countries appears to be declining in direct proportion to the growth of their interest in improved economic and political relations with the Soviet Union. The increased role of China throughout the world and the internal problems of Yugoslavia will—at least for a time—lead them to provide less support for Rumania's autonomous position. Rumania's campaign to strengthen economic and political relations with the developing countries promises only limited dividends in terms of support for its independent foreign policy, and hence, from the Rumanian point of view, the evolution of security and *détente* in Europe constitutes the crucial factor which will determine the scope of Rumania's autonomy from the Soviet Union.

[17] Nicolae Ecobescu and Edwin Glaser, " European Security and International Law," *Lupta de Clasă*, No. 3, March 1972.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Rolland-Barbusse Debate

David James Fisher

FROM December 1921, to the Spring of 1922, the communist writer Henri Barbusse and Romain Rolland engaged in a heated debate over the political and social role of the intellectual. It consisted of three successive, open letters on each side and was initiated by Barbusse's *Clarté* article, " The Other Half of Duty: Concerning Rollandism ". The controversy had a significant resonance in France, and to a lesser extent in German intellectual circles. The debate also had an important Soviet echo as Victor Serge and Leon Trotsky expressed their opinions on several of the issues raised in the dispute. Four years after the Russian Revolution, two and a half years after the signing of the Versailles Peace Treaty, and one year after the founding of the French Communist Party, left-wing, pacifist, and anarchist intellectuals were asked to reassess their detachment from the Communist International in the light of these events.

Rolland's relations with the French communists and French socialists in the years 1920 and 1921 were relatively cordial despite the presence of hidden strains which would eventually precipitate a confrontation and a rift. With the division of the French proletarian party into two at the Congress of Tours in December 1920, Rolland carefully chose to remain non-partisan in what he considered to be a disastrous split. Thus he wrote to the socialist Jean Longuet informing him that he would not actively collaborate with the newspaper *le Populaire*. He preferred to remain alone rather than have his name used by one party as an instrument of power or authority against the other. " But I will not mingle in the unholy struggles which have divided and weakened the two halves of socialism." [1] Remaining detached in this situation entailed a resistance to the politics of divisiveness and an effort " to promote inside France the union of all the forces of the revolutionary Left against Reaction." [2]

During the period from late 1919 to late 1921, the columns of the socialist and communist press were not only open to Rolland but solicitous of his collaboration. Rolland would occasionally write articles and appeals for *le Populaire, l'Humanité, le Journal du Peuple,* and *la Vie Ouvrière.*

The diffuse range of these writings reveal in capsule form both the nature of Rolland's protest and the concrete issues he felt most committed to. Thus he propagandized for internationalism by advoca-

[1] Letter, Rolland to Jean Longuet, 19 March 1921, Archives Romain Rolland (hereafter cited as ARR). In a letter to Longuet on 11 April 1918, Rolland wrote that he considered his thought apolitical.

[2] Romain Rolland, *Quinze ans de combat* (Paris, 1935), p. 17.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ting a universal language, Esperanto; he worked for the proliferation of the pacifist message by writing an introduction to an anthology of European anti-war poetry; he retained his link with the younger generation of French communist intellectuals by reading and reviewing their works; he fought the resurgence of post-war nationalism and militarism by denouncing various reactionary French laws; he called for revision of the French educational curriculum in an open letter to French teachers; and, finally, he wrote appeals in favour of political prisoners like Pierre Monatte and André Marty.[3]

Likewise, the response of the socialist and communist press to Rolland's books and to a spate of books about Rolland was quite favourable. In many instances friends of Rolland reviewed his books, as did Martinet who reviewed *Liluli* and *Clérambault* in *la Vie Ouvrière*,[4] and as did Jean-Richard Bloch, who wrote a three-part essay on *Colas Breugnon* in *l'Humanité*.[5] The article most typical of the organized Left's response to Rolland in this period was Raymond Lefebvre's review of *Les Précurseurs*. In this article, Lefebvre underscored the immense esteem and influence that Rolland held in the socialist world because of his impeccable internationalism and courage during the war. Lefebvre lavished praise on Rolland's transition from a pre-war writer of genius into a man who "sounded the rally of the International," and whose judgments were consistently generous and loving. "He who never had a red card in his portfolio became the leader of an International in which he was not a member."[6]

ROLLAND'S activity during the First World War became the major source of inspiration for a series of books written and published between 1919 and 1921 by close friends and admirers. In rapid succession books appeared by Paul Colin, Stefan Zweig, Pierre-Jean Jouve, Jean Bonnerot, and Marcel Martinet.[7] A laudatory if not reverential attitude

[3] See respectively: Romain Rolland, "Romain Rolland et l'Espéranto," *la Vie Ouvrière*, 6 August 1919; "L'Opinion de Romain Rolland sur l'Espéranto," *la Vie Ouvrière*, 23 April 1920; "Lettre à E. Adam," *la Vie Ouvrière*, 7 May 1920; "Le Sacrifice d'Abraham," *l'Humanité*, 19 March 1920; "L'Introduction aux Poètes contre la guerre," *l'Humanité*, 15 April 1920 and *la Vie Ouvrière*, 16 April 1920; "Suprême hommage," *l'Humanité*, 5 December 1920; "Contre la loi superscélérate. Une lettre de Romain Rolland," *l'Humanité*, 3 July 1921; "Monatte," *la Vie Ouvrière*, 25 February 1921; "Lettre à la défense, en faveur de Monatte," *la Vie Ouvrière*, 11 March 1921; "Télégram à Longuet," *Le Populaire*, 2 October 1921. For information on Monatte and Marty, consult Robert Wohl, *French Communism in the Making, 1914–1924* (Stanford, 1966), pp. 166, 430.

[4] Marcel Martinet, "*Liluli* par Romain Rolland," *la Vie Ouvrière*, 20 August 1919; Marcel Martinet, "*Clérambault* par Romain Rolland," *la Vie Ouvière*, 15 October 1920.

[5] Jean-Richard Bloch, "Critique de *Colas Breugnon*, Un livre gai," *l'Humanité*, 7, 8, 9 June 1919.

[6] Raymond Lefebvre, "Review of *Les Précurseurs*," *le Populaire*, 11 January 1920. See also the serious, four-part review, "*Clérambault* par Romain Rolland," by Jean Bernier in *Clarté*, 11, 18, 25 December 1920 and 1 January 1921.

[7] Paul Colin, *La Vertu d'héroïsme et Romain Rolland* (Brussels, 1919); Stefan Zweig, *Romain Rolland, der Mann und das Werk* (Frankfurt, 1920) (Zweig's book was

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

characterized these works. The eloquent introduction to Jouve's book, written " as a poem and an act of faith," was transparent; it exemplified the non-critical nature of these works, works which were labours of love intended to repay a personal debt.

The socialist and communist reactions to Rolland contrasted with the derogatory treatment he received in the French and Swiss bourgeois press. In a series of reviews of Rolland's works in *le Temps*,[8] Paul Souday accused Rolland of being anti-intellectual, sophistic, scholastic, overly schematic, anti-Republican, and above all captured by the Bolshevik and German legend which attributed the cause of the war to French imperialism. Souday's underlying assumption was that Rolland's pacifism at any price proved impossible with an enemy such as Germany.

Paul Seippel, a former admirer of Rolland, also took issue with the French writer's alleged new stage of pacifism, his movement away from the defence of individuality towards new sympathies with the Russian Revolution. Seippel found the post-war Rolland hard and ironic, lacking clarity on crucial points, prone to divide the world into Manichean parts, and most dangerously, contradicting his own pacifist principles by legitimizing the militaristic tyranny of the Soviet Union. He concluded that Rolland's political stances, while doing irreparable harm to his literary reputation, were erroneous because they were built on illusion. The illusion resulted from Rolland's absorption of Lenin's ideas: " He does not see that the Mongol Lenin is not Danton but Genghis Khan." [9]

The French extreme Right preferred to blur distinctions between Rolland's style of pacifism and communism. For them, Rolland's internationalism and *Clarté's* Leninism were identical in their harmful effect on French culture and society.[10]

It is important to note that these adverse remarks were answered by *engagé* socialists and not by non-aligned left-wing intellectuals. For example, in two reviews in *le Populaire*,[11] Renée Dunan polemicized with Souday defending not only Rolland's intelligence, his ability to pose essential questions, but also his judgment, and his absolute sincerity. In addition, Louise Bodin discredited Souday and praised Rolland

translated into English in 1921 and into French in 1930); Pierre-Jean Jouve, *Romain Rolland vivant 1914–1919* (Paris, 1920); J. Bonnerot, *Romain Rolland (sa vie, son oeuvre)* (Paris, 1921); Marcel Martinet, *Pages Choisies de Romain Rolland* (Paris, 1921), two volumes.

[8] Paul Souday, " Review of *Liluli*," *le Temps*, 8 April 1920, p. 3; Paul Souday, " Review of *Pierre et Luce*," *le Temps*, 2 September 1920, p. 3; Paul Souday, " Review of *Clérambault*," *le Temps*, 14 October 1920, p. 3.

[9] Paul Seippel, " Les derniers livres de Romain Rolland," *le Journal de Genève*, 27 September 1920, p. 1.

[10] See Jean Maxe, " L'Idole ' L'Européen ' Romain Rolland," *les Cahiers de l'Anti-France*, Vol. I (Paris, 1922), pp. 10, 13, 67, 91.

[11] Renée Dunan, " Review of *Pierre et Luce*," *le Populaire*, 6 September 1920, p. 2; Renée Dunan, " Review of *Clérambault*," *le Populaire*, 21 September 1920, p. 2.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as " a great heroic writer." [12] Bodin favourably reviewed the books by Zweig, Martinet, and Jouve on Rolland; despite his isolation, she thought Rolland served as a " guide and dominant example " to these men, a worthy master because of his " complex universal, and magnificently adored character. . . ." [13]

BY 1922, Rolland, aged 57, found himself in a unique situation with reference to his intellectual stature in France. On the one hand, he was honoured by members of the French socialist, communist, and independent Left. Yet because of the memory of his unpopular anti-war positions, the substance of which were construed as pro-German by the French population, and because of his frontal attacks on the French cultural establishment and on the French bourgeoisie, the former winner of the *Grand Prix de Littérature* and the Nobel Prize for Literature discovered that his name had almost disappeared from the French literary press, newspapers, and scholarly organs. He believed this indifference to be the result of an intentional boycott of his works, perhaps motivated by political differences, or by the punitive will of the respectable part of French intellectual life in Paris.[14] He did not take into consideration new developments in aesthetics or in literary taste. Despite the neglect or barely disguised hostility in critical circles,[15] his importance to the intellectual community of the Left and the Communist Party was soon to increase.

His escalating importance was the result of a debate with the communist intellectual Henri Barbusse in which he became the symbol of an allegedly dangerous and self-deceiving trend among non-reactionary intellectuals. The immediate backdrop for the Rolland–Barbusse debate dated back to Rolland's uncompromising stances in 1919 on independence of mind, his refusal to join mass political parties, and his resignation from Barbusse's *Clarté* committee. Rolland's subordination of socialist and democratic principles to his own style of pacifist internationalism estranged and puzzled members of the French Left. With freedom to criticize as his highest priority, his concept of the independent yet international mind proved to be outside both the Socialist and the Communist Internationals. Because politics and political action were always relative, expedient, and present-centred, Rolland found that his temperament clashed with those who concentrated exclusively on power relations in the here and now. Activists,

[12] Louise Bodin, " Un nouveau livre de Romain Rolland, *Pierre et Luce*," *l'Humanité*, 13 September 1920, p. 2.

[13] Louise Bodin, " Les jeunes amis de Romain Rolland," *l'Humanité*, 17 April 1921, p. 4.

[14] Letter, Rolland to Madame Louise Cruppi, 7 December 1922, ARR. Also see *Journal intime* (unpublished personal diary), December 1920, p. 43, ARR.

[15] See for example, André Gide, " Réflexions sur l'Allemagne," *la Nouvelle Revue Française*, 1 June, 1919, p. 46n; André Gide, " Journal sans dates," *la Nouvelle Revue Française*, 1 July 1919, p. 278; André Thérive, " Feu Clérambault," *la Revue critique des idées et livres*, No. 178, 10 December 1920, pp. 582–587; and Albert Thibaudet, " La conscience libre et la guerre," *la Nouvelle Revue Française*, No. 88, 1 January 1921, pp. 67–80.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

he wrote to Jean-Richard Bloch, had to limit their aims and narrow their focus if they were to be effective. The activist contrasted with the intellectual in that actions were by definition modified or bypassed by subsequent actions while intellectual activity had an absolute and timeless character. A true thinker had to be heretical: not only was he never to tolerate impediments to the full search for and public statement of truth, but he had always to reject unitarianism, whether it be by officials of the State, Church, or Party.[16] It was not surprising that Rolland told Bloch that his plans to write a short volume on Karl Liebknecht had to be abandoned because his present orientation no longer corresponded to works of this genre.[17] Implicit in this argument, was the notion that the role of the intellectual was to write and not to act. Thus in an implicit attempt to persuade his friend to follow his course, Rolland exhorted Bloch to write a book, perhaps a confession of a World War I soldier, which would restore his confidence in his individuality and dissuade him from "getting involved in social and political activity."[18] While not underestimating the value of political or social revolutionary action, he explicitly stated that such activity was unsuitable for intellectuals—intellectuals had to be disposed to "stronger, more vast and profound action."[19]

DURING the period 1919 to 1922 Henri Barbusse engaged in activities whose primary intention was to win war veterans and intellectuals to the cause of the Third International. The short tract, *The Knife Between the Teeth: to the Intellectuals* (1921), was typical of his efforts. In this work, Barbusse equated communism with reason, clarity, and the eternal truths of conscience. Those who supported communism supported a doctrine that was "at the summit of the history of ideas."[20] Workers of the mind (intellectuals) who held themselves apart from solidarity with men and movements of the future, showed themselves to be incapable of assuming social responsibilities. Barbusse's book was addressed to the lack of realism and the congenital distrust of politics on the part of intellectuals. By repudiating politics, intellectuals became part of the constituency upholding the status quo; if they were to understand the necessary relationship between political action and social thought, they would understand that "politics is life." To be politically inactive meant, for Barbusse, to act conservatively. In Barbusse's division of the world, there were those who were part of the solution, and all the rest formed the ranks of the problem: "Those who are not with us are against us."

Barbusse's brochure fulfilled the expectations of his title. He had

[16] Letter, Rolland to Jean-Richard Bloch, 30 January 1920, ARR.
[17] Letter, Rolland to Jean-Richard Bloch, 28 March 1920, ARR.
[18] Letter, Rolland to Jean-Richard Bloch, 17 September 1920, ARR.
[19] Letter, Rolland to Jean-Richard Bloch, 20 September 1920, ARR. In this letter Rolland affirmed that "a book is worth an army."
[20] Henri Barbusse, *Le couteau entre des dents. Aux Intellectuels* (Paris, 1921), pp. 14–80. This was written in August 1921.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

no use for reformism, pacifism, humanitarianism, anarchism, or moralism. Such outmoded postures, which were shortsighted, and ungrounded in the socio-economic conditions of contemporary life, would prevent intellectuals from choosing the " right " path. Selection of the reasonable path involved the acceptance of the doctrines of International Communism as well as solidarity with the Soviet Revolution, " the beginning of a second phase of humanity." Barbusse's advocacy of violence as a legitimate method for achieving social progress (" Today violence is the reality of justice ") was consistent with his support for a Leninist Dictatorship of the Proletariat. Within this framework, both violence and dictatorship were provisional but necessary tactics with which to impose social progress. Nevertheless, in his tract Barbusse blunted the edge of his knife by making two concessions. The first reassured writers and artists that an alliance with the communist phalange would not result in the total subordination of their work to sociology and politics, nor would they be required to join communist parties and strictly obey their discipline. The second was a gesture of conciliation toward Rolland, " splendid incarnation of conscience and incensed perspicacity." That Barbusse included praise for Rolland, after having denigrated pacifists for confusing the wish with the achievement of peace, reflected a last token of gratitude to him; more importantly it underlined his reluctance to excommunicate Rolland, and the prestige he carried, from the Communist International.

Barbusse triggered off the Rolland–Barbusse controversy with a polemical article in *Clarté* on 3 December 1921, entitled " The Other Half of Duty: Concerning ' Rollandism.' " [21] In drawing a distinction between Rolland and the Rollandists who had deformed the master's thought and example, Barbusse commended Rolland's moral values and literary genius, and he conceded that during the war Rolland had been " superbly infallible." [22]

Ostensibly, Barbusse aimed his attack at the " numerous and vague disciples " of Rolland, those ubiquitous writers, thinkers, and artists who remained unaware of the impotence, social hazards, and " intellectual error " of Rollandism. The two most serious charges which Barbusse levelled against this non-reactionary " intellectual left " pertained to their self-imposed distance from real events and to their faulty analysis of the social causes of war and misery. What made the commitments of these men partial and conservative was their intransigent position on the autonomy of intellectual activity. Though they posed as representatives of the most advanced thought, their critiques

[21] Henri Barbusse, " L'Autre moitié du devoir. A propos du Rollandisme," *Clarté*, No. 2, 3 December 1921, pp. 25–28. Barbusse's open letter was also published by *le Journal du peuple*, No. 31–32, 31 January–1 February 1922. The entire Rolland–Barbusse debate has been collected and published together for the first time in Romain Rolland, *Textes Politiques, Sociaux et Philosophiques Choisis* (Paris, 1970), ed. Jean Albertini. All citations come from this text, and will be referred to as *Textes Politiques*.

[22] *Textes Politiques*, p. 192.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the existing social order were always insufficient and came after the fact. " The role of the pure moralists is negative." Not only were Rollandist invectives against society tangential and unsystematic, but their rebellious content was incomplete because they remained separated from all constructive efforts at realization of a more just society. Barbusse insisted that protest, refutation, and opposition only half fulfilled the intellectual's responsibility.

Moreover, with only an intuitive grasp of social struggle the Rollandists did not recognize that their " moral ceremony " had not the slightest effect on the men and forces which controlled policy making in society —i.e. the profiteers, diplomats, courts, police, and capitalists. Without directly mentioning the Rollandists by name, other than the German, Georg Nicolai, and the Englishman, E. D. Morel, Barbusse clearly evoked a derogatory portrait of sentimental and ivory tower humanitarians. Their domain was exclusively that of pure ideas. Clinging to the heritage of the past, they were unable to react effectively to the present because of their antipathy to both politics and violence, the concomitant of which involved their cavalier dismissal of organization and collective regulation. The pacifist and liberal ideologies to which they looked were destined to irrelevance, while their summary pronouncements on the inevitable failures of socialism were mistakenly rooted in past debacles such as the collapse of the Second International in 1914 and were closed to alternatives in the future.

In holding themselves apart from the social strategists and tacticians, in choosing an individualistic route rather than that of collective organization, Barbusse held that the Rollandists were opting for a lonely, futile, and ultimately retrograde solution—a solution heroic at moments, but " harmful," like that of the anarchists because it remained on the fringes of social struggle. Overly concerned with the problems of intellectual life in society, the Rollandists were insensitive to the specific nature of misery among the toiling masses. Lastly, because the Rollandists contributed a fragmentary critique of existing society, their point of view could easily be turned in a reformist direction; such a development would obstruct the total revolutionary emancipation of the workers by tempting them with temporary rewards and false promises. What they lacked above all was a unified doctrine and a viable programme to replace that which they condemned in society.

Although Barbusse's alternative to Rollandism was not specifically designated, he pointed to the model of *Clarté,* or an implicit revolutionary commitment to the Third International and to the theoretical foundations of socialism. The strength of such a commitment derived from its capacity to unite philosophy and action, " will and idea "; no other stance could successfully mediate between the oppressive present and the liberating future. It was the best, and Barbusse thought the scientific, answer to the cosmic and impractical nature of Rollandism.

Barbusse's agency for social change was the producers, the popular multitudes, who would be mobilized by their collective awareness of the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

inequities of the capitalist system and who would carry out a " revolutionary social geometry " through the vehicles of violence and constraint. For Barbusse, violence, however provisional, was an indispensable and neutral instrument which ought to be judged according to its historical utility; its positive use was legitimized by the fact that the " imperialist, militarist regime " rested on social crimes. Violence was the only available, commonsensical technique to disarm such regimes and to begin the process of creating a more rational and just order.

FOR a variety of reasons Rolland was upset by the initiation of this frontal attack by Barbusse. Before writing a rejoinder (dated 14 December 1921), he wrote personal letters to Barbusse expressing his repugnance about entering into a polemic with him at the moment. Though he appreciated Barbusse's desire to debate issues and not personalities, he thought that the attack on the so-called " Rollandists " contradicted this ground-rule from the start. By assaulting those attitudes which Rolland's life and work authorized, Barbusse explicitly belittled independence of mind and disinterested inquiry in order to enrol intellectuals in " a party of violent political action, and which is (in my sense) narrow." [23] Furthermore, he challenged the motivation for the debate, accusing Barbusse of bad faith on two grounds: first, that Barbusse was negligent and non-egalitarian in refusing to publish Rolland's reply in *Clarté*; and second, that Rolland's ideas had been misrepresented. Rolland found it truly unfortunate that Barbusse would not grant intellectuals the option to work for great human causes in ways different from *Clarté*. Nevertheless, he decided to reply in order to demonstrate his determination to remain outside parties or ivory towers so that he could retain his liberty while freely associating with just and necessary social causes.[24] However, Barbusse continued to remain silent on the question of publishing Rolland's reply in *Clarté*, a review which was, Rolland thought, " hard or flexible according to its needs." [25] Finding himself without an organ to express his views, Rolland wrote to Paul Colin asking if he might publish his rebuttal in *l'Art libre*.[26] Although he would have preferred the entire discussion to have taken place on common ground, in *Clarté*, he assented to Colin's affirmative gesture.

Rolland's public answer, " First Open Letter from Romain Rolland

[23] Letter, Rolland to Barbusse, 18 January 1922, ARR. *Journal intime*, January 1922, pp. 81–82, ARR.

[24] Letter, Rolland to Paul Seippel, 27 December 1921, ARR.

[25] Letter, Rolland to Paul Colin, 1 January 1922, ARR. As late as 20 January, Rolland mentioned that Barbusse had not responded to his letter. See the letter from Rolland to Edouard Dujardin, 20 January 1922, ARR.

[26] Letter, Rolland to Paul Colin, 9 January 1922, ARA. Colin, editor of *l'Art libre* had been favourable to Rolland in his reviews of *Colas Breugnon*, *l'Art libre*, 15 May 1919; his review of *Les Précurseurs*, *l'Art libre*, 1 December 1919; his review of *Pierre et Luce*, *l'Art libre*, October 1920; his review of *Clérambault*, *l'Art libre*, November 1920. Yet Colin was entirely friendly toward Barbusse and the *Clarté* movement, publishing its manifestos, lists of members, appeals.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to Henri Barbusse," [27] maintained the tone of moderation set by Barbusse and rested on two assumptions: despite their intellectual disagreements, the two were united in the struggle against the forces of reaction, and Rolland was answering for himself—not for the putative Rollandists.[28] The strategy of Rolland's letter was offensive as well as defensive. Defensively, he replied to Barbusse's denigration of detachment by arguing that aloofness did not denote inactivity or unconcern with human misery as his own works had proved. He wished to be understood as an active man of faith, an " unattached mystic " (*un mystique en disponibilité*) who was conscious of the ethical import of " the enigma of human evolution " which could not be reduced to a problem of Euclidian geometry.

Rolland offensively attacked Barbusse's " neo-Marxist, communist " theory for declaring arrogantly and omnipotently " the infallibility of its fundamental laws." The postulation of a " social geometry " appeared absurdly rationalistic and reductive to Rolland; it was marred by its preoccupation with surface phenomena, neglectful of intangible subterranean forces.[29] In practice, the Soviet application of Barbusse's theory had been " cruel and lamentable." Though the villainous acts of the bourgeois governments of Europe and America had contributed to these excesses, Rolland thought that the revolutionary leaders had violated the essentials of human progress by sacrificing " the highest moral values: humanity, freedom, and—most precious of all—truth." He asserted that the most unfortunate development of the Soviet Revolution [30] to date had been the transformation of noble attitudes and aspirations into vehicles of political expediency, and their subordination to the reason of State. " I do not struggle against one reason of State in favour of another. And militarism, police terror, or brutal force are not in my eyes sanctified because they are the instrument of a

[27] Romain Rolland, " Lettre Ouverte de Romain Rolland à Henri Barbusse," *L'Art libre*, January 1922, pp. 1–2. This was republished in *Clarté*, No. 6, 1 February 1922, pp. 126–127; *Rassegna internazionale*, Vol. IV (1922), pp. 14–17; *le Journal du Peuple*, No. 33, 2 February 1922; *The Nation*, 8 February 1922; *Les Humbles*, March 1922; all of Rolland's open letters to Barbusse were included in Rolland's *Quinze ans de combat* (Paris, 1935), pp. 43–59.

[28] *Textes Politiques*, p. 205.

[29] Ibid. pp. 201–202. In an afterthought on Barbusse's concept of " social geometry," Rolland demonstrated the way in which Barbusse confused facts and laws, and proceeded non-scientifically in a deductive manner. Moreover, he indicated how Barbusse's theory actually presupposed a metaphysical hypothesis, namely, that of the concrete existence of laws about society. More injuriously for Barbusse, Rolland pointed out that his jump from pure to applied science neglected the recent developments of Einsteinian physics and its theories of relativity. He concluded that Barbusse's calculus could offer only rough approximations of social reality, at best. " We are far from social geometry." (pp. 216–218)

[30] Letter, Rolland to Amédée Dunois, 23 October 1920, ARR. Rolland's attitude toward the Soviet Revolution was influenced by Bertrand Russell's trip and subsequent writings on his findings. In a letter to Marcel Martinet of 14 August 1920, Rolland expressed no joy in the triumph of Napoleonic militarism in the Soviet Union. In a letter to Martinet of 23 September 1921, Rolland lamented the condition of intellectual activity in Russia, saying that intellectuals were rejected and isolated in the USSR.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

communist dictatorship instead of being the instrument of a plutocracy." [31]

Rolland distrusted the automatic attribution of truth, justice, and progress to the Soviet Communist Party despite positions and actions which vitiated its moral and political authority. Even the judgments of Lenin, the only communist leader who exercised his mind independently, were circumscribed by the doctrinaire parameters of his communist ideology and by his isolation in the Kremlin. Nevertheless, Rolland's information on Bolshevik practices was not without its glaring contradictions. In a letter to Frans Masereel of 10 January 1921, Rolland praised Bolshevism for its organizational astuteness. He cited in particular Trotsky's forced transformation of the Red Army into an industrial and agricultural army, considering it " a good use of militarism." Unwittingly, he mistook a brutal use of militarism for a constructive use of it.[32]

ROLLAND'S fundamental opposition to the assumption that violence was merely a provisional detail was supported by a theory of the self-perpetuating nature of human violence. From a psychological perspective, Rolland believed that the human organism was so sensitively made that it could absorb and retain the slightest modifications in human interactions. Because the experience of violence was jolting, it left " indelible traces " on man's mind, stamping impressions that would remain for the duration of a lifetime. No matter which slogans were used to rationalize the resort to violence, the pressure of past acts would have a cumulative effect on man's psyche, making him more vulnerable and more prone to answer violence with additional forms of coercion.

To answer the Marxist view of the means, Rolland reasserted his integral pacifist position in *Clérambault,* and added that the question of means was more crucial in revolutionary times than in normal periods. In Rolland's man-centred universe, human life was the highest priority. Though he recognised the necessity for radical social change, he thought the imperative was to minimize the disparity between the techniques of change and the desired social goal. Since men were moulded by their participation in the daily struggles for change, emphasis had to be placed on the moral nature of these activities. If the means were appreciably distorted by the excesses and arbitrary character of violence, the goal would inherit these distortions, or, more dangerously, the means might overwhelm the ends. " The means, however, shape the mind of man according to the rhythm of justice or to the rhythm of violence.

[31] *Textes Politiques,* p. 203.

[32] Letter, Rolland to Frans Masereel, 10 January 1921, ARR. This contrasted with the hostile views of Trotsky recorded by Jacques Mesnil in Rolland's *Journal intime* in which Trotsky was accused of ruthlessness, bad faith, and the usage of demagogic rhetoric to manipulate crowds. After Mesnil's visit to the Soviet Union in 1919, he concluded that Trotsky was a " modern Machiavel." See also E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution 1917–1923,* Vol. II (Middlesex, 1952), pp. 213–217, 228–229.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

And if it is according to the latter, no form of government will ever prevent the oppression of the weak by the strong." [33]

Proclaiming his opposition to all republics based on force, ruse, or lies, Rolland detected the absence of a passion for truth in the Soviet Union and in the communist circles in the West. The most concrete illustration of that absence was the collapse of self-criticism, the end of the promotion of free debate within their own ranks. The unwillingness of communists to receive criticism from the outside was only an extension of the communist habit of seeing everything in political terms, and of desiring to win no matter what. Consequently, its propagandists were practically required to dismiss the protest of the defenders of conscience as " anarchistic " or " sentimentalist." The results of this intolerant stance would not only lead to the separation of men like Rolland from the Revolution, but more significantly, it would necessitate an internal loss of elan, the hardening of political lines into doctrinarism.

The article closed with Rolland's reiteration that he would not countenance any instrumentalities which, though bursting the chains of past human oppressions, threatened to impose new fetters. Crude communist environmentalism combined with their harsh reaction to any criticism made him feel that the Soviet Revolution would not be an exception to this historical rule. " With you and the Revolutionaries, against the tyrannies of the past! With the oppressed of tomorrow, against the tyrannies of tomorrow! Schiller's phrase—it has always been my motto: *in tyrannos!* (Against *all* tyrants)." [34]

BARBUSSE answered Rolland's *l'Art libre* article in an open letter called simply " Reply from Henri Barbusse." [35] Departing from the courteous tone of the previous article as well as from the distinction between Rolland and his followers, Barbusse scored his points by larding his argument with personal allegations against Rolland, of whom he conveyed a highly contradictory picture. He was upbraided for his lack of generosity, and for his philosophical disposition toward concepts like " harmony " and " wisdom," which blunted the necessity of active struggle and which were the outgrowths of magical and metaphysical word plays. Barbusse also asserted that Rolland's critique of communism paralleled " those of the anarchists and bourgeois." [36]

Rolland failed to recognize that communism was prepared to replace the outmoded capitalist order as a system, not merely by recourse to high-minded wishes. More than the towering intellectual contribution of Karl Marx, communism was a set of sociological principles and laws which had been elaborated and modified over a long period of time.

[33] *Textes Politiques,* p. 203.
[34] Ibid. p. 205.
[35] Henri Barbusse, " Lettre à Romain Rolland. A propos du Rollandisme," *Clarté,* No. 6, 1 February 1922, pp. 127–128. This also appeared in *le Journal du Peuple,* No. 36, 5 February 1922; and in *l'Art libre,* February 1922, p. 19.
[36] *Textes Politiques,* p. 209.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For Barbusse the power of the doctrine arose from its rational synthesis, its ability to examine a society and deduce socially verifiable principles. While Barbusse conceded that the theory and practice of communism had not yet been perfected, he added that Rolland's superficial treatment obscured the latent strength of the doctrine, particularly its systematic, egalitarian, international, and dynamic character. Barbusse considered communism nothing less than the fullest incarnation of integral Republicanism; it could offer in application and precision all that the directionless and defensive Rollandists could not. Barbusse finished his defence by attacking Rolland for his failure to extend his discussion of violence to those Western imperialist countries who were then holding the Soviets in check. He concluded that the indifference and disenchantment of men like Rolland, who ought to have rallied to rather than hindered the Soviet effort, would only retard the gigantic experiment in social reconstruction.

BEFORE the appearance of Rolland's second answer to Barbusse which he wrote on 2 February 1922, we can gain further insight into his position by examining the private thoughts he recorded in his letters. In a letter to Charles Vildrac, he reaffirmed that the core of the debate concerned the role of the writer and the artist. In his opinion that role demanded a defence of the freedom and integrity of " Mind," especially in times of upheaval. The intellectual had to strike a balance between " the grave diggers of Reaction " and the " tyrannical proletarian "; that balance depended upon faithfulness to freedom of judgment which, negatively defined, signified the avoidance of abdication through an assault on error and injustice.[37]

Two parallel themes pervaded these letters: Rolland's solace from knowing that many European intellectuals on the Left agreed with his positions and his recognition of the wide divergences of his political stances from those of the communist intellectuals. Among the intellectuals who expressed agreement with Rolland's ideas were Charles Vildrac, Stefan Zweig, Maxim Gorky, Pierre-Jean Jouve, René Arcos, Frans Masereel, Georges Duhamel and Jacques Mesnil. Because of Gorky's precarious situation in the Soviet Union, Rolland preferred not to mention his antagonism to Barbusse's stand, fearing that it might jeopardize his safety.[38] Likewise, the situation of Mesnil at *l'Humanité* was critical, " one free word and he might lose his job." [39] Rolland detected a brusque political change in Barbusse's second article in terms of its tone and content. He interpreted Barbusse's efforts as " furious " and " vengeful." [40] That Barbusse placed him without qualification in

[37] Letter, Rolland to Charles Vildrac, 17 January 1922, ARR.
[38] Letter, Rolland to Paul Colin, 20 January 1922, ARR. As an appendix to his first reply to Barbusse, Rolland included an extract of a letter to an unnamed " Russian revolutionary ". The letter was in fact written to Maxim Gorky and dated 20 December 1921.
[39] Letter, Rolland to Paul Colin, 24 January 1922, ARR.
[40] Letter, Rolland to Paul Colin, 21 January 1922, ARR.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the ranks of the conservative bourgeoisie was an indication of his madness. This purely rhetorical act was destructive because it stripped away support for the construction of the Soviet Union, "their, our, common edifice."[41] To equalize the situation, Rolland wanted to publish a second rebuttal in *l'Art libre*; so that the views of both sides could be presented, something *Clarté* refused to do, he wanted Colin to include both Barbusse's article and his riposte.[42]

While Barbusse privately apologized for the departure from a "measured and noble tone" in his second open letter,[43] Rolland regarded it as a declaration of war and an escalation of the debate.[44] It would be appropriate to maintain the controversy on the level of ideas, he wrote to Colin, because the fundamental question pertained to the intellectual's "sacred right of freedom," his freedom to exercise his judgment. Revolutionaries were too habituated to think and to act according to army discipline. The consequences of mechanical regimentation were detrimental to the Revolution as well as to the production of innovative thought. Rolland felt the necessity to demonstrate the concept that "one can (or must) be Revolutionary and free at the same time. And human also, into the bargain (that appears incomprehensible to them!)"[45] What he meant by being free was the intellectual's obligation to express his thoughts openly: codes, strictures, censorship, any form of compromise of this right curtailed this obligation. Rolland was convinced that the controversy at hand was a "great subject"; therefore he wanted Colin to solicit responses to these issues from intellectuals in France and the rest of Europe. The creation of a wider public forum had to be founded on the avoidance of aggressive remarks against Barbusse and *Clarté*. To meet Rolland's hopes for a "vast and useful echo" of these issues, *Clarté* had to accept this preliminary condition and reciprocate by toning down its personal antagonisms so that all collisions would be on the level of ideas.[46]

THE extension of the Barbusse debate confirmed Rolland's earlier intuitions concerning the divergences of his ideas with communist intellectuals. In letters to Jean-Richard Bloch, Rolland admitted his opposition to Bloch's commitments and observed that they "march[ed] down different roads."[47] Both Bloch's support for *Clarté* and the expression of his ideas in journalistic form were seen merely as an *hors d'oeuvre* anticipating more substantive and creative work. What was dangerous about journalism was the way in which thought was

[41] Letter, Rolland to Charles Vildrac, 21 January 1922, ARR.
[42] Letter, Rolland to Paul Colin, 22 January 1922, ARR.
[43] Letter, Rolland to Henri Barbusse, 21 January 1922. Extract from *Journal intime*, 24 January 1922, ARR.
[44] Letter, Rolland to Paul Colin, 22 January 1922, ARR.
[45] Letter, Rolland to Paul Colin, 26 January 1922, ARR.
[46] Ibid. In a letter dated 1 February 1922, Rolland asked Colin to publish a questionnaire on this subject and to publish answers in *l'Art libre*, ARR.
[47] Letter, Rolland to Jean-Richard Bloch, 23 January 1922, ARR.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

poisoned, mingled with propaganda and passion. Those who propagandized for *Clarté,* he wrote Bloch, only desired to substitute one new form of party domination for that of another. Because of Rolland's antipathy to all forms of domination, he asserted that he would never join a party. "My mission is to be a heretic, to break fetishes."

Rolland's public reply, "Second Letter from Rolland to Barbusse," [48] spoke directly to Barbusse's "convenient and oratorical" placement of Rollandists in the ranks of the bourgeoisie. He equated Barbusse's brand of "proletarian chauvinism" with national chauvinism and reminded him that members of the bourgeoisie were found everywhere, even in the Communist Party. Rolland challenged Barbusse's authority to purge men who disagreed and refused to join up with the communist concept of revolution. Since the revolution was the symbol of a spacious and open-ended house in which men would strive to build a progressive and happy humanity, Rolland condemned communist exclusivity, Barbusse's concept of an ideological coterie. "The Revolution is not the property of a party." [49]

Hence, in his efforts to open the windows of the Revolution to allow the influx of fresh air, Rolland argued for the need for freedom to co-exist with a revolutionary commitment. While unimpaired freedom of thought might appear to communists as an exorbitant and irrelevant pretension, such a guarantee was more than a privilege to Rolland: it was both a right and a duty. The first duty of intellectual activity was the refusal to accept all "bandages" of thought, of any party, church, or caste. To avoid betraying the duties of his profession, the intellectual had to remain incessantly vigilant against all forces of authority. Protest, the most basic task of the intellectual, had to be perpetuated during and after the making of a revolution. Rolland's vigorous insistence on this special weapon of intellectuals led him to credit intellectuals with a vastly efficacious power: ". . . to ridicule, to castigate, to fling stones at abuses, in emulation of the steeled criticism, the embittered irony of Voltaire and the Encyclopedists who did more for the downfall of the monarchy than the handful of hotheads who took the Bastille." [50]

Along with fundamental differences on the necessity to fuse freedom and revolution, Rolland's assessment of the possibilities for change in Western Europe clashed with Barbusse's. Rolland was conscious of the wide-scale apathy on the part of the "profound masses" which set a finite limit to the amount of change realizable. Where Rolland's analysis grasped the gradual process by which change would be implemented, Barbusse's remedy was immediate, precipitous, and destructive. For Rolland, the unleashing of revolutionary forces in Europe would be a disaster; instead of radically improving the oppressive

[48] Romain Rolland, "Deuxième letter à Henri Barbusse," *l'Art libre*, February 1922, pp. 17–19. This also appeared in *le Journal du Peuple*, No. 47, 16 February 1922.

[49] *Textes Politiques*, p. 210.

[50] Ibid. p. 213.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nature of society, these forces would reopen the wounds of war, perpetuate the cruelties, and sap the last resources of strength. In relegating victory to the far future, Rolland's perspective was implicitly an evolutionary one.

The thesis that violence begets violence, that the use of one type of coercion against another results in mutual destruction, forced Rolland to introduce a novel element into the debate—something which was simultaneously a spiritual commitment, a political philosophy, and a powerful tactic. It was conceived of as a weapon for activists, for the masses as well as for the individual. Hitherto ignored in continental Europe, Rolland introduced the weapon of Gandhian non-violent resistance, Non-Cooperation with the State, which he contended had already proved its viability in Gandhi's efforts to undermine British control of India. Gandhism was presented as the antithesis of the Marxist overvaluation of collective forces and denigration of the political power of the " individual conscience, isolated, religiously isolated and naked—conscience, lever of the world! " [51] The religious and political aspects of Rolland's Gandhism intermingled: on the one hand, implacable resistance to the laws, institutions, and policies of a criminal State would threaten existing power relations; on the other hand, the the acts of individuals who resisted the colossal State would release moral forces, " the fire of conscience, the quasi-mystical sense of the divine which is in every being." [52]

Not only did Gandhism extricate Rolland from the political dead end of his earlier positions by offering a tactic for action, but it also enabled him to integrate the processes of individual liberation and collective emancipation. The work of constructing a new and just society would tap the moral and spiritual resources of the individual and allow for his relative independence. Despite the divergence of Rolland and Barbusse on the time necessary to implement a new social order, the role of the individual and the Party, and the hierarchy relation of liberty to equality, Rolland ended his reply on a note of partial conciliation. Both viewpoints ought to, and he hoped would, be harmonized in the new Republic.

IN his third and final open letter, " Reply of Henri Barbusse," [53] Barbusse again insisted on the utopian facets of Rollandism. Generous hopes, goodwill, faith, and honesty were all fine virtues; none were sufficient as the means of reorganizing the social structure. Similarly, Barbusse judged intellectual criticism and protest to be admirable but limited; besides lending prestige to the forces of reform which diffused the militancy of those masses who called for root and branch change, Rollandists lacked the courage, practical sense, and

[51] Ibid. p. 214.
[52] Ibid. p. 213.
[53] Henri Barbusse, " Réponse de Henri Barbusse," *Clarté*, No. 10, 1 April 1922, pp. 221–25. This also appeared in *le Journal du Peuple*, Nos. 92, 94, 2 April, 4 April 1922.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the capacity to see to the end of things. Steeped in self-contradiction, these " half-liberals " and " half-pacifists " took refuge in poetic exaltations of individual freedom and conscience, while omitting all reference to the exceptional and privileged nature of that liberty. Equality on the other hand was scientifically exact and attainable.

Barbusse revived Rolland's distinction between liberty and equality, but turned it against his opponent. That Rolland chose liberty was perfectly consistent with his position, for liberty was a vague and tentative notion readily modified by various circumstances. Nor would Barbusse retract the pejorative epithets " bourgeois " and " anarchist " when describing Rolland's thought. These adjectives were justified by the unreal and non-applicable nature of his theories—his ethical, abstract approach to social problems. Moreover, Rolland's glorification of individualist solutions coupled with his suspicion of all collective efforts as masking hidden forms of tyranny were not only residues of his *infantile anti-authoritarianism* but also *commonplace formulations of* the ruling class. By association Rolland was guilty of having been a bourgeois. Unable to go all the way in opposing militarism, imperialism, and the exploitation of the poor by the rich, these men faltered because they refused to take risks, they refused to involve themselves actively in daily tasks to implement their humanitarian dreams.

As for Rolland's reflections on violence, Barbusse interpreted them to be " confused, arbitrary, lost in verbalism." [54] Against Rolland's sophistic and scholastic repudiation of all forms of violence, Barbusse held that constraint was not only an essential element of social struggle, but it was also part of the cohesion and discipline of a functioning society. Perhaps because he was unacquainted with Gandhi's political philosophy and methods, Barbusse reacted to them in a contradictory manner. He granted the efficacy of non-cooperation in certain situations, seeing " this heroic passivity " as closely related to the weapon of the political strike.

He also argued that the success of a non-violent tactic depended upon the unanimous consent of its participants. Without a vast majority, which in turn presupposed a collective organization and leadership, the inevitable result would be the multiplication of violence. Using the hypothetical example of the refusal to collaborate in mobilization for war, Barbusse predicted that the actions of a minority of passive resisters were destined to fail because of their heavy reliance on individualism and because of the scope and deadliness of repressive agencies.

Barbusse concluded his rejoinder by comparing the contemporary socialist reality, notwithstanding the Soviet Union's faults and its waverings of doctrine, with the disagreeable presence of a capitalist society, " the rapacity of the metallurgical and militarist oligarchy." After having assessed the weight of the evidence on both sides, Barbusse

[54] *Textes Politiques*, p. 220.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

chose communism and its predictable scientific ideas and its realistic attempts to build its dream of a better future. That Rolland did not choose the same path was regretful; but the teachings and actions of the former master had to be surpassed to meet the pressing demands of the day. "What you have said—what you have done—will always remain sacred and precious to us, and in spite of you, we will use them to go further than you."

ROLLAND eagerly awaited the responses of European intellectuals, many of whom he felt were embarrassed and unprepared for the "duty" of taking public positions on these vital issues.[55] He expressed private anger at Barbusse's intolerance and his negligence in publishing critiques of Rolland's positions in *Clarté*. Such actions were consistent with Fernand Desprès' desire to suppress freedom of the press, and foreshadowed the kind of regime French communism promised for intellectuals.[56] Part of the central responsibility of the intellectual, Rolland wrote to Vildrac, was to defend the honour and grandeur of the Revolution. Because of the ineptness of the doctrinaire and full-time politicians of the Revolution, all the hope that the Revolution promised for the future was being drained away. As a result, the paradoxical and thankless task of saving the Revolution from internal corruption, "from failure of character," had to devolve on the intellectual, non-communist Left. To preserve something valuable for those who would succeed them would not be easy; it required, as Rolland wryly noted, that "God save us from our saviours."[57] Nevertheless, he warned against any public expression of hostility against Barbusse or *Clarté,* which despite its faults still functioned as a review staunchly opposed to reaction—"our true, durable, irreconcilable enemy."[58] In advising Colin to maintain the courteous tone of the debate, Rolland also stated that *l'Art libre* should remain open to new ideas in the interests of fairness and objectivity; Rolland himself thought that it was premature to draw conclusions until all sides were heard, but he reserved the right to intercede in a later number.[59]

THE Rolland-Barbusse debate expanded in March 1922, when an entire number of *l'Art libre* was devoted to a discussion of "Independence of the Mind." Twenty-three intellectuals replied to Rolland's inquiry which he had addressed to his international colleagues at the end of his second open letter to Barbusse. The question he posed was whether it was necessary for contemporary intellectuals to be actively engaged in the revolutionary cause.[60]

[55] Letter, Rolland to Paul Colin, 3 February 1922, ARR.
[56] Letter, Rolland to Paul Colin, 10 February 1922, ARR.
[57] Letter, Rolland to Charles Vildrac, 15 February 1922, ARR.
[58] Letter, Rolland to Paul Colin, 27 February 1922, ARR.
[59] Letters, Rolland to Paul Colin, 3 March, 6 March 1922, ARR.
[60] *l'Art libre*, No. 3, March 1922. The following intellectuals participated in the debate: Georg Brandes, René Arcos, Léon Bazalgette, Jean Debrit, Georges Duhamel, Edouard

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Only two of the 23 participants supported Barbusse's position. Writing from a sociological perspective, Edouard Dujardin argued that the policies adopted by the Soviet Union were consistent with the social expectations of its institutions. Moreover, the construction of a society along Soviet lines required strict authority and discipline; persecutions and excommunications, however painful, were indispensable if the task of renewing the collectivity was to go forward. Proclaiming his unqualified solidarity with the Soviet Union and the cause of revolution, Marcel Martinet criticized the way in which Rolland posed the question of revolution. By framing the question in terms of a "revolutionary army," Rolland not only showed that his choice was made, but implied that to be a revolutionary one had to join the Communist Party. To disprove this thesis, Martinet pointed to Pierre Monatte, who was clearly a revolutionary but who remained outside the Party. Unlike most traditional intellectuals, Martinet continued his allegiance to the Soviet Revolution despite its misery and faults. To appreciate the superhuman effort which the Russians had initiated, he exhorted intellectuals to be conscious of the immediate necessity for action, the imperative to "assume part of the collective responsibility in action. . . ." Naturally, solidarity with the revolution did not mean the abandonment of critical faculties, but what was essential was action; after the European Revolution had been made there would be ample time for criticism, and for "dressing the wounds of conscience as one pleases."

Two intellectuals took middle positions between Barbusse and Rolland. Fernand Gouttenoire de Toury stated that his "heart was with Romain Rolland but his reason was with Barbusse." Calling himself a "singular communist," he affirmed that the two concepts were reconcilable, but unfortunately he made no effort to sketch the outlines of such a synthesis. Léon Werth answered in enigmatic fashion, voicing admiration for Rolland, yet indicating that "the war taught us that thought is not part of great collective events." Though Werth dissociated himself from the word "duty," he agreed that the primary function of the intellectual was to be courageous in his work and not to yield to the contagions of popular opinion.

The remaining 19 responses were all strong statements on behalf of Rolland's point of view. Significantly enough, in these articles there was only one reference made to Marx (it was by Jacques Mesnil), which suggests the auxiliary role of Marxist theory in this debate. Rolland's introduction of Gandhian non-violent resistance did not fare much better. René Arcos concluded his article with a reference to organized conscientious objection; in his opinion, the refusal of 50,000 mobilized men to use the instruments of violence would not only end war, but would also bring down the bourgeois State. Paul Colin mentioned

Dujardin, Luc Durtain, Fernand Gouttenoire de Toury, Pierre-Jean Jouve, Annette Kolb, Andreas Latzko, Marcel Martinet, Jacques Mesnil, Henry van de Velde, Charles Vildrac, Léon Werth, Georges Chennevière, Gustave Dupin, Heinrich Mann, Frans Masereel, Jules Romains, and Paul Colin.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

" non-cooperation " in his article, but did not develop his thoughts on the subject.

The stances of the pro-Rolland intellectuals evinced a consensus on the importance of the World War I experience, an almost unanimous opposition to violence, an impatience with intellectual defences of coercive methods and temporary dictatorships. Supporting these notions was a vehement commitment to a pluralistic society, an advocacy of the relevance of individualism, the belief in personal transformations, acceptance of solitude as the proper sphere for the intellectual, and above all a shared concept of internationalism which transcended class and party. It was in this spirit that both Pierre-Jean Jouve and Charles Vildrac could evoke the name of Vigny when referring to the problem of the artists' mission.

Jouve angrily demanded from Barbusse evidence of how Zweig or he had deformed Rolland's thought in their respective intellectual portraits of the master. By pigeon-holing them conservatives, Barbusse demonstrated an insensitivity to these men who were committed to preserving the human dimensions of the Russian Revolution. Likewise, Paul Colin lashed out at Barbusse for the label " Rollandism "; the term signified nothing but an invention of language, for the indefinite group which Barbusse alluded to did not have a cohesive identity or ideology. " There are Rollandists perhaps, but no Rollandism."

Most of the intellectuals who participated in the debate would have concurred with Colin in charging Barbusse with having precipitated a gratuitous schism between revolutionary communist intellectuals and independent Left-wing intellectuals. Most would have agreed with Colin's notion that intellectuals should act in ways which are suitable to their temperaments and expertise. What this meant in practice was the impossibility of imposing obligations on them. The tendency for thinkers to reject doses of orthodoxy and Party discipline was the basis of their strength. These men countered Barbusse's pejorative description of Rollandists by replying that the intellectual's *métier* prepared men for mental conquests, which were struggles nevertheless, though " intellectual action is less direct, it is no less burning, and in many ways more solid."

The novelist Jules Romains considered Rolland's letter " excellent " and, though inexperienced with political questions, could not see how an intellectual could opt for another position. Jean Debrit added a Nietzschean interpretation to Rolland's defence of intellectual independence. He argued that the solitary hero surpassed the traditional limits of bravery and bordered on the superman. The right to think freely was merely the prelude to what was really necessary, namely a " Revolution of the Mind."

Likewise, Georges Duhamel held that real revolutions were those of the mind. " La Boétie, Vauban, Rousseau, Diderot were revolutionaries. St.-Just is only an agitator." Solitude and distance from contemporary political activity made for intellectual integrity and mature

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

decision-making on the part of the thinker. Duhamel called for a "moral revolution," for profound ethical transformations, actions springing from thinkers who had purified their authority and preserved their dynamism. Duhamel explicitly stated that it was appropriate for intellectuals to engage in political and social affairs, but their engagement had to derive from the dictates of conscience to be authentic.

IN April 1922, *l'Art libre* published four German contributions to the original questionnaire, replies which were delayed because of postal censure. Of these four, only Kasimir Edschmid supported the positions of Barbusse. Edschmid's key point was that all transformations other than economic revolution were utopian "in a century of mad economic concentrations." Instead of isolation, the correct role for intellectuals was service to the revolution by hammering out an ideology which would reinforce the goals of radical, social upheaval.[61] René Schickele called for "Freedom of conscience" and sided with Rolland's resistance to all forms of militarism, including "proletarian militarism." Fritz von Unruh argued that profound change resulted from individual metamorphoses ("the moral renovation of humanity") never from social change which was always superficial. He briefly made note of the "immense power of Gandhi's spirit." Stefan Zweig voiced his opposition to the communist theory and practice of revolution; he distrusted all violent overthrows, all allegiances to class, party, or nation. Since serving freedom was essentially an internal activity, it was restricted to the isolated man. Freedom was non-realizable in the "visible world." To avoid the inevitable degeneration of revolutions into expressions of cruelty, intellectuals had to remain apart from and in constant struggle against all movements which stressed the "end" of revolutionary activity.[62]

EDOUARD DUJARDIN'S journal, *Cahiers idéalistes,* provided an additional forum for the Rolland–Barbusse debate by publishing 13 reactions to it from French, Swiss, and Italian intellectuals.[63] Two of the 13 sided with Barbusse. The first, Joseph Rivière, indicated he had joined communist ranks despite his distaste for the discipline of parties and unions. Marcel Millet, the only manual worker who

[61] Kasimir Edschmid, *l'Art libre,* No. 4, April 1922, pp. 50–51.

[62] Stefan Zweig in Ibid. p. 52. *L'Art libre* continued to be the periodical which most actively defended "Rollandist" thought. See Paul Colin's "Review of *Les Vaincus,*" *l'Art libre,* No. 6, June 1922, p. 83; and Jacques Mesnil's "La Fin et les Moyens," in Ibid. pp. 98–99. Mesnil found that the Italian communist Bordiga posed the problem in a more cogent, if not more abstract, fashion than Barbusse had. Nevertheless, Mesnil expressed his distrust for those who dipped into Lenin's writings for passages to use as stratagems.

[63] *Cahiers idéalistes,* June 1922. The following intellectuals participated in the *Cahiers idéalistes* response to the Rolland–Barbusse debate: Charles Baudouin, Paul Colin, H.-L. Follin, Charles Gide, Pierre Larivière, Marcello-Fabri, Han Rymer, Marcel Millet, Georges Rénard, Joseph Rivière, Francis Vielé-Grifin, Charles Vildrac, Léon Werth.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

participated in the controversy, accepted the necessity for revolutionary violence, but urged that intellectuals should not be severed from the struggles of the organized masses. In his view intellectuals were vital because they kept ideals and sensibility alive. If thinkers were estranged from proletarian parties, the organizations would harden their ideas into dogma.

Both Pierre Larivière and Han Ryner wrote articles which advanced anarchist ideas. They opposed Barbusse's defence of the dictatorship of the proletariat and supported the Rollandist notion of independent thought and the imperative for man to liberate himself before undertaking the economic revolution. The nine liberal and Rollandist intellectuals repeated the standard arguments without contributing anything particularly novel. However, Paul Colin and Charles Vildrac discussed the efficacy of Gandhi's non-cooperation in social conflict. Vildrac maintained that an organized, non-violent campaign by workers, including the tactic of non-payment of taxes, could lead to a paralysis of the state. And finally, one intellectual seized on the metaphysical side of the debate. Francis Vielé–Grifin not only found Rolland's point of view more logical than Barbusse's, but since Rolland spoke " in the name of peace," he would follow him because Rolland was closer to Christ.

In short, despite divergent phraseology, Rollandists unanimously agreed that the production of books was far more significant and effective in the long run than were political and social programmes, Marxist catechisms, and the active engagement of intellectuals in agitation and progaganda.

THE French communists jumped into the midst of the polemic by publishing an article by Amédée Dunois in *l'Humanité* called " Concerning the *Communist Manifesto*." [64] Dunois opened his article on a conciliatory note in which he praised Barbusse and Rolland for the dignity of their lives and even suggested that Barbusse's concept of Revolution was not incompatible with Rolland's views of Freedom. The resolution of the debate, Dunois argued, was anticipated by Marx in the *Communist Manifesto* and pointed towards practical solidarity with the modern proletariat. Identifying capitalist society with decadence, war, and legalized exploitation, Dunois believed reconciliation was impossible between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Agreeing with Marx's analysis that bourgeois ideology and sentimentality were parasitical, Dunois underscored the necessity to side with the proletariat because of their historical mission to achieve Revolution and Freedom, even though the struggle might require " the convulsions of dictatorship and terror." The trouble with Rolland's position, unlike that of Martinet's or Barbusse's, was that he had not clarified his choice; either

[64] Amédée Dunois, " A propos du ' Manifeste Communiste,' " *l'Humanité*, 10 March 1922, p. 1.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

he was choosing freedom with the Proletariat and the Russian Revolution or freedom with the capitalists and the " ignoble vanquishers of Versailles."

Rolland responded to Dunois' challenge to state his position unequivocally in a private letter dated 10 March 1922. In it he said: " I am with the proletariat when they respect truth and humanity. I am against the proletariat every time they violate truth and humanity. There are no class privileges, neither high or low, in the face of supreme human values." [65]

Dunois reacted vigorously in an article on page one of that issue of *l'Humanité* whose title, " Neutrality is Impossible," revealed its contents. Continuing the thesis that in a polarized situation one is either with the workers or with the middle class, Dunois criticized Rolland for expecting a class to behave in a manner appropriate only to individuals. He evoked Marx's name to reiterate that class and not individuals lay at the base of historical struggles. Because an exploited class had to seize situations as they developed, when it acted it could not always exercise complete control over all the situational variables nor over the means at its disposal. Where it could exhibit respect for human values was in its programme: " Every Socialist and Communist Programme since 1848 strictly respects truth and humanity in its demands." There could be no purely human civilization, Dunois added, without the abolition of classes. He concluded by pledging that he would be " with the proletariat whatever happens," but also he stated that such a pledge neither demanded the repudiation of only critical judgment nor the deification of the proletariat.

In a private letter to Martinet, Rolland expressed his reservations about the theory and practice of Marxism. Though he made his points in an *ad hominen* fashion, Rolland asserted that Marxism was a faith, that economic materialism was dated, and more pertinently that the " excessive simplification " of the doctrine denied the legitimacy of differing codes and alternative concepts of duty. He suggested that Martinet and Monatte discuss these issues further with him in a personal conversation.[66]

MONATTE and Martinet visited Rolland on 18 March 1922. In this discussion, Rolland reiterated his refusal to be exclusively present-minded, his disinclination to yield to the demands for immediate gratification by the crowd. Sustained by his idealist faith and by his capacity to take the long view, Rolland predicted that his era was just the beginning of " plutocratic imperialism " and would not be one of revolutionary social upheavals. On the question of revolutionary

[65] This was published in *l'Humanité* on 12 March 1922. On 4 February 1921, Rolland had written Dunois expressing the hope that Dunois could fill the void at *l'Humanité* created by Jaurès death. Rolland found the post-war *l'Humanité* stripped of art, literature, and large humanitarian thought.

[66] Letter, Rolland to Marcel Martinet, 13 March 1922, ARR.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

violence, he thought that his position had been vindicated by the most recent example of Bolshevik intolerance and cruelty, specifically, the arrests and summary trials of the Social Revolutionaries.[67] The result of the policies of violence and the sweeping condemnations of those who advocated alternative philosophies as " sentimentality " would be ruinous for the Russian Revolution. Rolland believed that it was " unrealistic " for revolutionaries to discount sentimentality, given its irrefutable existence and influence over men and public opinion. More importantly, violence would estrange those intellectuals whose writings constituted a key sector of public opinion, and, consequently, the revolution would lose the support of great moral forces. " In fact the result of the policies of Bolshevik violence (and especially the awkward attempt to apologize for these politics) has been to detach the Russian Revolution from the elite of the free thinkers of Europe! The Russells, A. Frances, Brandes, etc." [68]

What was inadequate about the Russian Revolution and its staunch defenders, Rolland told Monatte and Martinet, was its failure to take account of imponderable forces, " forces of instinct and heart." The neo-Marxist materialist attack on freedom of the mind constituted a case in point. To reduce an " essential force of humanity " to a pretext which disguised bourgeois interest or individual egoism was to oversimplify grossly. What it negated was the potential harmonization of the exigencies of the socio-economic Revolution and the equally legitimate needs of spiritual, creative, and personal freedom. Moreover, if persecutions were conducted the Soviets might be able to uproot the " false intellectuals, the climbers, and the cowards of the Market Place," but ultimately the technique of violence would backfire. True intellectuals would be elevated into heroes and martyrs by unwarranted persecutions: " their oppressed convictions will grow into a powerful faith."

Rolland completed his record of this conversation with a reflection on the lack of political wisdom on the part of the engaged revolutionaries. The revolutionary mind was immature because of its exclusive reliance on the theories and doctrine of one book (presumably Marx's *Capital*), and because of its crude attempts to impose its dogmas on nature. To reduce the living complexity of man's existence to the dictums of economic materialism was to propagate a faith. Even a man with " as robust a mind as Lenin " was limited since his doctrine derived from one major source.

OBVIOUSLY, Martinet was disappointed with many of the positions Rolland expressed in this conversation, particularly with his stand on the Barbusse debate, and with the responses of a majority of the

[67] *Quinze ans de combat*, pp. 66–67. On 6 March 1922, Rolland was asked to intercede to protest the political trials of the Social Revolutionaries. Anatole France had already done so, thus supporting the anti-Bolshevik position of the French Socialists.

[68] *Journal intime*, Cahier XXXII, p. 123, ARR.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

intellectuals in *l'Art libre*. Feeling this way, he reacted through an open article, the substance of which indicated the final break with his former mentor.[69] Martinet's key point about Rolland and the Rollandists was that they had not changed since the war. Defenders of " Independence of the Mind " had been repetitious and far too generous towards the " imbecile and cruel social regime ", while at the same time brimming with complaints about proletarian demagoguery. During the war, Rolland had raised the global issues on which revolutionaries meditated, despite their disagreement with him on specifics and conclusions. But that time had been passed, and Rolland's views had to be superseded. Martinet believed that the desertion of the intellectuals, their " vain retreat " from the workers' struggle, stemmed from their lack of vision and reluctance to dirty their hands in a protracted and bloody revolution. Sounding an antagonistic note, Martinet proclaimed that the desertion of the intellectuals was " too bad for them." Workers could expect very little from those " eternally malcontented servants."

Rolland was shocked by Martinet's ill-tempered article and wrote him a personal letter indicating his regret that it had been published.[70] Two days later he accused Martinet of injustice, hostility, impertinent highness of tone, and an inexcusable lack of respect for intellectuals worthy of esteem. Due to his narrow political partisanship, all of Martinet's judgments were analysed as prejudicial, and none of them, according to Rolland, derived from a rigorous investigation into the reasons which motivated the intellectuals referred to. The contempt that Martinet showed for intellectuals in Rolland's camp revealed nothing about them, but rather unmasked Martinet's " weakness and sensibility." Carried away by a mood of dejection, Rolland thought Martinet was caught in the insoluble trap of wishing to prevent the imminent ruin of the Russian Revolution. If the men of faith and conviction, pigeon-holed Rollandists, had shared *l'Humanité's* political outlook, Martinet would have had only praise for them.[71]

THE unfairness and rhetorical violence of Martinet's article forced Rolland to re-enter the Barbusse controversy. Before Martinet's intercession, Rolland had decided to end the debate with Barbusse. He had written to Colin that the controversy with Barbusse had arrived at an impasse. Since the public now had enough information to make its choice, it would be futile to extend it further. ". . . Barbusse sleeps on his positions. One feels that it is impossible for him to understand ideas other than his own." [72] According to Rolland, Barbusse's lack of understanding was mostly aptly illustrated by his under-

[69] Marcel Martinet, " Les Intellectuals et la Révolution," *l'Humanité*, 25 March 1922, p. 1. Martinet had written an earlier article on the same themes, " La Révolution et la Liberté," *l'Internationale*, 8 March 1922.
[70] Letter, Rolland to Martinet, 25 March 1922, ARR.
[71] Letters, Rolland to Marcel Martinet, 27 March, 30 March 1922; see also *Journal intime*, Cahier XXXII, pp. 132–133, ARR.
[72] Letter, Rolland to Paul Colin, 20 March 1922, ARR.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

estimation of Gandhian non-cooperation, "the power of sacrifice inspired by the religious faith of a martyr." [73]

Even though Rolland admired the articles of Duhamel, Durtain, Vildrac, and van de Velde [74] in *l'Art libre*, he felt obliged to respond publicly to Martinet's attacks; he thought it was more important than ever that intellectuals openly declare and assume their responsibility; this was not the moment for obliqueness or reticence.[75] It was clearly Martinet's, and not Barbusse's, espousal of the communist thesis in its rawest form that Rolland now opposed.[76]

Thus Rolland's third and last article, "The Revolution and the Intellectuals. Letter to Some Communist Friends," [77] aimed at refuting the scorn and irony of Martinet rather than at "prolonging to eternity" the Barbusse debate, especially in a situation where each participant held obdurately to his own position.[78] In declaring his opposition to the communist concept of revolution, Rolland argued that a left-wing intellectual had to struggle for a revolution in his own way, reinforcing radical social transformations which corresponded to the interests of humanity and which were consistent with man's spiritual and ethical needs. The communists deceived themselves by twisting revolutionary violence, injustice, and intolerance into virtues; their sophistic arguments about the temporary nature of tyranny only revealed their tendency to uphold "provisional falsehoods." Nor would this change once the communists had attained victory, for as the first years of Soviet history demonstrated, they would be no less blind, no less dictatorial.

That Rolland refused to forgo the distinction between defects and virtues should not be interpreted as a stance which "demand[ed] an ideal of man of inaccessible perfection." What he could not accept was the arrogance of Moscow's communism, and the pride of its Western apologists; instead of constructing a system built on errors, and boasting of the extraordinary misfortunes which were exacted on a daily basis, communists should have been more humble, self-critical, and above all eager to make alliances with sectors of potential support. Reiterating the arguments spelled out in his conversations with Monatte and Martinet, Rolland stated that the communist policy of "brutalization of European liberal opinion" was unrealistic and self-defeating. The result of the violence of communist rhetoric coupled with the active

[73] *Journal intime*, Cahier XXXII, pp. 131–132, ARR.
[74] Ibid. p. 128. See also *Quinze ans de combat*, pp. 22–25.
[75] Letter, Rolland to Jean-Richard Bloch, 17 February 1922, ARR.
[76] *Quinze ans de combat*, p. 26. During the heat of the debate Rolland interceded privately on behalf of Barbusse to insure his candidacy in the *Cercle Littéraire Internationale*. Rolland would not tolerate the apparently political omission of such "an important name in internationalism," a writer with real artistic value. See Rolland's letters to Léon Bazalgette, 9 March 1922, and to Jean-Richard Bloch, 3 March 1922, ARR. Once again, Rolland demonstrated his generosity, his capacity to keep politics and personalities separated.
[77] Romain Rolland, "La Révolution et les Intellectuels. Lettre aux amis communistes," *l'Art libre*, April 1922, pp. 49–50. This also appeared in *le Journal du Peuple*, No. 117, 29 April 1922.
[78] *Textes Politiques*, p. 227.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

policy of alienating sympathetic intellectuals could only lead to the ruin of the Russian Revolution. Anatole France's recent telegram on behalf of the Social Revolutionaries, and the ugly exploitation of his name by the anti-Bolshevik press, demonstrated the power of moral forces in influencing public opinion on a mass scale. Out of ignorance the Soviets were duplicating one of the fatal miscalculations of the French Revolution, whose policy of terror and "massacre," "alienated the Wordsworths, the Coleridges, the Schillers from it definitively. . . . In my view this was one of the causes of the ruin of the French Revolution. Let the Russian Revolutionaries take heed of it! Woe to those who scorn the forces of the heart." [79]

And, finally, Rolland concluded by pitting his concept of the psychological complexity of the human organism and the coexistence of various independent orders in society against the Marxist system which neglected, narrowed, and falsified this multi-dimensionality into a dogma. "Its horizon is far too narrowly circumscribed by economic materialism." Though he admitted being stymied at that time in elaborating and following an alternative route to Marxism, he patiently searched for a direction to lead him out of this dilemma. He did not wish to choose communism for lack of anything better. The article ended with a mystical and lyrical flourish in which Rolland praised "Mind" as a force of nature. "It is in the free play of associated forces that we must find the revolutionary formula of the future. But so long as you do not give to each one of them its place, nature violated, will avenge herself on you, by destroying your massive and lame constructions." [80]

FRENCH anarchists took a lively and active interest in the Rolland–Barbusse debate partly because of the significance of the issues and partly in response to Barbusse's defamation of anarchism. The anarchist weekly *le Libertaire* published five articles on the confrontation between February and April 1922. In one article by Maurice Wullens and in two by Fabrice, communists, represented in the person of Barbusse, were vilified for their opportunism, disdain for the truth, and for their repudiation of individual initiative and free choice.[81] In two subsequent articles, André Colomer contrasted anarchist theory and practice with the world views of both Rolland and Barbusse. He criticized Rolland for his metaphysical notion of "liberty," and for his hesitations in regard to violence and the proletariat. On the other side of the coin, Colomer faulted Barbusse for his advocacy of the Communist International—his "social algebra" which subordinated individuals blindly to authority and which had led to the appalling

[79] Ibid. p. 231.
[80] Ibid. p. 233.
[81] Fabrice, "Romain Rolland et Henri Barbusse," *le Libertaire*, No. 158, 3 February 1922; Maurice Wullens, "Romain Rolland et Barbusse," *le Libertaire*, No. 160, 17 February 1922; Fabrice, "Littérateur," *le Libertaire*, No. 160, 17 February 1922.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

condition of anarchist and revolutionary syndicalists in the prisons of the Soviet Union. "The emancipation of the workers is the work of the workers themselves" was incompatible with the Leninist theory of the Party. Colomer's position was a mediation between the two outlooks of Rolland and Barbusse; inspired by the latent force in individuals and the proletarian masses, it aimed at human well-being through an elimination of coercion and exploitation, especially by the State. Towards the annihilation of the State, the proletariat could employ any means at its disposal, including violence.[82]

The anarchists who clustered around *la Revue Anarchiste* clearly sided with Rolland in the Barbusse dispute. They agreed with Rolland's belief that all revolutions were incomplete and vain unless they provided for the necessities of an "inner revolution." Not only was Rolland more moral and perceptive than Barbusse, but his form of intellectualism, "in the good sense of the word," avoided the excesses of Rousseauistic optimism, while endeavouring to bridge the gulf between manual and intellectual workers "to rally *men of goodwill.*" Representative of free thought, incarnation of human sense, pacifist when other pacifists had been paralyzed, Rolland was considered "the conscience of this epoch." Finally, by drawing the parallel between Rolland and Kropotkin, *la Revue Anarchiste* awarded Rolland the supreme compliment. "Let Romain Rolland, free mind, receive here the homage of those who put liberty above all." [83]

Le Journal du Peuple followed the unfolding of the Rolland-Barbusse debate to the extent of republishing the six letters exchanged between the two protagonists, in addition to most of the responses in *l'Art libre* and *Cahiers idéalistes.* Han Ryner expressed the opinion of the newspaper in an article printed on 9 April 1922, when he joyously consented to the epithet "Rollandist." To be an authentic Rollandist, he explained, was to be courageous, to write with "penetrating power and luminous clarity," and above all, to attain a delicate balance between the forces of the mind and the heart." [84]

Marceline Hecquet's article "On Non-Cooperation" was a preliminary examination of the Gandhian strategy from a French anarchist perspective. Hecquet wrote the article to fill the void created by the lack of attention given to Rolland's advocacy of non-cooperation, as well as to counteract the neglect of India's war of liberation, and its implications for Europe. What was attractive about non-cooperation was its twin capacity to harness the political aspects of individual moral forces and its ability to channel purposefully voluntary sacrifice in order to destroy slowly the criminal edifice of the State. In short, Hecquet believed in the revolutionary potential of Gandhian methods,

[82] André Colomer, "La Révolution et le Prolétariat," *le Libertaire*, No. 165, 24 March 1922; André Colomer, "Philosophie ou Révolution," *le Libertaire*, No. 168, 14 April 1922.

[83] Génold, "Le bon grain et l'ivraie," *la Revue Anarchiste*, No. 5, May 1922, pp. 17–20.

[84] Han Ryner, "Rollandists," *le Journal du Peuple*, No. 99, 9 April 1922.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as well as in their suitability for the European context. " It is in full calm that the idea of revolution by non-cooperation, *based on non-violence*, must be put in motion." [85]

To assess the anarchist contribution to the debate, two central points should be kept in mind: first, anarchist sensitivity to the contemporary persecutions in the USSR of Russian anarchists and Social Revolutionaries and their strong opposition to these repressive Soviet policies; and secondly, their more or less opportunistic use of Rolland as a convenient device with which to criticize Barbusse in order to score points against the Soviet Union. Many of the anarchists who praised Rolland during the debate were not themselves pacifists during the war.

THE tail end of the Rolland–Barbusse debate spilled over into 1923. Victor Serge's article " Above the Social Battle " pitilessly attacked Rolland for his egoism and distance from the brutal realities of class struggle.[86] Nothwithstanding Rolland's sincerity and high intelligence, Serge thought that Rolland incorrectly stressed the building of character and critical intelligence as the essentials of education. Western nations ought to imitate the Soviet model of education so that class consciousness, respect for the liberating mission of work, internationalism, and critiques of individualist customs could replace the poisonous effects of education received under the auspices of the enemy class. Serge repudiated " passive obedience "; in his judgment, it would only undermine the power of workers by forcing them into a submissive and reformist direction. Those who truly stood for the creation of a better tomorrow had to apply the energies of intelligence and heart to the contingencies of today's social battle. " Not above: for one perceives only the great egoism of privileged intelligences, detached from life." [87]

Among by-products of the Rolland-Barbusse debate was a short but fervent exchange between Rolland and the famous historian of the French Revolution, Albert Mathiez. Mathiez took issue with the conclusions which Rolland drew about the nature of intellectual disenchantment with the French Revolution of 1789. Apparently written to clarify Rolland's historical misinformation and ignorance, Mathiez's purpose was to demonstrate precedents for intellectual allegiance to revolutionary upheavals. The logical inference of such precedents was that intellectuals should now rally to the Soviet Revolution. His article

[85] Marceline Hecquet, " De la Non-Coopération," *le Journal du Peuple*, No. 179, 29 June 1922.

[86] Serge's article is in direct response to " Une Lettre de Romain Rolland," *l'Ecole Emancipée*, No. 45, 1 September 1923, pp. 2–3. In this open letter Rolland argued that education should stress free inquiry and oppose every Church mentality. "And clericalism—all clericalism (bourgeois or proletarian)—that is the enemy! "

[87] Victor Serge, " Au-dessus de la mêlée sociale," *l'Ecole Emancipée*, No. 4, 14 October 1923, pp. 49–51; see also A. Richard, " Education ' Humaine,' " *l'Ecole Emancipée*, No. 9, 18 November 1923, in which he supported Serge's charges against Rolland's contempt for proletarian clericalism.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

referred to the " fact " that most European intellectuals had continued to sympathize with the French Revolution despite the Terror. The respective evolutions of Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Southey came long after the Terror—their disillusionment resulted from the transition of the Republic into its Caesarist incarnation under the Consulate.

> There were without doubt then, as today, some Romain Rollands to take refuge above the social battle in a superior puritanism, but there were also the Henri Barbusses to understand the profound reasons of an unprecedented crisis and to maintain their sympathies and their cooperation with the men of action who led the struggle with an intrepid heart.[88]

Rolland answered Mathiez's charges by contesting his evidence for Wordsworth's extended sympathies for the French Revolution; Mathiez's citation of a three-line passage from *The Prelude* was hardly sufficient documentation. The annexation of Wordsworth to the revolutionary parish glossed over the testimonies of Wordsworth's horror of the revolutionary Terror. Moreover, it self-servingly misrepresented the poet's historical disillusionment with these excesses. Not only did Wordsworth reverse his earlier faith in the Revolution, but the distortions of the Terror pushed him forever away from political commitments and towards an exclusive absorption in poetry. Rolland was clearly identifying his current views on Revolution and violence with those of Wordsworth. *The Prelude,* Rolland insisted, had to be understood as a vindication of the poetic individual: " He finally discovered that true freedom is inner freedom, that of the creative mind." The rejoinder concluded with an accommodating gesture by Rolland; he paid tribute to Mathiez's scholarship on Robespierre and to the vision and political expertise of Robespierre himself. Yet, Rolland's historical appreciation of the " Incorruptible " did not alter his fundamental opposition to any apology for a dictatorship of violence: " . . . if tomorrow Robespierre became master in France again, I would go to die with Chénier and not with Robespierre." [89]

In his reply to Rolland, Mathiez reiterated his position that Wordsworth did not turn against the Revolution because of the Terror, and, consequently, Rolland's efforts to situate him above the battle were quite simply wrong. Mathiez chided Rolland for not imitating the youthful Wordsworth by courageously supporting the Russian Revolution as Wordsworth had the French. Rolland's essential problem was his Olympian removal from the world of action and everyday struggle, which in turn generated attitudes of disdain towards those who were activists. " Romain Rolland the poet, mingles in action only intermittently, prefers the beauty of gestures and the harmony of altitudes." Though retired in his Empyrean, Mathiez advised Rolland to be more

[88] Albert Mathiez, " L'Elite Européenne et La Terreur," *Clarté*, No. 16, July 1922, p. 323.
[89] Romain Rolland, " L'Elite Européenne et La Terreur. Réponse à Albert Mathiez," *Clarté*, No. 16, 1 July 1922, pp. 372–373.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

indulgent, or at least less discouraging, to his counterparts whose mission in life was to act. Little else could be expected from Rolland " who takes refuge in the Universal as the result of his own weariness and nausea." [90]

Personally, Rolland was extremely gratified by the quality of support which his positions elicited from the intellectuals of Europe. He expressed deep satisfaction with the private expressions of solidarity he had received from Albert Einstein [91] and from Maxim Gorky,[92] both of whom voiced unequivocal agreement with Rolland in the controversy. Conscious of the necessity to found an organ which would provide a forum for advanced thought without being tied to politics, Rolland helped to inaugurate a new Paris-based review, *Europe*. He wrote to Paul Colin that such a periodical should contain " no politics," that it should be " as individualist as possible," while relegating an important place to music, art criticism, and science.

Besides ending the cultural isolation of intellectuals in France, Germany, England, and the Soviet Union, Rolland hoped that the new review would stand in sharp opposition to French conservative and aesthetic organs, especially to the *Nouvelle Revue Française*. He urged that *Europe* should promote historical and critical works on inspirational personalities. Above all, the review had to be international; it had to seek actively the collaboration of Asian intellectuals.[93]

On a personal level, the controversy with Barbusse helped Rolland to resolve his life-long love/hate ambivalence towards Paris. Feeling frustrated by and distrustful of the prevailing modes of contemporary intellectual life and politics, he departed for Switzerland on 30 April 1922, never again to live in the French capital on a permanent basis.[94]

Once installed in Switzerland, Rolland was able to return to creative activities, dedicating his energies to the completion of the first volume of *L'Ame Enchantée, Annette et Sylvie,* which appeared in August 1922. Thinking that the ramifications of the Barbusse debate were over, he expressed his feelings of respect and affection for Barbusse, " in spite of the errors of his thoughts." Without bitterness, Rolland privately faulted Barbusse for his self-deceptions, but found attractive his sincerity, noble character, faith in humanity, and his " chivalric generosity." [95]

[90] Albert Mathiez, " Réplique à Romain Rolland," *Clarté,* No. 16, 1 July 1922, pp. 373–374.

[91] Letter, Rolland to Paul Colin, 21 April 1922, ARR.

[92] Letters, Maxim Gorky to Rolland, 3 January 1922, and 25 January 1922; letters, Rolland to Maxim Gorky, 20 December 1921, and 21 January 1922, ARR.

[93] Letter, Rolland to Paul Colin, 23 April 1922, ARR. See Pierre Abraham, " La Naissance d'une Revue," *Europe,* September–October 1973, pp. 6–13; in discussing the origins of *Europe,* Abraham omits all mention of the Rolland–Barbusse debate. It is somewhat ironic that one tangible result of the debate was the creation of a permanent organ in Paris which provided an outlet and a focus for the " Rollandist " point of view.

[94] *Quinze ans de combat,* p. 69.

[95] Letter, Rolland to Paul Seippel, 28 May 1922, ARR.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DURING this period the pages of *l'Humanité* were still open to Rolland, especially on issues less emotionally charged because farther from home. On 15 June 1922, he attacked American capitalism for its "execrable persecutions" of labour forces like the IWW. America even more than Europe was substantially delivered over to the "hypocritical reaction and violence of the powers of money." In proclaiming his solidarity with radical labour groups and with Anita Whitney's feminist and social activities, Rolland argued that any attempt to crush the people was in violation of "elementary liberties." [96]

Rolland's next two political articles could hardly have pleased the French communists. In July 1922, he interceded on behalf of Henri Fabre, director of *le Journal du Peuple*, who had been excommunicated from the PCF. The central theme in this open letter was the imperative for communists and socialists to call a truce and to move towards unity. Not only had the hour passed for meaningless, doctrinal polemics, but the mutual prescriptions of the "companions in arms" were unjustified given the "pitiable" role many of them had played in the last war.[97] Reciprocal antagonisms, "boutique quarrels," hindered unity and, more pertinently, aided the triumph of the reactionary regime. All opposition to reaction, the real enemy, was legitimate whether through art, thought, institutional reform, or social action. Calling for a human international, Rolland, "an heretic by nature, who laughs at every Church," would not condemn one form of activity at the expense of another. Above the hothouse quarrels of the Left, he affirmed his choice to work in solitude: "I am against Reaction. I combat it, *alone*." [98]

Inspired by a letter and appeal from Catherine Breshkovsky, "grandmother of the Russian Revolution," Rolland next wrote an open letter protesting the current trials of the Social Revolutionaries in the Soviet Union. What Rolland objected to most was the evolution of the oppressed into the oppressor in Russia. The hunger for the sacrifice of former brothers by the "murderous judiciary" in the Soviet Union was criminal. It violated the spirit in which the Revolution was made, and more importantly, the supreme value of human life. "The Russian Revolution is great enough to be generous. Let it leave the cowardly arguments of force to the Reaction. Violence serves only to mask weakness." [99] Soviet repressive policy of this sort played directly into the hands of its hypocritical adversaries. The Soviets could not afford to intensify the sufferings of its own citizens and should have been shrewd enough "to spare the precious blood of

[96] Romain Rolland, "Le Banditisme du capital aux Etats-Unis. Une lettre de Romain Rolland," *l'Humanité*, 15 June 1922, p. 1.

[97] *Journal intime*, extract 5 July 1922, ARR.

[98] Romain Rolland, "Lettre de Romain Rolland," *le Journal du Peuple*, No. 87, 8 July 1922.

[99] Romain Rolland, "Le Procès des S.R. Russes," *le Journal du Peuple*, No. 195, 16 July 1922.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

those who struggle for its future." [100] Rolland was enraged by the refusal of *l'Humanité* to publish this article and the accompanying letter from Catherine Breshkovsky. An honest newspaper had the obligation to publish the opinions of its adversaries and dissident friends. Silence or dismissal was unworthy, for there could be no refutation or serious discussion without the presentation and exact analysis of an opponent's position. It made no difference to Rolland whether Breshkovsky was right or wrong. What counted was the impeccable sincerity of her commitment, paid for by a life of sacrifice. This alone gave her the right to be heard. That Martinet and Dunois could disdainfully reject her "sincere and poignant complaint" was indecent. Rolland concluded:

> There is no longer justice or truth in the French communist press, only communist justice and truth. This will lead to shipwreck, not for freedom which doesn't concern the communists, but for the Revolution. If the Revolution does not retain religious respect for truth and moral values, it will fatally break up into *combinazioni*—or otherwise become cunning and violent like Fouché or Bonaparte.[101]

The motor force of Rolland's politics, he declared, was to work for the restoration of mutual tolerance among the men and movements on the Left. Since unity was seemingly impossible at the moment, he would aim at an eventual "reassembly" by emphasizing the strength of the common enemy. As he wrote to Martinet, he would retain the "faith of a free spirit" by remaining outside traditional political constellations. That communist intellectuals fanatically misconstrued his stance as "anti-Bolshevik" was simply a function of the current communist obsession. The so-called "anti-Bolshevism of the Left," allegedly shared by Tagore, Croce, and Rolland was rather the outgrowth of communist intolerance, and, concomitantly, the unjust consideration of the ideas of these men. Affirming his belief in non-cooperation, Rolland rejected the attribution of "dilettantism," made to him and claimed: "As I have said earlier: not 'anti-Bolshevik' —but 'aBolshevik': for at the bottom of my soul, none of this interests me." [102]

On the occasion of reviews of Rolland's play, *Les Vaincus*, communist intellectuals obliquely answered Rolland's latest position. Martinet felt that because of his neutrality Rolland was caught in "insoluble contradiction"; he was "tragically, heroically alone." [103] Jean Bernier's interpretation of the real cause of Rolland's separation

[100] *Journal intime*, extract 12–16 July 1922, ARR.

[101] Letter, Rolland to Marcel Martinet, 18 July 1922. See *Journal intime*, extract 18 July 1922, ARR.

[102] Letter, Rolland to Marcel Martinet, 13 July 1922, ARR.

[103] Marcel Martinet, "*Les Vaincus* de Romain Rolland," *l'Humanitè*, 14 September 1922.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from the revolutionaries of his day was his "purely sentimental reason." [104]

A FITTING epilogue to the Rolland–Barbusse confrontation came in early October 1922, in two articles by Léon Trotsky. Combining irreproachable revolutionary credentials with penetrating insights into literature, Trotsky's contribution may be analysed as the official Soviet view of the debate. With Martinet's drama *La Nuit* as a foil, Trotsky unleashed an attack on Rolland the man and on Rolland the politician. By assimilating the admirable qualities of the school of Rolland—his "calm profundity and penetration," his personal courage during the war—Martinet synthesized Rolland's personal gifts and the cause of the proletarian revolution. His astute political consciousness demonstrated a "larger, more living, more human" commitment than Rolland's. To begin with, Trotsky disparaged Rolland's philosophy for its narrowness; his humanistic egoism pertained only to artists and lacked a programme of action for the people. When the problem of war and peace and of intellectual collaboration became one of revolution, Rolland faltered and remained stationed "above the battle." Moreover, his blanket condemnation of violence and dictatorship stemmed from mistaken personal considerations, moral and aesthetic notions, and not from an understanding of how history operated. Revolutionary violence, Trotsky asserted, was the sole means by which workers would reverse the exploitative regime of their oppressors. Rolland's angle of vision was obfuscating on two counts: his incapacity to view large issues from the vantage point of the masses, a failure to empathize with the forces from below; and his obsolete individualism which obscured the necessity for a programme and organization of social action. "And thus human history is in sum only a material for artistic interpretation or for moral judgment. The individualist pretensions of Rolland belong to the past." Rollandist pacifism lacked a revolutionary strategy; consequently, it raised expectations while promising to fulfil them with only halfway measures. Trotsky judged Rolland inadequate because he was "all nerves." "Poisoned by scepticism," he soared high in contemplation and in eternal oscillations, and "in his decisive moments [was] always hostile to the insurgent proletariat." By aligning with the revolutionary proletariat, Martinet, in contrast to Rolland, surpassed his former master, and displayed all the "muscular optimism" of those forces in history destined to carry the day.[105]

Rolland briefly noted Trotsky's articles in a letter to Frans Masereel in which he recorded the going-over he had received from the "Czar

[104] Jean Bernier, "Quelques Livres," *Clarté*, No. 17, 5 July 1922.

[105] Léon Trotsky, "Le drame du Prolétariat français," *Clarté*, No. 22, 1 October 1922, pp. 507–511; and Léon Trotsky, "Une pièce qui est une date," *l'Humanité*, 7 October 1922, p. 1.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of all Russians, more powerful than Napoleon." [106] In his diary, Rolland observed that the comments of "Generalissimo" Trotsky were "not without justice" from the perspective of a revolutionary activist. Though Trotsky did not understand his personality nor his faith, he was a far more interesting opponent than were the bourgeois critics. "Trotsky's sabre dipped in red ink is better sharpened on the whole than the razor of Souday or Thibaudet." [107] Still, Rolland planned no public reply to Trotsky's scathing remarks. By late October 1922, he was convinced that the Bolsheviks had arrived at a conspicuous "point of aberration," namely of concentrating their energies on the pockets of left-wing intellectuals, pacifists, anarchists, and anti-militarists rather than on the real enemies—finance capitalism and the upper bourgeoisie.

LIKE all seminal intellectual debates, the Rolland-Barbusse confrontation raised rather than resolved complicated and vast questions. Its immediate and relatively wide-scale reverberation in left-wing intellectual circles testified to the relevance and seriousness of the issues under discussion. For a brief but significant moment, European men of letters were asked to formulate their views publicly on the all-important matter of their role in society. As Rolland aptly observed during the controversy,[108] the antinomies of the debate involved conflicting interpretations of and allegiances to principles. Not only did it seem to oppose liberty and authority, or freedom and equality, but also it contrasted the ideology of the "One against all" with the ideology of collectively determined historical forces. Related to these issues was the hierarchical question of the relation of the means to the ends, and the proposition that non-cooperation was a viable alternative to violence. Moreover, Rolland's stress on the intellectual's highest commitment to the free search for truth collided head on with Barbusse's advocacy of the communist credo.

For Barbusse,[109] the initiator of the debate, the confrontation climaxed his break with Rolland's style of internationalism, pacifism, and intellectual independence. Barbusse was fully prepared to accept the consequences of aligning with Third International Communism, and he held that all intellectuals with faith in the future would affiliate with such movements. He recognized that post-war Europe was almost totally politicized, and concluded that intellectuals could no longer hide behind an apolitical relation to their society. His alternative to the latter was an acceptance of communism which was, in effect, a proclamation of a total commitment to Marxist ideology as well as to communist organizational structures.

[106] Letter, Rolland to Frans Masereel, 11 October 1922, ARR.
[107] *Journal intime*, extract October 1922, pp. 49–51, ARR.
[108] Letter, Rolland to Edouard Dujardin, 2 March 1922, ARR.
[109] For more details on Barbusse during the debate see Annette Vidal, *Henri Barbusse. Soldat de la Paix* (Paris, 1953), pp. 226–232; Vladimir Brett, *Henri Barbusse. Sa Marche vers la clarté, son mouvement Clarté* (Prague, 1963), pp. 256–314.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Unlike Rolland, Barbusse's commitment arose from his belief in the necessity of class struggle and political struggle. His advocacy of Marxism contained a rudimentary perception of the methodological value of Marxism as a sociological and historical tool of analysis. He bridged the gap between theory and practice by joining a mass communist party, a party at least rhetorically devoted to proletarian emancipation and to the realization of socialism.

It is important to note the striking parallels and no less striking divergencies in the respective careers of Rolland and Barbusse. While the contours of Barbusse's later uncritical attachment to Stalinism are foreshadowed here, Rolland could not reach some of Barbusse's conclusions or adhere to similar goals until he went through a different evolution which involved a reappraisal of his relation to the changing contemporary historical situation.

The situation of the French Communist Party in late 1921 and 1922 was quite precarious. Because the prospects of post-war revolution seemed to have fizzled out by 1920, and because of the absence of dynamic leadership, the Party found itself with a declining membership and influence. The one successful revolution, the Soviet Revolution, left a profound imprint on French communists. As a result of the mystique of the Russian Revolution and the closeness of the Party's ties to the Comintern, French communism began to accept completely Bolshevik tactics along with the Leninist emphasis on organization, discipline, centralization, and theory. Though not in full gear until 1924, the Bolshevization of French communism precluded cooperation with the old Socialist Party. The year 1923 brought more centralized control of the Party's press, and the transition of organs like *l'Humanité* away from the spirit of Jauresian socialism. As Bolshevik dogma, in contradistinction to theory, triumphed, the French communists tried to out-Bolshevize the Bolsheviks. The Party offered its adherents two diametrically opposed choices: expulsion or capitulation to Moscow. No middle road was possible. With Trotsky as the leading Soviet architect of Comintern policy toward France, it became imperative to expose heterodox fellow travellers and dissidents to the masses. Thus French communism in 1922 was militant, antiparliamentary, and based on an unconditional loyalty of its leadership to the Soviet Union leading to policies which tragically misfired within France.[110] Existing in an objectively non-revolutionary situation, the French communists persevered in their ideological commitment to that eschatological event, revolution, which never materialized.[111]

It is no surprise, then, that Barbusse's presentation of the communist's view of the intellectual's responsibility was static, simplistic, "undialectical"; its primitiveness reflected the slow and fragmentary penetration of Marxism into France, an almost caricatural grafting on of the Bolshevik ideology to Jacobinism. There was no theoretical

[110] See Wohl, op. cit. pp. 167–263, 431–454.
[111] George Lichtheim, *Marxism in Modern France* (New York, 1966).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

component to Barbusse's thought, not even a preliminary sketch of socio-economic analysis. There was no tentative discussion of such crucial issues as the workers' relation to the productive forces, of the intellectuals' relationship to the workers, or of the questions of class consciousness and of Democratic Centralism in the Party. However, let it be added that Rolland also did not raise these issues. If we assume that Barbusse had assimilated the conceptual apparatus of Lenin before that of Marx, we may also assume that his sectarian and absolutist presentation of the communist case clearly represented the *Weltanschauung* of the PCF at this moment. In offering banalities as profound truths—the proclamation that Marxism was an exact science with immutable laws, the notion that communist practice offered a blueprint for change—Barbusse had entangled himself in such a maze that his concept of Marxism could not be disinguished from watered down versions of Rousseauism, positivism, and St.-Simonian social engineering.

On the issue of legitimization of violence as a tactic for the revolutionary proletariat, Barbusse's position (along with Dunois, Martinet, Mathiez, Serge, and Trotsky) was consistent with the major defences of communist practice. Constraint in specific historical circumstances was neither arbitrary, nor totally destructive. As part of the process of history, it constituted only one moment; to assess violence properly, one would have to analyze its usefulness, its capacity "to push history forward," and avoid those moral categories which would cloud political issues. With all the fervour of a recent convert, Barbusse saw no other viable alternative to intellectuals than the Manichean one: either they were with the Soviet Union and social revolution or against them.

IN this intellectual duel we can see a classic example of fundamental differences on a variety of overlapping issues. Barbusse dedicated himself to politicizing the masses and the intellectuals and to forging effective means of wresting political control away from the dominant classes in French society. Rolland, on the other hand, backed off from overt power considerations, worked to depoliticize at least the intellectual sectors of society, and put forth an anti-authoritarian philosophy which sprang from a repugnance toward all tyrannies. For Barbusse the questions of authority and ultimate priorities were non issues; a communist intellectual was committed to communist revolution and to whatever means the Party felt were necessary for overthrowing a decadent capitalist society. In Rolland's outlook, the intellectual's allegiance was full of contradictions; though committed to the defence and introduction of humanist concerns into the consciousness of the intellectual (and by inference into the intellectual's public), he was unclear about the precise goal of intellectual labour. Consequently, he took refuge in abstractions: intellectuals should aim for truth, justice, the elucidation of man's ethical concerns. Believing in

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the historic mission of the European proletariat, Barbusse viewed Rolland's advocacy of the historic role of the intellectual as a new form of obfuscation, a confused melange of ideas which would block radical political solutions to society's dilemmas.

In the same way that Rolland's espousal of absolute intellectual omnipotence and integrity co-opted social discontent, Barbusse perceived the hesitations, inconsistencies, and partial political nature of Rollandist pacifism. Pacifism was an incomplete stance from the perspective of Marxist social analysis, strategy, and tactics. By stressing his opposition to Marxism, Rolland criticized Soviet and French communist indifference to the pursuit and articulation of truth. Because he sought the maximization of human dignity, Rolland was sceptical about the construction of an egalitarian and compassionate society through the use of unjust, arbitrary and brutal methods.

Without being fully clear about it, Rolland objected to the function of the intellectual as the servant of the Party: true intellectual responsibility prohibited selling one's services to the nation during the war as well as joining up with proletarian parties in the post-war context.

Barbusse's attack on Rollandism, especially on its political implications, forced Rolland to crystallize his positions, to restate his philosophical orientation, and to advance a strategy which would extricate him from his ambivalent position between revolutionary Leninism and the reactionary bourgeoisie. The introduction of Gandhi's political philosophy and tactics at this point foreshadowed the major line of Rolland's political evolution throughout the remainder of the 1920s. Gradually, he would elaborate the various possibilities of Gandhi's non-cooperation for Europe; in the process, he would become " the " leading Gandhian propagandist in Western Europe. Rolland intuitively saw two novel and attractive elements in Gandhism: the potential power of non-violent forms of struggle; and the possibility of Gandhism replacing Marxism as a viable international political strategy and ideology on a mass scale.[112]

Barbusse had, nevertheless, hit a sensitive nerve in unmasking the comfortable consequences of post-war Rollandism. As the paragon of this intellectual tendency, Rolland faced the problem of how to justify being an unhypocritical intellectual while being a leftist at the same time—how to advocate radical if not socialist change in society yet refuse to adhere to organizations and parties presenting a political challenge to the old society. Rolland's agonizing consideration of this dilemma was a case history in the ambiguous, if not ultimately insoluble problem, of the intellectual's relationship to mass political organizations.

On the most fundamental level, Rolland and Barbusse clashed on questions of epistemology. Rolland's disagreement with Barbusse on method pertained to modes of thinking and perception, in addition to action and organization. Barbusse reacted to Marxism–Leninism

[112] See David James Fisher, " Romain Rolland and the Popularization of Gandhi 1923–1925," *Gandhi Marg* (Journal of the Gandhi Peace Foundation), July, 1974.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and to the Russian Revolution on a political level. For Rolland they posed a moral problem; his dilemma was to help formulate a route for humanity which would minimize the horrors it would have to face in marching toward the future.

Rolland's particular stumbling block arose from his difficulty in explaining how a non-communist leftist commitment could involve daily struggle, vigilance, and exemplary activity rather than the token espousal of unrealizable positions. The reality of the Russian Revolution exacerbated his difficulties. Although his grasp of the contemporary French version of Marxist theory was clearly imperfect, and though he trafficked in stock rebuttals to communist propositions (i.e. that Marxism was economic materialism, that it was amoral, etc.), he was an astute enough observer to detect the inherently perilous aspects of Leninist theories of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of the Soviet suppression of fundamental human freedoms—speech, press, assembly. In attempting to link Left opposition and sincere intellectualism, Rolland tried desperately to close the chasm between political commitment and an uncompromising allegiance to inquiry and the pursuit of truth. To bridge the disastrous tension between freedom and social revolution, Rolland defended traditional civil liberties, stressed pluralism and unity as necessary antidotes to Bolshevik political expediency, purity of doctrine, and divisiveness. His plea for open criticism, and for self-criticism within communist circles had a prophetic ring. Anticipating what would happen if criticism were to be constrained or prohibited, Rolland would accept no policy or apologies for policies which suppressed these elementary human freedoms.

WHAT separated Rolland from his communist opponents was his view of the Soviet Revolution. It should be noted that many of his contradictory attitudes between 1914 and 1922 surfaced here and became explicit. On balance, Rolland's first sustained analysis of the Russian Revolution was critical; the accent was placed on potentials unachieved, on ideals debased, on Bolshevik abuses of internal power, and externally on the disregard for the goodwill of its foreign sympathizers. Much of Rolland's disappointment with the Soviet Revolution derived from his exaggerated expectations about this world-historic event; very much like the young poet Wordsworth in the 1790s, sensibility and wish seemed to interfere with a more realistic appraisal of the Revolution's possibilities. From this framework, Rolland offered his critical support of the Russian Revolution with the explicit understanding in mind that a critical assessment meant an attempt to determine both merits and faults of the Revolution and that it did not mean unqualified adulation.

Neither Rolland's refusal to enter the ranks of the French Communist Party nor his wide-scale disagreements with Barbusse made him an anti-communist. He remained a non-communist intellectual who

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

believed that dialogue among sincere and high-minded men of the Left could be enlightening and beneficial to all sides. He believed that the communists were not the real enemies. He identified the real opponents of the Left as the intellectual reaction and the institutions, policies, and hegemony of the political conservatives. Moreover, Rolland hoped that he could collaborate with Barbusse in future campaigns against the Right, thus leaving the door open for their subsequent anti-fascist efforts in 1927–28 and for their initiation of the Amsterdam–Pleyel Movement 10 years after their famous controversy.

Rolland's reluctance to align himself with a mass political party sprang, in large measure, from his commitment to certain ethical ideals which, he believed, were easily corrupted by their transformation into concrete political action. The disinterested intellectual was the guardian of these ideals, the man of character whose choices ought never to compromise the moral principles Rolland held dear. The more socially and politically detached the intellectual was, the more capable he would be of living up to the autonomous and incorruptible role Rolland had set for him.

In addition, Rolland's assumptions about the nature of Marxism were also a significant factor in his rejection of organized political movements. He assumed that social revolutions led to the same results as war. Treated in such a light, Marxism bore the stigma of amorality: ethical ideas were not to be found in the revolutionary camp. His intransigent position on the means-ends controversy was contradictory. His affirmation of non-violence should be seen as an earnest but preliminary effort to transform his idealistic faith into a method for achieving social change, to reconcile his demand that every act be integrally virtuous with his desire to implement a classless society.

ERRATUM

In the Winter 1974 issue of *Survey* the reference to Klement Gottwald on page 75, lines 15–16 should have been to Matyas Rakosi. In the same article on page 75, line 11 the name of the Polish peasant leader should read: Stanislaw Mikolajczyk. Norman Davies' " Waiting for Dinner " should have been in the section on Eastern Europe.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Rediscovery of Amadeo Bordiga

Earlene Craver

IN the past few years Antonio Gramsci (the Italian communist intellectual and political leader who died in 1937 a " martyr of fascism ") has made a belated entry into the English-speaking world. In 1967, the first biography of Gramsci in English was published; in 1971, Gramsci's *Quaderni dal carcere* finally became available in English translation.[1] An original and creative contributor to Marxist thought, Gramsci has received an enthusiastic reception from both the popular and scholarly press and has been embraced warmly by the Anglo-American New Left.[2]

Paradoxically, Italy's new Leftists during this same period have begun to question the revolutionary value of Gramsci's political thought. In search of a new heroic model with which to confront the official Communist Party's hero they have turned towards Amadeo Bordiga [3] (1889–1970), Gramsci's ideological rival during the turbulent, formative years of the Italian Communist Party and the ultimate loser in the internecine struggle of the twenties.

Amadeo Bordiga and the Formation of the Italian Communist Party

Amadeo Bordiga, rather than Antonio Gramsci was the first leader of the Partito Comunista d'Italia (PCd'I) founded at Livorno in January 1921. Thirty-two years old when he assumed the communist leadership, he already had a long history of militant activity behind him.

As a youth, Bordiga had rebelled against the gradualist social-democratic version of Marxism subscribed to by those of his father's generation—indeed, by his own father. Between 1911 and 1914, the young Neapolitan engineering student launched a vigorous, and ultimately successful, campaign in Naples against the *bloc* (the socialist

[1] John M. Cammett, *Antonio Gramsci and the Origins of Italian Communism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967); Quintan Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, eds., *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci* (New York: International Publishers, 1971). An earlier version of the notebooks, *The Modern Prince and Other writings* (New York: International Publishers, 1957), was a very incomplete selection.

[2] In the U.S., *Telos, Socialist Revolution,* and *Liberation;* in England, the *New Left Review.*

[3] The recent works on him are: Luigi Cortesi, *Il socialismo italiano tra riforme e rivoluzione. Dibattiti congressuali del PSI, 1892–1921* (Bari: Laterza, 1969). The essays on 1912–21 were republished in an amplified edition, *Le origini del Partito comunista italiana. Il PSI dalla guerra di Libia alla scissione di Livorno* (Bari: Laterza, 1972); Andreina De Clementi, *Amadeo Bordiga* (Turin: Giulio Einaudi, 1971).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

practice of forming electoral alliances with other parties in " unwinnable " districts). During the campaign, he became known for his uncompromising attitude and his logical methods of argumentation.[4]

A leader in the socialist youth organization, as well as an important local leader before the war, Bordiga came to national prominence in the Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI) with the outbreak of the first world war. A severe critic of Mussolini's first moves towards an interventionist policy, Bordiga also condemned the latent francophilism of most of his socialist comrades. In contrast with most socialists, he ascribed the causes of the war to capitalist imperialism rather than to the popularly held view of Austro-German militarism.

> In reality the bourgeoisie of all nations is equally responsible for the outbreak of the conflict, or rather the capitalistic system is responsible, in that by its need for economic expansion it has produced the system of great armaments and the " armed peace " which today has collapsed . . . into this horrifying holocaust.[5]

Though in writing these articles on the war Bordiga was unaware of Lenin's interpretation,[6] Bordiga edged towards proposing the Leninist thesis that the war between nations be turned into a civil war between classes.[7] By early 1917 he had accepted the full Leninist position. In July 1917 he became one of the leaders of a left-wing revolutionary intransigent faction which urged PSI leaders to sabotage the war effort by capitalizing on the rising spirit of mass unrest. Silenced along with the entire left-wing of the PSI following the military disaster at Caporetto, Bordiga returned to active political life at the war's end. In December 1918 he founded his own newspaper, *Il Soviet*.[8]

During the spontaneous upheavals that followed the end of the war (the *biennio rosso* of 1919–1920), *Il Soviet* levelled sharp criticisms against the inept maximalist[9] leadership of the PSI. Despite the Party Leadership's affirmations of commitment to the " dictatorship of the

[4] See *Storia della sinistra comunista* (Milan: Partito comunista internazionalista, 1964); Vol. I bis (1966). A collection of documents with text anonymously written by Bordiga.

[5] Amadeo Bordiga, "Al Nostro posto," *Avanti!*, 16 Aug. 1914; also " Il socialismo di ieri dinanzi alla guerra di oggi," *Avanguardia*, 25 Oct., 1 Nov., 16 Nov. 1914 in which his arguments were developed more fully.

[6] Confirmed by Bordiga in an interview (*Formia*, 1 Sept. 1969). The above-cited article in *Avanti!* was written just ten days after the war began.

[7] Italy's special position vis-à-vis the war in the first months meant that Bordiga's arguments were directed towards preventing Italian intervention. He expressed a generally pessimistic view on the possibility of halting the war once it had begun, see " Il socialismo di ieri dinanzi alla guerra di oggi," *Avanguardia*, 1 Nov. 1914. In the immediate aftermath of Italian intervention in May 1915 he used what I believe to be insurrectional rhetoric, " Il fatto compiuto," *Avanti!*, 23 May 1915.

[8] See *Storia della sinistra comunista*, Vol. I, and Earlene Craver, " The Crisis of Italian Socialism and the Origins of the Italian Communist Party, 1912–1921," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California, 1972.

[9] The term " maximalist " referred to the " maximum " programme of revolution, as distinguished from the minimum programme of reforms, found in the 1900 Party platform of the PSI. The maximalist faction obtained control of the PSI in 1912. Their post-war leader was G. M. Serrati.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

proletariat," Bordiga (like Gramsci who in June 1919 founded *Ordine Nuovo*) became concerned by the Party's lack of concrete revolutionary preparations. Gramsci thought that the preparatory stage of revolution required the transformation of the factory councils into indigenous soviets and the creation of analogous institutions among the peasantry. Bordiga instead argued (frequently against Gramsci) that the fundamental organ of revolution was the Party. Accordingly, he turned his efforts towards reforming and purifying the PSI's structure and programme.[10]

Bordiga maintained that the maximalists' decision to participate in the national elections in 1919 constituted a basic inconsistency with their stated revolutionary goal. Electoral participation tempered the revolutionary zeal of the Party, he maintained, and fooled the masses into believing that the socialist realization could be achieved through the ballot box. In a "revolutionary period" the PSI should abstain from electoral and parliamentary participation. Although he formulated his objections to electoral participation on a theoretical plane, Bordiga's argument also had a rather practical objective.[11]

Since 1917, he had become convinced that the continued presence within the PSI of the reformist social-democrats, who invariably held most elective offices, paralyzed the Party.[12] Thus, whatever the theoretical implications of abstentionism, it was also a useful means of divesting the Party of reformist influence. In any case, as a consequence of this line of reasoning, Bordiga, rather than Gramsci, became the first left-wing socialist leader to call for the explusion of the reformists (22 June 1919).

In July of the same year (in anticipation of the forthcoming PSI national congress) Bordiga organized the first communist faction in Italy. The communist abstentionists naturally drew considerable support from the South; however, they also had a large following in Tuscany, obtained the support of the entire youth movement and by October when the Congress was held, could claim a coterie of supporters in Milan and Turin.[13]

The communist abstentionists' goal in 1919 was to shift the PSI's orientation to the left, along the lines Bordiga had outlined in *Il Soviet*. But, their strategy was unsuccessful. At the national Party congress held at Bologna in October 1919 the abstentionist platform was

[10] For a comparative discussion of *Il Soviet* and *Ordine Nuovo*, the best sources are: Donald W. Urquidi, "The Origins of the Italian Communist Party, 1918–1921," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1962 and Andreina De Clementi, "La politica del Partito comunista d'Italia nel 1921–22 e il rapporto Bordiga-Gramsci," Pt. I, *Rivista storica del socialismo* (May–Aug. 1966).

[11] See, for example, "L'illusione elezionista," *Il Soviet*, 9 Feb. 1920.

[12] It was the practice of the Party Leadership to confer with the Parliamentary Group and trade union leaders before arriving at tactical decisions. This tended to give the reformists between congresses a leverage on Party politics quite disproportionate to their actual numerical strength within the entire organization.

[13] See *Il Soviet* during this period.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

defeated and the reformists, who were outspokenly critical of bolshevism, were allowed to remain.

Immediately after his defeat, Bordiga made plans for a schism of the communists from the PSI and for the formation of a new party.[14] But to accomplish these objectives he realized that he needed to win support within the Comintern and needed to broaden his bases of support within Italy—particularly by working out a basis for cooperation with Gramsci, who though critical of the maximalists, had consistently supported them.[15]

Bordiga managed to achieve his first objective at the Second Comintern Congress. The Twenty-One Points passed at the Second Comintern Congress in July 1920 left the PSI leaders with the alternative of either expelling the reformists or being expelled themselves. However, Lenin himself condemned Bordiga for his insistence that electoral participation in a " revolutionary period " was inimical to the realization of the Party's goals. Incorrectly associating Bordiga's abstentionist objections with those made by the German proponents of the factory councils movements, Lenin stuck to the criticism of the communist abstentionists that he had earlier made in *' Left-Wing ' Communism: An Infantile Disorder*. Therefore, in forming the PCd'I Bordiga was forced to agree to drop the abstentionist plank.[16]

In November 1920 Bordiga's faction concluded a pact with Gramsci, who belatedly accepted the necessity of a schism,[17] and that created the basis for the Communist Party.[18] With Serrati's failure to accept the Twenty-One Points at the Congress of Livorno in January 1921, the communists left the PSI to form their own party.

In the organization of the new Party Bordiga, not Gramsci, had played the principal role. The fact was reflected in the former

[14] See letter sent by Bordiga to Lenin dated 11 Jan. 1920 now in Roberto Gabriele, " Partito rivoluzionario e astensionismo in due lettere di Amadeo Bordiga all'Internazionale Comunista (1919–1920)," *Rivista storica del socialismo* (Jan.–Apr. 1966), pp. 178–88. The letter was confiscated by the police and never reached its destination.

[15] Gramsci hoped to win maximalist acceptance of his proposals on the councils. Not until the Leadership made it clear it would not implement his programme did he break with Serrati, the maximalist leader.

[16] The relevant passage in " ' Left-Wing ' Communism " is in a footnote reference, " I have had too little opportunity to acquaint myself with left-wing communism in Italy. Comrade Bordiga and his faction of ' Communist-Boycottists ' . . . are certainly wrong in advocating non-participation in parliament. But on one point it seems to me Comrade Bordiga is right . . . in attacking Turati and his followers (i.e. reformists), who remain in a party which has recognized Soviet power and the dictatorship of the proletariat, yet continue their former perverse and opportunist policy as members of parliament." V. I. Lenin, *' Left-Wing ' Communism: An Infantile Disorder* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1950), fn., p. 83.

Ironically it was Gramsci with his emphasis upon spontaneity and workers' democracy who was actually closer to the conciliarists Lenin condemned. See above cited Urquidi, " The Origins of the Italian Communist Party," passim.

[17] Gramsci broke with the maximalist faction at the end of April 1920. On 8 May 1920, *Ordine Nuovo* published an appeal " For the Renewal of the Party." This document which was approved by Lenin, actually represented a departure from Gramsci's earlier conciliarist formulations.

[18] The pact between the two groups was concluded at Imola on 28 Nov. 1920.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

abstentionists' domination of the first Executive Committee of the PCd'I.

Bordiga Becomes a Leader of the Left Opposition

The PCd'I had no sooner been created and Bordiga installed as its leader than he came into conflict with the Comintern. The specific issues were two: the united front and the fusion of the PSI (from which the communists had only recently split) with the PCd'I. But the larger conflict emanated from the Comintern's shift to the right—a process begun at least as early as the Third Comintern Congress.

As the Bolsheviks became increasingly pessimistic over the immediate possibility of revolution in the West and, therefore, sought to secure their own Revolution, they began to assume greater authoritarian control of the Comintern as a means of bringing frequently resistant West European parties into line. Bordiga was among those West European leaders who resisted the volte-face which Lenin's New Economic Policy and the united front tactic represented. Because he felt that the decision for schism taken at Livorno had been an irrevocable one (and also because he continued to regard the Italian situation at least until Mussolini's accession to power in 1922 more optimistically than the Bolsheviks) he resisted suggestions for the creation of a political alliance with other parties on the Left—a tactic which he equated, despite Comintern denials, with the pre-war *bloc*. He chose to interpret the less than explicit united front directives of the Third Comintern Congress solely along economic grounds, supporting communist participation in other trade unions with the avowed purpose of winning the working class masses to the communists' side.[19]

Bordiga's position on the united front was expressed in theoretical terms in the Rome Thesis, a document which emanated from the Second PCd'I Congress (March 1922). Termed by one Italian historian the " last great communist document formulated upon the hypothesis of the permanent revolution," [20] the Rome Thesis won the support of Gramsci and a majority of the PCd'I's rank-and-file.[21] It was repudiated, however, by the Comintern's Executive President, Grigory Zinoviev.

In a meeting with the Italian delegation prior to the Fourth Comintern Congress, Zinoviev criticized the Rome Thesis on tactics [22]

[19] See Paolo Spriano, *Storia del Partito communista italiano,* Vol. I Da Bordiga a Gramsci (Turin: Giulio Einaudi, 1967), pp. 152–202.

[20] Luigi Cortesi, " Alcuni problemi della storia del PCI," *Rivista storica del socialismo* (Jan.–Apr. 1965), p. 158.

[21] Later, both Togliatti and Gramsci would claim that they had subscribed to the Thesis drafted by Bordiga because they had been fearful of the growing strength of Tasca's right-wing. See Spriano, *Storia . . .* , Vol. I, pp. 188–90 and letters in Palmiro Togliatti, *La formazione del gruppo dirigente del Partito comunista italiano* (Rome: Riuniti, 1962).

[22] Bordiga's statement on tactics points up the basis of his disagreement with the Comintern as it began its shift to the right: " It is an error to suppose that one can,

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as inconsistent with the directives of the Third Comintern Congress. In addition, he proposed the " fusion " of the PCd'I with the PSI—that is, a merger of the communists with Serrati and those socialists willing to accept, albeit belatedly, the Twenty-One Points of the Second Congress.[23]

Bordiga was adamantly opposed to the " fusion " and to the concept of the united front " from above " (approved by the Fourth Comintern Congress) which could in specific instances lend sanction to communist participation in non-communist governments. Because he regarded the deliberations of the Second Comintern Congress as definitive in the establishment of communist principles, he saw the new tactic as something other than a flexible means of responding to the fascist threat. A workers' government which was not the " proletarian dictatorship " but merely " a form of transition," he told Zinoviev, was nothing other than a new form of *bourgeois* government.[24] By 1923 he was convinced that the International was showing signs of an opportunistic degeneration and was " marching towards the brink of communist revisionism *ab imis fundamentis*." [25]

Bordiga was also critical of the Comintern's transparent efforts to meddle in the affairs of the national parties that composed it. As he put it before delegates to the Fourth Congress:

> Our International has been seen too frequently as an organ independent of those parties which adhere to it. . . . The International is even stooping to form its own factions within the national parties.[26]

Though Bordiga referred then to Zinoviev's encouragement of Angelo Tasca's right-wing faction and the Russians' blandishments of Antonio Gramsci (who showed signs of wavering in his support of Bordiga) [27] he came to see in a matter of a few months the blatant interference of the Comintern in the PCd'I's internal affairs.

by expedients and maneuvers, expand the Party base among the masses at any time, since relations between the Party and the Masses depend in great part on the objective conditions of the situation. The controversy between us leftists and other factions lies in our belief that variations in the situation should not change the fundamental programme, organization, and tactics of the Party. As we see it, Party influence among the masses will grow when the situation becomes more revolutionary, provided that that Party holds firmly to its preconceived organization and tactics. The other factions apparently see the problem of ' conquering ' the masses as a problem of will; but actually, they fall into opportunism by continually adapting themselves to specific situations. Thus, they so deform the nature and functions of the Party that it is incapable of conquering the masses, or of performing its supreme tasks when the right situation does occur." As translated in Cammett, *Antonio Gramsci*, p. 161.

23 See Spriano, *Storia* . . . , Vol. I, pp. 216–31. The best primary source material on the relationship between the Comintern and the PCd'I on the issue of the front and the fusion may be found in Jules Humbert Droz, *Il contrasto tra l'Internazionale e il PCI* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1969).

24 As quoted in Spriano, *Storia* . . . , Vol. I, p. 246.

25 Letter to Togliatti dated 7 July 1923 as quoted in Spriano, *Storia* . . . , Vol. I, p. 286.

26 As quoted in Andreina De Clementi, *Amadeo Bordiga*, p. 172.

27 The best discussion on this is in Spriano, *Storia* . . . , Vol. I, pp. 291–313.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Infuriated by the failure of the " fusion " in April 1923 (for which the Comintern Executive blamed the Italian communist leaders), the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) took the occasion of Bordiga's arrest following his return to Italy to remove him from the Party leadership. In a departure from customary procedure, the Party's new Executive Committee was named by the Comintern rather than elected by the PCd'I's rank-and-file.[28]

Although the Comintern would have to contend with Bordiga and the Italian Left for at least two more years, this action, in retrospect, signalled the beginning of the end of his career as both a national and international communist leader.

" Bolshevization " and the political demise of Bordiga

Ironically, the protagonist of the Italian Party's " bolshevization " (which actually began with the Comintern's " act of authority " in June 1923) was Antonio Gramsci, whose own prison letters and notebooks contained more than a hint of condemnation of the process of Stalinization.

At the request of Zinoviev, Gramsci had remained in Moscow as Italy's permanent representative following the Fourth Congress. During his stay (from May 1922 to December 1923)[29] Gramsci became convinced that Bordiga's views on fascism were oversimplified, that his vision of revolutionary prospectives in the West was overly optimistic, and that his fears concerning the " hegemony " exercised by the Russians over the International were unfounded.[30]

Though he did not re-enter Italy until May 1924, Gramsci managed through means of a vigorous correspondence to convert Palmiro Togliatti and other Party leaders into fuller acceptance of the Comin-

[28] Ibid. pp. 273–90.

[29] Gramsci was in Vienna from Dec. 1923 until May 1924, ibid. p. 291.

[30] Gramsci wrote to Togliatti in Feb. 1924: " [Bordiga] thinks that the tactics of the International reflect the Russian situation, [a situation] produced by a backward and primitive capitalist civilization. For him the tactics are excessively voluntaristic and theatrical, because only by a supreme effort of will can the Russian masses be moved to revolutionary action when this action is not determined by the historical situation. He thinks that, for the more advanced countries of Central and Western Europe, this programme [i.e. united front] is inadequate or simply useless. In these countries the historical mechanism functions according to all the Marxist sacraments; there is a determinism lacking in Russia and, therefore, the dominant task must be the organization of the Party in itself and for itself.

I believe the situation is very different. First, the political conceptions of the Russian communists were formed in an international context, not a national one; secondly, the development of capitalism in Central and Western Europe not only determined the formation of broad proletarian strata, but also created an upper stratum, the working class aristocracy with its appendages of trade union bureaucracy and social-democratic groups. The direct determinism that moved the Russian masses in the streets to revolutionary assaults was complicated in Central and Western Europe by all the political superstructure created by the greater development of capitalism; it rendered mass action slower and more cautious, and therefore demands from the revolutionary Party a system of strategy and tactics much more complex and long-range than those used by the Bolsheviks between March and November, 1917." See above cited correspondence, Togliatti, *La formazione del gruppo dirigente*, pp. 196–97.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tern's new line. The task of converting the Party's rank-and-file proved more difficult.[31]

At a secret meeting summoned by Gramsci and held at Lake Como in May 1924, local Party representatives passed resolutions which backed Bordiga's positions on the Party programme, the fusion, and the front —even though they also, quite contradictorily, ratified the Comintern-imposed Executive Committee. The results of the conference, which came as some surprise to both Gramsci and the Comintern's representative in Italy, Jules Humbert-Droz, led to the intensification of their efforts to bring the entire Party into line with the new policies of the Comintern.[32]

The methods were similar to those used in other West European countries: (1) the silencing of an important leader of the Left and isolation of the opposition; (2) the complete reorganization of the bases of the Party structure.

For some time the Comintern had regarded Bordiga as the chief obstacle to their success in Italy. Unable to diminish his following (particularly since his successful defence trial in July 1924 Bordiga enjoyed a large reputation among the rank-and-file),[33] the Comintern attempted to apply the carrot and stick alternately in an effort to gain his active support of the new Party line. But Bordiga remained impervious to the Comintern's entreaties. Obdurate in defeat, he remained in Naples in " silent opposition." He refused the Comintern's order that he rejoin the Executive Committee [34] and stubbornly resisted demands that he head the ticket of communist candidates for the Chamber of Deputies in 1924. Finding the latter especially distasteful he sent word that the Comintern could find " another phonograph upon which to play its tune." [35]

Shortly thereafter Gramsci signalled the initiation of a new hard line on dissidents. A month before the opening of the Fifth Comintern Congress (June–July 1924) he wrote in the official communist newspaper, *Stato Operaio,* with specific reference to Bordiga, that merely " formal discipline " on the part of " prominent personalities," as the case of Trotsky demonstrated, served to " create a sense of malaise in the Party " and even threatened the Revolution itself.[36] Similar accusations were levelled at Bordiga in Moscow at the Fifth Comintern Congress.

Bordiga came to Moscow determined to use his considerable forensic

[31] Ibid. passim.

[32] See above cited, Humbert Droz, *Il contrasto tra l'Internazionale e il PCI,* pp. 74–237.

[33] Bordiga had been imprisoned in Feb. 1924. The trial was held in July. Bordiga offered a bold self-defence and was acquitted.

[34] He said the Comintern's insistence that he rejoin the Executive Committee after he had been arbitrarily removed from the leadership was " too similar to the orders of a fascist prefect transferring his subordinates to another post." Humbert Droz, *Il contrasto tra l'Internazionale e il PCI,* p. 85.

[35] Ibid.

[36] *La Stato Operaio,* 29 May 1924.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

talents in that international forum. At the Fifth Congress he became the principal spokesman against the "bolshevization" of the International and the projected "bolshevization" of the national parties. But, if, as Paolo Spriano suggests, the deliberations of the Fifth Congress represented a slight shift to the left from the Fourth Congress in a tactical sense, it also represented with its approval of the new resolutions on Party organization a further shift to the right.[37]

By failing to shift the course of the International, Bordiga's fate was sealed. Within a few months of the Italian's return to Italy, he was silenced. His newspaper, *Prometeo,* was suppressed, articles he submitted to *Stato Operaio* were refused publication, and important local Party leaders of leftist persuasion were arbitrarily removed from office by the Executive Committee. For many Party militants the choice now became "either Bordiga or the International"—an unhappy choice in the dark days of Mussolini's consolidation of power. This attitude was encouraged by the Executive Committee who now linked Bordiga's name to that of the disgraced Trotsky.[38]

Simultaneous with the Leadership's assumption of authoritarian control, the Party was transformed at the grass roots level from a Party composed of dedicated militants to a mass party—a factor which, some have submitted, contributed to Bordiga's ultimate defeat in 1926.[39]

But, though the actions of the Comintern may have played a central role in Bordiga's political demise, there were other reasons as well. The tragic conclusion of the Matteotti affair,[40] which resulted in the consolidation of the fascist dictatorship rather than in its disintegration as many had hoped, shattered all lingering illusions among militants concerning the non-permanence of the fascist regime.[41] By 1926, even the most dedicated militants were ready to concede that the post-war crisis would not resolve into revolution according to the telescoped two-stage pattern of the Russian Revolution. Though Bordiga was not the blind optimist it has sometimes been maintained, his almost catechetical formulations upon the purity of the Party seemed grossly inadequate to the needs of these repressive times. Gramsci's brilliant interpretation within the Italian national context of the new line from Moscow seemed to hold out more promise for a Communist Party which now had to project the revolutionary apocalypse into the far-distant

[37] Spriano, *Storia . . .* , Vol. I, pp. 362–80; see also Jane Degras, ed., *The Communist International,* Vol. II, 1923–28 (London: Oxford Press, 1960).

[38] See Humbert Droz, *Il contrasto tra l'Internazionale e il PCI,* pp. 198–237; Spriano, *Storia . . .* , Vol. I, pp. 429–56; De Clementi, Amadeo Bordiga, pp. 227–30.

[39] De Clementi, *Amadeo Bordiga,* p. 229 utilizes the old argument of the "immaturity" of the masses of workers and peasants who swelled the Party ranks after 1924.

[40] The assassination of Matteotti, a reformist socialist deputy, in June 1924 temporarily placed Mussolini's Government in trouble with parliament. By Jan. 1925, however, Mussolini had recouped and thereafter moved to consolidate the dictatorship.

[41] Spriano, *Storia . . .* , Vol. I, pp. 380–428 documents Gramsci's own optimism concerning the possibility of toppling Mussolini's Government and moving on toward a revolutionary stage during the early months of the Matteotti affair.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

future. Accordingly, in January 1926 at the Congress of Lyons, Gramsci's victory over the *bordighisti* was finally made complete.

The Theses of Lyons have long been regarded by contemporary communists as their constitutional charter. The Theses confirmed the "bolshevized" organization of the Party and re-structured it into "cells." It also changed the name of the PCd'I to its contemporary version, the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI). However, the most significant passages of the Theses (particularly in view of the various twists Togliatti and his political successors have given them in developing the ideology of the "Italian road to Socialism") were contained in the theoretical portion of the document. In these passages, Gramsci impressed upon the Party the need for forging an alliance with the peasantry and other disaffected classes and placed upon the PCI, in addition to its programmatic revolutionary goal, the historic task of completing Italy's incomplete *Risorgimento*.[42]

There is not much of an epilogue to Bordiga's defeat at Lyons. Like Gramsci and other communist leaders he was arrested in 1926, tried and imprisoned. In 1928, his faction (which had by then drawn closer to the Trotskyites) published a second, now frankly polemical, edition of *Prometeo* in Belgium. In 1930, he was formally expelled from the PCI.

If there is an epilogue to Bordiga's defeat at the Congress of Lyons, it lies in the story of the historical treatment accorded him over the next 30 years.

Amadeo Bordiga: 1930–60

Bordiga was virtually written out of Party histories following his expulsion from the PCI. In some works intended for popular distribution during the Stalinist era, he became an historical "unperson".[43] In scholarly studies, he was treated superficially. Though Bordiga's role in the schism of Livorno was rarely denied, communists pointedly (and proudly) traced their ideological lineage to Gramsci and the Congress of Lyons.

For more than 30 years Giuseppe Berti's 1934–35 articles in *Stato Operaio* (anticipated by Togliatti's telegraphic comments in 1930) remained the definitive work on Bordiga. Their arguments can be summed up as follows. (1) Bordiga had become the first leader of the Italian Communist Party primarily as a result of his organizational skills and the immaturity of the working class movement. (2) The communist abstentionist group had been fundamentally a local movement composed of members of the Neapolitan *petit-bourgeoisie*. (3) Bordiga had never truly understood Leninism, as the first conflicts over

[42] "Tesi sulla situazione italiana e sui compiti del PCI, approvate dal III Congresso nazionale nel gennaio 1926," *Stato Operaio* (June–July 1928).

[43] Giovanni Germanetto's observations on Bordiga in *Souvenirs d'un perruqier* (Paris: Bureau d'edite, 1931) were deleted in subsequent editions.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

abstentionism demonstrated. *Bordighismo* was in reality a left-wing offshoot of the Second International. (4) Bordiga was an extremely sectarian dogmatist who was incapable of adapting theory to practice.[44]

With Bordiga's contributions to the creation of the Italian Communist Party safely thrust aside, Gramsci, quite naturally, emerged as the true founder of the Italian Communist Party. Indeed, as Togliatti presented it, Gramsci had been the first Italian to comprehend Leninism and had done so as early as the 1919–20 *Ordine Nuovo* experiment.[45] Togliatti presented himself, of course, as the faithful transmitter of the Leninist-Gramscian legacy to the contemporary PCI.

In the fifties attacks upon the last part of that linkage (that is, between Gramsci and Togliatti) by first the socialist right and later the communist left opened the way for a closer scrutiny of the Gramscian heritage. After a decade of careful research (facilitated by releases of hitherto unpublished documents) the consensus among scholars was that Gramsci's political thought and the PCI's early political history were more complex than earlier facile interpretations had allowed. The influence of Crocian idealism on Gramsci's thought was so striking that the exact nature of his Leninism became tantalizingly ambiguous.[46] Certainly, Gramsci's theorizations on the factory councils during the *Ordine Nuovo* period were far from the classic Leninist conception on the role of the Party. The " orthodox " were nonetheless constrained to find a " Leninist " Gramsci, if not in Gramsci's conciliarist formulations in 1919, then in his statements on the Party in the Theses of Lyons in 1926.[47]

But, while " Togliatti's Gramsci " failed to stand up *in toto* in the face of the accumulating evidence (Party scholars were sent scurrying to repair the damage), the PCI's Bordiga remained virtually intact.[48] Moreover, as late as 1965 the old leftist held little interest for dissident leftists who found his political formulations " superseded." [49]

What led, then, to the revival of interest in Bordiga in the late sixties? There are two reasons: one, scholarly; the other, political, although the two have been intertwined.

[44] Giuseppe Berti, " Il gruppo del ' Soviet ' nella formazione del PCI," *Lo Stato Operaio*, 12 Dec. 1934 and 1 Jan. 1935; Palmiro Togliatti, "Appunti per una critica del bordighismo," *Lo Stato Operaio*, Apr. 1930.

[45] Palmiro Togliatti, " Il capo della classe operaia italiana," *Lo Stato Operaio*, May–June 1937.

[46] See the excellent summary in A. B. Davidson, " The Varying Seasons of Gramscian Studies," *Political Studies* (Dec. 1972).

[47] Spriano, *Storia . . .*, Vol. I, admits that Gramsci's early conception during the *Ordine Nuovo* movement " of a revolution from below through a molecular process of forming the workers' State " was not Leninist, p. 64, but he calls the Lyons Thesis the " mature product of the Leninist theoretical development of Gramsci and Togliatti," p. 497.

[48] There was a Trotskyite history of the PCI which took a pro-Bordiga point-of-view published in the fifties, Fulvio Bellini and Giorgio Galli, *Storia del Partito comunista italiano* (Milan: Schwartz, 1953); however, it had little influence on other historical studies at that time.

[49] Conversations with Stefano Merli, co–editor of the dissident leftist *Rivista storica del socialismo* in Florence (Spring, 1965).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In the first instance, the debate over the exact nature of the Gramscian heritage in the fifties and sixties by stimulating research on the Party's history invariably had the effect of unearthing information on Gramsci's rival, Bordiga. The three most important documentary additions which would in time become extremely important in the rehabilitation of Bordiga were: (1) the publication in 1962 of the 1923–24 correspondence between Gramsci and his former Turinese comrades; (2) Bordiga's own contribution in 1964 (supplemented in 1966), a collection of his writings with an anonymously authored essay obviously written by him; (3) the published correspondence of the Comintern's representative in Italy, Jules Humbert–Droz, available in a translated Italian edition in 1969.[50]

When the highly regarded communist scholar, Paolo Spriano came out in 1967 with the first volume of his multi-volumed study of the PCI (in which he made extensive use of the above documents) Bordiga was given life as an historical personage. Though Spriano in most instances reasserted the traditional negative assessment of Bordiga[51] he offered factual material on the old left leader which served to arouse the interest of contemporary leftists. Thus, political, rather than scholarly, considerations ultimately were of greater importance in bringing about Bordiga's historical rehabilitation.

The New Left Discovers Bordiga

Following the collapse of the first *centro-sinistra* government in 1964, the leadership of the PCI advanced the notion of forming a new popular front—an alliance which would stretch from the communists to the left-wing of the Christian-Democratic Party. Though the proposal was the obvious culmination of two decades of political collaboration (and a few courageous members were willing to say so) the proposal was more commonly justified either as an "offensive strategy" which would strike a fatal blow to the peculiarly Italian version of the bourgeois state or as a "defensive tactic" to meet the threat of a revitalized neo–fascist Right. However the popular front proposal was interpreted or justified, it was regarded by communists as consistent with their Party's Leninist and Gramscian patrimony.[52]

The popular front proposal had the result of bringing the PCI's

[50] See previously cited references.

[51] In an earlier article, "Il dibattito tra il 'Soviet' e l'Ordine Nuovo," Rinascita (Jan. 1961) Spriano had repeated the traditional judgments made by Berti and Togliatti. In the 1967 *Storia . . .*, Vol. I, he admitted that Bordiga had a national, rather than simply Southern or Neopolitan, bases of support in 1920–21. In addition, he "historicized" Gramsci's positions showing that Gramsci had arrived slowly at the full Leninist position of 1926. He nonetheless continued to claim that Bordiga's abstentionist plank was an essential part of his platform, that he had never understood Leninism and demonstrated the clear superiority of Gramsci over Bordiga in their comprehension of fascism.

[52] Federico Mancini and Giorgio Galli, "Gramsci's Presence," *Government and Opposition* (Summer, 1968) and Stephen White, "Gramsci and the Italian Communist Party," *Government and Opposition* (Spring, 1972).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

left-wing and other leftist dissidents, who had for some time been critical of the revisionism inherent in the Togliattian formula of the " Italian way to socialism," into open conflict with the PCI's leadership. By the " hot autumn " of student-labour conflict in 1969, the New Left consisted of a number of competing left-wing groups ranging from anarchosyndicalist to Maoist in complexion. (Of these the *Il Manifesto* group, begun by prominent PCI intellectuals expelled in 1969, was doubtless the best known, best organized and, some believe, the most original.)

The " Maoist " Marxist-Leninist groups (there were more than one) generally regarded the problem as one of the PCI's " betrayal " of true Marxism-Leninism. Other groups, such as the *Il Manifesto* and syndicalist-oriented groups, felt the need for the construction of a new revolutionary model adapted to the peculiar conditions of political and economic development in Western Europe and demonstrated a certain eclecticism in drawing upon, in addition to Lenin, the thought of such neglected revolutionary figures as Rosa Luxemburg and Trotsky. In any case, whatever the differences between the New Left *gruppetti* they were united on one central point: that the " Italian way to socialism " had been no way at all, that it had resulted in cooption rather than the socialist realization.[53]

As in the previous political debates of the fifties and early sixties, the contemporary ideological struggle between communists and dissidents was fought simultaneously on the historical front. This time the New Leftist dissidents struck at the heart of the PCI's claims to orthodoxy, questioning its claim to even a revolutionary and/or orthodox Leninist past. Had the Gramscian legacy been Leninist, they asked. If so, was Leninism the revolutionary strategy best adapted to conditions in Western Europe? Or, was a nascent revolutionary strategy more adapted to the West smothered by the process of " bolshevization "? Finally, in meeting the threat of fascism was there a viable, revolutionary alternative to the united front strategy first advanced by the Comintern and later accepted by Gramsci and the PCI? Such inquiries obviously led toward a re-examination and re-evaluation of Bordiga, who had represented the alternative to Gramsci in the twenties and whose political positions were in some ways analogous to those held by the New Leftists in the sixties.

Luigi Cortesi's essays on the Italian Socialist Party, 1892–1921 (*Il socialismo italiano tra riforme e rivoluzione* [Bari: Laterza, 1969]) represented the first effort to portray Bordiga in a new, and more favourable, light. (The relevant essays on the sources of the socialist schism and the origins of the PCd'I were later republished in 1972 in an amplified edition.) [54]

With Stefano Merli, Cortesi had been a co-editor of the reputable

[53] See Valdo Spini, " The New Left in Italy," *Journal of Contemporary History* (Jan.–Apr. 1972).

[54] Luigi Cortesi, *Le origini del Partito comunista italiano* (Bari: Laterza, 1972).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

left-wing review, *Rivista storica del socialismo.* From the moment of its inception in 1958, the *Rivista storica del socialismo* had played an important role in the demythologization of Gramsci. By 1967, however, Cortesi had concluded that one could not use a " Leninist " Gramsci to condemn a " revisonist " Togliatti or a reformist Giorgio Amendola, for whatever distortions the latter had made of Gramsci's thought there was, after all, a reformist coloration to Gramsci's theory-praxis. In other words, not just Togliatti's or Amendola's but Gramsci's own Leninist credentials were of doubtful orthodoxy.[55]

In urging historians to re-examine the Party's history " scientifically " subjecting *all* personalities to scrutiny, Cortesi seemed to be certain that by removing the last bits of hagiography surrounding Gramsci and the Party's early history leftists would be able to break once and for all the PCI's " syncretism of the ' Italian road ideology ' and Leninism." [56] Cortesi's own contribution to the historical debate was the aforementioned study on the origins of the Italian Communist Party.

By the time Cortesi's essays appeared in 1969, he had left the PCI and joined one of the splinter " Marxist-Leninist " groups. In the essays, he showed how Bordiga, rather than Gramsci, had been instrumental in the development of a left-wing revolutionary theory-praxis between 1912–21 which challenged the older " maximalist " conceptions. Moreover, he effectively argued that, despite Lenin's critique of *Il Soviet* and praise of *Ordine Nuovo* in *' Left-Wing ' Communism,* there were more parallels between Lenin and Bordiga (particularly with regard to his conception of the Party) than between Lenin and Gramsci. Lenin, quite simply, was misinformed about the Italian political scene. Even Bordiga's abstentionism, he suggested, had had more of an " instrumental " than theoretical character, its aim being the elimination of social-democratic influence. Indeed, Gramsci's *ordinovisti* were closer to the conciliarists Lenin had condemned than Bordiga's *Il Soviet* group.[57]

Although Cortesi tainted the " Leninist " image of the PCI's hero and documented in careful detail the role Bordiga had played in the schism of the PSI and creation of the new Party, he did not attempt to raise Bordiga to the status of a new hero, because perhaps Lenin served that function for him. Nonetheless, by breaking the " syncretism " of Lenin and Gramsci, Cortesi had gone far in restoring the historical image of Amadeo Bordiga.

Two years after the publication of Cortesi's essays the first biography of Amadeo Bordiga, written by a young New Leftist Andreina De Clementi, was published. Obviously a member of one of the more

[55] Luigi Cortesi, " Un convegno su Gramsci," *Rivista Storica del Socialismo* (Jan.–Apr. 1967).
[56] Ibid.
[57] Cortesi, *Il Socialismo italiano tra riforme e rivoluzione*, pp. 611–958 and Cortesi, *Le origini del Partito comunista italiano*, passim.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

eclectic New Left groups, De Clementi set about proving the original, rather than Leninist, character of Bordiga's thought. Indeed, she saw Bordiga's value as a subject of historical study in the fact that he had attempted to develop a revolutionary theory-praxis adapted to conditions in the West. The elimination of left-wing critics like Bordiga from the Comintern, she suggested, signified the " immediate identification of Marxism with Leninism, the imposition of the Russian model on all European models, and the codification of its orthodoxy on all parties." [58]

In her biography De Clementi focused on the crucial period between 1922 and 1925 when Bordiga came into conflict with the Comintern (and eventually Gramsci) over such issues as the bureaucratization of the International and the inauguration of the tactics of the united front. Dismissing Gramsci's theoretical analysis of fascism as one informed by social-democratic principles, and his tactical suggestions as revisionist, she praised Bordiga for his suggestive comments that another way (a revolutionary avenue) might have been developed to meet the fascist threat. Yet, De Clementi also agreed with earlier judgments that Bordiga's conception of fascism was " oversimplified." The difference was that unlike Spriano she claimed that Bordiga's analysis of fascism was superior to Gramsci's by reason of its revolutionary tone!

Though De Clementi concluded that contemporary leftists might have difficulty if they looked to Bordiga for a reliable guide to contemporary political action, she nonetheless argued that he had made an " autonomous " contribution to revolutionary theoreticians of the working class movement. First, she argued, Bordiga was the only Italian leader never to lose sight of the vast assimilative powers of Western *bourgeois* society. His abstentionist platform, for example, was founded on the fear that in the West where parliamentary institutions were more democratic than in the autocratic East the ballot-box could delude the working class into believing that revolution was attainable through democratic means. And, therefore, he tried (though unsuccessfully) to develop a revolutionary *praxis* suitable for conditions in the democratic societies of Western Europe.

Secondly, De Clementi states that Bordiga was the " only figure " in the International to " struggle to the end " with " great consistency " against the Comintern's abandonment of its international revolutionary principles and the substitution of nationalistic and revisionist ones. Indeed, she effectively argued, Bordiga's condemnation of the bureaucratization of the Comintern was more thorough-going than Trotsky's.[59]

Thus with De Clementi's biography Amadeo Bordiga was rescued from historical oblivion. After more than 30 years historical judgments on the Neapolitan communist had come full circle. And, perhaps, the

[58] De Clementi, *Amadeo Bordiga* (Milan: Einaudi, 1971).
[59] Ibid. p. 236.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New Left historians, who had done so much to de-mystify Gramsci, were on the verge of developing their own hagiography!

Historical scholarship on Amadeo Bordiga over the past 30 years emphasizes once again the old dictum that each generation reinterprets its past in the light of the present. One can only hope that through the mystification of politics, one can yet discern the outline of a new and more objective body of historical literature on the early history of the Italian Communist Party. If so, then the "rediscovery" of Amadeo Bordiga—whatever political purposes it may have served—will have been an important part of that process.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Unexpected Revolutionary: Lukács's Road to Marx

Lee Congdon

GEORG LUKÁCS joined the Hungarian Communist Party one month after it was organized in November 1918, and although he quickly became Europe's premier Marxist theorist,[1] his sudden, stunning conversion to revolutionary thinking and activism[2] has never been adequately explained.[3] Yet that conversion is crucial to an understanding of one of the most extraordinary intellectual and spiritual odysseys of our age. That Lukács did not carelessly commit himself to the cause of apocalyptic revolution is evidenced by the fact that in the course of a long life, he sacrificed everything that he held most dear on the altar of communism. What reasons, one asks, did Lukács have for joining the Party? He had never identified himself with any political movement or party prior to 1918; indeed, his early writings were indifferent to the political concerns that have occupied so many twentieth-century intellectuals.

The autobiographical essays that Lukács wrote in advanced years[4] are brief and on the critical months of late 1918, particularly vague. The portrait of the young Lukács that emerges from those self-analyses is that of a confused intellectual experimenting with ideas derived from widely differing sources before being overwhelmed by the dialectical thought of Hegel and Marx. According to Lukács and most Lukács students, the philosopher's road to Marx was marked by three major

[1] I refer, of course, to the philosophical quality of Lukács's work; Lenin's writings were certainly more influential.

[2] More than 50 years later, Arnold Hauser could still recall how completely unexpected Lukács's decision was to those of his friends who remained uncommitted to the Communist Party. Interview with Professor Hauser in London 28 Aug. 1971.

[3] In his famous series of articles on the young Lukács, the late Professor Morris Watnick wrote: " Just why Lukács' Marxism should have induced him to join the newly organized Hungarian Communist Party is not clear . . ." " Georg Lukács: An Intellectual Biography, Part II. Sensibility and Alienation," *Soviet Survey*, No. 24 (1958), p. 51. The late George Lichtheim could say only that " Lukács, after initial hesitations, joined the Party." *Lukács* (London: Fontana/Collins, 1970), p. 45. In a long essay entitled " Culture and Revolution: Lukács in the Hungarian Revolutions of 1918–19," *Telos* No. 10 (1971), pp. 35–92, Professor David Kettler argues, mistakenly as we shall see, that Lukács was a cultural revolutionary. Paul Breines, " Lukács, Revolution and Marxism, 1885–1918: Notes on Lukács' ' Road to Marx '," *The Philosophical Forum*, Vol. III, Nos. 3–4 (1972), pp. 401–21, is of little value. In Hungarian, there is a brief but suggestive essay by Zoltán Kenyeres: " Lukács György és a magyar kultúra," *Kritika*, Vol. VIII, No. 12 (1970), pp. 1–10. Kenyeres exaggerates, however, the young Lukács's " anti-capitalism."

[4] See in particular, " Mein Weg zu Marx," in *Georg Lukács: Zum Siebzigsten Geburtstag* (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1955); and the introductions to *Magyar irodalom—Magyar kultúra*, ed. by Ferenc Fehér and Zoltán Kenyeres (Budapest: Gondolat Kiadó, 1970) and *Utam Marxhoz*, Vol. I, ed. by György Márkus (Budapest: Magvető Könyvkiadó, 1971).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

signposts: Kant–Hegel–Marx.[5] If one accepts this claim, much of Lukács's early work seems incomprehensible, for the signposts there should read: Dostoevski–Kierkegaard–Marx. Although Lukács scholars have acknowledged the philosopher's fascination with Dostoevski and Kierkegaard (both of whom are anathema to Marxist-Leninists), they have mistakenly assumed that the writings of the profound Russian and the melancholy Dane led Lukács to detour momentarily from the appointed path.[6] Rather, it was precisely those writings that pointed the way through the dark forest of indecision to the Marxist clearing.

LUKÁCS was born to a Jewish family in Budapest on 13 April 1885. His father was the director of the Hungarian General Credit Bank and had received the hereditary title " von Lukács " in recognition of his services to the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The elder Lukács's position brought young György [7] into contact with the world of Budapest's patrician class, but it was not a world calculated to inspire affection in a sensitive intellectual and Lukács later remembered that " very early, I was ruled by feelings of strong opposition against official Hungary in its entirety." [8]

Although his father wanted him to prepare for a career in banking, Lukács dedicated himself to the study of literature. By the time he was in his mid-teens he had mastered German and English [9] and was well acquainted with the major European writers. His parents enrolled him at the highly-regarded Evangelical Gymnasium, but the school's conservative atmosphere served only to intensify Lukács's efforts to free himself from the intellectual world of *fin de siècle* Hungary.[10] Indeed, it was at the Gymnasium that he became fully aware of the extent to which the ruling classes (the magnates and the gentry) had enlisted Hungarian literature, music, and art in the service of a semi-official ideology, the twin pillars of which were Christianity and Magyar nationalism. Most teachers praised piety and patriotism more than creativity and independent thought.

But if Lukács rejected the ideological blend of Christianity and Magyar nationalism taught in Hungarian schools, he also opposed the positivism and impressionism fashionable among members of Hungary's emerging " counter-culture," [11] because he denied the common

[5] See for example, Lucien Goldmann, " The Early Writings of Georg Lukács," *Tri-Quarterly*, No. 9 (1967), p. 180.

[6] Andrew Arato, in a short article entitled " Lukács' Path to Marxism (1910–1923)," *Telos*, No. 7 (1971), pp. 128–36, seems to take seriously the influence of Dostoevski, but his discussion of that influence is limited to one paragraph.

[7] " Georg " is the German form of the Hungarian " György."

[8] Lukács, *Magyar irodalom—Magyar kultúra*, p. 6.

[9] Marcell Benedek, *Naplómat olvasom* (Budapest: Szépirodalmi Könyvkiadó, 1965), p. 76.

[10] Lukács, *Magyar irodalom—Magyar kultúra*, p. 6.

[11] By " counter-culture," I do not mean an anarchistic lifestyle; the so-called American counter-culture is essentially an *anti-cultural* movement. The Hungarian counter-culture

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

assumption of those movements that there existed no metaphysical essence, no ultimate reality. Although he believed that God was dead, he saw no reason to throw metaphysics on Christianity's funeral pyre. In an essay on Gerhart Hauptmann's drama, for example, Lukács suggested that the German writer's achievement was a function of his unwillingness to accept "emptiness" as a permanent metaphysical condition.

> The question is: What is Hauptmann like? Youthful enlightenment and scientific thinking followed childhood belief and emptiness followed science. When, however, the common man reaches emptiness, he reclines on the sofa and inhales the empty atmosphere. When Hauptmann reached emptiness, he searched; he did not think it possible that there was nothing.[12]

The necessity of searching for reality beyond apparent emptiness was a major theme of Lukács's writings before 1910–11. Indeed, the young Lukács was convinced that the abandonment of metaphysical inquiry had created an intellectual and spiritual crisis in Hungary and Europe generally. Hence, it is not surprising that, despite its opposition to Hungary's official ideology, he could not join the positivist circle around Oszkár Jászi and the sociological journal *Huszadik Század*.[13]

Lukács relationship with the *Nyugat* circle was even more distant and here again it was a question of conflicting world views. "*Nyugat's* positivism," he wrote in 1967, "often passed over into subjective impressionism, now under the influence of French criticism, now under that of the German Alfred Kerr. My work of that time stood in sharp opposition to all of these tendencies."[14] According to Lukács, the journal's editor, Ignotus, wished to secure a place for *Nyugat* alongside official Hungarian literature, rather than in opposition to it.[15]

For the young Lukács, then, Hungary's national regeneration[16] was a question of *Weltanschauung*, rather than of politics and society.

centred around two major forums: the sociological journal *Huszadik Század (Twentieth Century)* edited by Oszkár Jászi, and the literary journal *Nyugat (West)*, edited by Ignotus. It should be noted that Lukács himself was a member of the counter-culture and did respect those cultural rebels who eschewed positivism and impressionism; one might mention in this regard, Béla Bartók, Zoltán Kodály, Arnold Hauser, Karl Mannheim, the expressionist artists known as "The Eight," and especially the great poet Endre Ady. The only book to treat the counter-culture as a whole is Zoltán Horváth, *Magyar századforduló: A második reformnemzedék története (1896–1914)* (Budapest: Gondolat, 1961). For a slightly abridged German translation of this work, see *Die Jahrhundertwende in Ungarn: Geschichte der zweiten Reformgeneration (1896–1914)*, transl. by Géza Engl. (Neuwied am Rhein: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag GmbH, 1966).

12 György Lukács, "Az új Hauptmann," *Jövendö*, 23 Aug. 1903, p. 32.

13 Lukács, *Magyar irodalom—Magyar kultúra*, p. 11.

14 György Lukács, *Muvészet és társadalom*, ed. by Ferenc Fehér (Budapest: Gondolat Kiadó, 1968), p. 5.

15 Lukács, *Magyar irodalom—Magyar kultúra*, p. 12.

16 The counter-culture was a manifestation of the Hungarian intelligentsia's deeper desire for Hungary's national regeneration. For an intellectual biography of the leading advocate of national regeneration, see my forthcoming article, "Endre Ady's Summons to National Regeneration in Hungary, 1900–1919," in the *Slavic Review*.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

His characterization of Hauptmann's attitude toward politics and social questions was descriptive of his own.

> And with what kind of eye does Hauptmann view politics and social questions? He once shook the tree of the already decayed society and showed its fruits, but he no longer does this. Whatever must occur, he now says, let it occur. It is interesting to view what occurs but not worthwhile to take part in it. The oppressed are worth no more than the oppressors.[17]

One of the principal reasons for the anti-metaphysical bias of the Hungarian intelligentsia, Lukács believed, was the exclusion of the most profound modern dramatists, Hauptmann included, from the repertoires of Budapest's theatres. The National Theatre preferred popular plays while the Comedy Theatre was so enamoured of naturalism that every play was tailored to that genre's specifications. Lukács deplored this superficiality and in 1903 he suggested to his friend Marcell Benedek that they create a rebel theatre that would perform the works of such dramatists as Hauptmann, Ibsen, Strindberg, and Hebbel.[18]

At this time, Lukács was enrolled in Budapest University's Faculty of Liberal Arts (where he studied under Hungary's official literary spokesman Zsolt Beöthy) and he invited interested teachers and students to a meeting organized to discuss the possibility of turning the dream of a new theatre into reality. The plan captured the imagination of many of Lukács's most able fellow students, among them Bálint Hóman (later a distinguished historian) and Zoltán Kodály, and on 20 April 1904, these young men founded the "Thália Society." László Bánóczi, a lawyer friend of Lukács's became the Society's president and he, Benedek, and Lukács formed the "art committee."[19]

The aim of the Thália Society, according to its by-laws, was "the presentation of those dramatic or other performable works of art, old and new, which are not included in the repertoire of Budapest's theatres, but which nevertheless possess great artistic or cultural value and interest."[20] It was an ambitious programme for three young and inexperienced men and, as Lukács acknowledged 50 years later, it would have remained a dream had they not been able to enlist the aid of Sándor Hevesi, the assistant director of the National Theatre.[21] Hevesi became Thália's artistic director and at the organizational meeting he promised that the theatre would bring to the stage those dramas which were modern in the loftiest sense of the word: those which evidenced artistic truth.[22]

On opening night, 25 November 1904, Thália presented plays by

[17] Lukács, "Az új Hauptmann," p. 32.
[18] Marcell Benedek, "A harmincéves Thália," *Századunk*, Vol. IX (1934), p. 173.
[19] Benedek, *Naplómat olvasom*, p. 126.
[20] Cited in Ferenc Katona and Tibor Dénes, *A Thália története (1904–1908)* (Budapest: Művelt Nép Könyvkiadó, 1954), p. 5.
[21] Lukács, *Magyar irodalom—Magyar kultúra*, p. 574.
[22] Cited in Katona and Dénes, *A Thália története*, p. 17.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Goethe, Edward Brandes, and Paul Mongré. The second programme offered Strindberg's *Father* and Hebbel's *Mary Magdalene*.[23] The initial success of these performances led to Thália's most troublesome problem: its failure to find a permanent home. The established theatres were understandably reluctant to offer their stages and when suitable accommodations were found, the police often revoked the original permit.

Despite flagrant official harassment, Thália persevered, inaugurating special performances for working-class audiences in 1906. As alarm spread among official circles, more determined attempts were made to force the rebel theatre to close. Each time new accommodations were found, the police refused to issue a permit, usually because of "non-compliance with fire-prevention regulations."[24] Weary, beaten, and without money, Thália gave its final performance on 28 December 1908. It had given 142 performances (35 works by 27 authors) during the four years of its existence.[25]

THÁLIA'S troubles and the sterile intellectual atmosphere of Budapest University encouraged Lukács to leave Hungary and continue his studies in Germany. His selection of Germany over other European countries certainly was not arbitrary; since the latter part of the eighteenth century, Germany's intellectual hegemony in Europe had not been seriously challenged and matriculation at a German university had come to be regarded as the mark of an educated man. Moreover, Hungary had always been a cultural satellite of German Austria and German was the second language of the Hungarian intelligentsia. Proximity and tradition, of course, were not the only considerations that prompted Lukács's decision; he also felt it important to seek serious instruction in metaphysics.

Lukács therefore went to the University of Berlin in 1906 and began a course of study with the philosopher-sociologist Georg Simmel. Simmel was a leader of the anti-positivistic branch of Neo-Kantianism first associated with Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert and was generally regarded as a representative of *Lebensphilosophie,* a philosophical tendency that denied the primacy of epistemology and rejected positivism on the ground that "life" was prior to, and hence more significant than, knowledge.

This was the intellectual movement that attracted Lukács and under Simmel's tutorage he worked out a "metaphysics of tragedy."[26] Lukács, of course, was already a metaphysician when he went to Germany, but it was Simmel who helped him to develop his inchoate sense of tragedy. As a recent student of twentieth-century German

[23] Ibid. pp. 19, 42.
[24] Benedek, "A harmincéves Thália," p. 175.
[25] Katona and Dénes, *A Thália története*, p. 155.
[26] See Georg von Lukács, "Metaphysik der Tragödie: Paul Ernst," in *Die Seele und die Formen/Essays* (Berlin: Egon Fleischel & Co., 1911), pp. 325–73.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sociology has demonstrated, Simmel's work (as well as the work of Ernst Troeltsch, Max Weber, and Max Scheler) was dominated by a "tragic consciousness" which "proceeds from the all-governing conviction that in the end an unforeseen 'fate' and mysteriously-operating 'powers' determine social and historical events." [27]

The starting point of Lukács's formulation of a metaphysics of tragedy was his conviction that the nineteenth century's retreat from absolutes in the wake of the frontal assault on Christianity had produced an anti-metaphysical *Weltanschauung* that was alien to the human spirit. "That era in which we came of age—and the entire nineteenth century—did not believe in any permanence." Everything had been reduced to ephemeral "moods" that succeeded each other unceasingly and without value distinctions. The highest premium was placed on the "new" and the "interesting." [28]

The primary objects of Lukács's attack on the enemies of metaphysics were impressionism and naturalism, the fashionable cultural movements of *fin de siècle* Europe. He did not regard them simply as cultural aberrations, but as expressions of the crisis of the European mind and spirit occasioned by the loss of all certainties. "If one wishes to criticize the present," he wrote in 1910, "one must criticize the aesthetician." [29] Aestheticians were responsible for a culture whose only ambition was the creation of certain "moods." It was a culture for which peripheral concerns had become central; what had once been merely symbolic had now become the only "reality." According to this view, there was nothing more essential, more real, behind appearance; there was only a meaningless series of sensations and occurrences. Moreover, and most significantly:

> Culture once possessed a quality that transcended the merely individual (because culture is the common treasure of men); now there is nothing that can transcend the momentary realities of individual men. There were once relationships between people; now there is complete loneliness, the complete absence of relationships.[30]

If universals were abandoned, Lukács argued, the artist was reduced to expressing those dimensions of his existence which were unique and private. But those dimensions were uncommunicable and hence could not contribute anything to culture ("the common treasure of men"). Ultimately, the artist concentrated only on technique and "good

[27] Kurt Lenk, "Das Tragische Bewusstsein in der Deutschen Sociologie," *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, Vol. XVI, No. 2 (1964), p. 260. See especially, Georg Simmel, "On the Concept and the Tragedy of Culture," in *The Conflict in Modern Culture and Other Essays*, transl. by K. Peter Etzkorn (New York: Teachers College Press, 1968), pp. 27–46.

[28] György Lukács, "Az utak elváltak," in *Magyar irodalom—Magyar kultúra*, pp. 63–64. In this article, Lukács praised the artists known as "The Eight" for attempting to convey the "essence of things" in their paintings.

[29] György Lukács, *Esztétikai kultura: Tanulmányok* (Budapest: Athenaeum Irod. és Nyomd. Részvényt. Kiadása, 1913), p. 12.

[30] Ibid. p. 15.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

writing," the essence of *"l'art pour l'art."* Lukács maintained that wherever this "aesthetic culture" was triumphant, there was "no architecture, no tragedy, no philosophy, no monumental painting, no authentic epic." [31] Writers wrote only for other writers and painters painted only for other painters; culture became esoteric and trivial.

Lukács was certain that the chaos and superficiality of European culture mirrored the chaos and superficiality of the European soul. Culture and the soul could be redeemed only if they were given form; form brought unity out of chaos and, by eliminating the external, made possible a concentration on essences. Indeed, authentic culture, culture given form, could proceed only from a formed soul. The reality and experiences of the soul's essence must be brought out of chaos and articulated more clearly. Much as a sculptor chips away the marble, the soul must cast away from itself everything not truly its own.[32]

To give "form" to the soul, according to Lukács, was to delineate its limits; it was to deny that its possibilities were infinite. Without the awareness of limits imparted by form, the soul could not awaken to self-consciousness. The soul "is, because it is limited; is only, because and in so far as it is limited." [33] The argument is that if the soul were immortal, it could never be conscious of its existence; that consciousness depended on an awareness of the possibility of non-existence. An awareness of death, then, was necessary if the soul's essence was to be exposed. But if the soul was limited most obviously by its mortality, it was also formed by its quotidian fate. "The problem of fate," Lukács maintained, "determines at all times the problem of form." [34]

Forms were for Lukács fateful and *necessary;* they were the borders of the soul's existence which could be neither destroyed nor transcended. They were the dictates of the unknown powers that determine our destiny and whose decisions are not subject to appeal. Human existence was tragic in essence and human wisdom resided in the recognition of necessity and the willing of one's fate.

> The fateful moment for the critic [and for every thoughtful and sensitive human being] is therefore that in which things become forms; the moment when all emotions and events which were on this side or beyond the form, receive a form, merge and compress themselves into form. It is the mystical moment of the union of outer and inner, of the soul and the form.[35]

Lukács, like Simmel, had awakened to "tragic consciousness."

Lukács's tragic view of life reinforced his early interest in drama, for Greek drama had been the greatest expression of the ancient spirit of tragedy. "The drama," he wrote in his massive study of modern drama, "always reaches its apogee in tragedy; indeed perfect drama

[31] Ibid. p. 18.
[32] Ibid. pp. 28–29.
[33] Lukács, *Die Seele und die Formen*, p. 346
[34] Ibid. p. 16
[35] Ibid. pp. 17–18.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cannot be other than tragedy." [36] Therefore every great dramatist must be a tragic dramatist.

> He seeks ever more deeply the reasons for conflicts until he reaches those few great questions for which there are no answers, those conflicts for which there are no solutions; such conflicts are always between the individual and those unknown powers which we can call fate, destiny, universal order, or whatever deity, but whose real nature we never know.[37]

Lukács therefore believed that enthusiasm for the social drama was misguided. Such " drama " could not be dramatic in any authentic sense because it was open-ended and proceeded from assumptions antithetical to tragedy: man's free will and the chance occurrence of events. Social drama articulated moral or political principles which, though perhaps general in nature, were yet regarded as ultimately realizable. No possibility was ever ruled out. But " if the conflict is completely irresolvable (tragedy), ' messages ' lose all significance. . . ." [38] Not surprisingly, Lukács's early literary idols included two great masters of the tragic drama: Hebbel and Ibsen.

Friedrich Hebbel (1813–63) is scarcely known in the English-speaking world and no longer occupies a very prominent place in German culture, but Lukács admired him as the founder of the modern tragic drama. Great tragic drama, in Lukács's view, could be written only by those who possessed a tragic *Weltanschauung,* because drama and *Weltanschauung* were inextricably related. In Hebbel's consciousness the tragic sense of life was *a priori*; he was a tragic poet before he ever conceived the idea of writing a drama.[39]

Hebbel recognized, according to Lukács, that the tragic drama alone could " mirror " life because, like life itself, tragedy was governed by destiny. The tragic drama was for him the Ideal of life in the Platonic sense of its perfect form.

> That is why [Hebbel] hates with such fanatical strength everything in life that is not dramatic, everything that is accidental, everything that is only an isolated occurrence and not a part of the great dance performed to the music of necessity.[40]

Hebbel's characters bear witness to the futility of struggling against destiny; they deny by their ultimate defeat that man is " the captain of his soul and the master of his fate." Lukács wrote approvingly of Hebbel's tragic world: " If exorable necessity rules in this world; no one controls his own fate, everyone does that which he must do; external and internal powers that are invincible and irresistible drive human

[36] György Lukács, *A modern dráma fejlödésének története*, Vol. I (Budapest: Franklin-Társulat, 1911), p. 19.
[37] György Lukács, " Gondolatok Ibsen Henrikről," *Huszadik Század*, Vol. XIV (July–Dec. 1906), pp. 133–34.
[38] Lukács, *A modern dráma*, Vol. I, p. 49.
[39] Ibid. pp. 351, 355.
[40] Ibid. pp. 359–60.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

beings." [41] The actions of Hebbel's characters are so completely determined that they cannot be judged morally, for moral judgments presuppose man's ability to decide freely.

One of the most enthusiastically received of Thália's presentations was Hebbel's *Mary Magdalene* (1844), a tragic story of a young woman's unsuccessful attempt to escape the conventions of middle-class morality. The play gives almost perfect expression to Hebbel's (and Lukács's) metaphysical world view:

> Before Hebbel, middle-class tragedies struggled against social institutions and prejudices which were illegitimate; indeed the aim of these tragedies was to promote the liquidation of outmoded institutions and prejudices. In Hebbel's plays too prejudices bring about catastrophe, but the question of their legitimacy is never raised. For Hebbel, they are mental-spiritual realities. There exist certain forces over the spirit of men and these forces destroy those who, unable to submit themselves to the inevitable, dare to offer resistance.[42]

If Hebbel was the father of modern tragedy, Ibsen was, in Lukács's view, its genius. Ibsen's spiritual journey, Lukács contended, had been a microcosm of the odyssey of modern man. He began as a Romantic, was for a time an anarchist and a revolutionary, and ended as a tragic poet. While most modern men failed to complete this journey (they stopped at one of the intermediate stations), " the most singular men reach the last station, that of resigned and heroic insight into the tragic necessity of the laws of life." [43] This insight, according to Lukács, was the ground for Ibsen's abandonment of the revolutionary drama (directed against the middle-class world he hated). Beginning with *Emperor and Galilean* (1873), Ibsen ceased to agitate against the world as it was. " Then all the Brands of the world lost their warrant; their struggle has always been and will always be hopeless." [44]

Lukács described Ibsen's mature work as the apogee of the " analytic " drama. In this drama, all the important events of the plot have already taken place before the curtain is raised and cannot be altered; in the " synthetic " drama, every significant event takes place on stage. But Lukács contended that there was a still more fundamental difference: " The question of the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic drama is closely related to the question of whether or not the will is free." [45] Lukács, of course, championed the " analytic," or tragic drama.

> It develops directly out of the tragedy of fate, where blind, arbitrary or malevolent powers rule over impotent men. Under the influence of later realistic tendencies, the role of fate grows ever

[41] Ibid. pp. 365–66.
[42] Ibid. p. 369.
[43] Ibid. p. 434.
[44] Ibid. p. 448.
[45] Lukács, " Gondolatok Ibsen Henrikről," p. 131–32.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

more refined; social relationships, milieu, and universal order are the powers against which the individual struggles in vain.[46]

Without doubt, the young Lukács was a fatalist in the profound Greek sense of that word. According to his " metaphysics of tragedy," all attempts to alter destiny's implacable commands were futile. To be sure, there was a certain Promethean heroism in defying the gods, but rebellion was doomed to failure. The idea that human existence could be redirected by the free will of man had only encouraged men to think that life, as well as art, offered infinite possibilities. Lukács believed such an anti-tragic view to be a childish illusion.

It might seem that this tragic determinism would have posed a dilemma for Lukács. He wished to see Hungary transformed, yet the intensity of his convictions, reinforced by the memory of Thália's failure, led him to abandon all hope that his homeland might be remade in the image projected by such ardent reformers as Oszkár Jászi. It must be remembered, however, that Lukács placed great emphasis on the importance of *Weltanschauung*. For him, Hebbel's greatness resided in the tragic awareness that was an *a priori* condition of his consciousness and that made his drama a mirror of human life. Those world views that were based on the idea of human freedom had given currency to an art divorced from the authentic (tragic) character of life and to lives unconscious of and hence insensitive to their inescapable destiny. Ultimate wisdom and understanding consisted of the recognition of limits. Lukács therefore regarded it as his mission to awaken his countrymen to tragic consciousness, to a heroic recognition of their destiny. Such an awakening, he believed, would contribute more to the making of a new Hungary than any plan for social and political reform.

Initially a lonely crusader, Lukács soon found an intellectual brother in Béla Balázs.[47] Lukács first met Balázs (1884–1949) when both were actively engaged in the Thália Theatre experiment,[48] but it was not until the appearance of Balázs's poetry in the famous *Holnap (" Tomorrow ")* anthologies [49] that Lukács recognized him as a potential ally.[50] Balázs shared not only Lukács's distaste for *Nyugat* and *Huszadik Század* (he contributed to both journals, but always maintained a critical distance), but also his German training and commitment to metaphysical thinking and tragic drama. As Balázs wrote in his

[46] Ibid. p. 133.

[47] For the evolution of Balázs's thought, see my article, " The Making of a Hungarian Revolutionary: The Unpublished Diary of Béla Balázs," *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (1973), pp. 57–74.

[48] Balázs appeared in a number of Thália's presentations.

[49] The *Holnap* poetry anthologies were published by the Holnap Literary Society in 1908. As the title suggests, the poets included in the collections were regarded as heralds of a new literature.

[50] Lukács, *Magyar irodalom—Magyar kultúra*, p. 8. Lukács later observed that even in his verses, Balázs was a tragic dramatist. His verses were abbreviated dramas. *Magyar irodalom—Magyar kultúra*, p. 78.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

diary [51] on 23 September 1905: "*In praise of the Greeks.* If tragedy continues to develop as it did in the last century and within myself, then we will again arrive at fate-tragedy." [52] The two men soon formed their own "field of force" [53] in Hungarian life.

The most immediate task for the new alliance was to find an appropriate forum. Since there was no counter-cultural journal devoted to serious philosophical problems, Lukács, Balázs, and Lajos Fülep (a philosopher of art who also worked in the German intellectual tradition) began a new publication in 1911. *Szellem* ("*Spirit*" or "*Mind*") was a journal of metaphysics, ethics, the philosophy of religion, and aesthetics. The first number took as its motto a quotation from Kant's *Prolegomena* which emphasized man's inability to abandon metaphysical speculation:

> Dass der Geist des Menschen metaphysische Untersuchungen einmal gänzlich aufgeben werde, ist ebensowenig zu erwarten, als dass wir, um nicht immer unreine Luft zu schöpfen, das Atemholen einmal lieber ganz und gar einstellen würden.[54]

In this way, *Szellem* served notice that it stood in opposition to the positivism and impressionism that both Lukács and Balázs hated. The prevalence of anti-metaphysical thought in Hungary, however, prevented *Szellem* from winning a wide readership and the journal died in the year of its birth.

THE years 1910–12 constituted a critical period in Lukács's intellectual biography. At the beginning of the period he was still devoting his energies to working out the "metaphysics of tragedy," but by 1912 ethical problems and questions claimed the greatest share of his attention. Against his own injunctions, he now challenged fate and began to argue that it was at least theoretically possible for man to enter the realm of freedom. Lukács now described forms as *unnecessary* obstacles to meaningful relationships between human beings. This complete about-face can only be understood as Lukács's response to an experience so agonizingly personal that he never discussed it in his autobiographical writings.

The story surrounding the suicide of Irma Seidler is not likely ever to be told in full, nor need it be; its historical significance lies in its dramatic impact on Lukács and Béla Balázs.[55] The two men apparently

[51] Béla Balázs, "Naplói, 1899–1922," Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Könyvtára: Kézirattár. (Cited hereafter as MTAK: K.) Ms 5023/1–21. A partial transcription of the diary (5 Jan. 1899–16 Feb. 1909) is also available: Ms 5024/3.

[52] Balázs, "Naplói," MTAK: K. Ms 5024/3, s. IX, p. 3. 23 Sept. 1905.

[53] This term was first used to describe the Lukács–Balázs alliance by Ferenc Fehér, "Balázs Béla és Lukács György szövetsége a forradalomig," *Irodalomtörténet*, Vol. I, No. 2 (N.S.; 1969), pp. 317–46; Vol. I, No. 3 (N.S.; 1969), pp. 531–60. This is an excellent study by one of Lukács's students; it does not, however, make use of the Balázs diary.

[54] *Szellem*, Vol. I, No. 1 (1911).

[55] I am indebted to Mr Ferenc Fehér for calling my attention to this story.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

met her in Germany and she made a lasting impression on both of them. Her relationship to Lukács seems to have been platonic, but it was the termination of a love affair with Balázs that led directly to her suicide in 1910.[56] Balázs confessed to his diary that the death of the young girl quickened his sense of moral responsibility:

> This is my first sin, in the most weighty sense of the word. Strange that before this I felt my life and heart to be pure. . . . Since Irma's death religious questions have come to me as well as the compelling thirst to meet my God.[57]

The effect of the tragedy on Lukács was even more profound. It awakened in him a sensitivity to ethical problems that was to leave its mark on everything he wrote in the long productive years of life that remained to him. This new moral awareness formed the background to the short story entitled *On the Poverty of the Spirit* that Lukács published in German and in Hungarian.[58] This story is an indispensable introduction to all of Lukács's subsequent work, pre-Marxist and Marxist; it reflected the greatest turning-point in his life. Though of course he did not identify himself or Irma Seidler by name,[59] the story described Lukács's spiritual and intellectual crisis in the wake of the suicide; the central argument advanced was that all formal ethics were lifeless and inhuman.

In the story, a philosopher condemns himself to death by his own hand because he had been unable to prevent the suicide of a close friend. He believes that his actions had been governed by the barren ethics of "relationships between people," rather than by that unconditional identification with another that he calls "goodness."[60]

This distinction between a formal and a more immediate ethic runs through all of Lukács's later work. It is based on a distinction that was a commonplace in German intellectual life and that found definitive expression in Tönnies's *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft,* a work with which Lukács was well acquainted.[61] Lukács identified the ethic of "relationships between people" with "society," understood as a formal organization of human life. He believed that societal forms, like cultural forms, inevitably become divorced from the human purposes that originally provided their *raison d'être.* Men come to serve these forms rather than vice versa and are judged morally in terms of their performance or non-performance of formal ("social") responsibilities. The lives of most people, the philosopher maintained, were only "social."

56 Balázs, "Naplói," MTAK: K. Ms 5023/18, pp. 56–57. July 1913.
57 Ibid. p. 12. Sept. 1911.
58 Georg Lukács, "Von der Armut am Geiste. Ein Gespräch und ein Brief," *Neue Blätter*, Vol. II, Nos. 5–6 (1912), pp. 67–92. György Lukács, "A lelki szegénységről (egy levél és egy párbeszéd)," *Szellem,* Vol. I, No. 2 (1911), pp. 202–14. There is now an English translation: "On Poverty of Spirit: A Conversation and a Letter," transl. by John T. Sanders, *The Philosophical Forum,* Vol. III, Nos. 3–4 (1972), pp. 371–85.
59 Lukács did dedicate *Die Seele und die Formen* to her memory.
60 Lukács, "A lelki szegénységről," p. 205.
61 Lukács, *Muvészet és társadalom,* p. 7.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> These people, you see, can do with duties and their fulfilment. Indeed, for them the fulfilment of duty is the only way in which their lives can be raised to a higher level. This is so because every ethic is formal, the postulate of duty or of form—and the more perfect the form, the more it lives its own life, the further removed it is from every immediacy. Form is that kind of bridge that dissociates; a bridge on which we come and go and always return to ourselves without ever meeting one another.[62]

Lukács's "goodness" (unconditional identification with another) was possible only in a "community," understood as an integral, non-formal association of human beings. "Goodness" was not strictly speaking an ethical category because, according to Lukács, ethics in the traditional sense were by their very nature foreign to men; they were among the powers of alienation. Rather, "goodness" was a meta-ethic that transcended all formal categories and social relationships in order to build a direct bridge from soul to soul; it alone could overcome man's alienation from his fellows.

Inspired by this story, Béla Balázs also explored the problem of human alienation in a play entitled *Dialogue on Dialogue* (1913). The central characters in the drama, Mihály and his wife Márta,[63] have become aware that they are unable to talk to each other in any meaningful sense. Stock phrases are exchanged and they greet each other with a kiss, but there is never any real contact. According to Mihály, this failure to establish dialogue constituted a fundamental human tragedy, for dialogue is the only meaningful historical event. "Dialogue is in the life of consciousness what coitus is in nature."[64]

In order to shorten the terrible distance that separated souls, linking bridges would have to be built. The realization of essential relationships between two souls would create a third, "invisible soul." In Balázs's view, Dostoevski first perceived these "mystically living relationships," thus setting himself apart from all other writers.[65] It was to the great Russian writer that we must turn, Balázs suggested, for instruction in true humanity. As we shall see, Balázs gained his reverence for Dostoevski from Lukács.

By 1911, then, Lukács had turned his attention to ethics and the problem of society *(Gesellschaft)*. He still could not, however, follow Jászi and his circle in their critique of existing social relationships and in their reform propaganda, because he was calling *society itself* into question. *Any* formal organization of human life prevented the emergence of a free "community" based on the meta-ethic of goodness. Social reform might well provide a structure more responsive to human needs, but those reforms would themselves require revision and men would never achieve complete freedom.

[62] Lukács, "A lelki szegénységről," p. 204.
[63] "Mihály" and "Márta" are in fact Balázs and his first wife, Edith Hajós. Balázs, "Naplói," MTAK: K. Ms 5023/18, pp. 36–37. June 1912.
[64] Béla Balázs, *Dialogus a dialogusról* (Budapest: Az Athenaeum R.T. Kiadása, 1913), p. 9.
[65] Ibid. pp. 41, 43.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Because of his new ethical awareness, Lukács now believed that art had a *moral* rather than *metaphysical* mission to fulfil; that of providing a vision of a new, " homogeneous world " (Lukács's term for *Gemeinschaft*) that could inspire the actualization of utopia.

> Gyuri's [Lukács's] new philosophy. Messianism. The homogeneous world as the redemptive goal. Art the Luciferean " better made." The vision of the world become homogeneous before the actual process of transformation. The immorality of art. Gyuri's big turn toward ethics. This will be the center of his life and work. . . . Gyuri discovered and acknowledges the *Jew* in himself.[66]

Art was " Luciferean " because it rebelled against the world God made and created a better world. The *Kunstwerk* was an anticipation and a microcosm of perfection: it was utopian in essence.[67] But Lukács maintained that only one writer had been truly equal to art's Luciferean mission; only Feodor Dostoevski could be regarded as the herald of a new moral universe.

Lukács's most profound experience between 1912 and 1919 was his encounter with the work of Dostoevski. In the writings of the Russian genius he believed he had caught sight of a world in which " community " was not a mere abstraction. Dostoevski's characters had been stripped of their social dress and presented in their naked humanity. They lived their lives in response to the deepest promptings of their souls (their essential selves). Moreover, their relationships to each other were no longer determined by their social station, class, or origin. Rather, " new, concrete relationships linking soul to soul come to the fore. The discovery of this new world is Dostoevski's great achievement." [68]

Lukács's claims for Dostoevski deserve careful attention, for they became the foundation for his subsequent revolutionary theory.

> Before Dostoevski every character of every poetic writer from Homer to Tolstoi, by way of Shakespeare and Goethe, appears in concrete social shackles, and these shackles remain constitutive even in the character's relationship to the absolute. The road leading to the absolute, the soul's complete self-realization, did not put an end to the outward social form in which the soul was incarnated. Lear enters the Pantheon of his eternity just as much a king as Don Quixote does a knight, and if Wilhelm Meister and Levin attain harmony with God and the world, the one is still an educated bourgeois and the other, a member of the

[66] Balázs, " Naplói," MTAK: K. Ms 5023/18, p. 54. July–Aug. 1912.

[67] Georg von Lukács, " Die Subjekt–Objekt–Beziehung in der Aesthetik," *Logos*, Vol. VII (1917–18), p. 23.

[68] Lukács, *Magyar irodalom—Magyar kultúra*, p. 115. In a letter to Paul Ernst, dated 4 May 1915, Lukács wrote: " The problem for us is to discover the road that leads from soul to soul. Everything else *is only a means*, serves only this purpose." György Lukács, " Levelei Paul Ernsthez (1911–1926), " *A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Filozofiai és Történettudományi Osztályának Közleményei*, Vol. XX, No. 3 (1972), p. 286.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> landed gentry, even in the most metaphysical moment of their lives. Dostoevski was the first writer in whose world the constitutive nature of this determinism has come to an end. Myshkin is as little a prince as Yepanchin is a general or Rogozhin a middle-class millionaire. They are naked, concrete souls and their concrete relationships with each other cannot even polemically be identified with their outward forms.[69]

The Dostoevskian world was the subject of one of Lukács's most ambitious studies, *The Theory of the Novel* (published in book form in 1920, but written in 1914–15). In a preface to a new edition of this work (written in 1962), Lukács explained that he had originally intended to cast the book in the form of a series of dialogues between young people who had withdrawn from the horrible world of the Great War. "They try to understand themselves and one another by means of conversations which gradually lead to the problems discussed in the book—the outlook on a Dostoevskian world."[70] Though Lukács ultimately chose a less dramatic form of presentation, the search for a new world on the Dostoevskian model remained at the heart of the book.

Since *The Theory of the Novel* was originally intended to be the introductory section of a long study of Dostoevski, Lukács was largely concerned with showing how inadequate the pre-Dostoevskian "worlds" of great literature were as visions of utopia. According to him, the world of the epic most nearly approximated the utopian world. The epic world could be described as homogeneous, even as an integral community, but *only* if one understood community as a cooperative, as opposed to an antagonistic, system of *social* categories.

For Lukács, the epic world was the ideal form of the social world and the artistic expression of the integrated civilization of ancient Greece. With the dissolution of Greek civilization and the development of the modern, heterogeneous world, the epic gave place to the novel. The novel was the artistic expression of the inhuman "social" world that Lukács hated. Still, in the hands of its greatest practitioners, the novel could attain epic proportions. In the world of the "epic novel," as distinguished from the world of the novel proper, social forms advanced rather than obstructed human moral development and isolated, lonely men once more established meaningful relationships with their fellows.

The intimations of a breakthrough into a new epoch which Lukács discerned in the work of epic novelists encouraged him. But not even the epic could satisfy the utopian longing of his soul, for that longing was legitimate only if it were "incapable of being satisfied in any world that can be imagined and given form, whether past, present or mythical. If a world can be found that satisfies the longing, this only proves that

[69] Lukács, *Magyar irodalom—Magyar kultúra*, p. 115.
[70] Georg Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel*, transl. by Anna Bostock (London: Merlin Press, 1971), p. 12.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the dissatisfaction with the present was merely an artistic quibbling over its outward forms. . . ." [71]

The final chapter of the book, "Tolstoi and the Attempts to Go Beyond the Social Forms of Life," was the most important. Here Lukács argued that Tolstoi's great achievement was to raise the novel to epic form by providing a vision of the world based on an idealized conception of Russia's peasant communes. It was a vision that Lukács found infinitely preferable to the world of 1914–15, the world of the novel proper, but like all epic attempts to go beyond the world as it is, it "aimed only at an immanently utopian ideal of social forms and structures; therefore it does not transcend these forms and structures generally but only their historically given concrete possibilities. . . ." [72]

Only in Dostoevski's world, Lukács concluded, were the social forms transcended. His world was not "immanently utopian," it did not emerge from a purification or idealization of social forms. Rather it was a utopian world—a vision of essential life and community beyond social categories. Because he had defined the novel by the heterogeneity of its world and the socially-determined actions of its characters, Lukács made the extraordinary claim that Dostoevski did not write novels.[73]

The Theory of the Novel is the most profound of Lukács's early works; it is also the most misunderstood. One recent critic has argued that there was something seriously wrong with a theory of the novel that leads to the conclusion that Dostoevski wrote no novels.[74] Even so talented a critic as George Steiner referred to Lukács's claim about Dostoevski as "obscure rhetoric." [75] But far from being obscure rhetoric, it was precisely Lukács's recognition that Dostoevski did not write novels that made *The Theory of the Novel* a work of the first rank. The novel, as Lukács convincingly demonstrated, is essentially a social genre; the world of the novel is the social world. It was, however,

[71] Ibid. p. 115.

[72] Ibid. p. 144.

[73] Ibid. p. 152. Lukács never repudiated his interpretation of Dostoevski. Consider the final two paragraphs of an essay he wrote in 1943 in the Soviet Union. "The golden age: genuine and harmonious relations between genuine and harmonious men. Dostoevski's characters know that this is a dream in the present age but they cannot and will not abandon the dream. They cannot abandon the dream even when most of their feelings sharply contradict it. This dream is the truly genuine core, the real gold of Dostoevski's Utopias; a state of the world in which men may know and love each other, in which culture and civilization will not be an obstacle to the development of men.

The spontaneous, wild, and blind revolt of Dostoevski's characters occurs in the name of the golden age, whatever the contents of the mental experiment may be. This revolt is poetically great and historically progressive in Dostoevski: here really shines a light in the darkness of Petersburg misery, a light that illuminates the road to the future of mankind." "Dostoevski," in *Dostoevski: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. by René Wellek (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), p. 158.

[74] G. H. R. Parkinson, "Introduction," in *Georg Lukács: The Man, his Work and his Ideas*, ed. by G. H. R. Parkinson (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), p. 5.

[75] George Steiner, *Tolstoy or Dostoevsky: An Essay in the Old Criticism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), p. 346.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the distinctive mark of Dostoevski's works that they were not concerned with dramatizing, much less solving, social problems. Dostoevski's characters, as Lukács correctly perceived, did transcend their formal stations in life. Their problems and their relationships to each other were free of social determination.

Proceeding from this insight, Lukács argued that Dostoevski was a utopian visionary. Yet one might argue with equal justification that the Russian writer did not provide us with a utopian vision of a world that has never existed, but rather with a deep philosophic understanding of universal and timeless human problems and experience. He reminded us that human existence possesses a universality that is beyond all social particularities. On this view, his world was not utopian but actual; he showed us not what could be but what is. Lukács, of course, could not entertain this alternative reading of Dostoevski because he was convinced that men were not yet free of social determination. This conviction and the utopian interpretation of Dostoevski became the presuppositions of his subsequent commitment to revolutionary Marxism.

In view of the reasons for Lukács's reverence for Dostoevski, it should not be difficult to understand why, despite his hatred of the world as it was, he did not associate himself with either Jászi and the Radicals [76] or the Hungarian Social Democrats. At best these groups had an "immanently utopian ideal of social forms." In order to meet Lukács's ideological requirements a movement would have to have as its goals the transcending of all social forms and the establishment of "community" as a realm of freedom. Further, such a movement would have to be ethical in essence; its mission would have to be moral.

IT was fitting that Lukács should dedicate *The Theory of the Novel* to Yelena Andreyevna Grabenko, his first wife. Born in Russia, this extraordinary woman, who had served a term in a Tsarist prison because of her association with the terrorist wing of the Socialist–Revolutionary Party, was "a wondrous example of a Dostoevski character. Every one of her experiences and ideas could have been lifted out of Dostoevski's most fantastic chapters." [77] Lukács and Balázs met Yelena Grabenko in Paris in 1911 and both men were immediately attracted to her. Balázs reported that Yelena, in turn, "needed Gyuri in the spiritual sense: *'Il est ma salvation.'*" [78] Like most of Lukács's relationships with others, that with Yelena Grabenko transcended the formal and approximated the "essential" communion that he believed was frustrated by the "social" world. Indeed, Lukács later blamed the depth of their relationship for the "terrible and unimaginable hell" [79] in which they lived as man and wife. "He says that he feels

[76] On 6 June 1914, Jászi presided over the formation of a National Citizens' Radical Party committed to the principles of liberal democracy.
[77] Balázs, "Naplói," MTAK: K. Ms 5023/18, p. 23. 28 Feb. 1912.
[78] Ibid. p. 55. July 1913.
[79] Ibid. Ms 5023/19, p. 100. 28 May 1917.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the *deepest* relationship with Yelena, so deep that this superficial incarnation of theirs can only be obstructive." [80] The ultimate dissolution of their marriage notwithstanding, Yelena encouraged Lukács in his ethical strivings during the years before the First World War. She was " an experimental station, a human realization of his problems and ethical imperatives." [81]

It was with Yelena and with Ernst Bloch, the young utopian socialist whom he had met in 1910, that Lukács went to Heidelberg to settle in 1912. The failure of *Szellem* and his numerically small " field of force " in Hungary had persuaded him that he must find a home where his work would meet with more sympathy and understanding.[82] The University of Heidelberg was then the most liberal and cosmopolitan university in Germany. Students came from all of Europe and the faculty could boast of such well-known scholars as Georg Jellinek and Ernst Troeltsch. Above all, Heidelberg was the home of Max Weber.

Weber was already a legend by the time Lukács came to Heidelberg. So many visitors came to seek his wisdom that the great sociologist had little time or strength to devote to his own studies. Finally, in order to accommodate everyone, he decided to hold regular Sunday-afternoon gatherings. Among frequent visitors at these gatherings were Friedrich Naumann, Theodor Heuss, and the poet Stefan George.[83] Lukács came to the " circle " with Bloch [84] and was immediately impressed with Weber's monumental intellect and also with his appreciation of Dostoevski. Weber knew Dostoevski's work well [85] and Paul Honigsheim, a member of the circle, reports that he cannot remember any Sunday-afternoon conversation in the course of which Dostoevski was not at least mentioned.[86]

Weber had a very high regard for Lukács,[87] but the sympathetic hearing Lukács received at the German sociologist's home was deceptive. The Weber circle was not a microcosm of German intellectual life and Lukács quickly learned to his disappointment that except on Sunday afternoons, he was " not much less of an eccentric outsider than . . . in the eyes of Oszkár Jászi or Ernő

80 Ibid. p. 104. 28 May 1917.

81 Ibid. Ms 5023/18, p. 54. July–Aug. 1912.

82 Lukács, *Magyar irodalom—Magyar kultúra*, p. 13.

83 Paul Honigsheim, " Erinnerungen an Max Weber: Max Weber in Heidelberg," in *Max Weber zum Gedächtnis*, ed. by René König and Johannes Winckelmann (Köln: West-deutscher Verlag, 1963), p. 162.

84 Marianne Weber remembered that Lukács believed that the final battle between God and Lucifer was imminent and would depend on the decision of humanity. The stake was the redemption of the world. (As we have seen, for Lukács, Lucifer represented the utopian world that God had been unable to create.) Marianne Weber, *Max Weber: Ein Lebensbild* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1926), p. 474.

85 See for example, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 122, 126.

86 Honigsheim, " Erinnerungen an Max Weber," p. 241.

87 Weber was reported to have said on one occasion: " When I have spoken with Lukács, I think about the conversation the rest of the day." Ibid. p. 187.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Osvát." [88] This painful recognition, coupled with the support the German intelligentsia gave to Germany's entry into World War I, shattered Lukács's plans to make Heidelberg his home. He spent much of 1915–16 in Hungary and again took up "permanent" residence in Budapest in 1917.

IN 1915, a small group of Hungarian intellectuals had begun to meet with Lukács and Balázs every Sunday afternoon for discussion. The meetings were held at Balázs's home and were patterned after the Weber circle gatherings.[89] "It has begun in such a way that perhaps it can become an ethical academy for *Szellem*," Balázs wrote in his diary. "Only serious people who are metaphysically disposed are invited. Every new guest is recommended in advance and every member of the group has the power of veto." [90] In addition to Anna Lesznai and Lajos Fülep, the group included a remarkable contingent of younger men, among whom were Karl Mannheim, Arnold Hauser, Frederick Antal, Béla Fogarasi, and Michael Polányi. The subject for discussion was always chosen by Lukács and it invariably centred on some ethical problem or question suggested by the writings of Dostoevski and Kierkegaard. Politics and social problems were never discussed.[91]

By 1917 the "Sunday-afternooners" had formulated plans to set up a "free school," somewhat in the manner of the Free School of the Sociological Society that Oszkár Jászi had organized in 1906.[92] According to Balázs, Lukács was the driving force behind the plans: "He must teach. He wants to form a new generation by word of mouth and by direct influence." [93] The school began in the spring of 1917. Karl Mannheim, in a programmatic lecture entitled "The Soul and Culture," spoke of the cultural tradition with which the faculty wished to be identified:

> . . . in *Weltanschauung* and attitude towards life, Dostoevski; in our ethical convictions, Kierkegaard; in our philosophical point of view, the German *Logos*,[94] the Magyar *Szellem*, Lask and Zalai; in our aesthetic conviction Paul Ernst and Riegl; in our artistic culture, Cézanne, the new French lyric poetry, and particularly the trend represented by the *Nouvelle Revue Française*. Among our own, those whose names can serve as rallying cries

[88] Lukács, *Magyar irodalom—Magyar kultúra*, p. 13.

[89] According to Anna Lesznai, who was a member of the group, Balázs organized the meetings. *Kezdetben volt a kert*, Vol. II (Budapest: Szépirodalmi Könyvkiadó, 1966), p. 296. See also Kettler, "Culture and Revolution."

[90] Balázs, "Naplói," MTAK: K. Ms 5023/19, p. 38. 23 Dec. 1915.

[91] Interview with Professor Arnold Hauser in London, 28 Aug. 1971.

[92] The Free School of the Sociological Society offered courses for workers and advanced students on everything from personal hygiene and working-class history to modern literature.

[93] Balázs, "Naplói," MTAK: K. Ms 5023/20, p. 10. Early in 1918.

[94] *Logos* was a journal devoted to the philosophy of culture. Its contributors included Edmund Husserl, Friedrich Meinecke, Heinrich Rickert, Georg Simmel, Ernst Troeltsch, and Max Weber. Lukács also contributed to *Logos*.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> are Bartók and Ady (on the basis of the many excellent verses that have outgrown impressionism) and finally the Thália Theatre movement.[95]

Two lectures a week were held on the premises of the Pedagogical Institute. The faculty included: Frederick Antal, Balázs, Béla Bartók, Béla Fogarasi, Lajos Fülep, Arnold Hauser, Zoltán Kodály, Lukács, Karl Mannheim, and Ervin Szabó.[96] Balázs described some of the lectures and lecturers in his diary.

> Fogarasi's lectures on the theory of philosophical thinking were first rate. Hauser's on " Aesthetics After Kant " less able, but he had done an impressive amount of work. Antal's lectures were a bit weak. On the other hand, Mannheim's on the logic of epistemology were excellent, exciting, and rich; the first appearance of an important philosopher of the future. Gyuri also arrived, and although he improvised the ethical lectures, they were still paramount in importance.[97]

It was in response to a lecture by Béla Fogarasi entitled " Conservative and Progressive Idealism," [98] that Lukács presented a formal argument for a " moral revolution." He began by emphasizing the essential difference between the contemplative spheres (theory and aesthetics) and the practical spheres (ethics and politics).[99] Following Fogarasi, he argued that what was crucial to progressive action was the particular morality, not the metaphysical theory, on which that action was based. As an example, he cited the unprogressive character of Indian culture. That culture, he argued, was deeply connected with Indian ethics, with the teaching that holds that everyone in this life has unalterable tasks. Compliance with caste responsibilities was the highest virtue; the movement out of the caste, the greatest sin. This ethic had been correlated with the most distinct epistemologies and metaphysics in the course of development, but because the ethic had remained the same, the changes in *Weltanschauung* from the *Rigveda* to the Buddha and beyond had not changed in the least the socially-stagnant and unprogressive character of the culture.[100]

Lukács's reasoning is by now familiar. Social forms, in this instance the Indian castes, were the barriers to human progress. The Indian social order was admittedly an extreme example, but Lukács believed that it did not differ in principle from *any* social order. Compliance

95 Károly Mannheim, *Lélek és kultura* (Budapest: Benkő Gyula Cs. és Kir. Udvari Könyvkereskedése, 1918), p. 7.

96 Ibid. p. 30.

97 Balázs, " Naplói," MTAK: K. Ms 5023/19, p. 98. 28 May 1917.

98 Béla Fogarasi, *Konzervativ és progressziv idealizmus* (Budapest: Az Uj Magyarország Részvénytársaság, 1918). The published version of the lecture was dedicated " to the Sunday-afternooners."

99 György Lukács, " Felszólalása," in ibid p. 27. Balázs wrote in his diary (22 Dec. 1915): " Gyuri is wont to say that his great discovery was that metaphysical realities are not in the sphere of value." " Naplói," MTAK: K. Ms 5023/19, p. 48.

100 Lukács, " Felszólalása," pp. 27–29.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with one's social responsibilities, even if defined less encyclopaedically, must always be the highest virtue until society gave way to community.

There remained the problem of the relationship between ethics and politics. Lukács suggested that ethical activity was directed towards the inner transformation of man, while political activity was concerned with the creation, security, or transformation of institutions.

> Ethical idealism, in so far as it is directed towards politics, cannot want anything other than the creation of such institutions which best meet the requirements of the ethical ideal and the removal of those that stand in the road of this ideal's realization. And every politics based on this ethical idealism is conscious at every moment that that which it can attain is *only* political in nature; that is, it can accomplish only the creation of institutions which contribute positively or negatively to this development. No kind of politics can produce the ethically essential; the inner perfection of man, the true realization of ethics. It can only push aside the barriers from the path of development.[101]

Hence, according to Lukács, a political revolution could not in itself be significant. It could only clear the way for the essential moral revolution.

> The permanent revolution of ethical idealism opposes existence [institutions] as existence, as that which is of no value to the ethical ideal; and because it is a permanent revolution, because it is an absolute revolution, it is capable of determining the direction of the never-coming-to-rest, never-stagnating development [of the ethical ideal] and of regulating its movement.[102]

Lukács did not have long to wait. Hungary's defeat in the war led to the dissolution of the Habsburg monarchy and to the democratic revolution that brought Mihály Károlyi to power. The failure of that brief reformist experiment in national regeneration seemed to provide him with an opportunity to prepare his moral revolution.

THE Hungarian Communist Party was organized on 24 November 1918.[103] Lukács joined the Party in December,[104] along with Yelena Grabenko, Béla Balázs, and Béla Fogarasi. As one of the editors of *Vörös Újság (" Red Gazette "),* Lukács quickly established himself as the most brilliant and influential, albeit controversial, theorist of the Hungarian communist movement.

Those " Sunday-afternooners " who remained uncommitted to communism received the news of Lukács's party allegiance with stunned disbelief. They had come to know him well and had heard him speak often of Dostoevski and Kierkegaard and of the great universal moral

101 Ibid. p. 30.
102 Ibid. p. 31.
103 György Milei, " Mikor alakult a KMP?," *Párttörténeti Közlemények,* Vol. XI, No. 3 (1965), pp. 140–41.
104 Lukács, " Mein Weg zu Marx," p. 228.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

problems that defined the human condition. But they had never heard him speak of Marx [105] or of the necessity of political involvement. Anna Lesznai remembered that "Lukács's emergence as a communist occurred in the interval between two Sundays: Saul became Paul." [106]

The reaction among Lukács's new Party comrades was not only one of surprise, but also of suspicion. The communist writer József Lengyel testified that he was completely bewildered by his conversations with Lukács and "the ethical ones." [107] What, he asked, did Dostoevski's "Grand Inquisitor" and Kierkegaard's *Either/Or* have to do with the revolution? Lajos Kassák, the proletarian writer and artist, was more direct in his criticism. In his autobiography *Egy ember élete* (*One Man's Life*), he described a meeting of the *Vörös Újság* editorial staff in late 1918, at the time of Lukács's cooptation.

> I was a little surprised that Lukács had undertaken this work, he who a few days earlier had published an article in *Szabadgondolat* (*Free Thought*) in which he wrote with philosophical emphasis that the communist movement had no ethical base and was therefore inadequate for the creation of a new world. The day before yesterday he wrote this, but today he sits at the table of the *Vörös Újság* editorial staff.[108]

The article to which Kassák referred was entitled "Bolshevism as a Moral Problem" and appeared in *Szabadgondolat's* special number on bolshevism (December 1918). In this important essay, Lukács contended that there was a contradiction between Marx's sociological method and his utopian vision of the classless society. On the one hand, Marx had claimed that the motive force of history was class struggle; on the other hand, he maintained that the victory of the proletariat over its class enemy, the bourgeoisie, would bring all class oppression to an end.

On what grounds could Marx make this latter claim? "From the point of view of sociological necessity, this [the victory of the proletariat] signifies only the reversal of the class structure, the formerly oppressed become the oppressors." [109] If Marx's claim to have discovered the propelling force of history were admitted, "then it is necessary to accept evil as evil, oppression as oppression, new class rule as class rule." [110]

If bolshevism's confidence in the messianic mission of the proletariat could not be justified in terms of its understanding of historical process,

105 Interview with Professor Hauser.

106 Cited in David Kettler, *Marxismus und Kultur: Mannheim und Lukács in den ungarischen Revolutionen (1918–19)* (Neuwied: Hermann Luchterhand Verlag GmbH, 1967), p. 64. This book is an earlier version of Kettler's "Culture and Revolution," already cited.

107 József Lengyel, *Visegrádi utca* (2nd Hungarian ed.; Budapest: Szépirodalmi Könyvkiadó, 1962), pp. 245–50.

108 Lajos Kassák, *Egy ember élete*, Vol. IV: *Károlyi forradalom* (Budapest: Pantheon Kiadás, n.d.), p. 216.

109 György Lukács, "A bolsevizmus mint erkölcsi problema," *Szabadgondolat*, Vol. VIII, No. 10 (1918), p. 229.

110 Ibid. p. 232.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on what could it rest? The answer, according to Lukács, was that it rests on faith. Bolsheviks must *believe* that the proletarian dictatorship would eradicate rather than perpetuate oppression. They must believe that good (the classless society) could issue from evil (dictatorship and terror). This, Lukács insisted, was truly an instance of *credo quia absurdum est* and he declared that he was unable to share bolshevism's faith.[111] He thought it the better part of wisdom to use only moral means to achieve moral ends.

In the wake of the publication of this article, Lukács's commitment to the Party seemed to many observers to be a betrayal of his convictions. Yet the violation of principle was for him more apparent than real, for the Marxian vision of a redeemed world in which men could live in a community based on cooperation and brotherhood rather than on competition and oppression corresponded to the world Lukács had discovered in Dostoevski's writings. Thus the only stumbling-blocks in the way of his entry into the Party were the necessary terrorism of the period of proletarian dictatorship and the danger that the dictatorship would not, in fact, liquidate itself.

Lukács had been fascinated by the problem of terror for years.[112] He had meditated on Dostoevski's explorations of the terrorist mind, particularly in *The Possessed,* and he had relived with Yelena Grabenko her experiences in Russia. He could not, therefore, simply close his eyes to the problem of terror and in 1919 he published "Tactics and Ethics," an essay in which he attempted to set forth the resolution of the problem that he had worked out before committing himself to the communist movement. Indeed, the essay was Lukács's reply to the author of "Bolshevism as a Moral Problem."

Lukács had the intellectual integrity not to deny the terrible moral responsibility of those using terror, but neither did he think that they were the only ones who are morally culpable. He admitted that every man who identified himself with the communist movement was responsible for every life sacrificed in the revolutionary struggle. By the same token, however, be contended that every man who took sides with communism's opponents in order to preserve the status quo, must shoulder the moral responsibility for lives lost in imperialistic wars and class oppression.[113]

It was Lukács's conviction that there was no escape for men who wished to preserve their moral purity in the "age of absolute sinfulness"[114] that enabled him to overcome his earlier scruples concerning the resort to terror. All men, he believed, were caught in the tragic dilemma of having to choose between the purposeful and ephemeral

[111] Ibid.

[112] See for example, Lukács's letter to Paul Ernst dated 14 April 1915. "Letters from Lukács to Paul Ernst (1911–1926)," *The New Hungarian Quarterly,* Vol. XIII, No. 47 (1972), p. 90.

[113] György Lukács, "Taktika és etika," in *Utam Marxhoz,* Vol. I, p. 194.

[114] Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel,* p. 152.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

violence of the revolution and the meaningless and never-ceasing violence of the old, corrupt world. The choice was not an arbitrary one, for there existed a standard for judging the lesser evil which Lukács called " sacrifice."

To explain " sacrifice," he cited the novels of Boris Savinkov (1879–1925), the Russian socialist-revolutionary who was one of the assassins of Minister of the Interior von Plehve.[115] Savinkov had confronted the problem of terror without flinching.

> Murder is not permitted; murder is an unconditional and unforgivable sin. Yet it is inescapably necessary; it is not permitted, but it must be done. And in a different place in his fiction, Savinkov sees not the justification of his act (that is impossible), but its deepest moral root in that he sacrifices not only his life, but also his purity, morality, even his soul for his brothers. In other words, only that man's murderous act can be—tragically—moral, who knows that murder is not permitted under any circumstances.[116]

This was the committed Lukács's answer to the hesitant Lukács who still hoped to preserve his moral purity. It must be emphasized that the former had not abandoned moral reasoning, but rather had come to believe that a terrible price must be paid for the new world he longed to see.[117]

It would be misleading to suggest that this new understanding matured in an historical vacuum. The end of the first world war brought the destruction of a world that many had thought to be indestructible. Four great empires had fallen and the possibilities of creating a radically different world suddenly seemed very real. In particular, the collapse of the great European monarchies lent new relevance and excitement to the claim of Russia's new rulers that they possessed the keys to a great new kingdom.

115 Lukács almost certainly learned of Savinkov from Yelena Grabenko.

116 Lukács, " Taktika és etika," p. 197. See also the letter to Paul Ernst dated 4 May 1915: " I don't see in Ropsin [Savinkov's pen name] . . . a sign of disease: I discover in him a new form of the old conflict between the first morality (duty towards established society) and the second (duty towards the soul). The order of priorities is always specifically dialectic in the case of politicians and revolutionaries, whose soul is not directed towards itself but towards humanity. In this case, the soul must be sacrificed to save the soul: on the basis of a mystic morality one must become a cruel political realist and one must violate the absolute commandment which is *not* the obligation to works of art but the commandment ' Do not kill! ' " " Letters from Lukács to Paul Ernst," pp. 93–94.

117 Consider the testimony of Ilona Duczynska, a left-wing student activist in Budapest during World War I and later the wife of Karl Polányi. Duczynska talked to Lukács about bolshevism's moral problem in Vienna in 1921. "A representative theoretician who was perhaps the sole brain behind Hungarian communism, at a decisive moment answered my question as to whether lying and cheating of the members of the party by their own leaders were admissible by this statement: Communist ethics make it the highest duty to accept the necessity of acting wickedly. This, he said, was the greatest sacrifice revolution asked from us. The conviction of the true communist is that evil transforms itself into bliss through the dialetics of historical evolution. (That this morality of the type of Nechaev is, *inter alia,* based upon admiration of Dostoevski, will surprise nobody.) " Cited in Franz Borkenau, *World Communism* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), pp. 172–73.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A polarization was apparently developing between revolutionary and reactionary camps. Communist Russia was fighting for its life against White Russians and the Allies. Germany's Majority Social Democrats, led by Friedrich Ebert, Philipp Scheidemann, and Gustav Noske, were trying to curb the authentic revolutionary forces in the former *Reich*. Hungary's new democratic government feared revolutionary violence almost as much as István Tisza had. Lukács believed that the destiny of the world would be decided in 1918–19, and he was convinced that as a morally-sensitive man, he must choose the party that offered at least the possibility of a new world, the party of the revolution.

In his novel-memoir *Optimisták* (*Optimists*), Ervin Sinkó,[118] one of the participants in the struggle for the Hungarian Soviet Republic, re-created the turbulent days of 1918–19. Lukács appeared as one of the principal characters, the revolutionary intellectual "Vértes." On being asked why, in view of his initial moral censure of bolshevism, he had joined the revolution, Vértes-Lukács answered that he had become aware that he could not avoid sin. Once having recognized this inevitability, he had to decide whether he should take responsibility for every drop of blood spilled in the interest of the revolution or reject solidarity with a vision that could only be realized by means of terror. *Either* he had to support by inaction the world of Scheidemann, Noske, the German officer corps, and the White Russian officers, *or* he had to join in the revolutionary struggle for a new world. To support the old world, Vértes contended, was unthinkable, while to refuse to join the revolution out of moral scruple was in effect to say to Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg[119]: "I want to be better than you, I want to be innocent of every sin of violence." This was also unthinkable for anyone who knew anything of the character of the Spartacist leaders. Vértes therefore committed himself to the Communist Party and its revolutionary objectives.[120]

The second problem which bolshevism posed for Lukács was its inability to demonstrate conclusively that the proletarian dictatorship would liquidate itself. This claim, Lukács had argued in "Bolshevism as a Moral Problem," could only be accepted on faith, a faith which he did not then possess. The question is, therefore, why did Lukács become a believer? I have hinted at the answer in the discussion of Lukács's willingness to accept the responsibility for terror, but we must again consult Sinkó's valuable memoir.

[118] Ervin Sinkó, *Optimisták: Történelmi regény 1918–19-ből*, 2 vols. (Újvidék: Testvériség-Egység Könyvkiadóvállalat, 1953–55). In 1919, Sinkó (1898–1967) was a member of the Central Workers' Council of Budapest. Intensely intellectual, his book is made up largely of conversations and debates between revolutionary intellectuals. Lukács himself cited Sinkó's book as a source for the intellectual atmosphere of the revolution. "The Importance and Influence of Ady," *The New Hungarian Quarterly*, Vol. X, No. 35 (1969), p. 58.

[119] One of Lukács's closest friends and best students, Mr Ferenc Fehér, told me that Lukács had said often that the murder of Rosa Luxemburg was conclusive proof of the bestiality of the old world. After that event, he never looked back.

[120] Sinkó, *Optimisták*, Vol. I, pp. 313–14.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In one of his many debates with his comrades, Vértes-Lukács maintained that Marxist theory could not in itself provide the necessary impulse for heroic revolutionary action; indeed, action could never result from knowledge alone. No degree of erudition could impart perfect knowledge of a given situation or of the many possible consequences of an act, for the more extensive one's knowledge, the more one recognized the impossibility of perfect knowledge. This ironic truth, Vértes argued, led to scepticism and ultimately to a paralysis of the will. "Hamlet cannot act because he only knows and does not believe." [121] To act, to place oneself in the service of a revolution, required the power of faith. "In order to think well, a correct theory is sufficient, but in order for a man who knows good and evil to be able to live and fight, faith is necessary." [122]

But how, a young comrade asked, did one acquire this faith? Vértes's answer provides the solution to the final riddle of Lukács's conversion to communism.

> If the question interests you and you find some time, read Kierkegaard. I have a strong suspicion that he himself was without faith, but I know of no one who perceived more clearly than he the cardinal importance—and inaccessibility of faith.[123]

Lukács had been fascinated by Kierkegaard long before enthusiasm for the Danish thinker's works became fashionable. One of the essays in *Die Seele und die Formen* was a study of Kierkegaard and in "On the Poverty of the Spirit" Lukács argued along lines familiar to readers of "S.K." Kierkegaard also protested against "formal," institutionalized morality and insisted on an "existential" ethics.

During the pre-World War I years in Heidelberg, Lukács began a full-scale study (never completed) of Kierkegaard's critique of Hegel.[124] Although an examination of Kierkegaard's anti-Hegelian writings would take us too far afield, one should at least note that Kierkegaard rejected the mediative nature of Hegel's philosophy and his claim that philosophy could comprehend reality through reason. Kierkegaard denied that contradictory ideas could be preserved and reconciled at a higher level of understanding and insisted that there was no escaping the necessity of choice; the moral man must decide "either/or." [125] The recognition of this necessity for decision marked the ethical stage of life,[126] which, according to Kierkegaard, was existentially superior to the aesthetic stage. The inadequacy of the aesthetic stage consisted not in its choice of evil, but rather in its failure to choose at all, in its ivory-tower neutrality. Even if a man should mistakenly choose evil, he

121 Ibid. Vol. II, p. 290.
122 Ibid. p. 291.
123 Ibid. p. 293.
124 Lukács, *The Theory of the Novel*, pp. 18–19.
125 *Either/Or* was Kierkegaard's most famous book and the title has often been used to epitomize existential philosophy.
126 Kierkegaard identified three stages along life's way; the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would be able to discover his error by reason of the energy with which he chose.[127]

In the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the "Philosophical Fragments,"* Kierkegaard's most extended polemic against Hegel, one finds the famous claim that "truth is subjectivity." Kierkegaard did not mean, of course, that no objective certainty was possible, but only that it was "indifferent."[128] For him, the only significant truth was that which could not be demonstrated objectively or be comprehended by reason. Such "existential" trust could only be appropriated through a faith that was undeterred even by apparent absurdity.

We have seen that Lukács characterized bolshevism's promise of a classless society as a classic example of "*credo quia absurdum est*" in "Bolshevism as a Moral Problem." But his reflections on Kierkegaard and the dramatic events that followed the end of the war convinced him that he was living in a Kierkegaardian "either/or" situation. If he refused to choose between the old world and the revolution, he would in effect be denying his ethical view of life. For him, neutrality was impossible and unthinkable, for no mediation could ever preserve the "age of absolute sinfulness" in a new moral synthesis. The old world would have to be destroyed by the revolution.

Lukács never deceived himself about the scientific predictability of communism's realization. No amount of knowledge could ever have silenced his doubt; to join the revolution he had to make a leap of faith. Even if, in the end, communism proved to be a false promise, Lukács believed that his commitment would be ethically justified because he had exercised his will to a new world.

MIHÁLY KÁROLYI'S government collapsed on 21 March 1919, and Béla Kun, the Hungarian Communist Party leader, came to power; he promptly proclaimed Hungary to be a "Soviet Republic." The Kun government appointed several members of the "Sunday-afternoon" group to important cultural positions in the Republic. As Deputy People's Commissar of Public Education,[129] Lukács became the virtual dictator of cultural affairs. Béla Balázs directed theatrical activity in the Republic and Lajos Fülep, Karl Mannheim, and Arnold Hauser (though they were not Party members) joined the faculty at Budapest University.

The brief and troubled history of the Hungarian Soviet Republic cannot be recounted here.[130] What concerns us are Lukács's efforts

[127] Søren Kierkegaard, *Either/Or*, Vol. II, transl. by Walter Lowrie, revisions by Howard A. Johnson (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1959), pp. 171, 173.

[128] Søren Kierkegaard, "Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the 'Philosophical Fragments,'" in *A Kierkegaard Anthology*, ed. by Robert Bretall (New York: Modern Library, 1946), p. 215.

[129] The People's Commissar of Public Education was Zsigmond Kunfi (1879–1927), the chief theorist of Hungarian Social Democracy.

[130] See Rudolf L. Tőkés, *Béla Kun and the Hungarian Soviet Republic* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to define the goals and purposes of the Republic. The burden of his message to his fellow Hungarians was that Hungary's national rebirth could only be realized by means of a moral revolution. According to the Deputy People's Commissar of Public Education, reformism, despite its generous moral impulses, never understood the necessity of transcending "society" and its forms. Most particularly, the reformers' belief in the efficacy of a "rule of law" testified to their inability to free themselves from the matrix of the old order, for the rule of law was but another instance of formal rule; it was, in its very structure, the negation of a truly free community of men, a community which must be governed by moral rather than formal responsibility.

To defend his view that the mission of the communist revolution was essentially moral, Lukács emphasized time and again that the destruction of the old order was not an end in itself, but the means to a moral end. Man's liberation from the imperatives of his social and economic station would not guarantee the realization of a truly human community. Such liberation would only create the conditions under which a community of "mutual love and understanding" [131] *could* be realized. Therefore each man would have to prepare himself morally for the day when all social forms were destroyed and he was truly free.

Even when he discussed the problem of economic production, Lukács insisted on the pivotal role of morality.[132] By July 1919, it had become obvious to Hungary's revolutionary leaders that the Republic could not survive without increasing its economic production. They were also well aware that such an increase would necessitate firmer labour discipline. The question was whether or not the proletariat would discipline itself. If it could not, the government would have to create institutions to compel it to act in its own interest.

Lukács dreaded the prospect of compulsion and urged the proletariat to create its own labour discipline, thus exercising its moral will. If the government were obliged to subject the workers to institutionalized coercion, a legal order would be created that would have to be destroyed before the realm of necessity could give way to the realm of freedom. Because of the problems of labour discipline, then, the question of production was not simply economic, but moral in nature. The realization of the realm of freedom depended on the consciousness and moral quality of the proletariat. Only the proletariat could bring about the termination of morality's subordination to law, institutions, and compulsion. "The ultimate goal of communism is the building of a society [that is, 'community'] in which actions are regulated not

131 György Lukács, "A kommunizmus erkölcsi alapja," in "*Mindenki ujakra készul . . .*": *Az 1918/19–es forradalmak irodalma (Szöveggyujtemény)*, Vol. IV: *A tanácsköztársaság publicisztikája és irodalmi élete*, ed. by Farkas József (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1967), p. 145.

132 György Lukács, "Az erkölcs szerepe a kommunista termelésben," *Szociális Termelés*, 20 July, 1919, pp. 3–5.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

by the constraint of law, but by the exercise of man's moral freedom." [133]

Lukács's moral view of communism was also the basis for his extraordinary conception of the Communist Party. With the elimination of classes, he contended, political parties, in the traditional sense, would also be eliminated. These parties, though supposedly representing all men, were in fact defenders of the interest of particular classes. Indeed, the more seriously a party took its claim to be above the classes, the more it condemned itself to impotence.[134]

The Communist Party, Lukács maintained, opposed not only the corrupt, counter-revolutionary character of the old parties, but " parties " (that is, " forms ") as such. It did not offer an alternative " programme," since programmes merely masked class interest; it had a higher calling. " The Communist Party must be the first incarnation of the realm of freedom; in it the spirit of brotherhood, of true solidarity, of willingness and ability to sacrifice, ought first to prevail." [135] Lukács summed up the transition from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom in the following words:

> The transition from the old to the new society does not signify a mere economic and institutional transformation, but simultaneously a moral transformation. . . . This transition is . . . the transition from constraint and reification to freedom and humanity. And therefore freedom cannot be merely a fruit or result of development, but must become one of its propelling forces. Freedom's significance as a propelling force must become increasingly permanent until the moment has arrived when it fully appropriates the direction of society. From then on society becomes more human. The " prehistory of humanity " comes to an end and its true history can begin.[136]

Lukács never described his " realm of freedom " in detail because, as we have seen, he was convinced that to do so was to limit himself to a world in which development was possible only within the context of " social forms." The realm of freedom had never existed and therefore its contours could not be clearly discerned. All that could be said with certainty was that it was a realm in which men could become brothers, in which no formal barriers could interrupt essential human

133 Ibid.

134 György Lukács, " Párt és osztály," in " *Mindenki ujakra készul . . .*," Vol. IV, p. 225.

135 G[eorg] L[ukács], " Die moralische Sendung der kommunistischen Partei," *Kommunismus*, 1 May 1920, p. 488.

136 Ibid. p. 485. In the most important essay in *History and Class Consciousness*, " Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat," Lukács wrote that history really becomes a history of mankind only when " it contains nothing that does not lead back ultimately to men and to the relations between men." *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*, transl. by Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1971), p. 186. Hence, in his most famous book, Lukács continued to argue what he had argued since 1911—the " reified " forms we call " social relationships " must be stripped away in order to allow " naked souls " to create a truly human world of unmediated communion.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

communion.[137] It was a realm in which men were free to exercise their moral will after centuries of constraint. It was, in sum, a realm in which " history " would be consciously made by men and not men by history.

Lukács's revolutionary ideology suffered defeat in its initial encounter with post-World-War-I realities. The Soviet Republic was unable to resist the combined opposition of the " White " Hungarian forces led by Admiral Miklós Horthy and the Rumanian irredentists (claiming Transylvania) who were encouraged by the Allies. When Horthy established a counter-revolutionary government in August 1919, most of the communists, including Lukács, emigrated. In Vienna, Béla Balázs, Lukács's long-time friend, wrote what is perhaps the most fitting epilogue to Lukács's youthful career:

> It seems that one must choose whether one writes or lives one's ethic, just as the philosophers of religion reckon with but do not live God. If this is true, then it seems that György Lukács, out of integrity, out of moral imperative, is going to live to the very end in untruth. Because Lukács the conspirator, the political activist, the revolutionary, is assuming a *mask,* [is living in] untruth; it is not his metaphysically-rooted mission. He was born a quiet scholar, a lonely sage. . . . Of course the question is: What is more important, purity or the truth? He lives a lie out of purity (he does not live his own life). He commits a metaphysical sin. But it is not given to us either to intervene in the decision of a man of such profound ethical worth or to judge him.[138]

[137] " . . . Man, who is the foundation and the core of all reified relations, can only be discovered by abolishing the immediacy of those relations. . . . Their abolition, if it is to be a true abolition, cannot simply be the result of thought alone, it must also amount to their *practical* abolition as the *actual forms of social life.*" Lukács, *History and Class Consciousness,* p. 177.

[138] Balázs, " Naplói," MTAK: K. Ms 5023/21, pp. 11–12. 4 Dec. 1919.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Fellow-Travellers

Lewis S. Feuer

THE fellow-traveller is a type rather unique to our own times. When Christianity was spreading in the Roman Empire, there were no fellow-travellers; one was either a Christian or not. David Caute's book* is a remarkable survey of the thoughts and deeds of fellow-travellers from the Bolshevik Revolution to the present. His cast of characters includes the greatest names of European culture as well as a corps of camp followers. At times one has the feeling that an inevitable historical tragedy is unfolding itself; an inner flaw in the character of the greatest writers binds them through a series of successive capitulations to become the servitors of an emerging totalitarian order. A few drew back when they perceived how their idealistic words were used to reinforce an apparatus of repression, and said so publicly. Anatole France, Romain Rolland, Bernard Shaw, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Ernst Toller, Lion Feuchtwanger, Bertolt Brecht, André Gide, Jean-Paul Sartre, Paul Langevin, J. Robert Oppenheimer, Albert Einstein, are only a few of the names that traverse Caute's pages; the portraits are skilfully sketched and interwoven with the historical narrative, and illumined with often witty asides.

Caute's view is that the fellow-travellers were (and are) "true sons and daughters of the Enlightenment, of the doctrine of Progress." Their disillusionment with Western society, in his opinion, was "less radical, less total, less uncompromising" than that of the Communist members. Moreover, theirs was a "commitment at a distance"; Lincoln Steffens, for instance, believed the future was with Russian Bolshevism, and he urged others to become Communists; he himself, however, preferred living in Western Europe, and refused to join the Communist Party. Feuchtwanger said in 1937 that the freedom in Russia was "genuine" whereas that of the West was "bogus"; nevertheless, he never returned to the Soviet Union after his brief two weeks visit, and settled in California. "The fellow-travellers cultivated a convenient schizophrenia; they scorned democracy—at a distance"; in so doing they invented several devices for their Communist apologetics. They allowed nothing to be said which would cast doubt on the great Soviet "experiment"; the sacrifice of millions of people was written off, in a conspiracy of silence, as an historically necessary social cost; conditions in the West were just as bad, they said, and if they weren't, one should not apply the standards of Western freedom

* David Caute, *The Fellow-Travellers: A Postscript to the Enlightenment.* Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London, 1973, Macmillan, New York, 1973.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to Asian or semi-Asian societies, and in any case the Soviet citizen was " really " freer than his Western counterpart.

MOTIVES of a psychosexual kind, on Caute's account, evidently also commingled with their rationalistic altruism. Anna Louise Strong, describing her relationship to the Soviet Communist Party, wrote: " If I must have a lifelong boss, let it be a big one. Like ancient Jewish tribes wanting their Jehovah to be all-powerful, like a woman wanting an important husband." Caute also refers to the guilt and masochism among intellectuals (p. 206). But his main emphasis is that a " combination of the ideals of the old political Enlightenment with the achievements of the new economic, or socialist, Enlightenment . . . proved irresistible to the fellow-travellers " (p. 85). Averse, however, to the strict discipline of the Communist Party, they preferred " to flirt with a CP they never intended to marry " (p. 215). They could run with the Party pack, and join in its intellectuals' lynching bees: " An anti-communist is a dog," said Sartre, " I do not depart from that; I shall never depart from it." Nonetheless, in Caute's view, it took only a slight adjustment of their humanistic Enlightenment philosophy to make them fellow-travellers: " in the cases of nine fellow-travellers out of ten, the philosophy of a lifetime was merely coaxed and twisted a little to yield a different ideology."

The effect of the fellow-travellers was to deepen " the despair of the non-official Soviet intelligentsia during the years of perscution and terror " (p. 13). We might say there was a " structural-functional " necessity for fellow-travellers. While the party spokesmen justified the execution, torture or imprisonment of millions of innocent citizens in terms of Marxist ideology, the fellow-travellers did the same in terms of more universalistic philosophical ideas. They were thus invaluable to the party bureaucrats who squandered funds to wine, dine, and flatter them.

But here perhaps we reach the weakness of Caute's thesis. Men of the Enlightenment such as Voltaire and Diderot were ready to denounce the suppression of freedom from whatever quarter it issued; they were enemies to every despotism. They liked to imagine themselves as influencing monarchs, but they never wrote apologies for Prussian or Russian serfdom. They also retained a scepticism concerning grandiose political claims; they were the spiritual descendants of Montaigne as well as of Locke. The fellow-travellers, on the other hand, were less children of the Enlightenment than the heirs to the Platonic aspiration toward the status of philosopher-kings. Whatever their philosophy, whether they were clergymen, existentialists, idealists, or scientific materialists, they responded warmly to the notion that their kind were ruling in the Soviet Union. At the same time, they wrote a new chapter in the sociology of hypocrisy. Always seeking recognition, they had the ingredients of the prima donna; when

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stuffed with the adulation of the "makers of history," they would subscribe to statements which in their normal work as scientists and writers they would have regarded as patent frauds. They always retained privately all sorts of doubts and reservations, but they never voiced these publicly, and thereby, cooperating with the Communists on the latter's terms, consciously deceived people. Thus arose this ambiguity, noted by Caute, in which their actions belied their words. They thus managed to enjoy the best of both worlds.

IN a survey of an intellectual phenomenon in several countries through half a century, some errors and omissions are bound to occur. I might mention a few in Caute's book. Bertrand Russell, on his account, permanently rejected Soviet Communism in 1920 (p. 6). Actually, Russell's views fluctuated. In 1932, in the time of the depression, Russell wrote in his *Education and the Modern World* that Communism "creates an economic system which appears to be the only practicable alternative to one of masters and slaves. . . . It offers to young men and women a hope which is not chimerical and an activity in the usefulness of which they feel no doubt. And if it conquers the world, as it may do, it will solve the major evils of our time. On these grounds, in spite of reservations, it deserves support." John Reed was not honoured with an "imposing statue in a Harvard House" (p. 18); it was a portrait, and it marked not a forgiveness (as Caute would have it) but rather a feeling which prevailed for some time after the Roosevelt-Litvinov negotiations. Alexandra Kollontai is misnamed "Anna" (p. 53); Joseph Schumpeter was not a "German intellectual refugee" (p. 144); the Lusk Committee was not the "Lash Committee" (p. 313); the scientific correspondent J. G. Crowther is misdescribed as "the physicist Crowther" (p. 258); Anatole France is said to have admired Zola (p. 26) though actually he had a low opinion of Zola's merits until the events of the Dreyfus Case; Margaret Schlauch's relationship to the Communist Party is understated when she is depicted as a fellow-traveller (p. 132); the novel's title *Clérambault* is misspelled (p. 128), and so is the name of Leo Huberman (p. 75). Corliss Lamont was not "Professor of Philosophy" at Columbia University but rather a Lecturer.

The most significant absentees in Caute's book are Thorstein Veblen, whose famous post-war articles defended the Soviet as the Russian equivalent of a New England town meeting; the Yale professor of religion, Jerome Davis; the famed geneticist, Hermann Muller; John Dewey at the time when he gave the prefatory speech to the film *The Road to Life* and wrote his *New Republic* articles on the Soviet Union, and in lesser degrees the economists Stuart Chase, Paul Douglas, and Rexford Tugwell, a group moved by a high idealism and generosity of spirit.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CAUTE'S discussion of the American fellow-traveller seems to me inferior to the rest of his book. He tends to fall back on the clichés and myths that have accumulated around the " McCarthyist Era " and the Fifth Amendment, largely in a hagiography written by neo-fellow travellers. It is wrong to say that the Communist Party never represented a " genuine force among the American working class " (p. 304); at the end of the thirties it dominated such powerful unions as the United Electrical Workers, the United Automobile Workers, and the National Maritime Union. The Palmer Raids of 1919 are cited as a " witch hunt " without any mention of the numerous bombing episodes which preceded them. A wave of left terrorism from Haymarket to Abbie Hoffman has usually preceded an era of governmental measures against radicals. No wonder that Marx, Bebel, and Kautsky made the rejection of terrorism such a cardinal tenet. Caute also writes of the " hysteria " allegedly stimulated against Communists in 1952 by the political elites. But the studies of Samuel Stouffer indicate how the people at large were moved against Communists. Theirs was primarily a response to the Stalinist terror in foreign policy—the blockade of Berlin, the coup in Czechoslovakia, the take-overs in Poland and Hungary, and the growing realization that Stalin was indeed carrying out an anti-Semitic programme, though the full enormities of the execution of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee and the later " Doctors' Plot " were still unknown. Superimposed on all this was the invasion of South Korea, correctly surmised (as Khrushchev later conceded) to have been provoked by the Soviet Union. If Britain's atmosphere was calmer, it was because it did not carry the chief responsibility for the free world's defence. Caute declares that among those who pleaded the Fifth Amendment before governmental committees were many fellow-travellers. I have never heard of such a case, nor does Caute cite any. Such leading fellow-travellers as Leo Huberman began by denying they had ever been Communists, whereupon the interrogating committee lost all interest in their views; Paul Sweezy did likewise, and won his case of academic freedom in the Supreme Court against New Hampshire. Fellow-travellers, like the two editors of *Monthly Review*, carefully safeguarded the escape clause of denying they were Communists.

The tactic of the Fifth Amendment among Communists was born of two considerations: one, the long-standing insistence from the Comintern's first days, that an illegal apparatus be maintained, and second, the guilt and the inability which affected most Communists when it came in 1952 to defending their actions and proclaiming their beliefs in the public forum as earlier generations of radicals had done. Caute furthermore never asks whether a political secret society has any place in a democratic society. Nor does he ever confront the question of the effect of Communist Party discipline in such fields as the teaching of modern history (the Russian Revolution without

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Trotsky), the theory of relativity (the ether does exist), quantum theory (the principles of indeterminacy and complementarity are excluded), linguistics, genetics. . . . One is thinking of the average Communist teacher, bound by discipline, not such decorative figures as Picasso or O'Casey.

MEANWHILE, the fellow-travellers are back in the stands again. For instance: in the thirties, the noted scientist Joseph Needham was extolling Stalin's leadership and the Soviet regime; in 1952, he endorsed without question the Chinese-North Korean charges that the United States had practised bacteriological warfare. In 1973 he came to Toronto, lauded the leadership of Mao in the same words he had used about Stalin, and was as oblivious of Chinese dissidents as he had been of the Soviet; thereupon the University granted him an honorary degree. Caute has chosen not " to encompass the opposition to the Vietnam war in the present study " because it has seized " men of conscience " as it did in the case of Spain thirty years earlier (p. 14). It is far easier to trace the ramifications of fellow-travellers in the past than it is to apply the same anatomical skill to its possible current manifestations.

There are two sociological generalizations which might be added to Caute's analysis. First, the political adherence of fellow-travellers tended to be much longer than that of party members; a flirtation can go on in an irresponsible fashion indefinitely; one never has to accept the consequences of one's words. Second, the intellectual abilities of the fellow-travellers were generally higher than those of the party members. The travellers were aware, though they never said so publicly, that entry into the party would mean an encounter with the dictatorship of mediocre party bureaucrats. This was a " freedom " they recommended only to others.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Gulag Archipelago* and its Inhabitants

Michael Heller

THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO is, from the formal point of view, unlike Alexander Solzhenitsyn's other books: the writer had always striven to limit the place and time of the action. One day and the camp zone in *Ivan Denisovich,* three and a half days and the special research prison in *The First Circle,* 11 days and a particular area of East Prussia for the main action in *August 1914.* . . .

This time the location is the vast country of Gulag, which " begins a stone's throw away, a couple of metres from us," and the time span, indicated precisely in the subtitle, is 1918–56. But there is another respect in which *The Gulag Archipelago* differs from all Solzhenitsyn's earlier writings. He had called *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* " the first scanty and muffled account of a camp " and warned that the sensation the story aroused was nothing to what " would happen when the whole truth exploded."

The Gulag Archipelago is the whole truth. About the Archipelago and its inhabitants, but also about the country which gave birth to these monstrous islands.

The writer defines the genre in which his book is written as " an experiment in artistic research." He warns us: " I would not be so bold as to try to write the history of the Archipelago: I have not had the chance to read the documents." But this *is* the history of the Archipelago. And one may describe the genre as an experiment in artistic research into history. Solzhenitsyn " would not be so bold " as to write the history of the Archipelago because he has not read the documents, but here he adds that it is unlikely that anyone ever will have the chance to read the documents: " Those who do not wish to remember have already had enough time—and will have plenty more time yet—to destroy all the documents to the very last one." One may question whether the study of documents (and very often altered, forged, or mendacious ones at that) is a necessary prerequisite for the writing of history. Thucydides, after all, managed to write his *History of the Peloponnesian War* without consulting documents or working in archives. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, working on his history of the Archipelago in the " unwritten years," to use his expression, the " pre-Gutenberg era," as Anna Akhmatova called her own times, has reverted to Thucydides' technique: the use of his own experience and the testimonies of contemporaries. At the same time this is the most contemporary technique there is of sociological investigation: the material for the book came from " the accounts, recollections and

* Published in Russian by YMCA Press in Paris and in English translation by Harper & Row in New York and Collins/Harvill in London.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

letters" of 227 people. Their testimonies, which reflect the experience of all social strata, supplement all that the great writer gleaned from the Archipelago "with my skin, my memory, my ears and my eyes."

Solzhenitsyn recounts the history of the Archipelago, the history of its inhabitants, and the history of one of its inhabitants—himself. But the history of the Archipelago becomes the history of a state which felt the need to found a prison-camp empire, the need for mass terror; the history of its inhabitants becomes the history of the citizens of that state, who were transformed into passive victims; and finally, the fate of the author becomes the story of the genesis of a writer who undertook the mission of restoring a nation's memory. The three histories—the three main themes of the book—run parallel, intersect, and intertwine to create a unique document of the twentieth century.

IN the first volume of his monumental work in seven parts (two of which have so far been published) Solzhenitsyn sketches the contours of the Archipelago on the map of Russia and recounts the ways and means by which people come to be on its islands. The Soviet press, in an uninterrupted series of the bitterest attacks on Solzhenitsyn, has laid two mutually exclusive charges at his door on account of the book: some articles assert that *The Gulag Archipelago* contains nothing but lies, others that it contains nothing new, and that all the facts have been known for a long time and "condemned by the party." There is no need to dwell upon the first allegation. The second undoubtedly contains a grain of truth. Considerable factual knowledge of particular islands in the Archipelago has existed for some time—in the West. In 1924 a book by the Russian historian P. Melgunov, *The Red Terror in Russia 1918–1923*, came out in Paris. This was a collection of material relating to the first five years of Soviet power. The second half of the twenties saw the publication of the memoirs of those rare and fortunate people who had succeeded by some miracle in leaving the Archipelago. There was, for instance, the book *In the Land of NEP and the CHEKA*, by a Finnish citizen Boris Cederholm who was arrested in Petrograd in 1924 and sent to the Solovki concentration camp until 1926; it is one of the first eye-witness accounts of this camp. During the thirties some new islands in the Archipelago (the White Sea Canal in particular) became known, although the true dimensions of the Archipelago remained a mystery. It was the Poles who found themselves on Soviet territory during the war who first gave us some inkling of the gigantic size of the prison-camp empire; thrown into prisons and camps, they nevertheless survived to testify in the West about what they had seen and endured in the book *The Dark Side of the Moon*. After the war more and more testimonies made their appearance: the books by Gustav Herling-Grudzinski, Alexander Weissberg-Cybulski, A. Ciliga, Margaret Buber-Neumann, Eleonor Lippert, Julius Margolin, and many, many others. . . . The first attempt to systematize material on the camps

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

available in the West was made by David Dallin and Boris Nicolayevsky. And in spite of all this, as late as 1950 the editor-in-chief of the Paris communist journal *Lettres Françaises* could still express his gratitude to the Soviet Union for her "magnificent enterprise," as he termed the camps, noting that "in Soviet re-education camps the exploitation of man by man has been completely abolished."

In his preface to *The Dark Side of the Moon* T. S. Eliot wrote: "This is not merely the story of what happened to Poland and to innumerable Poles between 1939 and 1945. . . . It is also a book about the USSR, about the Europe in which we now live, about the world in which we now live." That Europe, that world refused to believe in the existence of Soviet concentration camps, which were an integral part of the USSR, of Europe, and of the whole world. They did not believe, because the truth about those camps seemed too monstrous, the scale of the camps and the numbers of prisoners too incredible. They did not believe, because the truth about the camp empire seemed incompatible with the ideals proclaimed by the "first socialist state in the world." They did not believe the testimonies of the first witnesses in the early twenties, because they had been the testimonies of enemies of the revolution, emigrés. They did not believe the testimonies of the thirties, because by that time Hitler's concentration camps were springing up and supporters of the Soviet Union doggedly insisted that whoever mentioned Solovki was approving of Dachau in the same breath, and only those who remained silent about Stalin's crimes had the right to expose the truth about Nazi atrocities. After the end of the second world war the exposure of Soviet extermination camps was equated with slander on a valiant ally, a conqueror of Hitler and saviour of Europe. At that time the exposure of Soviet camps was seen as a call for a new war.

The publication of Solzhenitsyn's story *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich,* a desperate manoeuvre in the complicated political game Khrushchev was playing, was the first official admission of the existence of camps in the Soviet Union. Six years before the publication of the story, Khrushchev, in a secret report delivered to the Twentieth Party Congress, had officially admitted that "violations of socialist legality had taken place in 1937–38," blaming Stalin for them and stressing that the victims had been "party and state personnel." Solzhenitsyn not only told of the camps, he told that the victims of the terror had been ordinary Soviet citizens like Ivan Denisovich Shukhov, an ordinary collective farmer, a rank and file private soldier, a rank and file prisoner. A counterbalance to Solzhenitsyn's story was to be provided by the memoirs of B. Dyakov and Grigorii Shelest, and Andrei Aldan-Semyonov's story *Bas-relief on Rock.* These works confirmed that there were camps in the Soviet Union, and cited facts which corroborated everything that had earlier been written about those camps, but at the same time they attempted to prove that the camps had been a chance accident in the life of the USSR, the fruit

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of Stalin's fantasy. They attempted to prove that true communists, even after having spent many years in the camps, did not lose their faith in the party. Their main message was the assertion that all this belonged to the past. Arkady Vasilev, a former NKVD man who had gone over to authorship, wrote a novel with the eloquent title *No More Questions.* Discussion was nipped in the bud.

It is significant that the right to discuss the camps, to disclose the secret of the camps, was left to literature. Historical scholarship remained silent. Soviet historians have not written a single research paper on the camps, or the waves of repression that were continually breaking over the state, if one disregards the apologies for the activity of the Cheka. An attempt by Roy Medvedev to fill this gap failed to receive official approval and the work was published only in the West.

So it was literature that charged itself with the interpretation of history. Boris Pasternak's *Doctor Zhivago* was the first book by a Soviet writer which, in the 35th year after the revolution, raised the question of the meaning of the revolution, of its necessity, of the disparity between the image of revolution as it appeared to the Russian intelligentsia before the cataclysm, and reality. The hero of the novel, a doctor, diagnoses the disease of the century as "revolutionary madness." He accuses the revolution of killing the human soul: "Our soul occupies a place in space and sits within us like the teeth in our mouth. You cannot endlessly violate it with impunity." The writings of Nadezhda Mandelshtam offer a profound analysis of the hypnotic effect of the word "revolution" upon the Russian intelligentsia. "This word," she writes, "had such tremendous power that I really fail to understand why the potentates needed prisons and tortures as well." The memoirs of Nadezhda Mandelshtam are a history of the Russian intelligentsia in the post-revolutionary period, a history of the decline, cowardly submission and destruction of an intelligentsia which had yielded to the temptation of a "total world-philosophy" and the temptation of a Grand Inquisitor. Vasily Grossman's *Forever Flowing* consists of reflections on the history of Russia couched in the form of a novel. Grossman was the first Soviet writer to analyse the role played by Lenin in the fate of the revolution and the post-revolutionary state. He draws a complex and at times tragic portrait:

> Violent lust for political power, combined with an old jacket, a glass of weak tea, and a student's garret. . . . Implacable cruelty, scorn for the most sacred idol of the Russian revolution—freedom, and there, right beside it, in the same man's breast, a pure, child-like delight at beautiful music, at a book.[1]

[1] In Evgeny Zamyatin's novel written in 1920, the head of the Sole State, the Benefactor, who asserts that "true, algebraic love for mankind is unfailingly inhuman, and the sure sign of truth is its cruelty," is a "bald, Socratically bald man," the spitting image of the founder of the Soviet state.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The author sees Stalin as continuing Lenin's cause, continuing what was the main feature of Lenin: "Lenin laid the foundations of a state without freedom. Stalin built it."

In his search for the causes of the rise of the "state of unfreedom" Grossman probes even further back into the depths of Russian history. It is there that he finds the sources of the new state: "The inexorable suppression of the individual has been a persistent feature of the thousand-year history of the Russians. . . . While the development of the West was fertilized by the growth of freedom, the development of Russia was fertilized by the growth of slavery."

Pasternak's novel, Nadezhda Mandelshtam's memoirs, and the historical reflections of Grossman, all of which, it goes without saying, have never been published in the Soviet Union, fail, despite their very considerable significance, to give a complete picture of post-revolutionary society, if only because the main object of their attention is the intelligentsia.

THE Gulag Archipelago absorbs everything that was said before it, and expands, supplements, deepens, rejects or accepts this material. Having selected as his main theme, his point of reference, the camp, the most important symptom of the mortal illness of the state and society, Solzhenitsyn analyses the behaviour of the patient. There is mention of the camps in *Doctor Zhivago;* Nadezhda Mandelshtam, the wife of a great poet who died in a camp, writes about them; and the hero of Grossman's book has spent 19 years in a camp. But for these writers the camp is merely a place of suffering, of agonizing death. For Solzhenitsyn it is the fruit of a system and the basis of a system, the expression of the political, economic and social impossibility of holding on to power without terror and camps.

His historical approach to the phenomenon has allowed the writer to gather a multitude of isolated facts, pieces of information and testimonies together into a single picture. In recounting the history of the Archipelago, Solzhenitsyn has created an encyclopaedia of Soviet society. At the same time his book is a perfect illustration of the reasons for the falsification of history in the Soviet state, one of the phases of which was the arrest of eminent Russian historians including Platonov, Bakhrushin, and Tarle in 1929. In his novel *We*, Evgeny Zamyatin has the citizens of the Sole State undergo an operation whereby the nerve-centre in their brains which gives rise to fantasies is cauterized in order to kill their desire for freedom once and for all. In the Soviet "Sole State" it is history that has been cauterized. "We forget everything," writes Solzhenitsyn, "We remember not facts, not history, but only those punched and programmed lines they want to drum into our memories by tireless repetition. It is a painful attribute . . . It makes us easy prey to liars." In 1962 it was admitted for the first and last time at a conference of

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet historians—by the historians themselves—that they were professional liars. A. Snegov, a party member since 1917 who had spent many years in camps, even proposed the setting up of something like the physician's Hippocratic oath for historians, which would require of Doctors of History the promise to write honestly.[2]

Alexander Solzhenitsyn does not claim to have written the history of the Soviet state; but he does write the history of Soviet law, to which he devotes three chapters: "The child-law," "The law grows up," and "The law has matured." In the beginning—as we have always known—was the word. For Solzhenitsyn the beginning is the word of Lenin, the common, single aim proclaimed in January 1918: to cleanse "the Russian land of all harmful insects." Even in the works of Soviet historians today one can find references to the brutality of revolutionary methods and measures. In *October and the Intelligentsia* (Moscow, 1972) S. Fedyukin cites a letter from V. Bonch-Bruyevich, an administrator in the Council of People's Commissars, to Lunacharsky, the people's Commissar for Education:

> I enclose herewith an appeal by the citizens Davydov regarding their father who was taken hostage. Davydov was a well-known geodesist: he was shot in the execution of 900 people after the death of Uritsky. No charge was brought against him. Two weeks prior to his arrest he had been summoned to Petrograd on official business. His children request that their petition be examined and that they and their sick mother be given the opportunity somehow to subsist.

The Soviet researcher feels that the execution of 900 hostages "shows a lack of correspondence between the measure of guilt and the measure of punishment," although it is not clear what guilt there could have been on the part of the geodesist Davydov in this case. He considers these instances of "a lack of correspondence" justified by revolutionary necessity, civil war, hostile environment, and so on. Solzhenitsyn sees this brutality, this inhuman terror, which began in the very first days of the revolution, as evidence of the anti-popular character of the revolution, of its internal weakness, of its superfluousness. "Even before there was any civil war," writes Solzhenitsyn, "it was realized that Russia, with a population like the one she then had, was, of course, unfit for any socialism, and that she was all soiled." Consequently it was necessary to "cleanse" Russia in order to render her worthy of the socialism which the victors—even against the will of the majority—intended to impose. But if it were against the will of the majority, if the whole country were "soiled," if it were necessary to cleanse Russia "of insects," there naturally would have

[2] A. Snegov evidently did not know that Soviet doctors of medicine do not take the Hippocratic oath, but "solemnly swear to carry on the great traditions of patriotic medicine, to be guided by the principles of communist morality, always to bear in mind the lofty calling of doctor in the Soviet state." Such an oath could, of course, easily be taken by Soviet historians.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to be resort to mass, blanket terror. The writer frequently draws the comparison between living conditions in the pre- and post-revolutionary state. And, as a rule, these comparisons are not to the credit of the post-revolutionary state. This, though, is not to say that Alexander Solzhenitsyn is an apologist of Tsarist Russia. He is perfectly well aware of the defects in the Russian pre-revolutionary state. But he shows that all these defects have been magnified many times over in the post-revolutionary state, while the horrors of penal servitude under the Tsars are regarded with a smile of pitying bewilderment by those who have done their time under the Soviets. In Kolyma prisoners read about the Decembrists' terms of servitude as though they were life in paradise, while in Vladimir central prison they dream of the living conditions of the Schlisselburg inmates. Solzhenitsyn insists on his comparison with pre-revolutionary Russia for another reason too: at every opportunity he stresses that Soviet citizens do not know the truth about their past.

> The first amazing thing we learn about the engineers accused in the "Industrial Party" case, is that those whales of the bourgeois intelligentsia—all eight of them—were from poor families . . . (How can this be? They told us that in tsarist days it was only the children of landowners and capitalists . . ? Surely the calendars cannot lie? . . .)

They can, asserts Solzhenitsyn. "All calendars are lying," he could say echoing the words of the hero of Griboyedov's [play] *Woe from Wit.*

Solzhenitsyn presents that history of the Soviet state as the history of Soviet law, demonstrating how that law has, from the very first days of the revolution, striven to become lawlessness. When, at the beginning of 1918, Admiral Alexei Shchastny was sentenced to be shot, it was pointed out to the court that there had been a decree abolishing capital punishment. The prosecutor, Krylenko, explained: "It is capital punishment that has been abolished. But we're not punishing Shchastny, we're shooting him."

In his analysis of the history of the law's "growing up," of its becoming increasingly more cruel, cunning, shameless and insidious, increasingly more lawless, the writer makes use of the shorthand reports of several open trials, taking each trial, as it were, in descending order, from the childishly naive juridical feebleness of the first trials, to the more mature experiments of the early 30s, right down to the sombre ceremonial of the theatrical spectacles of 1937–38. Solzhenitsyn attributes a very precise significance to these trials, regarding them as the most important barometer of the level of intensity of terror in the country. This is corroborated by a letter of Lenin's which came to light only ten years ago. On 20 February 1922 Lenin demanded:

> An increase in repressive measures against enemies of Soviet powers and agents of the bourgeoisie (especially Mensheviks and

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> Social-Revolutionaries) . . . the obligatory staging of a series of *model* trials (models in the speed and force of repression; models in the explanation of their significance to the popular masses through the courtroom and the press) in Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov and a few other of the most important centres. . . . Here we should apply to " civil legal relations " not *corpus juris romani,* but our own revolutionary sense of justice; we should systematically, stubbornly and insistently show, by a series of model trials, how this should be done with wit and energy. . . . (*Complete Works,* vol. 44, pp. 396–400).

Lenin insists on the transformation of the " model trials " into a school of fear, an instrument for educating the people, a method of " cleansing " them. Evidently Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, a lawyer by training, is not entirely sure whether his concept of the replacement of Roman law by " revolutionary sense of justice " is fit for wider dissemination, for he insists, in two postscripts to the letter, that both the letter itself and the identity of its author be kept secret. Solzhenitsyn shows how these " model " trials are organized, how with each passing year the accused men are subjected to a better and better working over, how the skill of the investigators and prosecutors at compiling charges known to be false grows and grows, and how the automatic approval of any sentences is encouraged to develop.

Solzhenitsyn's main source for his analysis of these trials are the speeches of prosecutors Krylenko and Vyshinsky. One must pay tribute to the tremendous skill with which the writer makes use of this one-sided material, finds in it details of time, portraits of the judges and the men in the dock, and, first and foremost, a basic political line aimed at transforming the law into a truncheon of state power. " For several centuries," writes Solzhenitsyn, " we have had a proverb: don't fear the law, fear the judges. . . . It is time to turn that proverb round and say: don't fear the judges, fear the law." When lawlessness reigns supreme, when lawlessness becomes the law, the islands of Gulag merge into an Archipelago.

THE history of this process is the first theme of Solzhenitsyn's book. A second theme is that of the " re-education " of men, the transformation of a country's citizens into the inhabitants and potential inhabitants of the Archipelago. The writer carefully traces the metamorphosis that takes place within people, and the methods used to accelerate the process. He sums up the result: we are rabbits, we are sheep, " we have lost the measure of freedom. We have no means of determining where it begins and where it ends." He talks of " our habit of obedience, our bowed (or broken) backs. . . ." And he muses that it might have been otherwise.

> If, during the mass arrests, for instance in Leningrad, when they arrested a quarter of the city, people had not sat in their burrows numb with terror each time the front door banged or they heard

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> footsteps on the stairs, but had realized that they had nothing more to lose now, and had eagerly laid ambushes in their entrance-halls, several men at a time with hammers, axes, or whatever they happened to have. . . . In spite of Stalin's enormous thirst the accursed machine would have ground to a halt.

If every arrested man had cried out as they led him along the street that

> beasts in disguise are seizing people! That they are grabbing them on false denunciations! That millions were being blatantly massacred! And hearing these cries many times daily, would people have raised their hackles? Would the arrests perhaps have ceased to be so easily made? . . . If the prisoners awaiting death in each cell had concertedly strangled their executioners when they came for them. . . . They were already at the point of death: why not then resist?

But there was no resistance. Because it was already too late. The writer describes the stages whereby society was reduced to an obedient herd, awaiting extermination. " The time is past, my friends, gentlemen and comrades! " Solzhenitsyn sadly remarks. His conclusion: that universal innocence begets universal inertia.

> Since you are innocent, what can they arrest you for? It's a mistake! . . . They're jailing other people *en masse*, that's ridiculous too; but there, in every instance, you're still left with a blind spot that makes you say: " but perhaps there was a reason in *his* case? . . .

The " purification " of Russia, as Solzhenitsyn shows, was a gradual process: one species of " insect " after another, one stream after another was forced along the waste pipes of the prison " sewerage system." But while one lot were being exterminated the rest kept silent, convinced that it would not affect them. There was occurring an atomization of society which considerably facilitated the work of the authorities. Fear can become the main motivating force behind a man's behaviour. But it was not enough to frighten people, to leave them alone face to face with the monster of the state, to force them to consent to the arrest of all around them. The next stage in the creation of the " new man " was, to use Solzhenitsyn's expression, " the nation-wide participation in the sewerage system." By this stage passive consent to terror was insufficient: what was required was active approval.

> Those whose bodies had not yet crashed down through the hatches of the sewerage system, those whom the pipes had not yet carried to the Archipelago—they had to walk above ground with banners, to sing the praises of the courts and rejoice in the legal reprisals.

Solzhenitsyn notes a crucial phenomenon in Soviet society: the link between executioner and victim, which in some instances goes as far

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

as complete interchangeability of roles. Today's executioner becomes tomorrow's victim, and yesterday's victim is ready to turn executioner at the first prompting. The universal innocence and universal uncertainty helped to create this mutual bond, which in turn was intensively cultivated by the regime, for it was conducive to the corruption of souls, both those of the executioners, and those of their future victims. At the Social-Revolutionaries' trial in 1922 the prosecutor, Krylenko,

> hit that sincerely sympathetic note of amicable accusation which he was ever more plentifully and confidently to flog at subsequent trials, and which was to have such stupefying success in 1937. The technique was to find something which united the judgers and the judged—against the rest of the world. . . . The Social-Revolutionaries were told from the prosecution bench: After all, you and I, we're revolutionaries! (We! You and I means we!)

And they would tell Boris Savinkov: " After all, you and I are Russians! . . . You and I means we! " And the oppositionists were told a different variant of the same thing: " After all, you and I are communists! . . . And you and I together makes we! "

It is precisely here, in this gradual corruption of future victims by steering them towards participation in, or—purely and simply! — approval of, crime, that Solzhenitsyn sees the solution to the " mystery " of the trials of the Old Bolsheviks (adding, moreover, that he agrees with the conjectures of Arthur Koestler). Beautifully drawn portraits of two stars of two notorious political trials illustrate the writer's thought. Mikhail Yakubovich, one of the chief defendants at the trial of the so-called Union Bureau of Mensheviks, who by some miracle survived many years of confinement in labour camps, disclosed to Solzhenitsyn the mechanics of how such " cases " were contrived: " it is extremely rare to obtain, as it were, ' posthumously,' an explanation by someone who took part in one of these trials. And I believe," writes Solzhenitsyn, " that it is just as though Bukharin or Rykov had explained to us the reason for their puzzling submissiveness in court." Honest, sincere, selflessly dedicated to the revolution, and a faithful servant of the Soviet regime, M. Yakubovich was arrested in 1930, and summoned to an interrogation by his good friend prosecutor Krylenko, who told him: " I do not doubt your innocence. But it is your and my party duty to conduct this trial. . . . I ask you to be as helpful as you can by meeting the investigation halfway." And Yakubovich " hastens to slip his own head into the harness," zealously, assiduously helps to " conduct the trial." The second portrait is of Bukharin, the man who " against the background of the times appears to have been the most intelligent and clear-thinking mind of all the disgraced and executed leaders." With remarkable artistic insight Solzhenitsyn shows how, by tossing him from hope to despair and back again, " from chill to fever," Stalin finally succeeds in destroying the soul of Bukharin, who in his time had

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had the engineers in the Shakhty case shot, and who had admitted the possibility of Zinoviev's and Kamenev's guilt.

There was, however, one more reason for the confessions, the consenting to collaborate with the executioners: torture. The chapter devoted to torture, which contains descriptions of 52 forms of "physical pressure with the aim of obtaining a confession," might have been copied from Nicolau Eimerich's *Manual for the Inquisitor,* written in the fourteenth century: there is the same inhumanity and brutality, the same absence of technical means. Torture was used to break those who were already prepared to confess. But as a kind of ritual act it was also applied to those who were prepared to collaborate, such as Yakubovich.

The third reason why innocent people confessed to crimes they had not committed was their lack of any "moral support." Analysing the reasons for their weakness and apostasy, their willingness to collaborate with their executioners, Solzhenitsyn remarks that Russian history already knows of instances like these. "Russian history," he writes, "has not provided us with any better examples of firmness. . . . In the course of his brief, two-week investigation, Radishchev, that outstanding man, renounced his convictions, his book—and begged for mercy. . . ." Even Ryleev "replied at length, candidly, and concealing nothing. . . ." Even Pestel broke and gave the names of his comrades (still at liberty). . . . Bakunin, in his *Confession,* "spat upon himself and grovelled before Nicholas I, thereby escaping the death penalty." The writer asks: what was it? "meanness of spirit? Or revolutionary guile?" One of the explanations Solzhenitsyn offers is that the nineteenth-century Russian revolutionaries—Radishchev, the Decembrists, Bakunin—"were interrogated by their class brothers . . . And naturally their desire was to explain everything." That was partly Bukharin's situation. But this is not Solzhenitsyn's chief contention. He wants to offer a "deeper psychological" explanation. This explanation becomes an important element in the writer's philosophy and historiosophy. Revolution, he feels, does not give Man sufficient moral support, does not give him the faith he needs to resist evil, does not give him the necessary strength to relinquish his life when the need arises, to remain a human being.

THE Gulag Archipelago is the story of Man's search, an answer to the question: was it possible to remain a Human Being on the Archipelago and in the society which gave birth to the Archipelago? Solzhenitsyn's book is peopled with a multitude of characters: some he simply mentions in passing, others he draws with two or three strokes of his masterly brush, still others he describes in detail, with repugnance, curiosity, or love. But he tests each one of them for their spiritual capacity to resist the forces of Evil. Few of them pass this test. Alexander Solzhenitsyn's moral code is one of elemental simplicity, but adherence to it on the Archipelago demands a strength of

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the sort that only the lone individual can summon up. It is these loners who comprise the tribe of righteous men without whom, as Solzhenitsyn writes in his conclusion to *Matryona's Home,* " no village can stand. Nor any city. Nor our whole land."

Solzhenitsyn's moral code is simple: that justice and truth should be held in higher regard than property, in higher regard than life. When a man ceases to set store by earthly things or by his life, he acquires an inner freedom and with it the power to vanquish Evil.

The victors' gallery includes Patriarch Tikhon, whose courageous replies to the court are admired by Solzhenitsyn. " Do you regard the laws which exist in a state as binding upon yourself or not? " asks the chairman of the court. " Yes, I recognize them in so far as they do not conflict with the rules of piety." The writer comments: " They ought all to have replied like that! How different our history would have been! " Also among the gallery of victors are the Russian engineers Pyotr Palchinsky, N. von-Mekk and A. Velichko, who refused to sign false charges. " Whether they died during torture or were shot we do not know for the moment, but they proved that it was possible to resist and to stand one's ground. . . ." Alexander Solzhenitsyn is a Christian believer and it is therefore understandable that his search for righteous men should be directed toward the clergy. Alexander Solzhenitsyn is convinced that engineers are destined to play a paramount role in the future of Russia, and that is why he deals with the fortunes of the arrested engineers. But he reserves his greatest admiration for one Vasily Vlasov, a party member and member of a provincial cooperative, " a man with a scrappy, random education, but possessing those original talents which so amaze one in Russian people; eloquent, quick-witted in argument, liable to flare up white-hot in defence of what he feels to be right. . . ." Solzhenitsyn contrasts his behaviour both before and after arrest with the pathetic, cowardly behaviour of party leaders. Vasily Vlasov is a member of the party, because he is convinced that the party is the servant of the people. During the course of his open trial he declared what perhaps no one else in the Soviet Union in 1937 declared: " I don't regard you as a court, but as players in a musical comedy sketch of a trial, acting out written roles. You are the performers in a vile provocation by the NKVD." Sentenced to be shot, he refused to appeal for a pardon, and when, after spending 42 days in a cell for men condemned to death, he was told that his sentence had been commuted to 20 years' imprisonment in a camp, he replied: " That's odd. I was convicted for lack of faith in the victory of socialism in one country. But can Kalinin really have faith if he thinks that even twenty years from now we'll still need camps in our country? . . ." Solzhenitsyn includes in his book six photographs of victims of the Archipelago and one of a man who stood his ground and survived—Vasily Vlasov. The story of his fate concludes with a brief note on Vlasov's eight-year-old daughter Zoya, who " adored her father . . . She survived for only one year

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

after his trial . . . and died of an inflammation of the cerebral cortex, uttering repeated cries of: 'Where's my daddy? Give me my daddy! '" These lines of Solzhenitsyn's inexorably call to mind the most important question asked in Russian literature:

> Imagine that you yourself are raising up the structure of man's destiny with the aim of making men happy in the end . . . , but it is necessary and unavoidable for this to torture only one tiny creature to death, a child . . . and to found this edifice on its unrevenged tears, would you consent to be the architect . . . ?

As though in answer to Dostoyevsky's question, Solzhenitsyn tells the story of Zoya Vlasova, adding: "When we calculate how many millions died in camps, we forget to multiply them by two or by three...."

The circle of righteous men who were able to stand up and defend their human dignity is very small. Very small, because the torments to which man was subjected on the Archipelago were of monstrous proportions. But these torments and these sufferings are seen by Alexander Solzhenitsyn as a trial of the human spirit, a necessary part of its purification and strengthening. Nowhere, possibly, is Solzhenitsyn's Christianity displayed with more force than in this advocacy of the trial of the spirit by suffering. In *The Gulag Archipelago,* as in all his other writings, he finds a connection between the fate of a man and the fate of a nation, between history and the individual:

> It is a simple truth, but it has to be learned through suffering: blessed are not the victories in war, but the defeats! Victories are needed by governments, defeats by nations. After victories one wants more victories; after defeat one wants freedom—and one usually attains it. Nations need defeats in the same way that individual people need suffering and misfortune: they make one's inner life more profound and spiritually elevate one.

Solzhenitsyn's conclusion might be expressed thus: in a society which is amoral on principle, which arose as a result of a violation of the normal course of history, and which gave birth to *The Gulag Archipelago*, only suffering will enable men to rise spiritually and to understand the need for morality.

THE third subject of *The Gulag Archipelago* is the fate of its author, the path travelled by Solzhenitsyn himself. With a degree of frankness characteristic only of Dostoyevsky's heroes the writer tells us about himself. He too is a son of his country, and he grew up in an atmosphere of "nationwide approval of the legal reprisals meted out to 'enemies,'" breathed the air of revolutionary slogans and myths; in the army, when he had received his officer's golden epaulettes, he felt higher than and superior to the rank-and-file—the "gold dust of his epaulettes" had poisoned him. Only a mysterious impulse from the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

heart, incomprehensible to himself, made him turn down an offer of a place at an NKVD school, where the Komsomol wanted to send him. Reproaching the millions of arrested people for their silence, he makes no excuses even for himself. He too " had many opportunities to cry out," but remained silent. Even in prison *after* he was arrested, Solzhenitsyn continued ardently to defend Marxism, convinced that Stalin had " distorted " Lenin. Gradually, through suffering and through witnessing the sufferings of others, he arrived at his new convictions, at the truth about the society in which he lived, at the belief that he had been charged with the mission of telling this truth so that the whole world might hear his cry.

Solzhenitsyn's originality as a historian lies in his agonizingly passionate treatment of his subject. This is not surprising, if we recall that his subject is the life of his people, and his own life. He speaks with unconcealed pain and bitterness of all the countless " streams " of prisoners who were sucked down into the sewers of Gulag, for this is the life of his people, and the death of his people. The restraint of the historian deserts him when he is faced with facts so brutal that they stand out even in the " Archipelago." Describing, for instance, the case of the shooting of six collective farmers who, after the haymaking, went back again over the meadow to mow just a little more hay for their cows, he writes: " If Stalin had killed no-one else, ever, on account of those six peasants from Tsarskoye Selo alone I would consider him worthy of being quartered." But straightaway he reminds himself: " but let us return to impassivity and impartiality." His impassivity abandons him when he talks of the " stream " of Russian prisoners-of-war: " The story of the millions of Russian prisoners pierces me through and through, like a cockroach under a pin." He met these prisoners-of-war—some of whom had fought together with him—in prisons and camps. If I had to single out one particular chapter of the book as the best, written with especial passion, especial emotion, and especial compassion, I would, I think, be obliged to choose the chapter called " That Spring." The chapter is about the victorious spring of 1945, which, " in our prisons," was the spring of the Russian prisoners-of-war. They poured through the cells,

> a stream of people, anyone who had spent any time in Europe: émigrés from the civil war; *Ostarbeiter* from the latest war with Germany; officers of the Red Army who had gone too far and drawn sharp conclusions which gave Stalin good cause to fear that that they might have brought back from their campaign in Europe European freedom, as had already happened once before, a hundred and twenty-five years earlier.[3] But even so, most of them were my contemporaries, or rather, not mine, but contemporaries of the October revolution—men born with the revolution.

[3] Solzhenitsyn is referring to the Decembrist uprising in 1825, which was staged by officers who had been in Europe after the victory over Napoleon.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

These "contemporaries of the October revolution" and of the writer (for Solzhenitsyn was born in 1918) were especially close to him and he understood them especially well. But this is not the only reason why their story has stabbed him to the heart. The fate of the Russian prisoners-of-war revealed to Solzhenitsyn the full extent of the inhumanity, ingratitude and cruelty of the Soviet state. Millions of Soviet soldiers found themselves taken prisoner by the Germans; all of them, when they returned home, were declared traitors of the Fatherland and sent to Soviet camps. "Sometimes we want to tell a lie, but our tongue refuses to let us. . . . They meant to declare them traitors TO the fatherland, but no one ever said or wrote—even in judicial material—anything other than 'traitors OF the Fatherland.'" Writes Solzhenitsyn: "It was not those wretched men who betrayed their Fatherland, but their calculating Fatherland which betrayed them. . . ." The writer turns to the history of his country:

> How many wars Russia has waged . . . and have we known of many traitors in all those wars? . . . But then, when we were living under the most just regime in the world, and fighting the most just of wars, suddenly millions of traitors appeared from out of the people. How can this be understood? How can it be explained?

And he explains:

> All those prisoners were put in jail, not, of course, *for* betrayal of the Fatherland, for any fool could see that the only people who could be convicted of treason were the Vlasovites. These people were jailed *to prevent them* from talking about Europe with their fellow-villagers. Out of sight, out of mind. . . .

Solzhenitsyn comes to the conclusion that Stalin had millions of ex-prisoners-of-war thrown into camps as a preventive measure, in order to preserve the prewar "curtain" which separated the land of the Soviets from the rest of the world. He concludes: "But perhaps all the same the root of the evil is in the state system?"

This conclusion is one of the most important in the book: that the concept of one's native land is not to be equated with its social system. He proves it a second time when he gives an account of the fate of the people who, he acknowledges, "could be convicted of treason": the Vlasovites.

Solzhenitsyn is well aware that the story of the Vlasovites will be the most explosive in the book, and will provoke particular wrath on the part of his adversaries. He writes:

> In our country the word "Vlasovite" has a similar ring to the word "filth." . . . But history is not written like that. Now, a quarter of a century later, when most of them have perished in the camps . . . I have written these pages because I wanted to remind [my readers] that the Vlasovites were quite an unprecedented phenomenon in world history: several hundreds of

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> thousands of young men between the ages of 20 and 30 who took up arms against their Fatherland in league with its worst enemy.

Who is more to blame, these young men, or their grey-haired Fatherland, asks Solzhenitsyn. His question can be phrased in another way: *does a state only have rights over its citizens, or does it [also] have obligations towards them?*

The writer does not justify the "Vlasovites," but with the historian's impartiality bows before the reasons which induced them to don German uniform. Some enlisted in anti-Soviet detachments "simply to get out of the death camps. Others—with the idea of going over to the partisans (which they later did, and fought for the partisans!)." But there was a third category:

> Some were stunned by that shameful year of '41, that astonishing defeat after all those years of bragging; and still others felt the chief culprit to be those inhuman camps of Stalin's. They too rushed to make themselves and their terrible experiences known, and to declare that they too were part of Russia and wanted to exert some influence upon her future instead of being pawns in other people's miscalculations.

Solzhenitsyn's conclusion is that a state which took away a man's opportunity to influence the fate of the country, took away every possibility of choice, and made him "a pawn in other people's miscalculations," bears the chief responsibility for the fact that hundreds of thousands of young people took up arms against their homeland, for the fact that they made the only choice—a terrible, fatal choice—which was open to them.

"Where does one's homeland begin?" asks a popular Soviet song. Alexander Solzhenitsyn appears to be asking: where does one's homeland end? He cites the words of an old Russian painter held in a German camp, meditating on the homeland which had repudiated its own citizens: "How could it be right, if our mother had sold us to the gypsies, no, worse than that, thrown us to the dogs? Could she still remain a mother to us? A Motherland which has betrayed her soldiers—can that really be a Motherland?"

It is the completion of the circle begun in January 1918 by Lenin's words on the need to cleanse Russia of insects, continued by decades of ceaseless purging and the creation of an Archipelago which has become the foundation of the state. The Motherland's rejection of her soldiers, their betrayal by their Motherland, is the logical culmination of the process whose first stage was the equation of Motherland with revolution, followed by the equation of Motherland with state, with the individual power of a tyrant, with violence.

ALEXANDER Solzhenitsyn breaks the most sacred of all the taboos which bind the consciousness of Soviet citizens. But it is precisely by doing so that he achieves his inner, spiritual liberation. "I

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

am a wanderer among the stars" he says of himself, recalling the prisoner in Jack London's novel. "They have bound my body, but my soul is not under their sway." It is in prison that he finds his liberation: "Is it not here in prison cells that the great truth abides? A cell is cramped, but is not the outside world even more cramping?" It is in captivity that he arrives at the "great truth": that truth is attained through suffering. He comes to a true union with the people: "Is it not our people who lie beside us under the bunks and in the gangways, tormented and deceived?" And in the final pages of the first volume of *The Gulag Archipelago* Solzhenitsyn finds the hero he is seeking. He finds him—to his own surprise—in the poetry of Pasternak, whom he had earlier disliked and "thought affected, abstruse, and very remote indeed from ordinary human lives." Upon hearing Shmidt's final plea at his trial [4] Solzhenitsyn was "pierced through and through," for it corresponded exactly with his own feelings and thoughts. As he is about to die, Lieutenant Shmidt, an organizer of the sailors' insurrection on the cruiser "Ochakov" in November 1905, utters these words, with which Solzhenitsyn wishes to associate himself: For thirty years I've been in labour/with love for my native land/ And I neither expect nor do I lose/Your indulgence!

Lieutenant Shmidt, who spoke out against a government he regarded as anti-popular, seems to Solzhenitsyn the model of a patriot: "Not to rise up with my native land/Would have been harder for me/ And the path I have trodden/I do not regret now."

One may well surmise that Solzhenitsyn was even more deeply struck by the verse in which the mutineer talks of his predestination than he was by the two verses he cites in his book:

> It is idle in years of chaos
> To seek a happy end.
>
> It is for some to punish and repent,
> For others to end with Golgotha.

Alexander Solzhenitsyn has accepted his destiny, his mission: to give the nation back its memory, to tell the truth about the past, to become witness and historian of an era of chaos. "One should believe only those witnesses who will allow their throats to be cut," wrote Pascal. Solzhenitsyn was prepared for that.

(*The second part of this study dealing with the second volume of* The Gulag Archipelago *will appear in the next issue of* Survey).

[4] In Boris Pasternak's long poem *Lieutenant Shmidt.*

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Documents: Soviet Union

Lydia Chukovskaya

A Break-through

I BELIEVE that the appearance in 1973 of Solzhenitsyn's new book *The Gulag Archipelago* is a tremendous event. By virtue of the immeasurability of its consequences it can only be compared with an event which occurred in 1953: the death of Stalin.

Our papers have declared Solzhenitsyn a traitor.

What he has in fact betrayed is not, of course, his native land, for which he fought with honour, nor the people, who gain in honour by his life and his writings, but the State Administration of Camps, GULAG: he has *exposed to the public gaze* the story of how millions perished, has told, with concrete facts, testimonies and biographies at his fingertips, a story that everyone must of necessity know by heart, but which the authorities, for incomprehensible reasons, are trying with all their might to *consign to oblivion.*

Who, then, is doing the betraying?

The Twentieth Congress lifted the bloodstained edge of the matting that covered those piles of corpses. This alone in the fifties saved millions from destruction: the living, the half-dead, and those in whom life still flickered faintly. Praise be to the Twentieth Congress.

The Twenty-Second Congress passed a resolution to erect a memorial to those who had perished. But what happened was the reverse: after a few brief years the crimes perpetrated in our country on a scale hitherto unprecedented in history began to be assiduously extirpated from the nation's memory. Millions of people had perished, all in identical fashion, but weren't they all, every one of them, not flies, but people, people, each with his own particular fate, his own particular death?

Consider the expression "rehabilitated posthumously" and the phrase "the consequences of the Stalin personality cult." What has become of the personality, not the one at the centre of the cult, but the one—every one—of which all that remains is a certificate of posthumous rehabilitation? Where has it disappeared, where is it buried, that personality? What happened to the person, what did he live through from the moment he was taken from his home to the moment he was restored to his family in the form of a certificate?

What lies behind the words "rehabilitated posthumously"? What life? What punishment and death? From about 1965 onwards silence has been the order of the day.

Solzhenitsyn, a living tradition, a living legend, has once more run the blockade of muteness; he has re-invested the deeds of the past

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with reality, and a multitude of victims and fates with their names, and, most important, he has re-endowed events with their true weight and instructive meaning.

We have discovered anew, we hear and see what it was all like: search, arrest, interrogation, prison, deportation, transit camp, prison-camp. Hunger, beatings, labour, a corpse.

The Gulag Archipelago.

Moscow, 8 February 1974

Speech by Lydia Chukovskaya at a Meeting of the Soviet Writers' Union

IN a few minutes' time you will unanimously expel me from the Union. And from being a member of the Writers' Union I shall pass into another category, that of persons expelled from the Union. I am grieved, because there are many talented, honest and pure people in the Writers' Union. And I am flattered too, when I recall that Zoshchenko and Akhmatova belonged to the " expelled " category in their time, that Pasternak died expelled, and that you recently expelled Solzhenitsyn, Galich and Maximov. I do not compare myself with giants of the order of Akhmatova or Solzhenitsyn, but I am proud of the fact that you have been forced to apply the same measure to me as you did to them.

Today you are sentencing me to the writer's supreme penalty: non-existence in literature. Long ago you started severing me from my readers, that is, you ceased to reprint my old books and to publish my new ones. It is quite within your power to make any writer totally non-existent, and even to make it appear that he or she never existed at all. The press is in your hands, in the hands of Presidiums, Secretariats and Boards.

You have stopped reprinting my writings on Miklukho-Maklai, on Herzen, on the Decembrists, on Boris Zhitkov, my critical articles and books " In the editor's laboratory "; and the result is that I have almost ceased to exist in the consciousness of my readers. Hitherto, however, it has still been allowed for references to be made to my books, in works published in small editions. Now you will prohibit even this.

Complimentary articles in the Soviet press about my writings will be consigned to *spetskhrany*—special collections kept hidden from the general reader. When my old book *Going Under* (*Spusk pod vodu*) came out in America, you cut short the publication of my recollections of Kornei Chukovsky in the [Soviet] journal *Family and School* (*Semya i Shkola*). After my article " The Anger of the People " was published abroad you withdrew my reminiscences of Chukovsky from the anthology published by Detgiz.

Explusion from the Union is the culmination of the sentence to non-existence. I was not, and am not. (At a meeting of the Bureau

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the Children's Section comrade Kuleshov has already announced that I did not exist, but the reader has no opportunity to protest—there is nowhere.)

But *will* I exist? Whenever you do deeds like these, you always forget—as you are forgetting now—that you have only the present and, in part, the past in your hands. There exists another factor, which holds both past and future in its charge: the history of literature. Remember Mikhail Bulgakov: for years your predecessors hounded him, for decades they refused to publish him, and now you trumpet him proudly before the whole world.

Remember Kornei Chukovsky: an order came from the top, and some Yudin wrote an article in *Pravda* called "The filthy and vulgar concoction of Kornei Chukovsky." You didn't intercede on Chukovsky's behalf at the time: on the contrary, you stepped up the campaign. You never do intercede on behalf of the word. And now you revere Kornei Chukovsky as one of the founders of Russian Literature, and you protect him from me.

As for Yudin, if he does go down in history it will be only as the author of this shameful article. There are no other reasons why he should. You supported Yudin at the time and all but expelled Kornei Chukovsky at a meeting of your Secretariat.

It is not you but the history of literature that will decide who is the writer and who the usurper.

In 1885 Tolstoy wrote to Urusov: "Yes, the word is the origin of everything: the word is the soul's most sacred treasure . . . The word is one deity that we know; and it alone makes and remakes the world."

The word—the spirit—has fled from you.

With this kind of word you cannot control things or take them in hand, even if you have very strong and very long arms. The position of the word in our country is truly desperate. If a person says something that does not coincide with your opinions of the moment, he is labelled an anti-Soviet. If in a foreign country someone criticises something done in our country, it is called meddling in our internal affairs.

That is the way you control things. But with the word, the sacred treasure of the soul, you can amuse, cure, make happy, expose and alarm people, but you cannot control things. You can exercise control only through hindrances to the word, obstacles to the word, dams built against the word: by removing books from the plan, from the library, by breaking up type that has been set, by not publishing, by expelling an author from the Union, by shifting a book from the '74 plan to the '76 plan, and by appropriating the paper for yourself, of publishing the prose of Filev in a printing of a million copies. That is the way you control things. Hampering. Hindering. Prohibiting.

"The word is the sacred part of the soul. It alone remakes the world." Even you are powerless to hinder it.

Despite all the obstacles you have set up—in '37–'38 and before, in

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

'46, in '49–'51, in '58, '66, '68 and '69—Russian literature is alive and will go on living.

. . . But the Muse went deaf and blind,
Germinating in the earth as a grain,
So that, phoenix-like, she can rise again
From the ashes into the blue air.

What will those you expel do? Write books. After all, even prisoners have written and are writing books. What will you do? Write resolutions.

Write on!

Moscow, 9 January 1974

A Letter from Lydia Chukovskaya

I WAS expelled from the Writers' Union on 9 January 1974 chiefly for my article "The Anger of the People." The expulsion was set in motion with the catch-phrase: "Comrades, we shall not *make a point* of discussing Chukovskaya's article, of course." They proceeded to a two-hour discussion that was *quite beside the point*. Eventually I was called upon to speak. I spoke of the resilience of Russian literature, ending with these words:

"I can prophesy that in the capital city of our homeland there will inevitably be an Alexander Solzhenitsyn Square and an Academician A. D. Sakharov Avenue."

The members of the Secretariat unanimously resolved: "Expulsion with wide press publicity."

A month has passed. Not a word has appeared in the press about my having been expelled. But on 12 January the paper *Sovetskaya Rossiya* published a lampoon, the aim of which was to smear my private and public life—mine, and that of my friends.

Herzen once had a name for articles of that ilk: "mud-cures."

LYDIA CHUKOVSKAYA

The Anger of the People: An Open Letter

. . . Moscow. 1958. 1 November. Pasternak has just received the Nobel Prize for Literature. The writers have expelled him from the Union. The papers are flooded with letters from workers: "The right decision"; "A frog in a swamp." Excavator-operators, oilmen, engineers, teachers, metal workers.

I am in a taxi. At the wheel, a gawky youth of 19 or so. Narrow shoulders, narrow face, puny, but his hands steering the wheel are huge.

I am sitting beside him, and between us on the seat lies a newspaper.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

I can think only of Pasternak. The speeches by writers, the articles and letters in the papers, and my own sin of not having been there in the Union when they expelled him, my muteness. I try to seek refuge in poetry. His poetry. But the only lines of his that come to mind are fatalistic ones.

. . . The darkness of night is aimed at me
Along the sights of a thousand opera-glasses . . .

. . .

. . . Yet the order of the acts is planned
And the end of the way inescapable . . . [1]

. . .

Lines from *Hamlet*, written hardly more than a decade earlier. And then some very old ones, favourites of mine from my youth:

. . . Let me rise above ignominious death!
Clothe me at night in willow and ice.
Beat me out at dawn from the damp lakeside.
Take aim, all's ended! Hit me in flight.

And so it has come to pass. They are taking aim. In flight. . . . Is it already the end or only the beginning of the end?

Suddenly, as if in a bad melodrama—or rather, as can happen only in real life—the driver turns his narrow face on mine:

"Have you read it, citizen?" He indicates the *Literary Gazette* with a sidelong glance. "Some writer, Paster, I think his name is, has sold himself to our enemies abroad and written a book, says he hates the Soviet people. Got a million dollars. Eats our bread and does the dirty on us. With my own hands—(we had stopped at a red light and he took his huge hands off the wheel for a moment)—I work on a combine, harvesting the corn for him. And he, the reptile. . . ."

His honest working man's hands gripped the wheel again. The light had turned to green, and off we shot. On the seat between myself and my interlocutor lay the paper: a few rectangular sheets. The Chairman of the Lenin Collective Farm in the village of Gulyai-Borisovka "joyfully welcomed the decision to strip Pasternak of the lofty title of Soviet writer." A senior excavator-maintenance engineer from Stalingrad was pleased too: "No, I haven't read Pasternak," he wrote, "but I know that in literature we're better off without frogs." The letter was headed simply: "A frog in a swamp."

It's a flimsy thing, paper. You can crumple it up in one hand and throw it out of a window. Tear it into pieces, or burn it.

But there it was between me and my companion like a wall of reinforced concrete. In his eyes the great poet whose poetry and prose I had loved ever since my adolescence was merely a parasite devouring bread on the cheap.

[1] Quoted from the translation by Max Hayward and Manya Harari in *Doctor Zhivago*, Collins & Harvill Press, 1958.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

" Pasternak, not Paster," I said, through the wall. " Everything they tell you about him, everything they write, is lies. They are deceiving you. He is a great Russian writer. He has sold no-one. He loves you. He said this about you in his poetry:

Overcoming my adoration,
Worshipping, I gazed.
Here there were old women, villagers,
Students, locksmiths. . . ."

The driver hadn't heard a single word. There was the wall between us. We were sitting next to each other, still separated only by the newspaper pages. But my voice didn't carry across them to my neighbour.

We had arrived. I glanced at the meter and handed the driver my fare.

" Paster or Pasternak, what difference does it make," he said. " You can read and write, citizen, don't you read the papers? . . . I can do without your 20 kopecks, I don't take tips. . . ."

And he handed me back my coin with a gesture as proud and inexorable as though he were being offered at least 200 pounds sterling by a foreign power to commit treason.

I am reminded of this pitiful incident this week, the beginning of September 1973, when the papers once again, for the *n*th time, have been flooded with the organized anger of the working people. This time it is directed against two remarkable compatriots of ours, Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn.

. . . 1968. Moscow. December. A joyous day. Alexander Solzhenitsyn is 50. They have already begun persecuting him, but the pace is still leisurely. The Writers' Union haven't yet expelled him, but they no longer celebrate his birthday. Hundreds of readers of Solzhenitsyn's prose, published and unpublished, send him congratulatory telegrams in Ryazan. So do I:

" Your voice has given muteness itself the gift of speech. I know of no writer longer-awaited and more needed than you. Wherever the word has not perished, the future is saved. Your bitter books lacerate and heal the soul.

You have given Russian literature back its reverberating power."

The power which Solzhenitsyn has returned to Russian literature is, to the Writers' Union, a burden. The Union simply isn't equipped to deal with it. The Soviet Writers' Union is an administrative institution created to govern. Power is ungovernable. It governs of itself.

. . . 1969. November. Solzhenitsyn has been expelled from the Union by administrative means, presidiums and secretariats, without even the meeting of the Moscow writers' organization that honoured Pasternak. And indeed, what have the Moscow writers to do with it? Solzhenitsyn lives in Ryazan, after all. And in Ryazan he was expelled.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Ryazan-sized pen-pusher. A matter too trivial to warrant a meeting of Muscovites. There were some people, though, albeit very few, who did intervene on behalf of this trivial little writer. One of the 23 who protested was myself. I sent a telegram to the Union's Presidium to say that I considered Solzhenitsyn's expulsion a national disgrace to our homeland.

. . . 1973. September. The hounding of Academician Sakharov and simultaneously of Solzhenitsyn who, in 1970, was awarded the Nobel Prize and thereby laid himself open to various forms of persecution, but still has the courage to defend others.

The newspaper pages are filled with the utterances of orderly ranks of academicians, writers, sculptors, artists. There are also comments by " ordinary people," workers, an organized outburst of elemental popular anger, ordered to look like the natural eruption of a volcano.

It goes without saying that none of the angry or the indignant has the slightest idea of who Academician Sakharov is, or of what he has done, or what proposals he has made, or what he thinks. In trams and underground trains you hear conversations about some scoundrel Sakharevich who thirsts for war. And perhaps he isn't really Sakharov at all but Tsukerman?

Where are you now, my old interlocutor, my narrow-shouldered lad of a driver with your honest working man's hands? Do you still believe the papers as you did then? Do you hate Academician Sakharov now at the prompting of a newspaper, as you did Pasternak when you conceived your sincere loathing for him on a similar prompting in 1958, or as you did on other occasions—and do now—Solzhenitsyn? " I haven't read Pasternak, but I know that in literature we're better off without frogs." " I haven't read Solzhenitsyn's novels, but I am filled with indignation. . . ." Or have you perhaps sobered up in the meantime, my talkative taxi-driver, have you divined that before you pass an opinion on poems or novels or other people's thoughts, and before you swell with indignation apropos of them, you must *know* them and think for yourself about everything in the world, with your own mind, not the mind of newspapers?

The soundproof wall, which the authorities have methodically and malevolently erected between the creators of spiritual values and those for whose sake those values are created, has since 1958, and particularly since 1969, grown higher and more forbidding. A wall hermetically sealing off the " ordinary people " from their prophets and martyrs.

This wall that has been raised up is a solid one of concrete and iron.

It is as high and as harmful as the Berlin Wall. The Berlin Wall seals off one part of the city—and its people—from another, and guards open fire on whoever attempts to cross over it. Every shot rings out over the whole world and calls forth an answering echo in the soul of every man, German and non-German alike. In our country the fight for the soul of the " ordinary man," for the right to bypass the

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

wall of censorship and to commune with him, is waged soundlessly. Mandelshtam once wrote about this soundlessness:

> We live without feeling the land that we tread.
> No-one at ten feet can hear what we said.
> And if somebody does dare to half-talk still,
> We point to the man on the Kremlin hill.

The " man on the Kremlin hill," Stalin, is dead, but his cause lives on. The mass round-ups came to an end with his death. The camps and prisons are filled, not with tens of millions of people guilty of absolutely nothing, as they were under Stalin, but with thousands of people charged with an offence. And the offence is the same for all of them: the word. Through the wall of newspaper lies which has been erected, that wall between the carefree and those who have taken to thinking, the word does not penetrate. Shout! Your shouting will reach the ears of no-one except perhaps a hundred or so people listening through the hole that *samizdat* has drilled in the wall. Nowadays, in our time, the KGB is assiduously bricking up this hole with searches, prison terms and newspaper spittle. And even if, despite the fortified wall, your shouting does reach the ears of some people, they will only be a few hundred; and the population of our country is about two hundred and fifty million. And they are filled with indignation, not at those people who fortify the wall that bars the way to truth with bursts of unjust trials, with prisons, with camps, and with falsehood, but at those who strain their minds, their souls, and their voices in an effort to reach the ears of their compatriots on the other side of the wall.

Rattle on, Yemelya! Go to town, Borisovka! [2] The men from the press will come and visit you at home or telephone you of their own accord and, imitating the " popular idiom," fabricate your anger and your indignation for you themselves. All you will have to do will be to scribble your name on the paper. And scribble it you do.

The first to speak out in condemnation of Academician Sakharov were leading representatives of science, art and literature. I shall not address myself to them. They are educated people, well-read, and perfectly well aware of the real value of both Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov, and, most importantly, of themselves too. They are not worth wasting words on. The signature of Shostakovich to the musicians' protest against Sakharov proves irrefutably that the problem posed by Pushkin has been settled once and for all: genius and villainy are compatible. Genius and treachery. Genius and lies. The Members of the Academy of Sciences, the members of the Writers' Union and the other " creative unions "—including in the first instance those who manipulate the union strings—have thought everything out perfectly; they know what

[2] In Russian a pun on the names of the letter-writers Miss Chukovskaya mentions earlier in connection with the press campaign against Pasternak in 1958. " Meli, Yemelya! " and the collective farm chairman from the village of Gulyai (" have a good time ")-Borisovka.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

they are doing, they understand why and how Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn, each after his own fashion, stand in their way.

There is no point in my addressing them, those writers, artists, musicians, actors and performers. They know where the truth lies without my having to explain it to them. The worst of them are professional traitors, who have long since ceased to have anything to do with either science or literature or art; the best are talented and love literature, art, and science, but believe that " one must not lose touch with readers, spectators, audiences," and find it more convenient to sell their word, thinking that unless they sign a document written in advance by their boss, publishing houses will cease to publish their scholarly works, novellas, stories and verses; that a learned article or a story already accepted and set up in type will be scrapped; that they will be refused permission to perform abroad; or that exhibitions of their pictures will be closed down. And then what? What will then become of poor literature and science, and poor poetry—and of them themselves? Their thinking is short-sighted and they fail to see that one cannot go on and on endlessly cutting scallops out of one's own heart, or it will cease to bear fruit. I don't know how it is with mathematics or music, but with literature, with the word, it cannot be done. Go on writing your verses and stories, keeping yourselves in print! You exist no more.

It is not to you that I address myself, but to that boy at the wheel who, without having read a single line of Pasternak and without knowing his name properly, firmly believed that Boris Pasternak was eating our bread, hated our people and had sold out to our enemies abroad.

It is unlikely that you will hear me, but it is to you that I am speaking. To the so-called " ordinary person." He is not at all ordinary, and certainly not so very stupid, but he is ill-informed. He has been misled. His ignorance is a fatal thing. For himself, and for us too.

In *Izvestia* of 3 September, a Doctor of Technical Sciences V. Sychov expresses " anger and indignation " apropos of Academician Sakharov in the most stereotyped language. Next day he is backed up by an oscillator-assembly worker M. Vlasov. Miners from Donetsk hasten to add their support. *Pravda* of 3 September carries a letter written on their behalf by the foreman of a complex team at the " Donetsk-Coal " combine. Leningraders too are indignant: as well as M. Vlasov, there are the workers at the Kirov factory, in the persons of their foremen; two Heroes of Socialist Labour; and one Deputy of the Supreme Soviet. Passions rise high in Rostov-on-Don also.

" When I read in the paper about the behaviour, or rather, the anti-Soviet escapade of Academician Sakharov," writes gas-welder comrade Olkhovoy, " I was heartily indignant. Well, I thought, if I'd been at the press-conference where Sakharov slandered our homeland, I'd have given him a piece of my mind." [3]

[3] The literal translation of this Russian phrase is " a couple of sweet words."

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

That was from the paper *Sovetskaya Rossiya.* I can imagine how pleased the pressman was at having unearthed a real, "popular" expression: "a piece of my mind."

The collective farmers too refuse to be outdone. They are "heartily indignant at the dishonourable actions of Academician Sakharov" (the same paper, 4 September). They are mostly rank and file workers, but there are one or two persons of exalted status: Heroes of Labour, and Soviet Deputies.

The nation is "heartily indignant." And how! For, back on 30 August, the writer Vadim Kozhevnikov, writing in *Izvestia*, had explained for the benefit of collective farmers, miners, combine-operators and turners, that Sakharov—just listen to this! —had blasphemously demanded "the intervention of imperialism in the internal affairs of his own country and the fraternal socialist countries."

Well, how could the entire Soviet people fail to be filled with indignation! I would have been filled with indignation myself had I not known what sort of person Vadim Kozhevnikov is. . . . I can't find the right word to describe him and what he has done (perhaps I should call him the chief guard at the Berlin Wall, and his words bullets, shooting down people who seek to be united with their fellow-countrymen). Kozhevnikov informed the three million readers of *Izvestia* that Academician Sakharov was allegedly calling for intervention in the running of our country. In those circumstances how could one fail to be filled with indignation?

Allow me to take my turn at saying what Academician Sakharov really did and what he is really calling for. Is he a parasite and does he eat for free the food cultivated by the honest hands of collective farmers and gathered in by the honest hands of combine-operators, or are the words of Kozhevnikov a blasphemous lie, a crime committed with malice aforethought?

The celebrated Soviet physicist A. D. Sakharov, Full Member of the Academy of Sciences, three times Hero of Socialist Labour and twice State Prize-winner, invented the hydrogen bomb for the Soviet state.

And so, comrades, workers and collective farmers, he has not eaten our bread for nothing, but has toiled, and put into the hands of the Soviet state the most powerful weapon in the world.

Awarded enormous sums of prize-money, he donated a hundred and fifty thousand rubles of it to the Soviet state, to go to an oncological institute and to the Red Cross.

Did you know that?

But if he created the bomb, doesn't he perhaps love war all the same?

No, comrades, collective farmers, workers, and employees of the Soviet state!

Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov, a man with a sincere mind and a thinking heart, has come to hate the bomb and to hate all forms of

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

violence. In his appeal to the Soviet Government, and to peoples and governments throughout the world, he was the first person to think aloud about what is now called " international *détente.*" He has written several long articles which are known to the whole world—with the exception of you, comrade Soviet people—articles in which he invites the peoples of the earth to amass thoughts instead of bombs: to think how to save mankind from the threat of war, starvation, disease, extinction, and how to save nature, the human race and civilization from being destroyed.

He has achieved something more important still: he has concerned himself with the fate of the people as individuals, each a separate, specific entity, and first and foremost with the fate of people in our country. That is the special service he has rendered; for, however weighty your thoughts, it is easier to meditate upon the fate of the world as a whole, than to rescue just one person from trouble. And as well as the bombs, the disease, and the starvation, this planet—and on it our country in particular—boasts a profusion of prisons and camps and (our own, Soviet contribution to the science of butchery) lunatic asylums where healthy people are forcibly locked up.

With some of his friends, and in precise accordance with the Soviet Constitution, Academician Sakharov set up a Human Rights Committee. The Committee is registered at the United Nations,[4] an organisation to which the Soviet Union subscribes.

Neither he, nor his friends, have ever, on any occasion, in any respect, violated Soviet law. On the contrary: they have become the defenders of people convicted in the teeth of Soviet law, and unmaskers of those who themselves violate our law.

Stop. For this is precisely the point where Academician Sakharov and his friends became a hindrance to the authorities. There exist written and unwritten laws. In our country there is one unwritten law in force that is more powerful than our entire code of laws taken together, a law which the regime will never repeal; one crime for which the regime never pardons anyone; this single and most strictly observed law: every person must be severely punished for the slightest attempt to think for himself. To think aloud.

That is the reason Kozhevnikov was let loose upon Sakharov, and after Kozhevnikov, mechanically, at the pressing of a button, the " anger of the people."

Sakharov rejoiced as much as anyone at the easing of international tension, to which he himself, through his fertile meditation, had paved the way. But at the same time he considered it his duty to warn those who rejoiced: take care that, amidst the hubbub of banquets laid on at medium, high-level and summit meetings, the voices of those

[4] Not entirely true: but the Committee became affiliated on 23.6.71 to the International League for the Rights of Man, which has consultative status (category V) at the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

few people in our country who refuse to reconcile themselves to brutality are not lost.

Galanskov died in a camp. Grigorenko is daily being punished with slow death in a prison mental hospital. Amalrik, who had meningitis while under imprisonment, ought immediately to have been pardoned, but instead, when he had served his term, they sentenced him to a new one. For him, is that not tantamount to a death sentence? These are some of the destinies which have accidentally crossed my field of vision. Searches and arrests are taking place everywhere at this moment —from the Black Sea to the White . . . in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Odessa. In the prison mental hospitals healthy people are being driven to madness. It is against these illegalities and brutalities that Academician Sakharov has raised his voice. And for this they are calling him an anti-Sovietist.

Does the word " Soviet " mean illegal and brutal?

In whose name do I address my non-existent reader? In the name of the entire Soviet people, as one electrician did? In the name of the working class, as one miner did? Or in the name of a roundabout-attendant or a gas-welder?

No. I do not grant myself any such right. I do not know who gave it to them. . . . Do I speak in the name of the Soviet intelligentsia? No again. After all, Sviridov, Leonid Martynov, Engelhardt, Bykov, the Kukryniksy brothers and Chingiz Aitmatov are unquestionably intelligent people also, and they came out against Sakharov, the defender of the persecuted. Therefore I no longer have the right to number myself as one of the intelligentsia. The time has come to count someone out of the intelligentsia—either me, or them. . . . Do I protest in the name of the " dissidents," as the protesters persecuted in our country are known abroad No. I speak for myself, and only myself—the " dissidents " have not commissioned me to speak on their behalf, and anyway, there is no such organization here as the " dissident movement." And the very word " dissident " seems to me to be inaccurate. In order to " dissent," to think otherwise, the person from whom you are distinguishing yourself by your " otherness " must himself think something. But stereotyped newspaper verbiage is not thought. And the persecution of *samizdat,* of the *Chronicle of Current Events,* of Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn, and hundreds of other people—you can't call it an ideological struggle: it is an attempt, using prisons and camps, to drive voices once more to dumbness.

. . . I have a vision of Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov, doggedly standing for four hours in the pouring rain outside the closed doors of an " open " court where articles of the Criminal Code are being selected and applied as a punishment for thought, and I can hear him gently but insistently repeating these words to the police guard: " I am Academician Sakharov . . . a member of the Human Rights Committee . . . I request to be allowed into the courtroom. . . ."

He is not allowed in. For he is not only a physicist: he and his

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

friends are also experts on Soviet law; he might come out of that courtroom and tell people how those laws are being violated. He might violate the chief law by which we live: not one that is recorded in the Constitution, but the chief, the unwritten law—the law of the preservation of silence.

Did you know that, you actors in this recurrent " anger of the people "? You declare in the papers that it is beyond your powers " to express in words the indignation you feel " . . . The reason it is beyond your powers is because there is not a grain of sincerity in your " indignation "; it has been provoked by a mechanical system of button-pressing.

And you, Kozhevnikov, and all those of you who press the buttons, you, who deliberately blot out the radiance of the finest minds with which our native land endows us; you, who are erecting a concrete and iron newspaper wall between the finest minds and the " ordinary people "; you, who are trying to turn back the clock of history; you, who artificially, by mechanically pressing buttons, provoke waves of " popular anger," preferring muteness to any spoken word: take care lest there should burst forth from under the ground a genuine anger, which, like a flow of lava, will not only sweep over your squalid wall, but, unenlightened and unredeemed by any inspiring, conciliatory thought—Sakharov's, for example—will drown the guilty and the innocent alike in a sea of blood.

Is this what I want? No. I would not wish it upon anyone.

Moscow. 7 September 1973 LYDIA CHUKOVSKAYA

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Document: Soviet Union

Letter to L. I. Brezhnev from Yu. F. Orlov

Esteemed Leonid Ilyich!

The campaign against A. D. Sakharov has prompted me to put these questions to you.

1. Our scientists receive approximately one thirtieth only of Nobel Prizes for the fundamental sciences. We have some remarkable researchers and remarkable results, but you must evaluate the overall situation realistically. The overall gap in the number and quality of discoveries is not closing. Do you not think that this is indicative of the fact that our country is lagging dangerously far behind in the intellectual sphere in comparison with other advanced countries?

2. The historical fact is that the new scientific and industrial revolution began—and is still proceeding at an intensive pace—in the West, and that our state philosophy struggled long and hard against all the main trends in contemporary thought: the theory of relativity, the quantum theory, genetics, cybernetics. Nowadays we prefer not to mention these disastrous blunders. However, the scientific revolution is still far from completed, and the exact sciences are continuing to invade spheres of knowledge which our ideology still regards as interpretable only from the standpoint of the "scientific-Marxist worldview." Attempts at objective analysis in these fields are regarded as an infringement of the state's authority. Ideological intolerance of this kind limits our capacity for complex thought and unbiased evaluation of experience as a whole. Do you not think that because of this we shall continue to lag behind intellectually in the future too?

This is not to say that there should not be any state ideology. I am deeply convinced that both the people and the state must profess certain well-defined moral principles. These principles, crystallized by long years of human experience, are: love for one's country; and the human conscience, that universal morality conceived and preached by the finest representatives of each generation. There is one other principle, the importance of which we are bound to admit if we wish to hold ourselves back from the brink of history's final cataclysm. It is that fanatical adherence to principles changes those principles, that, in the sphere of human relationships, any principle must allow for a certain vagueness of interpretation and admit considerable freedom of choice.

But our ideology is quite different in character. It calls itself "scientific," which is a dangerous thing for any ideology to do, since scientific truth is capable of undergoing radical changes. It is equally injurious to science, to be persistently preserved and pickled in ideology. As for the state, by supporting this ideology by all the means at its disposal, it places itself in a very foolish position.

Does it not follow therefore that the repressive apparatus of state

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

must be unburdened of this ideology, that from the kindergarten to the Academy of Sciences we should be relieved of the *obligation* to study, teach and obey principles which are so untrustworthy in the light of both scientific and historical experience?

3. There is no reason why we should relinquish our own path of development, with the condemnation of private property as its basis. But we must acknowledge that there are other, parallel ways, each with its own merit. Thus for instance Western experience has shown that the problem of the " absolute impoverishment of the masses " may also be effectively solved within the framework of contemporary capitalism, by scientific and technological methods, with other contributory factors: partial state control, the pressure of trades unions operating within the limits of bourgeois freedoms, the pressure of the public conscience, and fear of outbursts of violence. Furthermore, capitalist economy has, as we can see, learned to use " regulators " to prevent dangerously explosive situations, and oscillation is a perfectly normal feature. Finally we have to acknowledge that the massively complex problems associated with the concentration of power in the hands of a few, are in the capitalist countries mitigated and veiled to advantage by bourgeois freedoms, and this is by no means a drawback, while in our country, the same problems stand out in all their magnitude, quite unconcealed.

At the same time it is clear that if we had lived in total isolation from the outside world, we should not know that there existed other, stable historical paths of development. Furthermore the most important scientific truths would have remained unknown to us for long periods of time, since they would lie outside the bounds of the ideological barrier defended by the state with all its might. And incidentally, our ideology would thus have been " proved." This, essentially, was the situation until 1953.

Bearing in mind these historical factors, ought we not to approach any " theories " and " laws " of social development whatsoever with extreme caution? In the field of government should we not switch to a cautious but active *experimental* search for optimum courses, taking into account our own historically-formed ideas and peculiarities? At the moment we are prevented from doing so by the absence of openness and the absence of free discussion on any questions pertaining to the economic and political structure of our society.

4. I believe to be correct the assertion that socialism of the rigidly regulated variety can be advantageously practised only if and when energy and other resources are limited on principle: i.e. as an alternative to the wasteful [economy of] free capitalism. Nowadays, however, we can assume as a certainty that man will succeed in guaranteeing himself a permanent supply of energy during the next few hundred years. Do you not agree that, if only for this reason, rigid controls are no longer necessary, and that we can go over to almost total freedom in the sphere of ideas—ruling out only the ideology of violence

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and revolt? Do you not also agree that, for the same reason, we could, without fear of the consequences, allow far more freedom to private initiative in the production sphere?

5. The biggest mistake in Marxist theory of social development is its failure to take account of man's innate spiritual needs and qualities. In essence Marxism denies their existence in human nature. This assumption has not, however, been scientifically proved, that is, proved by the methods of experimental biology, biochemistry and biophysics. Science is as yet only groping towards an understanding of these problems. But if we look at the large-scale disparity between practice and Marxist theory we can pick out its most important errors.

First and foremost there is such a thing as human morality and conscience, one of the eternal and powerful driving forces of history. It is a characteristic which develops in a man as his understanding grows, and which stems from his capacity to experience pain on account of imagined as well as real suffering. Because of it, a man can suffer from his awareness of the sufferings of others. Marx himself was a man of this kind, although he created a simplistic scheme that did not cater for this quality.

As for violence, to which Marxism attaches so much importance, it also is a driving force in history. But here there is one important distinction: human violence, unlike animal violence, is by no means always the strictly natural consequence of external conditions, but may arise to all appearances spontaneously and from there run wild. Therefore the problem of violence demands *perpetual* vigilance on the part of those who are opposed to it on principle, whatever the social system and level of civilization.

Another inner quality of man is the need to be able to make a free and sometimes spontaneous choice. For it is freedom of choice, and not " freedom as cognized necessity," that is real freedom. To struggle against this necessity is senseless. The modern state must know how to satisfy it, while at the same time keeping the law within the bounds of the reasonable.

The need . . . to express one's own personal opinion to others is also one of man's most vital inner needs, particularly when he is satisfied.

Does it not seem to you that the approach to man and his place in society that is taken in this country is primitive, inappropriate to objectively existing human qualities, and does not answer human needs?

6. Do you agree that genuine culture is indivisible and continuous, that our intellectual backwardness can to a considerable extent be explained as a result of the devastating breaches we have ourselves made in our thin cultural stratum during the course of history; that the scientist's intellect is fostered in the scientific tradition, and shaped not only by his scientific environment but by his cultural milieu as a whole, and that limitedness of imagination in art affects imagination in science?

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

7. Do you agree that we are giving no serious thought whatsoever to the problem of how to stimulate economic activity on a large scale; that, while remaining true to our principle of state ownership of property, we could profitably take a leaf out of Western experience and sharply increase incentives? Perhaps we ought, for example, from time to time to introduce a policy of free initiative into certain branches of the economy, making managerial salaries dependent upon profits, and deciding in which branches of the economy to introduce the policy in accordance with the state of the market at any particular time. It is clear, though, that the most important thing is to have the opportunity freely to discuss *any* ideas in this sphere. Do you agree with me here?

8. Some dogmatists may possibly be shocked by these various proposals for the adoption of " partial capitalism without private property " or something in the same vein. But, in the first place, our chief principle, the absence of private property, will be retained; and, in the second, I am bound to remark that in our country socialism has in practice assumed the features of " feudalism without private property," while under Stalin it even became a " slave-owning society without private property." For what were those millions of camp inmates or those scientists in prison research establishments if not slaves of the state? How does a collective farmer with no passport differ from a serf labourer in an old-style village commune with respect to his rights? What is our present-day system of residence and travel permits but a feudal restriction on free movement about the country? One gets the impression that our people still have not learned to think in anything other than feudal categories in the sphere of legal relations. Is it not time we switched to a more modern plane of freer relations?

9. One of the quickest ways of levelling the intellectual potential of different countries is to rescind the ban on freedom to travel abroad. I am talking of travel by scientists, engineers, students, writers, artists and any citizen, whenever they wish and for as long as they need. What is the sense of this prohibition, which is both unprofitable for the state and degrading for its citizens?

10. One of the survivals of history in our consciousness is the fact that we do not permit anyone to voice the slightest criticism of the Central Committee. Under these conditions it must be admitted that the conveyance of critical works out of the country in order that they might, by an extremely devious route, reach the ears of the government, is the only legal channel of " feedback " for internal politics. Can it be that no-one in the Central Committee realizes the absurdity of this situation?

11. Our mode of political control is that of a typical regime with no feedback. We are essentially competing with capitalism, but we have placed ourselves under the most unfavourable conditions; there are all sorts of incentives and feedback channels we do not use, and we do not trust our own fellow-citizens. We would have avoided many mistakes and disasters had we given the people a consultative voice

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

right from the start, not simply as a formality, but in actual practice; and had we adopted that well-tried method of feedback, a free press—that is, a press free of all political and ideological censorship, with the reservation mentioned earlier. Do you not think that at the present time there are certain tensions which have arisen in this country which could be easily and painlessly relieved by the abolition of censorship—if, however, this is done in time?

12. Any criticism of the Central Committee is regarded as a crime. Therefore people either " waver with the Party " or are thrown back against the barrier of fierce struggle. You know, of course, that there is now a small, but growing, number of people who have been thrown back against this barrier. This " logic of struggle " is thrust upon them by the regime itself. I ask you, what is the point of it all? Would it not be more sensible for us, sixty years after the Revolution, as the twentieth century draws to its close, to create, at last, normal, graduated inter-relationships between citizens and the state? Here again, I envisage first and foremost, as the first step, the abolition of press censorship, the free exchange of information, and open publicity.

13. You must obviously realize that imprisoning members of the " opposition " in psychiatric hospitals and maiming them there with injections is a measure comparable with the sterilization of political opponents in the Nazi Reich. Basically I have nothing to ask you on this point.

Respectfully,

Yu. F. Orlov, Professor, Doctor of Physico-mathematical Sciences, Corresponding Member of the Armenian Academy of Sciences,
Moscow 117485,
Profsoyuznaya ul. 102, k.7, kv. 1.

16 September 1973

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Our Contributors

FRANÇOIS BONDY, the Swiss writer and critic, is the former editor of *Preuves* and at present an editor of *Weltwoche*. His publications include *So sehen sie Deutschland, Aus nächster Ferne, Der Rest ist Schreiben* and *Gespräche*.

J. F. BROWN is the author of *The New Eastern Europe, Bulgaria under Communist Rule* and numerous articles on East European and communist affairs.

LEE CONGDON is Assistant Professor of History at Madison College, Harrisonburg, Virginia. His recent publications include articles on Béla Balász in the *Journal of Contemporary History* and on Nietzsche and Heidegger in the *Journal of European Studies*.

ROBERT CONQUEST, the historian and poet, is the author of *The Great Terror, Russia after Khrushchev, Power and Policy in the USSR*, and *The Nation Killers*.

EARLENE CRAVER is assistant Professor of History at the University of Kentucky. She is at present writing a book on *The Crisis of Italian Socialism and the Origins of the Italian Communist Party 1912–1921*.

BRIAN CROZIER is the Director of the Institute for the Study of Conflict. He is the author of the two volume biography of General de Gaulle and other books.

ROBERT W. DEAN is the author of *Nationalism and Political Change in Eastern Europe: The Slovak Question and the Czechoslovak Reform Movement, West German Trade with the East: The Political Dimension* and is co-editor of *East European Perspectives on Security and Co-operation in Europe* (forthcoming).

JOHN ERICKSON is a Professor in the Department of Politics in the University of Edinburgh. He is the author of *The Soviet High Command* and many publications on Soviet military and political strategy.

LEWIS S. FEUER is Professor of Sociology at the University of Toronto. He is the author of *Marx and the Intellectuals* and *The Conflict of Generations*.

DAVID JAMES FISHER received his doctorate in History from the University of Wisconsin and is currently completing a study of Romain Rolland and the question of the intellectual.

JOSEPH GODSON was until his retirement in 1971 a Senior Foreign Service Officer in the State Department. He organized the Europe-America Conference in Amsterdam in 1973. A free-lance writer, he is currently collaborating with the *International Herald Tribune* on a series of articles on American-European differences.

GREGORY GROSSMAN is Professor of Economics at the University of California. He is the author of *Soviet Statistics of Physical Output of Industrial Commodities*.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MICHAEL HELLER is a Maitre-Assistant at the Sorbonne, Paris. He is the author of *Le Monde Concentrationnaire et la Littérature Soviétique.*

ROBERT R. KING is the author of *Minorities under Communism: Nationalities as a Source of Tension among Balkan Communist States.*

BERNARD LEWIS is Professor of History of the Near and Middle East at the University of London. His works include *The Arabs in History, The Emergence of Modern Turkey* and *The Middle East and the West.*

LEONARD SCHAPIRO is Professor of Political Science with Special Reference to Russian Studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is the author of *The Origin of the Communist Autocracy, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Totalitarianism* and other works.

GEORGE SCHÖPFLIN, who was Hayter Fellow at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, London University, 1973–74 is a communist affairs specialist with a broadcasting organization in London.

EDWARD SHILS is a Professor of Sociology at the University of Chicago and a fellow of Peterhouse College, Cambridge. He is the Editor of the quarterly review, *Minerva* and the author of *Torment of Secrecy* and other works.

GEORGE URBAN is a former Senior Research Associate of the University of Southern California. He is the author of *Kinesis and Stasis, The Nineteen Days* and has edited and contributed to *Talking to Eastern Europe, The Miracles of Chairman Mao, Can we Survive our Future* and *Toynbee on Toynbee.*

P. J. VATIKIOTIS is Professor of Politics with reference to the Near and Middle East in the University of London. His works include *The Egyptian Army in Politics, The Modern History of Egypt* and *Conflict in the Middle East.*

To our readers: Due to industrial disputes the Spring 1974 number of *Survey* was delayed and it appears together with the Summer 1974 number as the current double issue.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MILLENNIUM

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

PUBLISHED BY THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT, L.S.E.

VOL. III NO. 1

E. M. Chossudovsky	Lenin and Chicherin: The Beginnings of Soviet Foreign Policy and Diplomacy.
J. P. Chiddick	India's Search for Security: Indo-Soviet Relations, 1966–71.
Edith Penrose	Origins and Development of the International Oil 'Crisis'.
R. W. D. Boyce	America, Europe, and the Triumph of Imperial Protectionism in Britain, 1929–30.
Richard Rosecrance	Kissinger, Bismarck and the Balance of Power.
G. F. Salkeld	Aid: Case Unproven.
James T. Latting	The U.S. Approach to SALT.

BOOK REVIEWS

MILLENNIUM is published three times a year. The price of the Journal is 40p per copy, annual subscription £1·50 (includes postage), U.S. $4. There is a special reduced yearly subscription rate of 90p for students in the United Kingdom. Subscriptions and enquiries should be addressed to: Sales Manager, MILLENNIUM, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE.

ASIAN SURVEY

Leading American monthly devoted to current developments in Asia. Coverage of political, economic and social trends in such societies as China, India, Japan, Pakistan, Korea, Indonesia, Thailand and Burma.

As an annual feature, two structured issues are published in January and February surveying major trends for the previous year in twenty-one Asian countries. In addition, a symposium on Sri Lanka political and economic developments contributed by social scientists at the University of Sri Lanka, Peradeniya, was recently published and a special issue consisting of contributions by Soviet specialists on Asia will be published in 1974.

Rates: In the U.S., Canada, and Latin America, $12.00 a year for individuals, $18.00 for institutions, $6.00 for students; elsewhere, $13.00 a year for individuals, $19.00 for institutions, $7.00 for students.

ASIAN SURVEY

University of California Press

Berkeley, California 94720

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

POLITIQUE ETRANGERE

La grande revue des questions internationales

SOMMAIRE

(39ème année) N° 1 — 1974

William E. GRIFFITH	La quatrième guerre du Proche-Orient, la crise de l'énergie et la politique américaine
Henryk BIRECKI	L'URSS et la crise énergétique de l'Occident
Alain JOXE	Où vont les militaires chiliens?
Jean KLEIN	Désarmement et arms control en 1973: bilan et perspectives
René-Albrecht CARRIE	Les règles du jeu ou un retour au concert des puissances

Prix de l'abonnement:
France : F. 56.–
Etranger : F. 75.–

CENTRE D'ETUDES DE POLITIQUE ETRANGERE
54, rue de Varenne — 75007 Paris
C.C.P. : PARIS 1865–41

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Spring 1974 **Volume 28, No. 1**

WORLD TRADE AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

U.S. Trade Policy: An Overview
Geza Feketekuty

Trade Between the U.S. and the European Community: Differing Expectations in a Changing Power Relationship
Werner Feld

The U.S. Policy Shift on East-West Trade
Walter G. Krause, F. John Mathis

The Outlook for U.S.–Japan Economic and Trade Relations
Yasuo Takeyama

Trade Peace in the Pacific Through a Free Trade Area?
Richard Kosobud, Houston Stokes

U.S.–Developing Country Trade and Restrictive Business Practice Policies
Robert L. Curry

Why U.S. Companies Can Compete
Lewis Young

BOOK REVIEWS

D. J. Mathieson — Joan E. Spero — Murray Belman
Robert A. Isaak — H. Barger — Charles Issawi

Subscriptions: Single current issue, $2.25; single back issue, $2.50; one year, $4.50; two years, $8.50; three years, $12.50. Plus 50 cents per issue for foreign postage and handling.

SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
Office: 420 West 118th Street, New York, New York 10027

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CONTREPOINT

REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE

DIRECTEUR: PATRICK DEVEDJIAN
RÉDACTEUR EN CHEF: GEORGES LIEBERT
RELATIONS EXTÉRIEURES: JEAN C. TEXIER

N° 13 Printemps 1974

LA CRISE DES VALEURS

Daniel BELL: les contradictions culturelles du capitalsme
Leszek KOLAKOWSKI: La revanche du sacré
Vittorio MATHIEU: Entre l'ordre et le désordre

MELANGES

François FEJTÖ: Un itinéraire d'historien
Alain-Gérard SLAMA: L'héritage de Lénine
Jean BLOT: La résistance littéraire en URSS
Georges FRIEDMANN: Soljenitsyne, une flamme dans la tourmente
Louis de VILLEFOSSE: Staline et le massacre de Katyn
Raoul GIRARDET: Le visage de Kreisky
Marc FUMAROLI: Bergman, Brecht et Grotowski
Jean-Louis CURTIS: Périclès au Théâtre français
Paul BADY: Destin de Lao She
Raymond ARON: Lectures de Pareto

Le numéro: 15 F (£2) L'abonnement: 50 F (£6)
1 RUE DU MAIL 75002 PARIS FRANCE

ECONOMICS OF PLANNING

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMIES AND THEIR RELATIONS WITH MARKET ECONOMIES

Items from Vol. XI, No. 1–2, 1971:

LEIF JOHANSEN: Ragnar Frisch (1895–1973)

V. I. DANILOV-DANILYAN: Some Problems in Social Planning

PETER BENTLEY CLARK, LANCE TAYLOR: Dynamic Input-Output Planning with Optimal End Conditions: The Case of Chile

ZSUZSA DÁNIEL, ANNA JÓNÁS, JÁNOS KORNAI, BÉLA MARTOS: Plan Sounding

A. G. PAPANDREOU, URI ZOHAR: Programme—Project Formulation Evaluation and Selection in the Context of a National Plan

JOSEF C. BRADA: Taut Planning and the Allocation of Investment in a Stochastic Economy

MOHIT KUMAR ROY: A Note on the Computation of an Optimal Ordering for an Input-Output Matrix

Annual subscription rate: $11.00. Back issues may be obtained

ECONOMICS OF PLANNING
Box 2585 Solli, Oslo 2, Norway

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TERZO MONDO

rivista trimestrale di studi, ricerche e documentazione sui paesi afro-asiatici e latino-americani
diretta da UMBERTO MELOTTI

anno VII (1974) n. 23 (speciale)

LA LEZIONE DEL CILE

scritti e interventi di André Gunder Frank, Fernando H. Cardoso, Eriberto Torres Rivas, Antonio Carlo, Giampiero Cotti Commetti, Vittorio Dini, Elias Condal, Tullo Vigevani e Umberto Melotti.

Questo numero: L. 1.200 (U.S. $2)
Abbonamento 1974: L. 4.400 (U.S. $8)
Collezione completa dal n. 1 (1968) al n. 22 (1973):
L. 15.000 (U.S. $25)

I QUADERNI DI TERZO MONDO

Da quest'anno a " Terzo Mondo " s'afficianca una nuova collana di quaderni monografici. Sono già apparsi:

" Marx e il Terzo Mondo "
di Umberto Melotti L. 1.800 (U.S. $3)

" Marx e il Mondo Antico "
di Leone Iraci L. 1.800 (U.S. $3)

" Lévi-Strauss e il Terzo Mondo "
di Pietro Scarduelli L. 1.800 (U.S. $3)

" La Tanzania verso il socialismo "
di G. P. Cotti Cometti L. 1.800 (U.S. $3)

I quattro quaderni già pubblicati L. 6.000 (U.S. $10)
Abbonamento ai prossimi quattro quaderni L. 6.000 (U.S. $10)

CORSI DI SOCIOLOGIA

a dispense

Finalmente a dispense il corso di formazione in sociologia organizzato dall'Istituto di Studi e Indagini Sociologiche e dal Centro Studi Terzo Mondo. La proposta di una sociologia critica ed impegnata nei testi di Umberto Melotti, Giuliano della Pergola, Giovanni Bianchi, Gino Del Grosso, Eugenio Turri, Alberto Merler, Tito Perlini, Adele Faccio e altri qualificati studiosi.

Abbonamento con diritto a tutti gli arretrati: L. 12.000 (U.S. $20)

Ogni versamento relativo a " Terzo Mondo ", ai quaderni e al corso di sociologia va effettuato sul conto corrente postale n. 3/56111 intestato a " Terzo Mondo ", Via G.B. Morgagni 39 - 20129 Milano. A tutti gli abbonati delle riviste che pubblicano il presente annuncio si concede lo sconto speciale del 20% sulle quote indicate.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

Revista trimestral del Centro de Relaciones Internacionales

JULIO-SEPTIEMBRE 1973

Vol. I Nueva Epoca Núm. 2

SUMARIO

Artículos:

Edmundo Hernández Vela S.—Le entente hegemónica.

Leopoldo González Aguayo.—La perspectiva mexicana de América Latina.

Raphael Steger Cataño.—El grupo andino: la corporación andina de fomento, el Convenio Andrés Bello, Cronología y Bibliografía general comentada.

Liborio Villalobos Calderón.—El Consejo Económico y Social de la ONU y la cooperación internacional.

Irene Zea, La intervención norteamericano de 1954 en Guatemala y susconsecuencias

Documentos:

De la Asemblea General de la OEA, de abril de 1973.

Declaración de la 10a. Conferencia de Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de la Organización de Unidad Africana, de mayo de 1973.

Convenio mexicano-cubano sobre el apoderamiento de naves aéreas y marítimas, del 7 de junio de 1973.

De la Conferencia Europea de Seguridad y Cooperación, del 4 de junio de 1973.

Tratado Checoeslovaco-Alemán del 20 de junio de 1973 y notas anexas sobre derecho penal y el status de Berlín.

Acuerdos Soviético-norteamericanos de 1973.

Cronologías:

La política exterior de México del 1° de mayo al 30 de junio de 1973.
La política internacional de América Latina del 1° de mayo al 30 de junio de 1973.

Subscripción anual (4 números)	$100.00 M.N.
Subscripción anual correo aéreo	$120.00 M.N.
Número Suelto	$ 25.00 M.N.

R.I. aparece los días 1°, de enero, abril, julio y octubre de cado año.

Toda la correspondencia relativa a la venta o subscripción de la Revista debe ser dirigida al señor Lamberto Obregón, Secretaría Auxiliar, Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, Ciudad Universitaria, UNAM, México 20, D.F.

Redacción y administración: Srita. Gloria Abella Armengol, Centro de Relaciones Internacionales, Ciudad Universitaria, UNAM, México 20, D.F.

PUBLICADA POR EL

CENTRO DE RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES

Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales,

Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE CHINA QUARTERLY

An international journal for the study of China

APRIL–JUNE 1974 ISSUE NO. 58

The Tenth Party Congress: The Power Structure and the Succession Question — **Richard Wich**

The Cultural Revolution and China's Search for Political Order — **Byung-joon Ahn**

National Development and Social Revolution in Early Chinese Marxist Thought — **Arif Dirlik**

Prison Management in the Kiangsi and Yenan Periods — **Patricia Griffin**

REPORTS FROM CHINA BOOK REVIEWS
QUARTERLY CHRONICLE AND DOCUMENTATION

Editorial Office:
School of Oriental and African Studies, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HP

Subscriptions:
Research Publications Ltd., Victoria Hall, East Greenwich, London SE10 0RF

Subscription Rates: £4·00 or U.S. $10.00 a year
For full-time students: £2·00 or U.S. $5.00 a year
Individual Copies: £1·00 or U.S. $2.50

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

COOPERATION AND CONFLICT

NORDIC JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

A quarterly journal edited by Johan Jørgen Holst

CONTENTS No. 1/1974 — VOL. IX

Kjell Skjelsbæk, The Nordic Countries in Nordic and More Encompassing International Organizations

James L. Richardson, Australian Foreign Policy under the Labor Government

Toivo Miljan, The Baltic Sea: *Mare Clausum* or *Mare Liberum?*

Karl E. Birnbaum, The Member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE): Current Preoccupations and Expectations

Nils Petter Gleditsch: Time Differences and International Interaction

Subscription rates: US $8.00 a year
For subscribers in the Nordic countries: N.kr. 40.– a year

UNIVERSITETSFORLAGET
P.O. BOX 307, BLINDERN, OSLO 3, NORWAY
P.O. BOX 142, BOSTON, MASS., 02113, USA

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE WORLD TODAY

The monthly journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs provides the general reader with up-to-date and authoritative information on current world problems

The May and June 1974 issues include:

Nato's twenty-five years	*Philip Windsor*
West European defence identity: the French paradox	*Uwe Nerlich*
Turning the clock back in Yugoslavia	*K. F. Cviic*
The Malaysian miracle—and dilemma	*Pran Chopra*
South Africa: authoritarian reform?	*Merle Lipton*

Annual Subscription: £3·25 post free (U.S.A. and Canada $10)
28p per copy

Orders may be sent to booksellers and newsagents, or to the Oxford University Press, Press Road, Neasden, London, NW10 0DD (Tel.: 01-450 8080)

MINERVA

A REVIEW OF SCIENCE, LEARNING AND POLICY

EDITOR: Professor Edward Shils

VOLUME XII NUMBER 2 **APRIL 1974**

COMMENT

The Public Understanding of Science

ARTICLES

Striking Gold in Science: Fermi's Group and the Recapture of Italy's Place in Physics *Gerald Holton*

The Aims of Education and the Proper Standards of the University *Alexander M. Bickel*

The National Research Fund: A Case Study in the Industrial Support of Academic Science *Lance E. Davis and Daniel J. Kevles*

The Dutch Universities between the "New Democracy" and the "New Management" *Hans Daalder*

REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS

Identity and Openness in Higher Education: Report of the Second Anglo-American Conference on Higher Education *Marjorie Reeves*

BOOK REVIEWS

Richard R. Nelson, Loren R. Graham, John Ziman, Herbert G. Grubel

Annual subscription: £3.50/$10.50 Single copy: £1.00/$3.00

MINERVA, 59 St. Martin's Lane, London WC2N 4JS

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Osip Mandelstam

Selected Poems

Translated by W. S. Merwin and Clarence Brown

'Eliminated in Stalin's Terror in 1938 and a non-person since, Mandelstam has miraculously survived in his poetry as one of the most original geniuses of the century. His biographer and an American poet have combined to produce translations which are also poems in their own right, at once lucid and allusive.'—A. Alvarez in *The Observer* £2·50

The Eighteenth Century in Russia

Edited by J. G. Garrard

During the eighteenth century the Russians sought to resume their rightful place in the Western intellectual and cultural community. The contributors to this volume, which covers topics ranging from education to urban planning, devote their attention to the nature and results of Russian contacts with the art and thought of Europe, and to the pressures of Russia's own intellectual and socio-political growth. Illustrated £6·50

Oxford Slavonic Papers

New Series Volume 5: 1972

Edited by Robert Auty, J. L. I. Fennell, and I. P. Foote

The main contribution to this volume is a fully illustrated catalogue of the Victoria and Albert Museum's rich collection of Russian drawings, especially important for the history of theatrical design. Articles on literature are devoted to the Turgenev source for Henry James's '*Princess Casamassima* and a commentary on Mandelstam's 'Grifel'naya oda' in the light of previously unpublished drafts. Illustrated £3·50

Oxford Slavonic Papers

New Series Volume 6: 1973

Edited by Robert Auty, J. L. I. Fennell, and I. P. Foote

This volume contains historical items on the unpublished personal records of two senior officials of Nicholas I, the London trial of the *émigré* revolutionary Vladimir Burtsev, and the Russian ministerial crisis of 1911 as described by Grand Duke Nikolay Mikhailovich. Other articles deal with English literature in Russia and Esenin in America, the work of the Slovene poet Prešeren, and the liturgical song book of Evstatie. Illustrated £3·50

Oxford

Printed in Great Britain by The Eastern Press Ltd., London and Reading

PRODUCED 2004 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED